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कृपया पुस्तक के ऊपर कोई निशान आदि
न लगायें।

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पुस्तकालय
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वर्ग संख्या..... आगत संख्या.....

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

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PANCH SHEEL IN ASIA—ROLE OF INDIA

By T.N. KAUL*

PANCH SHEEL or five principles of peaceful coexistence were incorporated in the preamble of the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet which was signed on 29 April 1954. The name *Panch Sheel* was given to these five principles by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru when he stressed the importance of this Agreement in the Indian Parliament soon after its signing. The phrase *Pantaja Sheela* was also used earlier by President Soekarno while describing the five *national* principles of the Republic of Indonesia. While President Soekarno's *Pantaja Sheela* dealt mainly with national affairs of Indonesia, *Panch Sheel* as embodied in the Sino-Indian Agreement, represented a code of conduct and the principles guiding relations between two sovereign independent countries and was therefore of international significance. Soon after India and China signed this Agreement, many other countries, especially in Asia, endorsed these principles in their official pronouncements and joint communiques with other countries. This gave these principles a special significance and importance, particularly in the developing countries of Asia.

It was hoped at that time that the two great countries of Asia, such as the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China, would be guided in their relations by these five principles which would set an example to other countries of Asia and induce them to follow the same principles in their dealings with one another. However, the continent of Asia is a large sprawling land mass with many different ancient cultures and civilisations which follow different political, social and economic systems. They had to face many of the problems soon after their independence, which had been left over as a legacy by their erstwhile imperialist and colonial rulers. *Panch Sheel* was the guideline to resolve such problems peacefully, bilaterally and without outside intervention, on the basis of mutual benefit and non-aggression, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each country.

If India and China had succeeded in resolving their differences in accordance with these five principles, the peace, stability and progress of both countries as well as others in Asia and indeed throughout the

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*Mr. Kaul is India's Ambassador to the Soviet Union.
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world, would have been strengthened. It may be worthwhile to examine why this did not happen and why relations between the two became strained soon after the signing of this Agreement and led to a violent conflict in 1962.

Bilateral and international agreements have a value of their own and can help in relaxing tension and resolving problems provided there is mutual trust and confidence and not a conflict of national interests and ambitions. Unfortunately, China because of its relative isolation from the rest of the world from 1949 onwards, drew within its own shell and looked with suspicion not only at the so-called great powers but even some friendly neighbours such as India. This was partly due to the non-recognition of the realities on the ground by the United States of America and others who shut their eyes and refused to recognise the new People's Republic of China. However, it has to be examined why China looked with suspicion and mistrust on a country like India which, along with Burma, was among the first non-Communist countries of the world to recognise the People's Republic of China.

It is all the more surprising when one looks at the past history of both these ancient countries. It is significant that they never engaged in a war against each other, except a few skirmishes in 1842 across the Ladakh border in Tibet. Their cultural influence spread to their neighbouring countries but never led to a clash or conflict of cultures. The three countries of Indochina mark almost the dividing line between the civilisations and cultures of India and China, Indian culture having impact on Kampuchea and that of Laos and China on Vietnam. Similarly, mingling and intermingling of the two cultures with the indigenous cultures of third countries can be seen in Burma, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. Buddhism spread from India to all these countries as well as to Tibet and China from the second century A.D. onwards. Indian scholars like Mahaguru Padma Sambhava preached Buddhism in Tibet and beyond. Buddhism from India also travelled *via* Canton to China.

It is only when European colonial powers like Britain, France, the Dutch and others tried to colonise the countries of South, Southeast and East Asia that these latter countries lost the previous cultural and commercial contacts they had with one another.

Pilgrims had travelled from India to China as well as to other countries of Asia and pilgrims from these countries had travelled to India for many centuries before the penetration of the Western countries. This cultural and commercial intercourse had led to the building of peaceful and friendly relations between India and China and between these two countries and others in Asia.

The rivalries and jealousies between the various European colonial powers in India and other countries, as well as the Opium War and the

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so-called 'open door' policy which they tried to impose on China, created a strong resentment among the indigenous people against the outsiders. In China, they sometimes used such terms as "barbarian" or "foreign devil" for Europeans. However, towards India, China had a feeling of respect and regard because of Buddhism through the centuries. In fact, the Chinese word for India is "*Shi Tsang*" which literally means "the Western heaven". Similarly, India had great regard and respect for Chinese culture and civilisation as well as its progress and development. Chinese tea and silk were highly appreciated in India while Indian spices, muslin and *pashmina* adorned the homes of emperors of China. The porcelain vases of China and Indian textiles acquired world fame. When India and China were at the height of their civilisation, the European countries were still relatively 'uncivilised' and backward.

However, the development of science and technology, the invention of steam and coal power gave rise to the industrial revolution in Europe which the countries of Asia missed. This led to what may be called, in the words of the late K.M. Pannikar, "the European dominance of Asia." This dominance lasted for over two centuries and it was through a long struggle for freedom and independence that India and other countries of Asia were able to shake off the yoke of European imperialism and colonialism. China was still waging a civil war in which America helped the Kuomintang against the Communists when India attained freedom in 1947. Although China had suffered from Japanese militarism in the 1930s, and from European and American economic and political domination in the 19th and 20th centuries, it was able to successfully launch a revolution which gave birth to the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949. India and the non-aligned countries of Asia welcomed this although they were not following a communist ideology. They did so because they saw in the success of this revolution the resurgence of a proud and ancient civilisation which had overthrown foreign domination.

At the same time, there were fears and suspicions lurking in the minds of many leaders of Asia about the traditional expansionism and chauvinism of China which had in the past claimed suzerainty and even sovereignty over many countries such as Burma, Malaya, the three Indochina countries, the two Koreas, Thailand and others. Even the sending of gifts by the rulers of these countries to the Emperor of China was treated as a kind of "tribute" from a vassal to his sovereign. Some people in Asia wondered whether this trend of imperialist China would continue or not under the new socialist regime of Mao Tse Tung.

India was not among those countries who harboured this suspicion or fear. In fact, Jawaharlal Nehru firmly believed that friendship and

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cooperation between these two giants of Asia, India and China, could and would lead to the resurgence of the whole of Asia and the establishment of Asian pride and personality. As he said during the Asian Relations Conference which was convened in March 1947 in New Delhi, a few months before independence: "We propose as far as possible to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disaster on an even vaster scale.... We are of Asia and the people of Asia are nearer and closer to us than others....Too long have we been passive spectators of events, the playthings of others. The initiative comes to our people now and we shall make the history of our choice."

However, it soon became apparent that the new rulers of China still harboured some suspicion against India being an agent of the Anglo-American camp. This suspicion came to the surface when India tried to persuade China to come to a peaceful settlement with the Dalai Lama of Tibet. India had no designs on Tibet and wanted a peaceful border with the Tibet region of China. But the Chinese leaders who were still suffering from the hang-over of the past could perhaps not see new India in its proper light. They mistook Nehru's pleading for a peaceful settlement of the Tibetan problem as an interference in their internal affairs and used strong language against India. The fact of the matter is that it was some of the Western countries who were supplying arms to the Kuomintang and some Tibetan sections to rise in revolt against the Peking Government. India had kept itself absolutely aloof and did not allow these powers to use its territory for such interference. May be that the lack of contact between the new leaders of China and India was partly responsible for Chinese suspicion of India's motives.

Jawaharlal Nehru had a perception of Asia and the world which transcended narrow national and chauvinistic aims and ambitions. I recall my meeting with Nehru in New Delhi on my way to Peking in October 1950. I volunteered to go from Washington to Peking as Counsellor to our newly established embassy there. He told me that China was a great and ancient country, proud of its culture and civilisation as India was. Relations between the two countries in the past had been friendly though outside powers had carved their spheres of influence in various regions of the two countries. He could not predict how relations between a democratic, secular, nonaligned India and a resurgent, proud and communist China would develop in the future. But, he told me it should be our honest and sincere effort to develop friendship and cooperation with our great neighbour China because otherwise imperialists and colonialists would try to fish in troubled waters and try to divide both countries. He directed me to make personal

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contacts with the Chinese leaders and try to explain to them the friendly hope and feelings India entertained towards China.

It was during this time that India was making strenuous efforts in and outside the United Nations to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Korea where China and America were directly involved while the Soviet Union was an interested spectator. As soon as I reached Peking at the end of October 1950, I was deeply impressed by the efforts that Ambassador K.M. Pannikar was making to bring about a *rapprochement* in Korea by his able presentation and pleadings with Chou En-lai. We would often be called by Chou En-lai to the Waichiaopu (Chinese Foreign Office) around midnight to hold long discussions on the Korean problem. China began to feel that India was not a stooge or a client state of the Western Powers but a genuine non-aligned country that wanted to enlarge the area of peace, friendship and cooperation throughout Asia. The Chinese feelings against India about Tibet became softer and we were able to have informal, frank and friendly conversations with the Waichiaopu and other Chinese leaders.

I recall in early 1951, a long discussion with Chou En-lai when I asked him, "Why don't you make a unilateral declaration that you will respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all your neighbours?" I added that India was a fairly big country but the smaller neighbours of China would feel greatly reassured by such a declaration. Chou En-lai was quick to grasp the meaning of my question but not ready to give a categorical reply. He merely said: "The time is not yet ripe for such a declaration. It might arouse more suspicions than it will resolve. However, we shall bear your suggestions in mind and consider it at the proper time."

I reported this conversation to Pandit Nehru and he was quick to grasp the significance of such a move. In fact, it was his guidance that had led me to make such a suggestion. As relations between India and China started to improve, Pandit Nehru considered the time ripe for removing some of the irritants and resolving some of the problems that had been left over by the British imperialist policies in Tibet and on the Sino-Indian border. In Tibet he directed us to probe the Chinese on the possibility of resuming cultural and commercial intercourse with Tibet so that the main ground for Chinese suspicion against India might be removed.

The Chinese are past masters at the game of playing on the patience of others and taking their own time in deciding how and when it will be profitable and propitious for them to start talks on any problems with other countries. However, as the Korean crisis began to be resolved, the Chinese found the time more propitious for settling their suspicions

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against India with regard to Tibet. Informal and formal soundings were made by us both at the top and at the working levels, in the Waichiaopu, on the subject and it was agreed by both sides to hold negotiations on the question of India's trade and cultural intercourse with the Tibet region of China. Chinese suspicions were partly removed by India's declaration recognising the sovereignty of China over Tibet as against only "suzerainty" which Britain had accepted from time to time.

As the negotiations continued and India agreed to give up the extra-territorial rights which Britain had forced on China after the Younghusband expedition to Lhasa in 1904, such as the posting of troops in Ya Tung and Gyantse and managing the post, telegraph and resthouses along this route. While welcoming this the Chinese were still somewhat adamant and rigid about the rest of the border. There were minor differences in the Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh borders with China and these were ultimately resolved by China recognising six "border passes" through which trade and traffic could be checked between the two regions of India and China respectively. We told the Chinese that we welcomed this and we hoped that this Agreement had resolved all our problems along the border. However, Chou En-lai was shrewd enough to remark: "This has resolved all the problems that are ripe for solution."

It took us four months to negotiate the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet from 23 December 1953 till 29 April 1954. The negotiations at the level of Vice-Foreign Ministers were difficult. Chou En-lai was away at the Geneva Conference on Indochina and it was not possible to seek his intervention. It was therefore agreed that the pending questions in the Draft Treaty should be discussed informally by me with the Asian Director in Waichiaopu, Chen Chia Kang. We met informally with our respective interpreters for a whole month before we could present our agreed recommendations to the Heads of the two delegations, i.e., Vice-Foreign Minister Chang Han Fu and Ambassador Ragavan.

When the Draft was accepted by both sides, two points still remained to be resolved: (1) the preamble and (2) the duration of the agreement. On the first Chang Han Fu insisted that the five principles which had been mutually agreed should only be mentioned in a press communique and should not form part of the agreement itself. I insisted that these were the essence of the agreement and must therefore be in the preamble. Chang Han Fu did not budge and we had to take up the matter with Chou En-lai who immediately saw our point and gave his concurrence to include the five principles in the preamble.

As for the second point, we had suggested a period of 25 years for

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the duration of the Treaty, hoping that such a period of peace would lead to the consolidation of the civil administration on both sides and deter either side from amassing troops or adopting aggressive postures. However, I was surprised at the Chinese insistence to restrict the duration of the Treaty to only five years. Ultimately they agreed to eight years and no more. This created a doubt in our minds whether the Chinese were really keen on having a peaceful border with India and whether they would respect our territorial integrity. I reported accordingly to Prime Minister Nehru. I said that the Chinese were probably thinking of consolidating their hold over Tibet and other outlying areas within these 5 to 8 years and we must do the same. Pandit Nehru agreed but unfortunately some of his colleagues said that we did not have adequate financial resources, men and materials to do this and in any case, "there was no threat from the north."

This was a short-sighted policy which neglected our defences and tempted the Chinese to expand their hold over the territories we regarded as belonging to India particularly in Ladakh and at some points in the then Northeast Frontier Agency.

The Chinese built a rough road across the Aksai Chin area connecting Sinkiang with Tibet. This they did without any intimation to us because they claimed this territory belonged to them. They also raised some dispute about the middle sector at "Bara Hoti" on the US-Tibet border and a few places in the Northeast Frontier Agency. We were able to resolve these latter points by an agreement on both sides not to send their armed forces to either and to inform each other whenever we wanted to send civil administrators there. In the Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir, however, the Chinese continued their policy of nibbling our territory without either informing us or discussing the matter. This compelled us to send our border forces forward and at some place they were even behind the Chinese forward line. It was a dangerous situation which could lead to a violent conflict. Efforts were therefore made to set up a joint team of officials of both sides to examine the evidence of each side and make recommendations to their respective governments.

It is a pity that the official teams which met to discuss the border could not come to any agreement at all and each side stuck to its own claims without any give or take on either side. We, on our part, had repeatedly stated that history and events should not be read one-sidedly. Pandit Nehru frequently made the point, in public speeches and in formal correspondence, that because Bhutan sent gifts—not tributes at some stage to the Chinese Emperor, that did not make Bhutan part of China. Similarly, if the British drew boundary lines in an arbitrary manner and colonised foreign countries, that did not alter the fact that

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the Chinese Empire, too, was built on conquest and subjugation. There must be no doubt about the nature of past Empires and, we, in India, certainly had no love for British colonialism—indeed our freedom movement was living testimony to our irreconciliable opposition to it.

Where, in such a situation, does the solution lie? Once again, it was Pandit Nehru who provided the answer: "It makes no difference to China or India whether a few yards of territory in the mountains are on this or that side. But it makes a great deal of difference if this is done in an insulting, aggressive, offensive, violent manner either by us or by them....A mile here or a mile there does not matter, provided it is settled peacefully."

It was against this background that the two teams of officials met to discuss the border alignments. It must be noted that both teams worked hard at evaluating the available evidence. However, both sides were unfortunately rather more categoric and definite in their assertions of the truth as perceived by them. The result was that no agreement was reached and both sides only kept on repeating their stands on this or that aspect of the border until the talks themselves ended in 1961. It must, of course, be noted that the atmosphere was also becoming supercharged. This made it difficult for both countries to make the necessary concessions, and the element of political leadership that could have guided the talks with greater success was unavailable to the teams.

Apart from the atmosphere mentioned above—particularly the press and Parliament in India—the situation on the ground was rapidly deteriorating from 1959 onwards. On 31 March 1959, the Dalai Lama entered India from Tibet, after having journeyed through Tibet for over two weeks. This marked a decisive break in developments in that region. Firstly, it demonstrated that the autonomy of Tibet, enshrined in the May 1951 Agreement signed between the Chinese and the Tibetan Governments was not being honoured. It thus marked a break in the Tibet-China equation. Secondly, the Chinese chose to accuse India of involvement in the Tibetan disturbances. The Dalai Lama has always been a highly respected figure in India, not only among Buddhists but the followers of all other religions as well. It would have been unthinkable for India to turn away such a revered figure. Moreover, this was not the first time such a thing was happening. In 1910 the then Dalai Lama had also come to India and had gone back in 1912. In granting asylum to the Dalai Lama in 1959, the Indian Government made it clear that he was not to indulge in any political activity, and this is something he has abided by to this day.

However, this episode apparently was misunderstood in China and a series of incidents along the length of our border occurred. In August, the Longju incident occurred, when the two sides first exchanged fire

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with accompanying loss of life—and then the Kongka Pass (western sector) where there was further loss of life. Even after these incidents, however, our search for a political solution continued and Pandit Nehru invited the Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai to visit India for high-level talks. The visit took place in April 1960, but did not yield the desired result. Pandit Nehru also proposed the withdrawal of troops from the disputed border in Ladakh in order to avoid a repetition of border clashes but, for a variety of reasons, these and similar measures were not accepted by China. Tension in the region continued.

The border war of 1962 is a well-known episode and a painful one for us to write about even today. Suffice it to say that it solved nothing and served only as a proof of the complete failure of diplomacy, maturity and even of good sense. While China kept what it had occupied by force in the western sector (Ladakh), it had to withdraw from the area occupied by it in the eastern sector. China lost the friendship of a whole generation of India. India woke up to the realities of the situation and the need to strengthen its defence which had been neglected. However, China was then already embarked on the course that was to lead to the 'Cultural Revolution' and had no patience with diplomatic efforts at solving such problems.

Meanwhile, another development of great importance was taking shape. The Pakistanis, who had offered a joint defence agreement to India at the time of the 1959 episodes, entered into negotiations with China on the Kashmir-Sinkiang border. All of Kashmir is an integral part of India and Pakistan had no *locus standi* or right to 'gift away' part of India's territory to China. And China had no right to take it without India's agreement. Proof of this may be found in the fact that the agreement itself is named 'Provisional' and requires China to renegotiate the agreement once the final status of Kashmir is determined. The 'agreement' marked the emergence of a China-Pakistan tie-up which has seen the construction of the Karakoram Highway and military cooperation between the two countries.

One should also look at the more positive side of developments in South Asia. Inspite of the 1962 War, India and China did not break off diplomatic relations. China made a virtue of necessity by staging a 'unilateral' withdrawal from the eastern sector where it had no claims whatsoever, *de jure* or *de facto*. Mrs Gandhi took the initiative to restore Ambassadorial-level representation with China in 1976 when the first flush of the Chinese Cultural Revolution there had subsided. This was a difficult decision for us and involved considerable soul-searching. But statesmanship won out in the end, for the absence of Ambassadors in each other's countries could certainly not be considered a proper state of affairs between two ancient and civilised countries. Official-

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level negotiations have been going on since 1981, to discuss the border, and eight high-level visits have been exchanged. These are developments that can only be welcomed. Both countries have reaffirmed that only peaceful means will be used to settle the border problem. At the same time, we cannot afford to shut our eyes to the fact that the picture is not cloudless. From time to time, events and statements made by this or that country make us wonder whether everyone has, in fact, learned the lessons of the past.

With Pakistan, too, there are both encouraging and discouraging chapters from the past. There have been unfortunate wars and bloodshed from the very birth of Pakistan. However, once again, we see imaginative diplomacy at work, as in the Nehru-Liaquat Agreement, signed in 1951, on exchange of populations and general terms for better understanding between the two countries. However, Kashmir, an artificially created problem between us by the erstwhile colonial rulers, continues to create hurdles in the way of better understanding.

The problem of Kashmir arose out of a clear case of aggression in October 1947, before the 'princely' ruler of that state had decided whether to join India or Pakistan—as he was required to do under the terms of the transfer of power. In the face of this aggression, the ruler, as well as his Prime Minister, appealed to India for help, which we could not give until Kashmir decided whether to join India or not. If it chose to join Pakistan, where was India to play any role?

It was in these circumstances that the ruler of Kashmir supported by the leader of the National Conference, Sheikh Mohamad Abdullah, opted for his state to accede to India. Immediately thereafter, Indian forces began to be sent to Kashmir, large areas of which had already been occupied by the Paktstani invading forces. It was a difficult operation, but our farces succeeded in turning the tide and soon put the invaders to flight. It would have been an easy matter for us to have completed the rout and brought all of Kashmir under our control. However, humanist that he was, Pandit Nehru declared a unilateral ceasefire and thus left a part of Kashmir under Pakistani occupation to be liberated peacefully. This remains an issue yet to be resolved to this day.

Furthermore, Pandit Nehru made a unilateral declaration that he would also seek the approval of the people of Kashmir to the accession to India when the invaders had been thrown out. This was a reflection of his deep commitment to democracy and democratic methods. It may be noted that this step was not legally and constitutionally necessary; according to the provisions of the Transfer of Power, the princely ruler was fully entitled to accede to India or Pakistan, as other princely states had done. However, popular consent and secularism being the

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major pillars of independent India, Pandit Nehru once again sought Kashmiri popular consent. In this, the recognised leader of the people of Kashmir and President of the National Conference, Sheikh Abdullah, played a major role; he unhesitatingly declared that all the people of Kashmir were unequivocally in favour of the state's accession to India, because of the common goals and interests and the ideals of secular democracy which bound Kashmir with the rest of India, rather than to the theocratic state like Pakistan.

However, Kashmir has remained a question which the Pakistanis have continued to raise with India bilaterally and at international forums without let-up since then. Unfortunately in this, they have found the UN Resolution on the subject a handy pretext for keeping alive the issue. We, on our part, have nothing against an objective and reasonable discussion of the issue but are unable to agree to the involvement of outside powers or organisations in this issue. Similarly, we do not agree with the Pakistani approach, which makes the Kashmir issue a stumbling block for any improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations. In all this, we cannot but see an unwillingness on the Pakistani side to come to any understanding with us on some of the pressing issues before South Asia as a whole—issues such as economic backwardness, terrorism, narcotics, etc., and to develop freer contacts and trade between our two countries.

I have already mentioned the Nehru-Liaquat Agreement. It is important also to mention some of the later attempts at forging a statesmanlike agreement between our countries. The first such attempt was the Tashkent Agreement of 1966. To my mind, this Agreement was a very important milestone: for the first time, two Asian neighbouring countries met on Asian soil in a third friendly country and agreed to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations The negotiations at Tashkent were extremely difficult and involved very complicated issues. Furthermore, they came after two decades of hostility between our two countries. In the press of the two countries, the other country was invariably portrayed as an implacable enemy which was only looking for an opportunity to inflict damage on the other. Moreover, a sharp war had been fought in April and September 1965 and this had heightened mutual antagonism and suspicions. In this atmosphere, it was difficult for the two countries' leaders to engage in serious talks in either India or Pakistan. The British good offices had led to an exacerbation because Britain adopted a pro-Pak and anti-India partisan posture. The Soviet Union alone had the requisite credibility with both India and Pakistan to be able to successfully offer its good offices to both.

Acceptance of this offer, made by Prime Minister Kosygin was not

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easy for our Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri. Nor would it have been easy for the Pakistanis. And yet, good sense prevailed and both sides accepted the Soviet offer. The talks, as mentioned above, were difficult and there were many interlocking problems that had to be solved. Above all, Kashmir and the Sino-Pakistani tie-up on the basis of hostility to India were complicating factors. But statesmanship won out, and in large measure, thanks must also go to Prime Minister Kosygin for his untiring efforts at bridging differences between India and Pakistan.

Unfortunately, as so often happens, a brief moment of wisdom and courage is not sufficient in such major issues. The sustained effort required in implementing the agreement is as important as the signing of an agreement. In Pakistan, there were forces that made no secret of their opposition to the Tashkent Agreement and began to work to undermine it. I think these forces would regret the success of their efforts today, if they were to look back soberly at what they have wrought. The fall of President Ayub Khan did not bring them to power, but rather another military General Yahya Khan who was, unfortunately, totally devoid of the good sense and political courage of his predecessor.

The events of the post-1969 period are well-known and serve to show how unwise it is for states to employ unbridled force against their own people. I am certain that, but for the military crack-down in former East Pakistan, the call for Bangladesh would neither have been given, nor enjoyed such widespread support among the Bangladeshis. Once that happened the emergence of Bangladesh was inevitable. The presence of 10 million refugees from Bangladesh in India made us a party inexorably drawn into the conflict between the two wings of Pakistan. Mrs. Indira Gandhi, our Prime Minister, made every effort to persuade world opinion that the situation needed a political settlement. She visited all the major capitals around the world, explaining the true issues involved and asking for advice and influence on Pakistan in order to prevent the situation from getting out of control. However, the Pakistani leaders were the victims of forces unleashed by them and finally even went to the extent of launching an attack on India on 3 December 1971. In the resulting war, the geopolitical situation was entirely changed and new realities appeared in the subcontinent—among them, Bangladesh.

However, we never lost faith in the need to continue a political dialogue with Pakistan and, as early as March 1972, D P Dhar, as Special Envoy of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, visited Pakistan in order to restore normal relations between our countries. Later, in July 1972 Bhutto, who had become the Pakistani President visited Simla for

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summit-level talks with Mrs. Gandhi. The resulting agreement, the Simla Agreement, became the new basis for relations between our countries. I believe that both leaders were seriously committed to working out a new relationship and Bhutto, who had earlier talked of a thousand-year confrontation, told the Indian press "learn to like me". The Indian press which does indeed understand and feel close to Pakistan, did learn to like Bhutto and we began a new chapter in our relations. Diplomatic relations were re-established after having been broken off in 1971.

The Soviets had also tried to induce reason in the Pakistani leadership, and to persuade Pakistan not to be a party to the plans of some Western circles which were aimed against India, the Soviet Union and developing countries in general. However, this advice was of no avail throughout the 1950's and 60's. In the 70's, there was some hope of a turn for the better in our relations and relations in South Asia as a whole. The Soviet Union welcomed this development and, in the Indo-Soviet Joint Declaration of November 1973, expressly welcomed the Simla Agreement and hoped for better relations between India and Pakistan.

In general, relations between India and the Soviet Union have been one of the most stabilising and heartening features of Asian politics on the whole. From the very beginning of the 20th Century, there has been growing awareness of and interest in each other's country and, with the emergence of independent India, these relations acquired a qualitatively new character. Since then, they have developed in all fields and today, there is hardly any field of human endeavour where our two countries are not cooperating successfully, to our mutual benefit and maintainance of pcace and security in the region. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Cooperation & Friendship signed on 9 August, 1971 has been a bulwark of peace in this region. It represents a model that could be followed by all countries of the region in their mutual relations.

The most important role of Indo-Soviet cooperation has been that of promoting a joint or common approach to the world based on reason, the search for compromise and mutual understanding, paying full respect to the sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity of all countries. I have already mentioned the role played by the Soviet Union at various stages of our history. But nowhere is this more apparent than in the Delhi Declaration, signed in November 1986 by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and General Secretary Gorbachev, during the latter's visit to India. It offers what we believe is the traditional wisdom of our two countries and it is offered in all sincerity to the rest of the world. It represents the collective will and hope of the one billion people of India

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and the USSR, as well as of the rest of humanity. The Delhi Declaration is a natural development of Mahatma Gandhi's doctrine of non-violence and Pandit Nehru's *Panch Sheel*.

The dream of a non-violent and nuclear weapons free world is shared by many countries and most people in the world. The task now is to make this dream a reality and to move away from the dangerous developments that were facing the world in the late 70's and early 80's. At that time, there was loose talk about "limited nuclear war", which contributed to the sense of insecurity. Here again, the Delhi Declaration offers a useful interim measure: a convention on the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These documents are already bsfore the UN and it is to be hoped that they will be adopted soon.

The late 70's and early 80's were also troubled times in the Asian continent. In South Asia, this took the form of a massive re-armament of Pakistan; later came the assassination of President Zia-ur-Rahman of Bangladesh, who was the innovating spirit behind the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC); still later there was the ethnic trouble in Sri Lanka; and finally, the tragic assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi in October 1984. Each of these issues deserves detailed treatment in its own right. However, viewed collectively, they reveal that very powerful external forces of destabilisation are at work in the subcontinent, seeking to destroy the stability, independence and even territorial integrity of the countries of South Asia. And once more, we see different responses to the challenges facing us.

On the one hand, there are those who favour a polarisation of forces on the subcontinent and would like to see a resort to force in order to decide the issues that are causing these disturbances—ethnic, religious, political, economic, social and so on. The new militarists in some of the Western countries are also very keen to see a continuation of this polarisation and bloodshed on the Indian subcontinent, as well as in Afghanistan, Iran the Gulf and in Indochina.

But there is another trend which is also emerging and is, in fact, decisively establishing itself. Reference has already been made to the idea of South Asian cooperation, first proposed by the Bangladeshi President Zia-ur-Rehman in 1981. Although it was initially greeted with some scepticism among the various countries involved, it soon began to prove its viability. Gradually, official level meetings among the seven member states—Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka—became a regular feature and, in August 1983, the South Asian Association of Regionai Cooperation (SAARC) was formally launched, with different sub-groups devoted to specific fields of cooperation. The first summit was held in December 1985 in Dhaka and in 1987 a permanent Secretariat was set up in Kathmandu. The

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member states are to avoid political issues and bilateral problems within the SAARC framework and, so far, this has been honoured by almost every one of the participants.

SAARC represents a promising approach to the South Asian region and points the way for us to focus on the real issues facing all the seven countries. These are the issues of poverty, illiteracy, disease, etc. It is only through cooperation in such fields that we can unlearn the mutual antagonism of the past. It is important, therefore, that there should be no false hopes or unnecessary burdens placed on the organisation.

I have in mind specifically the Pakistani complaint against India regarding the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement. It has been suggested that we could have operated in the SAARC framework instead of the bilateral one. This, of course, is a gravely mistaken view. Not only does it violate the principle that bilateral issues are not to be discussed within SAARC, it also would introduce political and strategic issues into the SAARC framework and this is a burden this infant organisation may not be able to stand.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement is the right response at the right time, and is conceived in the proper framework. It began as an essentially internal problem in Sri Lanka of power sharing between the majority and the largest of the minority communities. In 1983 however, following the July massacres, it led to an inflow of Tamil refugees into the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, which inevitably dragged India into the conflict. At the request of the Sri Lankan Government, we lent our good offices in the search for an acceptable compromise, making clear that our concerns were really the presence of foreign 'special services', the development of Trincomalee for hostile military activity and the location of foreign radio stations for other than purely innocent purposes. At the same time, we were clear all along that we supported the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and had no truck with the secessionists who wanted to carve out a separate state in Sri Lanka.

Once again, it was a story of hard negotiations, frequent setbacks and bitter disappointments. But persistence, wisdom and a will to compromise have again won out. Even as late as December 1986, after the disappointment over Sri Lanka's going back on the agreement reached, we persisted in the diplomatic effort, while the killings were going on. And, finally, when the blockade of Jaffna peninsula began to hurt the peaceful and innocent inhabitants of that region, we had no choice but to airdrop relief supplies, after our unarmed ships were prevented from taking relief supplies to Sri Lanka through our Red Cross.

It is a tribute to the maturity and tenacity of the leaders, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President Jayewardene, that agreement has been successfully reached. It is clearly not to everyone's liking and some

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of President Jayewardene's close colleagues are openly hostile to it. The attempt on the life of Rajiv Gandhi at the farewell ceremonies is fresh proof that such forces will go to any length to prevent negotiated bilateral settlements based on compromise. And, I regret to say, the press is not doing the agreement justice by harping on the difficulties of implementation. There are difficulties in implementing any agreement, but the agreement itself does not become bad because it is difficult to implement. And, in any case, the early evidence suggests that both sides are determined to fulfil their obligations. To my mind, such cynicism is neither wise nor warranted.

A similar tale of improving relations can be told about most of our other neighbours. With Bangladesh, we are actively seeking solutions to long-standing issues and a senior Minister was in Dhaka recently as the Prime Minister's Special Envoy. With Nepal, relations are being subjected to a thorough re-examination in order to see how to improve them, and further strengthen them. With Bhutan one can confidently say that they have rarely, if ever, been better. And our Prime Minister recently played host to the Prime Minister of Maldives.

Pakistan remains the biggest challenge and problem in the South Asian region. It would be fair to say that Indo-Pakistani relations and Indian attitudes towards Pakistan are under closer scrutiny today than perhaps even before. This, to my mind, is a very good development. We must understand ourselves and our attitudes towards Pakistan, in order to see where we have objective difficulties with them and where we are being emotional in our approach. It is not sufficient to say that we have a love-hate relationship with Pakistan. A stable equation requires neither the one nor the other. It requires a sober assessment of interests and intentions and, then, a willingness to compromise, without sacrificing the basic principles of *Panch Sheel*.

Recent history will show wild fluctuations in our relations. From the euphoria of the late 70's to the extremely tense border situation in January 1987, our relations have been through the entire range of options. The Indian Foreign Minister (then Narasimha Rao) visited Pakistan in June 1981, and made every effort to persuade them to be moderate in their arms acquisition, while conceding their sovereign right to arm themselves. However, the massive acquisition of arms that actually followed forced an arms race in the subcontinent, while at the same time bringing cold war tensions into South Asia. This is something we have always sought to avoid and are continuing to do so. But, in spite of the clear view of most Pakistanis against such a strategic link-up with the USA the acquisition of sophisiticated arms continues. There is enough armament in our region already, and outside powers are getting increasingly involved in the Indian Ocean, in the

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Gulf and in South East Asia. It is surely not beyond our capabilities to work out mutually acceptable agreements which will ensure our security without posing a threat to any third country. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi has stated that the Sri Lanka Agreement can point the way to other countries as well and we certainly must hope that this good example can be duplicated.

There is now the question of Pakistan's nuclear programme. It is clearly aimed at developing weapons capability and therefore, is an issue of international concern and not really a bilateral issue at all, even though the Pakistanis themselves try to pose it in a bilateral context. Here again, we have set a good example by declaring (and adhering to it in our deeds) that we shall not develop nuclear weapons, despite having demonstrated our nuclear capability. It is reassuring to find a growing awareness in all the major capitals of the world that the Pakistani nuclear programme is a serious international issue and one that calls for concerted remedial action. Asia has only two nuclear weapon powers so far (USSR and China) and both have given unilateral pledges against first use of nuclear weapons. This is to be welcomed, though only as an interim step on the way to the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons.

The third difficulty in our relations with Pakistan is its involvement in terrorism in India's Punjab. Despite their denials, there is very persuasive evidence of this involvement and it poses a serious challenge to our territorial integrity. We have made several efforts at defusing the situation in Punjab and in coming to an understanding with Pakistan on the issue of terrorism. Some progress may be said to have taken place but this is far from satisfactory. Pakistan must realise that such games can be played by more than one side and can boomerang.

I am aware that there are more or less fears on the Pakistani side vis-a-vis India. This itself gives me hope that one day we will both see that our fears and suspicions are unfounded. The start of talks in 1982 was an important step in this direction. Although diplomacy contains a lot of playing to the gallery, in order to score points off each other, some serious steps have been taken and the most important is the agreement of January 1987 on the mutual withdrawal of troops after a near confrontation at various points of the common border.

The largest country in our neighbourhood next to USSR is China and, in the light of the history traced above, we have much to discuss, both in the strictly bilateral field and in the wider Asian perspective. As far as bilateral relations are concerned, we have been talking, both at official and political levels, specially since 1981. The meeting between our Prime Ministers in October 1985 in New York had generated fresh dynamism as both sides noted the importance of giving a political direction to the

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talks. However, much to our regret, action on the ground once again intervened and during the summer and autumn of 1986 minor incidents took place. But I was happy to see that both sides did not allow such provocations to upset the course of the talks. Indeed, our External Affairs Minister (then N D Tiwari) visited China in June 1987 and such exchanges are to continue. We cannot afford to underestimate the difficulties in working out a solution of our differences with China. But neither can we allow ourselves to lapse into inaction as a sequence. I detect a new sense of realism in both countries and perhaps both are free of the deadening certainty of the correctness of our respective positions. *Panch Sheel* which was first subscribed to by both in 1954 points the only way out.

The Sino-Pakistani relationship is also showing some signs of change, even though in its basics it is intact. This by itself need not necessarily cause concern. Friendship with China—whether Pakistan's or the Soviet Union's—is not by itself a negative development from our point of view. What can be a negative development is Chinese encouragement either to Pakistan's nuclear or conventional weapons programme; or Chinese encouragement of Pakistani intransigence towards India. On this latter, there have been occasional hints of change, though it would be premature to talk about a formal change of position on the part of the Chinese. However, this is a trend we should seek to encourage, since it will not only improve our relations with China but also promote a more mature policy from the Pakistani side as well. I would say the same about Soviet efforts at improving relations with Pakistan and China, it being clearly understood that this is not done at the expense of our tried and tested friendship with the USSR. I believe that the Soviet leadership also understands this and values Indo-Soviet friendship greatly, as we do.

There is then the issue of Indochina. We have very cordial relations with all the three countries of Indochina and these relations continue to develop. I believe that strong ties bind India with Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos and are a source of stability in the region. China obviously has its differences with the countries of the region and has even described the Kampuchean question as the main obstacle in its relations with the USSR. This is a untenable position, since the USSR (or any other country) is not going to pressurise Vietnam into making concessions—nor will Vietnam accept it A settlement in Indochina is a major challenge for Asian dipolomacy, and it must steer clean of any dominance in the region by one or more outside power. This will not be easy to achieve, but I believe that there is evidence of an emerging appreciation of the realities of the situation.

The above is only a partial listing of the role of India in Asian affairs and does not say anything about our role in Korea and Indochina in

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the 1950's. This is another instructive chapter of Asian diplomacy, one moderately successful, the other also pregnant with possibilities. However, one final point needs to be made about general Asian relations.

It is clearly time for Asian countries to wake up to the new world around us and take our destinies in our own hands. The Soviets have proposed and even attempted to flesh out the contours of an all-Asian forum. This is, in principle, in accordance with our own thinking and conceptual approach. We had organised the first Asian Relations Conference in March-April 1947, even before independence. And we are soon going to mark its 40th anniversary in Delhi.

The difficulty in all such forums, however, is how to combine the good points of the *status quo* and yet allow for the normal and inevitable processes of change to develop. The problem with nearly all past agreements—the Congress of Berlin, Versailles, and so on—has been that they have not provided the necessary flexibility for the system they worked out to grow. As a result, they became a brake on normal developmental processes. And so, they had to be broken and were replaced by something better or worse.

In order to avoid such a situation, the Asian nations have to consult and discuss among themselves continuously. Such a process is under way at the moment and our effort is to contribute to it in every possible way.

I have been turning over in my mind the idea of a group of Asian countries from different parts of Asia—Arab, South Asian, South East Asian and from the Pacific Ocean—coming together and working out concrete issues that are ripe for collective decision-making. Naturally, no country would be excluded from the deliberations and collective decision-making would finally evolve a regional or inter-regional consensus.

An immediate pre-requisite, of course, is the removal of bilateral irritants. What Asian relations can one talk about so long as the Gulf War continues, or the Israeli-Arab dispute continues? However, change is coming about and I am heartened by the emerging trends. This involves considerable flexibility, reasonableness and political courage—in a word, statesmanship. Fourtunately there is a growing realisation of this and one can look to the future of Asia with hope and confidence.

Asia is a large continent with different cultures and civilisations at different stages of development and following different social and political systems. It may not be easy to bring them together on one forum immediately. Efforts should, therefore, be made to bring about Treaties of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation and non-aggression at the bilateral, sub-regional and regional levels and then join them at an

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inter-regional or even global level. India is a bridge of understanding between South East and South West Asia, between Central and South Asia and is therefore called upon to play its pivotal role. India has never shirked this whether in Korea, Indochina, the Suez, Congo and Lebanese Crises or in the field of disarmament and removal of *apartheid* and colonial domination. As an author of *Panch Sheel* and the Delhi Declaration India can and must play its natural role in Asia and the world—that of a catalytic agent to strengthen peace and peaceful settlement of problems, peaceful coexistence and cooperation, disarmament and development.

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NON-ALIGNMENT AND ASIA

By ZIVOGIN JAZIC*

THIS issue may be viewed from various angles, where at least two important aspects should be taken as the starting points. One being an assessment of the contribution of the Asian non-aligned countries and their leaders to the emergence and growth of non-alignment as a policy and as a movement and the other, an evaluation of the impact of non-alignment on the course of the development in Asia on all levels, bilateral, regional and global. Having no pretension of trying to present an overall analysis, and coming from a non-Asian country such as Yugoslavia with its keen interest and deep roots of friendship with the Asian non-aligned, it seemed appropriate only to focus on some of the outstanding accomplishments and to indicate those processes in the current international situation which are of broader interests to other non-aligned countries, outside the Asian scene.

It was neither coincidence nor a deliberately preconceived strategy that some of the most important impulses to the birth of non-alignment came from the Asian soil. First of all, they occurred as a result of the liberation struggle of a number of the Asian peoples during and especially after the Second World War. So, it happened that in Asia, in the most populated continent, with a rich cultural heritage, and at the same time a subject of many foreign conquests and colonial subjugation, many of its peoples embarked upon the final struggle for their self-determination and the achievement of national independence. India had been in the forefront of the struggle against the greatest colonial empire of our time. Tendencies of some of the Great Powers to preserve even after the defeat of fascism in the Second World War unjust and unequal international relations, including the remnants of old colonialism, had been challenged, not only in Asia but in other continents as well.

It is now just over four decades since the Conference on Asian Relations was convened in Delhi in early 1947, at a time when India was on the eve of its independence. The Conference was attended by the official representatives from 22 Asian countries. In those days many Asian countries were still under colonial domination or were already fighting for their liberation and freedom.

The fundamental messages of the Conference were: peace, freedom and emancipation from foreign role, mutual cooperation on a footing of equality, non-alignment with big powers and, finally, support to the

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United Nations. In his opening address, Jawaharlal Nehru pointed out that the future of Asia lay in freedom, peace and cooperation among its people within one world. Only when nations have become free, when people enjoy freedom, security and scope for development, can there be a peace which has not only political but economic qualities as well. India's future course towards non-alignment and global cooperation is easily discerned in his address to that Conference. It was not therefore fortuitous that the Declaration of the Fifth Summit in Colombo in 1976, paid tribute to the gathering in Delhi as the first expression of Asia's option for non-alignment. After a long period of foreign conquest and colonial oppression, the peoples of Asia were striving to preserve and defend their freedom and not become involved in military blocs and alliances.

The next major step, on a larger scale, in this direction was the Bandung Conference in 1955 of newly liberated Asian and African countries, where the new principle of peaceful coexistence, based on the right of peoples to self-determination and free development, was formulated. One year later, at Brioni (Yugoslavia) the historic tripartite meeting of Tito, Nehru and Nasser, went further and initiated the concept of a new policy and later of a new international movement, to be called non-alignment. Five years later, at the First Summit Conference in Belgrade among twenty-five participating countries, already ten were Asian (among the founding fathers Nehru, Sukarno, U Nu and some others came from Asia). Out of eight non-aligned summit conferences two were held in Asia (Colombo, 1975, New Delhi, 1983), to be followed by a significant number of conferences and gatherings at ministerial or other high levels.

II

Since then the Non-aligned Movement has grown to more than one hundred members, of which almost one third comes from Asia and the Pacific. However, the contribution of the Asian non-aligned countries and their leaders to the formulation and adoption of the basic principles, objectives and criteria of the policy and movement of the non-aligned countries, from their very emergence as a new, independent and non-bloc international political force, should not be judged only by an ever growing list of the number of meetings held in Asia. It has been far greater than that. For example, the main criteria for belonging to the Non-aligned Movement, still fully valid in the contemporary world, had been formulated and later adopted at the first preparatory meeting in Cairo in 1961 (on the basis of an Indian draft) and reaffirmed at all subsequent summit meetings. They are five criteria: independent policy based on coexistence and non-alignment; support to the movements for

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national independence; the members of the movement should not belong to a multilateral military alliance or other regional or/and bilateral military pacts, if they are concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts and the members do not concede military basis to a foreign power in the context of Great Power conflicts.

It is not easy to highlight the crucial points or make a detailed exposition in a comprehensive manner of the process in which the principles of non-alignment have taken their present form, even less so is possible to state the exact proportion of the contribution of various members to their content.

Nevertheless, the fact is that the basic principles and objectives in their substance have remained practically the same. This can be easily proven by comparing the formulations of the principles and goals as they had been defined at the first two summits (Belgrade 1961, Cairo 1964) with their definitions and enumerations at the Sixth Summit in Havana, 1979. Also, since then they have been reaffirmed without any change by the subsequent summits in Delhi and Harare. This affirms the true perceptions of non-alignment by the founding fathers and of its historic role, as well as their far-sighted vision, reaching right into our times. By stating this there is no intention whatsoever to neglect or diminish the vital role other non-aligned countries and their leaders played in further enrichment of these principles and goals, especially as far as the application of non-aligned policy in the global and regional framework is concerned.

Non-alignment has never been nor it can ever be a monolithic grouping of like minded countries, or a group pursuing exactly the same policies, since we are not a bloc and never will be one. However, the basic characteristic of non-alignment—to uphold the right of all peoples and nations to self-determination, freedom, independence and socio-political development of their own choice, resisting interventions, interferences, pressures and domination from whatever quarter or pretext—has been maintained and further strengthened in becoming an ever more important and global factor in the international community.

While struggling against colonialism, imperialism, neocolonialism, racism and *apartheid* and other forms of foreign domination and hegemony and rejecting the bloc policies and division of the world by power blocs, non-alignment has always been striving for an equitable international cooperation and a new international economic and political order in accordance with the principles of the United Nations and in the interest of all countries, regardless of their size and strength. Without idealization or illusions it may be said that the overwhelming majority of the non-aligned countries has remained faithful and has adhered to those principles and goals in practice, despite many difficulties and temporary

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setbacks, naturally within the context of the existing fabric of international relations and their own conditions and often limited possibilities. It should also be pointed out that the non-aligned countries have done so out of their own free choice and because of their substantial national interests.

From the first days of their activities as non-aligned countries, world peace, security, disarmament and development were, so to say, the main aims of their policy. They have never believed that the world conflict was inevitable. Quite the contrary, since the first summit they have been promoting peaceful and just settlement of all conflicts end they have seen the foundation for a real world peace and security for all peoples in general and complete disarmament, especially the nuclear one. They have always believed that Great Power rivalry and confrontation could be overcome through global *detente* and negotiations with the participation of all countries on an equal footing. These have been the constant premises of the non-aligned international actions, primarily in the United Nations, to which the Asian non-aligned countries have contributed an important share.

Apart from its principles and the projection of general policy in favour of peace and security for all nations, non-alignment has constantly stood for three major objectives—an accelerated economic and social development of developing countries and establishment of new economic relations, general disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, and the search for equitable solutions of regional crises and conflicts. In all these areas the Asian non-aligned countries, together with African, Latin American and European non-aligned countries have been among the most active participants. From the New Delhi Summit in 1983, when India and late Indira Gandhi, and after her death Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, assumed the Chairmanship of the movement, among the basic declarations, one recalls the New Delhi Message. It strongly emphasized that peace and peaceful coexistence, based on justice and equality, independence, disarmament and development are the central issues of our time. Among the main initiatives and proposals adopted by the Summit were: the halting of the arms race; achieving just solutions in the Middle East (including the Palestinian Question), in Southern Africa and Central America, as well as in the Southeast and Southwest Asia, in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean region (zones of peace) and the overcoming of the global economic crisis by establishment of New International Economic Order. In short, the Non-aligned Movement has once again demonstrated its global role and shown the willingness to cooperate with Great Powers and other countries, especially in the United Nations, in the spirit of interdependence and awareness of common destiny of mankind. The appeal to Iran and Iraq to bring an

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end to their war and to settle this tragic conflict through negotiations and peaceful means should also be highlighted.

III

After the initial success in spreading of non-alignment as a new policy and a movement of independent countries and national liberation forces in the fifties and sixties, the cold war and bloc divisions, with the Great Power rivalries and neocolonialist policies, continued to hold sway over the general constellation in Asia and the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

It is not our intention to describe the various phases in international development in the regions of Asia and the Pacific, as these are generally known. Most so-called local wars, foreign interventions and armed conflicts (Korea, Indochina, Vietnam, India and Pakistan and others) took place in Asia. Apart from Europe, this was the site of the largest concentration of the armed forces, military bases and fleets of nuclear powers, a region of numerous pacts, bilateral and multilateral, mostly of a bloc character. Experience has, however, shown clearly that this was not the way to stabilise the situation, let alone ensure greater security for the countries of Asia.

By many of their characteristics—political, economic, cultural, historical, religious, etc.—Asia and the Pacific represent highly diversified regions, so that it would be hard to bracket these distinctions under a common denominator. By and large, the entire region can be subdivided into several areas, beginning with what is known as West Asia, where the Iraq-Iran War and the Israeli-Arab conflict with the Palestinian problem at its core are both continuing unabated. Even if this area is set apart from the others, it is still very much present as a crisis spot demanding solution. In Southwest and Southeast Asia, primarily the problems of Afghanistan and Kampuchea are present, as a result of foreign interventions and interferences. The Far East and the Pacific again have their own preoccupations and dilemmas, including the old Korean problem.

However, the state of affairs in Asia is not so wholly negative; on the contrary, fresh ideas and actions are emerging from various quarters. It seems indisputable and even realistic to maintain that increasing independence, accelerated development, *detente* and the step-by-step resolution of disputed problems and misunderstandings, without any imposition of solutions by the great and powerful, should be encouraged throughout. It is the policy of non-alignment which professes authentic principles and which is striving for all the peoples to enjoy equal rights within these processes. Bloc policy and divisions have so far produced neither stability nor general security. Reliance on nuclear weapons is

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becoming more and more problematic and dangerous. In Asia which experienced in practice the disastrous effects of nuclear weapons, demands for elimination of all atomic weapons enjoy enormous popular support—in India and in many other countries.

Despite unresolved conflicts, differences and contradictions there are also common needs and aspirations, such us development in peace and security. It is very possible that these demands will be satisfied by spreading cooperation by gradual steps, in a way most suited to conditions in Asia. Undoubtedly the processes of independence, emancipation and cooperation on a footing of equality, including ASEAN and SAARC activities have made gradual progress in Asia and the Pacific. This is evident from the growing number of independent states, especially in the Pacific, as well as from initiatives and actions of long standing in the UN and the Non-aligned Movement, seeking to transform the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace which has been proclaimed by the relevant General Assembly Declaration and followed by many resolutions calling for its implementation. Then, there have been similar proposals connected with other regions in South and Southeast Asia, especially the recent Rarotonga Agreement to set up nuclear weapon-free zones in the South Pacific with the active participation of Australia and New Zealand.

However, the Great Powers and their fleets carrying atomic weapons are present throughout. But the role of the nuclear powers and the highly industrialized countries, although of great importance, should not be permitted to be dominant, if it means neglecting interests of others, particularly the non-aligned countries. Furthermore, it is not even certain that the present circle of nuclear powers will remain such as it is now, if the trend towards even greater rivalry and arming, especially in acquiring nuclear weapons, continues. Therefore, the only lasting solution is the total elimination of all nuclear weapons, constant progress towards general disarmament under international control and the establishment of a world system of political and economic security within the framework of the United Nations, but not as an exclusive monopoly of the Great Powers. The Non-aligned Movement has been constantly pursuing these goals for decades. Already there is a variety of ideas and proposals regarding the establishment of regional security in Asia, among them the proposal of the Soviet Union being most far-reaching. In India too new thinking and various options of promoting cooperation and security in the region of South Asia and the Pacific are being considered.

Without entering into any detailed examination of basic problems and tangible aspects of the complex situation in Asia and the Pacific, it can be said with certainty that the issue of regional security has finally been put on agenda, though still in a rather long-range perspective. The cur-

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rent situation and the constellation of power (forces) is such as to make it hard to expect quick results or options on the part of the immediately interested countries in these regions concerning the projects of considerable potential range.

It seems that only a step-by-step approach and flexible means have chances of succeeding. In that respect the improvement of overall bilateral relations, the settlement of border and other disputes, especially finding speedy and just solutions through dialogue and negotiations—bilateral and multilateral—for the outstanding crises areas in Asia and the Pacific, a number of them being the heritage of the cold war period and various imperialistic and hegemonistic tendencies and practices, are the probable corner-stones in the search for cooperation and development in freedom and security.

The application of the non-aligned principles on bilateral and regional levels could only help in the right direction. By doing so the non-aligned countries in Asia will at the same time contribute to the strengthening of the role of non-alignment in the world and vice versa, non-alignment as a global factor, benefiting from such development in Asia, could give a more substantial support to its members in their common endeavour towards peace and prosperity.

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UNITED NATIONS AND OUTER SPACE

By BELA SUR*

THE development of ASAT[1] and BMD[2] weapons is likely to directly or indirectly impinge upon the military uses of outer space. As a result, humankind has felt endangered because a war fought with weapons placed in space is likely to cause doomsday. Consequent to this realization, the United Nations seized itself of the problems created by space-related research and keeping foremost its aim of promoting international peace and security sought to promote international cooperation for the peaceful uses of outer space. Nations have come to consider outer space as "supranational where international cooperation is essential."[3] Thus, the discussions in the General Assembly culminated in the establishment of an Ad-Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space which became a permanent one in 1959.[4] It aimed at the following four major categories of studies.[5]

(i) The extent of participation of UN and the specialized agencies in the peaceful uses of outer space;
(ii) The area of international cooperation which could be undertaken under the auspicies of the United Nations to benefit all states, irrespective of their economic and scientific development, dissemination of information and coordinatio of national research programmes for the study of outer space;
(iii) To chalk out future organizational plans for international cooperation in this field, within the framework of the United Nations; and
(iv) to examine the legal problems which may arise due to the exploration of outer space.

The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) is assissted by two permanent sub-committees namely Legal Committee and Scientific and Technical Committee. All these are assisted by the Outer Space Affairs Division in the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs of the Secretariat.

At the International Geophysical Year (IGY) Rockets and Satellites Conference held in October 1957, after the launching of SPUTNIK-I, it was suggested that the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) make scientific investigations with rockets.[6] Hence in 1959, the ICSU set up the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) which is concerned with research in outer space devoid of the technological problems, like construction of rockets and their control.[7] Among some of its functions

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are to coordinate international experimental investigations in space, to encourage interactions between experimenters and theoreticians, to stimulate exchange of results, to plan symposia and discussions on space research and to work as closely as possible with other organizations engaged in these tasks.[8]

In 1961, the General Assembly adopted a resolution initiated by the COPUOS which stated that outer space should be used only for the benefit of mankind and that "states should be guided by the Charter of the United Nations, and that outer space and other celestial bodies were free for exploration by states," keeping in view the principles of international law.[9] On the recommendation of COPUOS, the General Assembly also took steps towards examining the legal problems of outer space and concluded international legal instruments. In 1963, it adopted the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing Activities of States in Exploration and use of Outer Space which was designed on the resolution adopted in 1961. The treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and uses of Outer Space, including moon and other celestial bodies was accepted in 1967.[10] In regard to these treaties, the then Secretary General of United Nations, U. Thant said that, "it is both urgent and necessary that the powerful forces generated by human ingenuity be kept under control and utilized for the benefit of humanity and the strengthening of peace. It is most gratifying to see that the problems of exploring outer space are being solved through positive and sustained international action and measures within the framework of the UN."[11]

The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects launched into Outer Space was adopted by the General Assembly and came into force in 1968.[12] The humanitarian aspects of this Agreement were particularly stressed. Article I states that any party that "receives information or discovers that the personnel of a spacecraft have suffered accident or are experiencing conditions of distress...under its jurisdiction or on the high seas...shall immediately notify the launching authority...and the Secretary General of the United Nations, who would inform the launching state of the mishap." Article II obligates the contracting parties to take steps to rescue the personnel of a spacecraft which landed unintended owing to accident, and also inform the Secretary General.

The Agreement further states that if the parties receive information "that the personnel of a spacecraft have alighted...in any place not under the jurisdiction of any state", they will "extend assistance in search and rescue operations." (Article III). Any party that discovers "that a space object or its component part has returned to earth in territory under its jurisdiction...shall upon request" and with the assistance of the

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launching authority, "take steps...to recover the object." (Article V) This Article also says that "expenses incurred in fulfilling obligations to recover and return a space object...shall be borne by the launching authority."

In accordance with these terms, in 1970 USA received several offers of assistance after a power failure in its spacecraft APOLLO-13 which forced cancellation of a planned landing of men on moon and endangered the safe return of astronauts.[13]

The possibility that an object launched into space could accidentally return to the surface of the earth wreaking destruction on other states, led to the Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects which came into force in 1972.[14]

Article I of this Convention defined the terminology. Accordingly, "damage means loss of life, personal injury...or damage to property of states or of persons or of international intergovernmental organisations."[15] A launching state means a state which launches a space object or whose territory is used for launching. Article II says that a launching state would be liable "to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight." Further, if damage is caused elsewhere than on the the surface of the earth of a launching state, then it is liable for damage only if it is the fault of persons for whom it is responsible. (Article III)

If damage is caused elsewhere than on the surface of the earth of the launching state or the state where the personnel belong, then the two states are jointly liable for damage to the third. (Aricle IV) Article VI exonerates a launching state from absolute liability if it establishes that the damage has occurred due to the negligence of the claimant state,

The most appalling feature of this Convention is that its provisions do not apply to damage caused to nationals of the launching state or to foreign nationals who are in the vicinity of the launching site. (Article VII) Any other state is permitted to present claims, if the state which has sustained damage does not do so. (Article VIII)

It was felt during the beginning of the United Nations involvement in outer space, that the organization could serve as the respository of information about all objects launched into space by the states. Discussion on this subject led to the conclusion of the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space. It came into force in 1976, and in accordance with its provisions, the Secretary General established a register in which all information furnished could be recorded.[16]

The General Assembly called upon "states launchtng objects...to furnish information promptly to the COPUOS through the Seeretary General for registration of launching."[17] COPUOS and the Secretary General were to keep "close contact with governmental and non-governmental

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organizations concerned with Outer Space matters." The General Assembly also noted the potential importance of "communication satellites, for use by the United Nations and its principal organs and specialised agencies." The purpose of this Convention is-to assist in the identification of space objects.[18]

Another legal instrument that was drafted and discussed by the General Assembly was the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies.[19] Articles I states that, "Moon includes other orbits around it. All activities on the moon, including its exploration and use, shall be carried out in accordance with international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations...in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and mutual understanding and with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other states." (Article II) Parties are prohibited from using force or "threat of hostile act on the moon." (Article III) Article VI states that "in exploring and using the moon, state parties shall take measures to prevent the disruption of the existing balance of its environment, whether by its harmful contamination through the introduction of extra-environmental matter or otherwise."

Article IX permits the parties to establish manned and unmanned stations on the moon provided that they used only the area required for their needs and inform the Secretary General of the location and purposes of that station. This agreement opened for signature in 1979 and till date, has not entered into force.[20]

One of the most important issues discussed by the COSPAR was the definition of outer space. It had investigated the lowest altitude at which artificial satellites could orbit, without being pulled to the earth by the gravitational force.[21] In this context, it supported Belgium's recommendation that the lowest limit of outer space be fixed at 100 kms.[22]

As a response to the interest in outer space by a multitude of nations, the United Nations convened the first conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space at Vienna, from 14-27 August 1968.[23] The conference had two main objectives:

(i) To examine the benefits of space research on the basis of technical and scientific achievements and the extent to which the non-space faring powers might enjoy those benefits; and
(ii) To examine the opportunities available to non-space faring powers for international cooperation in space activities and the role of the United Nations in this regard.[24]

The report of the conference stated that it was in the interest of all countries, especially the developing countries that the knowledge of

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space be widely disseminated.[25] The thematic sessions dealt with the scientific, technical and economic aspects of radio, telephone and television communications, meteorological satellites and the development of regional systems, use of satellites for marine and air navigation, medical and biological problems in space research and the non-space applications of space technology.[26] The conference was attended by 78 states and 8 specialized agencies of the United Nations.[27]

The efforts of the theoreticians and scientists have frutioned in interstate cooperation and led to many successful endeavours. Joint space missions and experiments set an example of how different countries with widely varying political systems and levels of development can work towards a common goal. A prime instance of intergovernmental cooperation is the International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation (INTELSAT) which was established in 1964.[28] Initially begun by 11 countries, it now has 106 members and serves over 130 countries.[29] The satellites are owned by INTELSAT and the earth stations by the individual countries. INTELSAT also leases capacity for domestic use and many countries are utilising this facility for intra-country communication. INTELSAT submits its annual report to the COPUOS.[30]

The Council for International Cooperation in the Study and Utilization of Outer Space (INTERCOSMOS) is another interstate programme of cooperation amongst Socialist countries which was sponsored by the Soviet Union in 1965.[31] INTERCOSMOS aims at joint activities for the study of physical properties of outer space, space meteorology, communication, biology and medicine.[32] This organization does not have a common budget, instead every country finances the development of scientific study in which it is interested and the results of these experiments are accessible to the international scientific community.

Research in the field of space communications as part of the INTERCOSMOS, led to the creation of the International System and Organisation of Space Communications (INTERSPUTNIK) in 1971.[33] It was created to meet the need for exchange of radio and television programmes, and other types of information between different countries. Currently, INTERSPUTNIK has 12 members and operates by using Sovlet satellites on a lease basis.[34]

European Space Agency (ESA), yet another inter-governmental organization was established in 1978 and aims at promoting the peaceful purposes of cooperation among European states in space research, technology and its applications.[35] The ESA has 11 members and a special agreement for cooperation with non-European states.[36] Its programmes include communication satellites, meteorology and remote sensing now culminating in the successful launching of ARIANE.[37] Several program-

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mes of ESA are in close collaboration with the NASA, like the SPACE-LAB, which is to be launched by a US Space Shuttle.[38]

The specialized agencies of the UN have also played an important role in space research. The advent of satellites has had an enormous impact on the activities of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), which is the UN specialized agency for facilitating cooperation for the rapid exchange of weather information. A committee appointed by WMO noted that it should accept the responsibility of observing physical processes with the help of satellites.[39] The year 1961 was one of important developments, as a panel of experts of WMO reviewed the results of the first two meteorological satellites, namely TIROS I and II.[40] The experts enabled efficient communication to all countries of the observations from these weather satellites.

In 1962, WMO considered a plan for the measurement of atmospheric radioactivity.[41] The development of satellite technology led to the adoption in 1963 of one of the main WMO programme, the World Weather Watch (WWW).[42] It comprises of regional networks of stations recording weather information on land and air from meteorological satellites, meteorological data-processing centres and telecommunication facilities.[43] USA and USSR agreed on a joint programme in the field of meteorology, and stated that "it is important that the two satellite launching nations contribute their capabilities towards the establishment of a global weather satellite system for the benefit of other nations."[44] In this way WMO aids in environmental information,

Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) has also taken considerable interest in the development of space technology for maritime purposes. It made recommendations for improving existing radio-telephone and radio-telegraph facilities and decided to set up an International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) for navigational purposes.[45] IMCO has developed a global maritime distress and safety system.[46]

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has the responsibility to ensure that international civil aviation develops in a safe manner and that air transport services between different countries are established. In the field of space, it is concerned with the use of satellites for search and rescue operations, obtaining aeronautical meteorological data, transportation to and from outer space and problems related to safety including the possible danger to civil aircrafts in flight by space debris.[47] ICAO weather stations provide surface and upper air information for use in meteorological forecasting.[48]

The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is another UN specialized agency responsible for regulating international telecommunications, including space communications. Its primary role is to allocate,

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coordinate, notify and register radio frequencies and positions on the geostationary orbit for various radio communications services.[49] From time to time it establishes new rules for radio use in outer space. In 1977, it also agreed on plans for allocation of frequencies used in satellite television broadcasting.[50]

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) provides expert advice to states on the use of space communication for education and national development.[51] In 1972, it adopted a resolution for the free flow of information; spread of education and greater cultural exchange.[52] Each country has the right of deciding the content of educational programmes broadcast by satellite to its people.

United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) are other UN agencies engaged in space related activities.[53]

As opined in the beginning of this article, rapid development in the field of space technology has led to the realization of disastrous consequences of an arms race in outer space. Thus in August 1982, more than a decade after the first conference, the UN summoned the Second Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE '82).[54] The conference largely focused on future developments in space transportation systems, solar power stations in space, their potential benefit to mankind, and the implications for international cooperation.[55]

It was felt that there was a need to examine requirements such as training and infrastructure and an ever-growing need to increase awareness of the general public and decision makers regarding space technology.[56] A world-wide conference entirely devoted to this subject was more likely to meet these challenges than would a number of meetings at different times and in different places.[57] The conference was not to limit itself to the discussion of science and technology, instead, it was designed to consider their relevance to man and his environment.[58] The military aspects of outer space were the most controversial and acrimoniously debated items. In the opening statement, the UN Secretary General said:

> We must oppose vigorously the increased militarisation of outer space. We have time—but very little. Almost daily we read proposals and even plans to increase the military component of space programmes. It is essential that the forces of reason and peace join together to counter what would be a frightening escalation of the arms race. For once, we have the possibility to face jointly, as a human family the challenges and opportunities which lie in outer space for all humanity. The UN has the duty to be in the forefront of all those who

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choose peace, rather than war, in this last and greatest frontier of the Universe.[59]

The final report of the Conference urged nations with major space capabilities to contribute actively to prevent an arms race in outer space, for it was realized that "the maintenance of peace and security in outer space is of great importance for international peace and security."[60]

UNISPACE '82 was considered as an "integral part of the efforts of international community for the establishment of the New International Economic Order through the adoption of decisions aimed at the use of science and technology particularly for the developing countries."[61]

Even after the Conference was over, the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament kept debating on the issues of outer space. US categorically stated in the Committee on Disarmament in 1983, that "*some of the activities in outer space were important to its national security and that of its allies*" and that they intended to continue that role.[62] Other members pointed out that "*squandering of valuable material and human space programmes was condemnable.*"[63]

Soviets stressed the dangers of a "Space-based ABM defence which could disrupt the linkage between strategic offensive and defensive armaments embodied in the SALT-I Agreements."[64] The US on the other hand, stressed that the ABM Treaty in no way limited research activities in space-based ABM and that they would proceed beyond research only if their defensive systems were invulnerable and cost-effective; in other words, cheaper than the offensive systems.[65]

The resumption of the Geneva Arms Control talks gave an opportunity to COPUOS to devote all its "energies, resources and goodwill" to organize international cooperation for the non-military use of space.[66] Recently, it studied the environmental effects of solar power satellites,[67] and the problems of space debris which can "destroy a spacecraft owing to its high velocity."[68] Matters pertaining to the implementation of the recommendations of UNISPACE '82 and of remote sensing of earth by satellites were discussed.[69] The term remote sensing means the sensing of the Earth's surface from space with the help of electromagnetic waves, for improving management of natural resources and protection of environment.[70] Such activities are to be conducted in accordance with the principles contained in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.[71] Remote sensing shall promote the protection of mankind from natural disasters and all states participating in this are asked to furnish data of an impending natural disaster.[72]

Without overlooking the future, man must deal with his immediate problems. In varying degrees of urgency, man needs food, education, healthcare, energy and raw materials. Space technology by itself cannot

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solve all these problems but it is evident that it will have an effect on all these ends.[73]

In order to pre-empt an accelerating arms race in outer space, it is imperative that future arms-control agreements take place under the auspices of the United Nations. There is an urgent need for an Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Agreement, an elaborate verification regime and Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) talks within the UN. But first and foremost, the UN must define outer space and differentiate it from air space.

Despite its involvement in space activities since the dawn of the space age, the UN has not been very successful in preventing an arms race in space. This is so, because the permament members use this forum to further their respective interests, thereby neglecting those of other members. It must be realized by the space powers that there is no security other than common security. Concerted and rational efforts must be made by all members of the UN towards this direction, for ams race adds to the growth of violence in the world and diverts people from socially constructive works. Therefore, world public opinion must be channelised to pressurize for the preservation of our eco-system to fructify the visions of the founding fathers of the United Nations.

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CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY: OPENING TO THE WEST

By T.R. GHOBLE*

AFTER the hectic period of Cultural Revolution the Chinese leaders as well as their people felt the necessity to attain normalcy and refurbish stability. For Mao, the Ninth Party Congress constituted a hard fought victory over the Party machine loyal to Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. At the Congress Lin Biao in his 'Political Report' officially condemned Liu Shaoqi as "the arch representative of the persons in power taking the capitalist road."[1] Deng, spared formal denunciation, was quietly dropped from the Ninth Central Committee, and other prominent anti-Maoists faded into obscurity or simply disappeared.

In a move without precedence in the international communist movement, the 1969 Party Constitution[2] officially designated Lin Biao as 'Mao's successor'. It can be said here that the Ninth Party Congress represented a coalition between the Maoists and the Lin Biao faction at the national level. As was generally believed, Mao was supposed to have been unhappy with such a power distribution. He had every reason to be unhappy over the tremendous influence enjoyed by Lin Biao and the Central Military apparatus at the time of the Ninth Congress.[3] Nevertheless there can be no doubt that he believed that the rebuilt 'party centre' in 1969 was infinitely less bureaucratic than the one it had replaced. Perhaps the main reason why Mao was not too disturbed to see many of the radical ideas of the Cultural Revolution only partly achieved, was that he saw the Cultural Revolution dialectically as a process rather than as an event.[4] According to Mao there would be new periods of bureaucratization. To counter this a whole series of upheavals was necessary. With this belief ingrained firmly in his mind Mao visualized that the immediate task was to disallow or thwart the institutionalization of military participation in civilian administration. In the final analysis power should pass to the armed proletariat. The Cultural Revolution had not resulted in instant communism but who, apart from a few 'ultra-leftists', believed that it would? It had, however, created a precedent for rebellion which made the ossification of the Communist Party much more unlikely in the immediate future. The idea of "capitalist relations" as an intrinsic form of any transitional society had been well established; also the need for constant struggle to transform them was actuely felt.[5] The modified Great Leap situation which prevailed

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in 1969, as a result of the Cultural Revolution, provided a much better framework for that struggle than the old Soviet model or its "revisionists" transmogrification. By 1969 there was a new concentration on the importance of closing the urban-rural gap and indeed on the danger of any exacerbation of the division of labour. Education was now more closely geared to the production of people who were both "red and expert."* During the Cultural Revolution the people had experienced a profound lesson in the relationship between economic forms and political ideas and were ready to carry on where the Great Leap left off.

Between 1969 and 1973 came the eventful year of 1970. It was characterized by the attempt of Lin Biao to hold on to and consolidate power. The 'crisis' which arose out of the preposterous attempt of Lin Biao was of immense importance to Chinese politics. Hence, analyses based on the assumption that it was a mere power struggle will not be adequate to explain the event properly. Thus, it is rather inevitable for a Sinologist to study the event with an open mind trying to project a multifaceted approach.

In the period from 1969 till 1973 some significant changes are to be seen in the realm of policy-making in China. It seems that internal politics in China is not so much affected; on the other hand fundamental changes are perceptible in foreign policy. But one can not differentiate and compartmentalise the foreign policy as it is a logical extension of domestic politics and, hence, both aspects are parts of the same political process.[6]

Lin Biao personally set the theme for the policies which the Central Military now wanted to be implemented. By October 1969 Lin Biao revived certain campaigns which were a part of the 'Three Red Banners' programme during the Great Leap Forward.[7] A few weeks later once again he referred to a certain 'leap', which this time was to be "new and flying." Lin Biao reiterated; "we will advance in flying leaps, and at a speed which will turn one day into twenty years."[8] Lin Biao by now had made it clear that he seriously wanted to attempt to reverse the revisionist interpretation of Mao's concept of development and to reintroduce essential elements of this concept into China. Once again the Maoist concept of 'politics in command' was to be the basic principle for China's development, and the country's underdevelopment was to be overcome by the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses.[9]

By 1969 Lin Biao and his group had already been aware of the fact that the attempt to reintroduce Maoist concept of development during Cultural Revolution had failed. The mobilization of youth dynamism

*"Red and expert" and "Socialist education for the cadres" these phrases circulated at the beginning of 1957.

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and the trust placed in the spontaneity of revolutionary masses had both been proved wrong. They came to the conclusion that discipline and military organization were, therefore, to be the basis for a new start. This is shown in particular by the choice of methods of mobilization, which were employed by the military leadership. The leadership pursued a threefold aim—first, the concentrations of rival leftist youngsters in the cities was to be broken up and in this way the consolidation policy of the new leadership was to be supported. Secondly, they were hopeful that the youngsters would learn discipline from the peasants while working in the field. Finally, the centre expected a mobilizatory effect from this campaign which would result in the gradual reduction of the differences between mental and manual labour.[10] There seemed to be some promising signs of success in the attempts made to recreate the mobilizatory desire of the "Great Leap Forward"* in factories and rural People's Communes. In November 1969 the leadership of Beijing Iron and Steel Works made exemplary demands for a tighter management of work in industrial plants. Anarchy and factionalism were to be done away with.[11] In the agricultural sector there was a movement during the winter of 1969-70 to reverse the concession granted to peasants, as private enterprise in the early 1960's.[12]

By autumn of 1970 the basic elements of the mobilization campaign to be introduced by Lin Biao and his closest collaborators in the Central Military had clearly taken shape. The goal of Mao's concept of development through mobilization, which had been sacrificed directly during the economic crisis of the early sixties, was now finally to be realised through the extension of the military principle of organization and behavioural norms to the civilian sector of the society. For this reason the leadership had to make increased demands on the masses. The Army was now supposed to be utterly convinced of its ideological duty and thus actively committed to the militarization of society in order thereby to realize the concept of a thoroughly indoctrinated and egalitarian Army State.[12] However, by 1970 this particular notion about the Army's pivotal role had to face the challenge thrown by a counter concept. The bulk of the regional military commanders preferred internal stability to economic experiments. They wanted the Army to be a coalition of professional soldiers, each with his own power base. Hence, they did not like the idea of the leadership's 'demands on the masses' in order to arouse its sympathies and cooperation.[13] Consequently a situation arose where the contradictions developed and assumed surrealist proportions. Therefore it was rather inherent in the nature of the

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circumstances that a conflict and crisis of the worst kind was an inevitable result. The conflict substantially eroded Lin Biao's power base and ultimately brought about his downfall. With the aggravation of the situation, the country entered another internal crisis, with effeets comparable to those of the Cultural Revolution, even if the form of these effects was fundamentally different.

FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-CULTURAL REVOLUTION ERA: A SHIFT IN ORIENTATION AND OUTLOOK

Communist China's foreign policy over the years has created immense interest in the minds of students of international politics. Such a surfeit of attention is attributable to the enigmatic image presented by China to the outside world. Their posture has been 'enigmatic' because they have professed that they seek to change the existing world order and nevertheless they have continued to strive for tactical gains in the present set up. From the time of their liberation till the momentous break with Soviet Union, Communist China could be easily identified with the Socialist Bloc. But with the emergence and growth of a Sino-Soviet rift[14] there was a deliberate effort in Beijing to formulate and evolve an 'independent world policy'.

China's foreign policies, like its domestic policies, have undergone many changes in direction and emphasis, and therefore cannot be characterized with simple generalizations. At different times since 1949, leaders have had sharply differing perceptions of the opportunities and dangers of confronting them, have shifted national priorities and goals, and have pursued varying startegies and tactics. Despite all changes however there have been significant continuities; hence, it is important to understand both the elements of change and elements of continuity.

The image of the international community propagated by the Chinese Communist leadership in 1949—shared at that time with leaders in Moscow and, for that matter, in Washington as well—reflected the Cold War views of that period. The world was portrayed in essentially black-and-white, bipolar terms. The crucial fact of international life was believed to be an intense struggle between two blocs or 'camps'—a revolutionary "socialist camp" headed by Soviet Union and a counter revolutionary "imperialist camp" headed by the United States.[15] The Chinese like the Russians and the Americans regarded the arena for this struggle as world-wide. Neutrality was impossible. There was no possibility, Mao declared in 1949, of pursuing a "third road."[16] All nations and forces must of necessity be linked to or associated with one side or the other.[17]

In conformity with the basic premises (based on a strictly 'two camps'

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outlook) the Chinese had reached at certain exclusive and typical conclusions in the early years of their nascent state. The Chines decided that in such a bipolar world their interests required close alignment with Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc. Apparently 'ideology' was given more importance, but nevertheless security and national interest was mingled with their ideologically oriented foreign policies. Beijing was constrained to adopt an overtly antagonistic posture towards United States. both for historical as well as ideological reasons. "American Imperialism" remained the principal contradiction in the international system in the eyes of the Chinese.

The military alliance entered into by Communist China with the Soviet Union in 1950 was ostensibly directed against United States and its far-eastern ally Japan. Unquestionably this act itself became the basic determinant of Chinese foreign policy in the following years. But the alliance with Soviet Union gave to Communist China as many disadvantages as the advantages it ushered in for the new state. It limited their flexibility in international relations.[18] In years to come Chinese national interests brought an unprecedented as well as unimaginable schism between the two 'elder brothers' of International Communism. In the early 1950's of course there was no reason for Beijing's leaders to anticipate this course of events, and they deliberately chose to make the Sino-Soviet Alliance the keystone of China's foreign policy.[19] Along with the policy of 'leaning to one side' China actively and overtly followed a line in which the revolutionary content in foreign policy was conspicuous. The revolutionary militancy of the Chinese Communists was largely expressed, however, in rhetoric rather than concrete action. Thus their support to revolution elsewhere was mere moral exhortation and ideological backing.

The Korean War subjected Communist China to a new situation where many premises in the 'belief pattern' of foreign policy making in Beijing underwent drastic changes. In the process a line for the future was adequately crystallized. In mid-1950's following the North Korean attack on South Korea, the United States decided to send American troops to support South Korea. In the meantime the United States' decision to 'neutralize' the Taiwan Strait, was looked upon by the Chinese (fairly justifiably) as a direct involvement in the civil war. From 1950 until the agreement for truce in 1953 the Korean War became the chief concern for both China and United States.[20]

In retrospect it seems that both United States and China made serious miscalculations, during the early months of the Korean War, with consequences that were to shape their respective policies for years to come.[21] Both the countries overreacted to the possible threat posed to each other. On the other hand, China was visibly dissatisfied with

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Soviet Union's ambiguous stand and its unwillingness to help China directly on the threat of a war with United States. The war, however, involved sizeable political as well as military costs for Beijing. One was a significant delay in China's entry into the international community and the postponement by several years of normal state-to-state relations between China and the majority of the non-communist world.[22] For advantage United States used all its influence on the world community to 'isolate China' as far as possible.

From 1949 till 1952 China's foreign policy interests had focused almost exclusively on other communist nations and parties and closely associated insurrectionary and revolutionary forces. In late 1952, under the slogan of "peaceful co-existence", the cultivation of non-offieial relations with many different kinds of groups abroad was initiated. It was at this time that Beijing initiated an active programme of "peoples' diplomacy."[23] China began to open up diplomatic relationship with the non-communist states. Between 1954 and 1958 Beijing established relations with thirteen more non-communist nations and with Yugoslavia. The list included three non-communist Western European states (including United Kingdom), but the rest were nations—mostly small—in the developing world.[24]

Still China continued to stress that close relationship with Soviet Union and other Communist States was necessary to effectively counter United States. But China, by now, had changed its view on the 'neutral powers' in the world. They were not merely 'running dogs' of American Imperialism. Chinese foreign policy was directed to woo the neutralist nations with a view to disintegrate American influence in the world. Their goal was to break out of isolation and to create a united front that would have substantial Third World support. They also hoped to weaken gradually the international position of the United States, particularly in Asia.[25] During this phase, which has been described as the 'Bandung period', which lasted until 1957-58, Beijing worked hard to establish its respectability and responsibility as a major power and to underline its desire for peaceful, friendly relations with non-communist nations. The Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai proclaimed that "revolution cannot be exported."[26] The outcome of this approach was the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet, in which Beijing and New Delhi sponsored the so-called five principles of co-existence.[27] In fact, however, the 'Bandung period' proved to be brief.

By late 1957 Beijing had abandoned its relatively flexible and moderate posture of 1954-57 and was moving towards a much more militant and revolutionary stance once again.[28] In 1957 Mao proclaimed that the "East wind will prevail over the West wind". He called for greater militancy on the part of the entire communist world towards the imperi-

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alists and in particular toward the United States. A major shift of this proportion in the domain of foreign policy is indicative of a complementary process of basic changes in domestic policies. In fact, the shift in the basic policies in internal politics may have caused the parallel change or shift of emphasis in the foreign policy. The Great Leap Forward of late 1950's was coupled with the worsening of the Sino-Soviet relations. Hence, it is imperative to understand the nature of Sino-Soviet schism in order to form a reasonably acceptable opinion on the mechanism of China's foreign policy.

China's relations with the outside world from the period of Great Leap Forward has had to tackle the all important question of their relationship with Soviet Union. The year 1958 is a veritable watershed in matters of both domestic as well as foreign policy of Communist China.[29] In the course of that year decisions were taken not only about introduction of a specifically Chinese path of development, but the first steps were also taken towards a specifically Chinese foreign and world policy. However, China's departure from the strict guidelines of Stalinist development policy and the simultaneous attempt to increase its room for manoeuvre in foreign policy did not at that time serve the ends which clearly emerged in the 1960's, namely, bringing about a total break with its Soviet ally. The change of direction in both areas of Chinese politics arose at that time from different sets of motives.[30] But the Soviet leadership assumed that the Chinese counterpart have decided to defy them on all accounts[31]

Until the autumn of 1957 the alliance between China and the Soviet Union in terms of foreign policy, i.e., both states' policy towards the non-Communist countries, had functioned smoothly.[32] Apart from relying on economic and technical matters, China showed a distinct dependency on Soviet Union in the matter of foreign policy. But gradually China showed its open disgust with the liberal approach taken by Khrushchev in accepting Yugoslavia's neutral position in the international set-up. The Chinese accused Khrushchev of evolving a long term policy of peaceful co-existence with the 'Imperialist West', which could never be accepted by the Chinese either on the ideological plane or from the angle of national interest.

The Chinese argued that a long term policy of *detente* assumes the status quo as the basis of ongoing compromises in power politics between the Soviet Union and the USA. It also assumes the renunciation of the need to protect one-sided Chinese interest like, for example, its interest in reintegrating Taiwan into the mainland states system.[33] The Chinese feared, at the same time, that the long term *detente* between Soviet Union and the United States will reduce the role of Beijing in all the important decision making processes of the international community.

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In retrospection we can agree that the Chinese fears were partially substantial.

By 1958 both Soviet Union and Communist China had come to a stage where serious differences of opinion were aired on questions of international politics.[34] The Chinese leadership tried their utmost to prevent Soviet Union from going forward with the policy of *detente* with the USA. The year 1958 is even more important because Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, declared their intention of becoming a nuclear power. In the same year the Taiwan Straits crisis and the bombardment of the island of Quemoy proved a difficult testing time for Sino-Soviet relations. It is surmised that the Chinese wanted to provoke Soviet Union to commit them for direct help. Again a few months later there occurred serious incidents on the border of China and India, which proved that there no longer remained a unanimity between Soviet Union and China even at times of conflict with other states.

The Sino-Soviet conflict had its roots in the de-Stalinization speech made by Khrushchev in 1956.[35] A few years later the Chinese were to state, "The truth is that the whole series of differences of principle in international communist movement began more than seven years ago. To be specific, it began with the 20th Congress of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) in 1956."[36] Furthermore, the most bitter exchange between the CPSU and the CCP started off on the occasion of the ninetieth birth anniversary of Lenin (20 April 1960). On this day Beijing started its large-scale propaganda attack on the Soviet Union's leadership. But in this attack the name of Soviet Union was not mentioned, hence, the polemics remained indirect and veiled. The Soviet reply came at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU where Khrushchev used 'Albania' as a disguise to attack China.[37]

The autumn of 1962 can be regarded in more ways than one as a momentous year in East-West relations due to the Cuban Crisis.[38] The dramatic nature of the crisis has yet remained uncontested. It also acted as an indicator of the respective positions of Russia and China on international problems. China was accused by Soviet leaders of employing tactics of disturbance during the Cuban missile crisis.[39] In the same year the Sino-Indian border conflict[40] also proved to be a vexatious problem for the Soviet Union. In 1963 Great Britain, United States and Soviet Union signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, much to the consternation of Communist China. At this stage Mao Zedong and his colleagues had come to the stark conclusion[41] that an agreement or understanding with Khrushchev is no more possible. But the following year (14 October 1964) saw the departure of Khrushchev,[42] who was replaced by a coalition of leadership led by Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin. A change in leadership at Kremlin was not enough to ameli-

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orate the dilapidated situation of Sino-Soviet relationship. Soon China exploded its first atomic bomb and signalled to the world a seemingly apocalyptic message.[43] At once, in tangible terms, the world came to realise that China had attained the stature and the capacity to become an 'independent world power'. In November 1964 Zhou Enlai made a trip to Moscow;[44] apparently both the leaders in Kremlin and Beijing wanted to exhibit their willingness to reach a solution. But in fact both the sides were not prepared to yield from their dogmatic assertive positions.[45]

In tracing the origins of the Sino-Soviet dispute, it can be argued that the causes must be sought in deep-rooted historical, geopolitical and cultural differences between the two countries and in ideological and policy differences between the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties that long predated any overt signs of conflict in the post-1949 period.[46] Keeping this in view we have to study the arguments in the Sino-Soviet debate as it evolved in the sixties. Conflict of opinions between the CCP and the CPSU covered both ideological and strategic issues. There were sharp differences between the Chinese and the Soviet stands on the present character of imperialism, the inevitability or non-inevitability of war,[47] the nature of "peaceful co-existence", the feasibility and desirability of using violent revolutionary methods, the possibility of disarmament and *detente* with the West, and many others. On all these issues Beijing took the more militant position and accused Moscow of departing from Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. The ideological element in the dispute was obviously important and reflected a widening gap between the Soviet and the Chinese perceptions of the world and their basic policy predispositions, both at home and abroad.[48]

In the early years of conflict with Soviet Union the leaders of the People's Republic of China took advantage particularly of the long term political and psychological crisis which Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinization had left within the "*socialist camp*" and in the whole of the international communist movement. Initially the Sino-Soviet dispute was itself a part of this crisis, which had a debilitating effect on the Soviet Union.[49]

But by 1965 Chinese foreign policy faced difficult situations. Moreover, the high tension on the domestic front in fact contributed adversely to the debilitation of the leadership. America had already started bombing of Vietnam, thereby creating a situation where the Chinese had to be cautious enough not to allow the Soviet Union an advantageous position in fighting American Imperialism. Two further events were to supplement the catalogue of China's foreign policy failures: the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistani War, and the fall of Sukarno after a Communist insurrection had been put down by the Indonesian Army.[50] In both

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cases Beijing felt completely deprived of its sphere of influence. It had lost its most important partners in foreign policy—Pakistan and Indonesia.

1965 is also important from the point of view of Lin Biao's "international revolutionary strategy" after the example of the Communist revolution in China. On 3 September 1965 Lin Biao delivered a speech marking the twentieth anniversary of the end of the last Sino-Japanese War, from which we can derive the basic precepts of the declared *weltanschauung*. According to Lin Biao, "the contemporary world presents a picture of the encirclement of the cities by the rural areas."[51] Lin Biao's explanations aroused attention particularly because at that time they were associated with a clear declaration of China's attitude to Vietnam War. The Minister of Defence, Lin Biao, thereby chalked out the Chinese strategy toward both Soviet Union and United States.

LIN BIAO'S GEO-POLITICS: GUERRILLA TACTICS INTERNATIONALIZED

In September 1965 a politico-military doctrine of supreme importance was formulated by Lin Biao, as is evident in his treatise entitled 'Long Live the Victory of the People's War'. The frankness of the essay reminds one of a little noticed sentence in the "Communist Manifesto" that "the communists disdain to conceal their view and aims", and to all intents and purposes it lays down the ideological grounds for China's diplomacy. It was a blend of theory and lines of action in world revolution. Writing with an eye on Vietnam, but mainly mapping a grand strategy for the future Armageddon of the communist and non-communist forces, Lin explained well Beijing's world outlook.[52]

Building on Mao's guerrilla tactics, Lin seeks to apply them from intra-to the international sphere. The eclat of the tactics was fairly patent at certain stages in the rise of Mao to power; however, truth requires one to append that toward the later years of civil strife in China, the reverse was the case. Frequently the hugger mugger retreat of the nationalist troops from towns forced the Reds to fill in the urban void first and then fan out in the countryside. Be that as it may, Lin seized the idea and managed to universalize it. The capitalist redoubts in North America and Western Europe, he said, arc cities of the world, with rural areas in Asia, Africa and Latin America. According to Lin's formulation the latter continents which now form a tight knit trio in the communist propaganda vintage are the 'main battlefield' of the fierce struggle between the peoples of the world on the one hand and U.S. Imperialism on the other.[53] China should strive to limit the influe-

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nce of America in the area. Lin drew the conclusion that the forces which dominate the 'continental trio' would dominate our planet entirely. When socialism prevails in these rural parts of the world, the urban parts would fall as a matter of course.

In the treatise Lin Biao always pointed to the example of the Anti-Japanese War in China to prove that the most important revolutionary war in the world was the 'people's war' and that in such a war victory was certain. However, by pointing back to the historical experiences of the Chinese Communists in the Anti-Japanese War he had chosen the most unsuitable example.[54] Japan's downfall was not achieved in China, but rather on Japanese soil, and it certainly did not come about because of the 'revolutionary awareness' of the Chinese peoples but with the help of the most modern weaponry available at that time, namely the first Atom Bomb, developed and applied by the U.S.A. But on 3 September 1965, Lin Biao perhaps hoped to instil into Chinese politics the fervour of a mass campaign against Liu Shaoqi and also to clamour for a similar strategy against Soviet Union in the international plane. To serve this purpose, the 'Long Live People's War' did offer the services it was required to deliver. In Chinese society zealous people pointed to this treatise to draw mass appeal for the mentioned campaigns.

In the meantime, by November 1965, China had come to the painful conclusion that there can be absolutely no scope for mending fences with Soviet Union. Hence an editorial in a leading Chinese newspaper declared the Soviet Union to be an enemy who stood in antagonistic contradiction to the People's Republic of China.[55]

The net effect of all the foreign policy moves of China during this period was to create a situation which constantly pushed it into unprecedented isolation. It is interesting to note that Foreign Minister Chen Yi, at this juncture, did not apparently feel satisfied with the formulation of Beijing's 'independent world policy'. In 1967 when the Red Guards held sway in Beijing, they took the opportunity to vehemently criticise Chen Yi, but he was not purged.[56] In the same year Beijing called back all its ambassadors from abroad. In August the Red Guards assumed control over the Foreign Ministry in Beijing, and consequently issued a wave of protest notes; which contributed adversely to the already worsening relationship with foreign powers.

As the revolutionary fervour began to subside, a mood of moderation was perceptible in China's foreign affairs. But subsequently with the 'moderating attitude' of China, its relationship with Soviet Union deteriorated to an extent when an armed conflict could not have been ruled out. The Ninth Party Congress was convened on 1 April 1969, against this backdrop.

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The Ninth Party Congress did obviously herald a 'changed orientation' in Beijing's foreign affairs. It sounded the death knell of the 'totally independent Chinese World Policy'. The Chinese leadership came to realise that their 'isolationist' stand was in no case 'tenable' given the mechanics of the world situation. Moreover the threat from Soviet Union assumed added significance with reference to their intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968,[57] which indicated the belief that Russia might at least try to pressurize Communist China. The heavy fighting on the Ussuri island of Chen-pao (Damansky) undoubtedly gave the leadership in Peking a severe shock.[58] Beijing had every reason to take '*Brezhnev doctrine*' seriously.[59] At the time of the Hungarian Crisis in 1956, Mao Zedong and his followers had themselves sanctioned this thesis. But at this moment the 'doctrine' had not crystallized, hence the dangers were not prognosticated by CCP leaders. In 1968, China heavily criticized the Soviets as 'social imperialists' and at the same time accused Alexander Dubcek of being a reformist.

In 1969 the Chinese characterized the Soviets as the 'New Czars', who sought to criticise the expanionist designs of a 'social imperialist' leadership in Kremlin.[60] The accusation that Russia had turned expansionist was substantiated by that country's successful foreign policy offensives in the Indian sub-continent (1965 Indo-Pak border conflict and Tashkent talks), and in their efforts to strike a *rapprochement* with Japan and Western European Powers.

Thus, to effectively counter Soviet Union's success in the world scene, China felt the dire necessity of a tangential turn in its approach to foreign policy. But Lin Biao's Political Report[61] to the Ninth Party Congress did not evince the fact that he had personally realized the necessity for such a change.[62] On the other hand, he painted the picture of the world in such a way that it looked like a battle of all against all and thereby justifying the continuation of a strategy of simultaneous conflict. Lin, therefore, announced that the general line of the Chinese foreign policy would, in future, be determined by the invincible trinity of proletarian internationalism towards the Socialist countries, peaceful co-existence towards states of different social systems, and revolutionary solidarity with the world's revolutionary forces.[63] Lin's exposition remained incoherent. He declared his government's willingness to start relations with all the world's non-communist countries on the basis of peaceful co-existence. At the same time, he deemed it an honour of China to be exposed to the two Super Powers' continuous attempts at blockade.[64] He mentioned that China needed at all times to be prepared against a military attack by 'US Imperialism' as well as by 'Soviet Revisionism', and that it had to be equipped for both a conventional and nuclear war. In so many words Lin wanted to

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convey the opinion that final victory will be of the proletariat and the 'revolutionary people's of the countries.

As regards the three basic objectives of Chinese foreign policy, viz., proletarian internationalism, peaceful co-existence with the different peoples of the world, and revolutionary solidarity with revolutionary forces, it was Lin Biao's firm belief that his country would be ultimately successful. But the events of the following years prove that Lin Biao's premises and convictions regarding foreign policies appeared too fragile and unrealistic in face of the major constraints of 'real politik' in international affairs.

THE NINTH PARTY CONGRESS AND AFTER

An *apriori* sum up of the events after this Congress would lead one to an conclusion that Sino-American *detente* is nothing but a natural offshoot of deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations. Basing on this premise many writers on China's foreign policy have furthered the argument that increasing fear of the possibility of a Soviet military attack propelled China to improve relations with U.S.A. This sort of an explanation does not seem to be tangential to what might really have happened, on the other hand nor does this form the core of the facts, at best sharply deteriorating contributing factors for the Sino-American thaw. But it, by itself alone, does not fully explain the totality of China's attitude in the post-Cultural Revolution period. To substantiate this explanation we have to go back to stark facts.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry statement on 26 November 1968, regarding the resumption of Sino-American Ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, has been very often cited as an evidence of China's initiative.[65] A careful study of the background of this proposal will enable us to see this move as part of a routine process of talks which had not ceased even during the days of the Cultural Revolution.[66] The proposal does not corroborate the argument that at this time both Communist China and United States were willing to (more so than before) settle the question of Taiwan through negotiations. Moreover, even if the Chinese had tried to hit at Soviet Union through such overtures, they would only have been interested in a 'signalling' and nothing beyond it. It is rather worthwhile to remind ourselves at this stage that Chinese reaction to Russian action in Czechoslovakia in 1968 did obviously show their utmost concern. In the Chinese eyes Soviet action in this East European country had tacit approval of U.S. Imperialism. Consequently, they argued, Soviet Union was bound to take a soft line on United States' war against the Vietnamese people, as this would be logically consistent with American approval of action against Prague.[67]

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The option of improving Sino-American relations as a counter-weight against the Soviet military threat, if indeed such an option had been under consideration, could have had to depend on other variable conditions.[68] For an enterprise of this kind China would have had to sacrifice its interests either in North Vietnam or Taiwan; either of the two alternatives should have been highly detestable for the men in Beijing. Moreover for a major *rapprochement* with United States a consensus among the Chinese leadership on this account was a minimum pre-requisite, which of course could never have been reached given the framework of party apparatus. Again the simmering flux in the domestic scene could not have permitted any move of this sort.

We have seen that no difinite decision was taken by Chinese leaders to deliberately try for an improvement of relations with U.S.A. during the post-Ninth Party Congress. It is pertinent on our part to examine the validity of the Soviet military threat on China, and the degree of its portended menace in the offing. The parallel between the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the enunciation of Brezhnev doctrine on the one hand, and a surgical strike on China's nuclear facilities or even major industrial centres—not to say the occupation of China in the Czechoslovakian style—on the other, was far-fetched. If a Soviet surgical strike upon China's nuclear facilities had been in the minds of the Soviet leadership, then the Cultural Revolution period would have been a much better time—when China was in a state of upheaval, when Sino-Soviet relations were sharply deteriorating, and when Chinese nuclear capabilities were more rudimentary. It would also be most difficult to estimate China's reactions towards such a surgical strike; a protracted conventional war might be a probable result, and it would be a scenario which all rational Soviet leaders would surely choose to avoid. Notwithstanding all such arguments to prove the improbability of a Soviet attack even if such a surgical strike had taken place, it would have been sheer foolishness to look to U.S.A. for an effective rebuff to Soviet Union. During this period, Secretary of State of America, William P. Rogers, remarked in Australia that a Sino-Soviet conflict would not be in the United States' interest and defined the Nixon Administration as 'neutral' should a Sino-Soviet conflict ensue.[69] Moreover there were repeated rumours to prove that America did not want the Soviet Union to carry out a surgical strike on Communist China at this stages. Another aspect of the Sino-Soviet border skirmish of March 1969 has not been properly elucidated. It stands to reason that both Moscow and Beijing could derive limited gains from a minor hostility of this particular nature. Moscow did not want to divert the attention of the leaders all over the world from the Czechoslovak crisis. Simultaneously, Beijing saw a limited tension in the border would

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ensure Party unity and hence augment the task of rebuilding the political fabric.

We have seen that China's approach to the West was not simply an offshoot of Soviet military threat. Moreover, the threat itself was the product of speculation; hence, it was unreal. Keeping these two propositions in mind we have to examine the general theories of China's post-Cultural Revolution foreign policy. The principal characteristics of the Chinese foreign policy in this period was to be seen in the following features: (a) the placing of Soviet Union on an equal footing with the United States, (b) the renewal of flexible united front including the second intermediate zone.[70] These themes were again more clearly elaborated in the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969. In Section VII of Lin Biao's Report to the Congress which presented the framework of China's foreign policy, it was clearly stated that,

> There are four major contradictions in the world today: the contradiction between the oppressed nations on the one hand and imperialism and social imperialism on the other, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist and revisionist countries; the contradiction between imperialist and social-imperialist countries and among the imperialist countries; and the contradiction between socialist countries on the one hand and imperialism and social imperialism on the other.[71]

Within the context of these contradictions, China's foreign policy was then outlined. It was claimed that the policy followed by Communist China in world politics was highly consistent over the years. The Report said that they have sought to develop relations of friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation with socialist countries on the principle of proletarian internationalism; to support and assist the revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed people and nations; to strive for peaceful relations with countries having different social systems on the basis of the five principles of Peaceful Co-existence.[72] Again it was reiterated that Communist China's foreign policy is not based upon expediency; it is a policy in which they have long persisted, and will still pursue this in future.

A vital aspect of Lin Biao's foreign policy assertion remained rather implicit in his report; that of regarding the Social Imperialism to be of the same category as American Imperialism. There was but only one Social Imperialist country in the world—Soviet Union; hence there is no contradiction in the Socialist Imperialist camp. East European nations obviously belonged to another category. The fact that social imperialism was made qualitatively similar to the U.S. Imperialism is definitely a

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major shift when compared to foreign policy formulation of Peng Zhen in 1965. In the Ninth Congress Lin Biao exhorted: "All countries and people subjected to aggression, control, intervention or bullying by U.S. Imperialism and Soviet revisionism unite and form the broadcast possible united front and overthrow the common enemies."[73] But in 1965 according to Peng Zhen's list, the contradictions between Marxism-Leninism and modern revisionism and that between socialism and imperialism were two separate contradictions. In the principal contradiction between the oppressed nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and U.S. Imperialism, the Soviet Union was simply excluded. Thus, by 1969, China had come to regard Soviet Union to be of the same stratum as United States. But in foreign policy-making the contradiction between socialist imperialism and U.S. imperialism has to be exploited. Regarding the United Front, there were to be important changes too besides the inclusion of Soviet Union as a target. The broadening of the United Front was an obvious theme; and China sought to make friends with "90 per cent of the world's population."

CHINA'S WEST-ORIENTED FOREIGN POLICY

When China began looking westward, the leadership had to face opposition from within the Party. Foreign policy as such was a major field of disagreement between the radicals and ultra-left during the period 1969-70. But it is quite difficult to determine just exactly when the disagreement began. As far as Zhou Enlai was concerned, the strategy based on the generalization of Lin Biao's people's war thesis had manifestly failed to produce any results.[74] In fact during the Cultural Revolution, China's foreign policy record was one long series of estrangements, which however satisfying to purist 'ultra leftists', was neither helping China nor advancing the cause of the world socialism. Though parts of the world's countryside (such as Vietnam) were weakening the 'world's cities' (the United States), the Third World prospect offered very little in terms of a United Front from below. Approximately during the times when the Cultural Revolution began nnternational relations had begun to show clear signs of change. There were distinct differences between United States and some of its NATO allies on the question of Vietnam.[75] As far as China was concerned, the leaders in Beijing had enough to be happy about in the prospect of establishing relationship with Canada, Italy and Belgium, as the latter countries had by 1968 expressed their willingness to do so.[76] All indications went on to prove that the United States Bloc was on the verge of pluralization. Consequently, on the other hand, the Soviet Bloc, which was subjected to unprecedented strains after the Czechoslovak operation, was also facing

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position which would eventually lead to disintegration. The all important question asked in Beijing was, could China still maintain a purist stand off position with both the major world power blocs disintegrating,

As the radicals saw it, the Soviet Union and the United States, in their struggle for world hegemony, oscillated between policies of competition and collusion (when threatened from outside). Therefore it was argued that it was naive to regard both of them as undifferentiated enemies. Rather, China should exploit the contradictions of each of them and their client-states. To do this, avenues of communication had to be reopened between China and the Soviet Union and also with United States. The parallel between 1969-70 and 1945 was immediately recalled. At that time the Chinese Communist Party negotiated with Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) and yet prepared actively for the resumption of hostilities.

It is impossible to say exactly when and how Lin Biao and the 'ultra-left' reacted to these developments, beyond the fact that Lin Biao was said to have opposed the new foreign policy line, presumably out of a crude ideological purism and more particularly since the new strategy negated his whole generalized People's War thesis.

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NEO-COLONISATION OF AFRICA AND THE OAU

By SEGUN JOHNSON*

The early part of the sixties witnessed a rapid decolonization of several parts of Africa even though many have argued that these were mere placations otherwise referred to as flag independence. The seventies and thereafter have witnessed the re-colonisation of African States or in proper terms, the neo-colonisation of Africa by Western Powers. That African States since their qualified independence have been in bondage was never in doubt. Subtly but seriously, the Western Powers through its hydraheaded multinational corporations, in conjuction with international institutions and conventions, have taken over the affairs of African States ranging from politics through economics to culture. While these were going on, the Organization of African Unity stood aloof concerned with nothing in particular or perhaps helpless or on another note used as a tool by Western imperialism.

It is the contention of this paper that Africa was neo-colonized by Western Powers mainly because there was no collective resistance that should have been envisaged and given by the Organization for African Unity. The formation, structure, financing and the objectives of OAU at the outset were inadequate to foresee and attack Western surreptitious moves to further imperialism in the seventies and beyond. Consequently, the OAU not only folded its arms while Western perpetrators went away with their imperialistic loot but was also consciously or unconsciously, directly or indirecly, covertly or overtly used in the course of the neocolonisation of African States.

THE formation of OAU was precipitated largely by political considerations; it was at the height of the cold war with its attendant bipolarity of the world. In consonance, the two emerged blocs during the formative stages of the OAU were a conservative Monrovia bloc which was sympathetic to the West and a left-oriented Casablanca bloc identified with socialist tenets.

Of importance to note is that the Monrovia bloc was principally constituted by Brazzaville Group of countries comprising the Francophone states as 'liberated' by De Gaulle. After the 1958 purported independence to African Francophone states, De Gaulle ensured that these states coagulate into a Union Afro-Malagasy (UAM) whose name was later

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changed to *Organisation Commune Afrique Malagasy* (OCAM). It was thus easy for it to form the core of the Monrovia bloc that became a formidable reactionary group that eventually determined the path of the OAU as the Casablanca bloc lost the initiative to group all African States together in a nitty posture against possible Western imperialistic machinations. Subsequent meetings and the eventual formation saw the conservative bloc of Monrovia dominating and charting the course of OAU.

The culmination of all this was the redomination of African States by the former metropoles in a fashion that they could not be held responsible for unlike the case during the colonial days. Had Nkrumah not once noted that neo-colonialism was

> the worst form of imperialism. For those who practise it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress. In the days of old-fashioned colonialism, the imperial power had at least to explain and justify at home the actions it was taking abroad. In the colony those who serve the ruling imperial power could at least look to its protection against any violent move by their opponents. With neo-colonialism, neither is the case. (Nkrumah, 1965)

African leaders having sold out their countries for personal gains left the economy, politics, military, culture and communications to the imperialists to manipulate for their own ends. It is only pertinent to study the neocolonisation of Africa through one and only one paradigm: structuralism.

STRUCTURALIST PARADIGM OF NEO-COLONIALISM

The structuralist paradigm which encompasses imperialism emanates from the Kantian philosophy of morality, the dialectics of Hegel, Marx's historical materialism as well as those of Engels and Lenin. This paradigm bridges the gap between politics and economics, exposes the solidarity among groups of common circumstances and historical changes in response to technological development and their implications in laws, ideologies and governmental institutions.

Significantly, structuralism has contributed a lot to the study of imperialism. Although, for the first half of the twentieth century it did not gain prominence, since the early 1950s it has become impossible to ignore its presence and importance in the study of international relations as presented by eminent scholars like A. Gramsci (1973), N. Poulantzas (1978), L. Althusser (1984), E Laclau (1979), C. Ake (1981) and

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B. Onimode (1983). Imperialism as a theoretical framework is being used here to understand the extra-territorial forces that are marginalising the proper independence of African states. It is thus imperative at this juncture to delve into other works on imperialism to serve as the basis of our understanding.

Often, imperialism has been described as unequal relations between the metropoles and the colonies. It is however essential to know the real basis for the extra territorial reach-out for capitalist countries. Thus, it is essential that we start from the contradictions of the capitalist system.

It is the view of Marxist economists that there is the tendency for a falling rate of profit on capital which may be caused by a number of reasons including under-consumption and the growing organic composition of capital. The latter is explained thus: where S=Surplus, C= Capital or equipment, often termed constant capital, V=Wages or variable capital, then the rate of profit is $\frac{s}{c+v}$; class struggle maintains the rate of exploitation or $\frac{s}{v}$ to be constant whilst organic composition of capital or $\frac{c}{v}$ is growing and as a result the rate of profit of $\frac{s}{c+v} = \frac{(s/v)}{(c/v+v/v}$ is declining. In order to offset the declining rate of profit, the capitalist exports his capital to a 'virgin' land which may lead to the formation of colonies or in the present day fashion, neo-colonialist state. Related to this are the processes of capltal concentration and centralization. Capital concentration is the growth of capital through the reinvestment of profits while capital concentration is the process of aggregation of a number of capitalists into bigger but few combinations. The result of capitalism is a serious competition which in a short time may lead to monopolies or possibly joint stock companies which at the end dwarf small firms or even exterminate them. In essence, capital becomes enlarged and hierarchically organised. During the formative process, industrial and financial capital would emerge from banks into finance capital. The young emerging monopolies, still weak in their youthful stage to control the world market, would solicit and support states in their expansionist policies in exchange for economic protection from the state.

Many Marxist economists basically agree on the explanation above but differ on the interpretation. Our concern for now may not be their idiosyncratic and theoretical variations, but the major elements present in all for our analytical purposes. It may be pertinent to delve into a few of the numerous literature available on the subject. First what exactly is imperialism?

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Claude Ake defines imperialism as "the economic control and exploitation of foreign lands arising from the necessity for counteracting the impediment to the accumulation of capital engendered by the internal contradictions of the domestic capitalist economy." (Ake, 1981) Ake accepts Michael Baratt Brown's definition of imperialism which is

> the outward drive of certain peoples...to build empires—both formal colonies and privileged positions in markets, protected sources of materials and extended opportunities for profitable employment of labour. The concept has thus been associated with an unequal economic relationship between states, not simply the inequality of large and small, rich and poor trading partners but the inequality of political and economic dependence of the latter on the former. (Brown, 1974)

Linkages Between Capitalism and Imperialism

The most important factor to notice is the linkage between capitalism and imperialism which is vital. In essence, imperialism is the unequal relations between a metropolitan power and its colony necessitated by the need to expand capitalism from the metropolis. Such a phenomenon is found between France and its former colonies as well as Britain and its former colonies.

Theories of imperialism are perhaps as numerous as the number of propounders. Although, there is a consensus about the objectives of imperialism, there are disagreements on how the imperialists precisely operate and the various effects imperialism has over the colonies.

A leading author on imperialism is Hobson who discussed what the imperialist could gain from the colonies. After considering and accepting some of the motives that may lead to imperialism including psychology, national pride, quest for glory, he maintains that the major cause for imperialism was an extension of markets and subsequent higher returns on investment. He postulates that where under-consumption exists due to over investment, there will always be the tendency for imperialism associated with uneven distribution of income. That those who own capital inevitably solicit to the state to aid t hem in establishing new markets thereby leading to the formation of protectorates, colonies and spheres of influence which is a direct causal factor of imperialism. If in the long run, imperialism does not pay for the country, as Hobson notes with regard to British imperialism, it would help investors by providing relatively high profitable foreign outlets for the capital which can be viewed as making imperialism the real vehicle of "growing cosmopolitanism of capital." (Hobson, 1938)

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Even though Hobson rejects the explanation of imperialism as an inevitable and integral aspect of industrial progress because of the concious intention of a capitalist's refusal to redistribute wealth, his work is only partially adequate for our analysis of the influence of the West on African states. This is because while Hobson sees Britain and the capitalists therein gain little in his time, this has not been so decades after.

Karl Marx in his famous book on Capitalism did not give imperialism a wide discussion as his reasonings suggested but there is little doubt about the implicit theory of imperialism in his works. He rationalised that the surplus value which is the value of the product of workers less what the capitalist pays his workers is converted into capital through accumulation process which ends up in capitalisation. Further capitalisation which entails the engagement of more labour leads to further accumulation. Due to the excess accumulation with other contradictions of capitalism, which have to negate the principles of accumulation hence capitalism, expansionism becomes inevitable. In essence, capitalism and expansionism are indivisible. Capitalism involves accumulation of more capital which is a process of employment of more labour, hence expansionist tendencies which are linkable to imperialism.

The inherent contradictions in capitalism further throw light on the linkage between capitalism and imperialism. First, there is inequality between the bourgeois and the proletariat. The former continues to accumulate more wealth while the latter cannot increase his demand, consequently leading to high savings over investment thereby causing a lower rate of profit which in itself is contradiction.

Secondly, productive forces are developed by capitalist competition. Capitalism develops alongside with the use of machinery in production. The use of increased machinery makes the capitalist more productive and competitive. It allows the organic composition of capital which is the ratio of constant to variable capital to increase. A rise in the organic composition of capital tends to lead to a decrease in the rate of profit. To resort to oligopoly would mean to inhibit increase in productivity. To increase the rate of exploitation may not even help the capitalist because of the limited resources of the worker. Thus, the capitalist can only resort to investing his capital in other countries where there is a relatively low organic composition leading to a relatively high surplus value per unit labour.

In essense, Karl Marx did educate us by showing the contradictions of capitalism that would necessitate the search for greener pastures as soon as the homeland is saturated which in essence is imperialism. In our case, Marx's postulation can be seen in French and British expansionism in Africa. Even then Marx's work did not delve into imperialism *per se*, as other related works like Lenin's.

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Lenin in a stronger vein, like Marx, rationalised imperialism from the capitalist system and called it the "highest stage of capitalism." The definition of imperialism must include the following five basic features:

1 the concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life;
2 the merging of bank capital with industrial capital and the creation on the basis of this "finance capital" of a financial oligarchy;
3 the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance;
4 the formation of international monopolist capitalist associations which share the world among themselves and
5 the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed. Imperialism is capitalism at that stage of development at which the dominance of monopolies and finance of capital is established in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance, in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun, in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed. (Lenin, 1980)

Lenin's contention is that monopolistic tendency is the reason for imperialism. That monopoly is borne out of capitalism and consequently imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism. Super abundance of capital is normally created in the face of mass poverty seeming incredible but very true. The two exist in the same society because of unequal development and deprivation of the masses which are vital factors in capitalism. Capitalism, in any case, calls for more accumulation disregarding the standard of living of the masses as this will mean decline in profits hence the need to export the capital to less developed countries.

Monopoly normally leads to stagnation of scientific discoveries as explained by Lenin in his example of an invented machine that would have revolutionised bottle manufacturing but its patent was bought by a cartel of German manufacturers ostensibly to prevent reduction in bottle prices and thereby reduce profit; thus, the need to export capital when there is a complete saturation in the homeland. The example above may not hold for today but was true for Lenin's days and showed the extent to which the capitalist can go.

Lenin's exportation of capital has been aptly articulated by Hilferding (1955) in his description of the processes of internationalization of capital position also supported by Bukharin (1966). Hilferding notes that internationalization which would bring the spread of capitalism into the

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world economy would create a world controlled by transnational companies with little regard for political territorial division thereby making capitalism to go beyond international relations, a position Keohane and Nye agree with. Bukharin further moves ahead to note the connection between the process of internationalization of capital and a parallel process of the nationalization of capital. He recognized that states provide tariff walls for protectionism which is exploited by companies that invest their huge capital thereby operating in the form of a nation and not transnational company. (Bukharin, 1966) Thus the study of imperialism has shown that capitalism can make the whole world one country where resources are unequally distributed.

So far, attempts have been made to give a clear picture of imperialism from various authors for our understanding of the concept to be used as a framework for our analysis of neocolonisation of Africa. The contributions of Lenin, Hilferding and Bukharin may not adequately explain the intricacies of society overlap between the former metropoles and the former colonies.

Perhaps, an author who adequately delved into these societal overlaps which is very important to our understanding of the basis of influence over African states is Johann Galtung who propounded the structural theory of imperialism. Galtung conceived imperialism as a dominance relation between collectivities especially between nations. The dominance relation does not disappear with the disappearance of imperialism nor will a disappearance of a part of imperialism, say political imperialism, lead to the disappearance of say economic imperialism. The views presented is a broad structural relationship between two collectivities. He sees imperialism as "a system that splits up collectivities and relates some of the parts to each other in relations of harmony of interest and other parts in relations of disharmony of interest or conflict of interest." (Galtung, 1971)

Conflict of interest is explained as a special case of general conflicts where concerned states are carrying out incompatible goals, where the centre and periphery nations are pursuing different and incompatible lines of action. Given the situation then, imperialism can be defined as

> one way in which the centre nation has power over the periphery nation, so as to bring about a condition of disharmony of interest between them. Concretely, imperialism is a relation between a centre and a periphery nation so that:
>
> 1 there is a harmony of interest between the centre in the centre nation and the centre in the periphery nation;
> 2 there is more disharmony of interest within the peripher

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nation than within the centre nation;
3 there is disharmony of interest between the periphery in the centre nation and periphery in the periphery nation. (Johann Galtung)

Imperialism has got its own mechanisms. Bade Onimode enumerates five fundamental mechanisms of imperialism as follows:

(a) Violence, both overt and covert;
(b) Trade;
(c) Foreign direct and portfolio investment or capital export;
(d) 'Aid' in cash or kind, including technical assistance either bilateral, intergovernmental or through an international agency;
(e) International institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. (Onimode, 1983)

This position is supported by Claude Ake with an addition of monetisation. The primitive colonies of Africa had to be monetised before they could be useful to the capitalist penetrators hence the introduction of monies. Although there had been some forms of money in Africa, they were not acceptable to the Europeans and had to be set aside so that a uniformity was created in their favour. Monetisation implied "the pervasiveness of money as a medium of exchange in the economy at large, the development of the attributes of what we now call the modern monetary system, including the credit system." (Ake, 1981)

In a similar but wider vein, Galtung viewed the mechanisms of imperialism from two perspectives: "the interaction relations itself...and how these relations are put together in a larger interaction structure: (1) the principle of vertical interaction relation (2) the principle of feudal interaction structure." (Galtung, 1971) Unequal exchange of assymetric interaction occurs and is normally associated with three stages of exploitation, namely: looting away of raw material; offering something ridiculous in exchange; and imposition of culture through exchange. The unequal gap created by the vertical interaction relation is maintained and protected by the feudal interaction structure. Four rules of this interaction structure have been defined and are relevant to our study of the neocolonisation of Africa:—

1 Interaction between centre and periphery is vertical;
2 Interaction between periphery and periphery is missing;
3 Multilateral interaction involving all three is missing;
4 interaction with the outside world is monopolised by the centre,

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with two implications:

(a) periphery interaction with other centre nations is missing;
(b) centre as well as periphery interaction with periphery nations belonging to other centre nations is missing. (Ibid.)

Galtung further looked into types of imperialism and classified them as follows:

1 economic;
2 political;
3 military;
4 communication;
5 cultural.

Admittedly, the order of presentation is at random. He presented a table to show the types of imperialism and what the centre and periphery nations provide as reproduced on next page. These types of imperialism are convertible. For instance, a military imperialism is convertible to communication imperialism by creating centralized command over communication and transportation facilities. Also, communication imperialism can be converted into cultural imperialism by the determination of amount of information that flows from centre to periphery nation. It should be noted that at any type of imperialism is convertible to any other.

While Onimode identified four phases of imperialism, Galtung identified three:

Past period	—	Colonialism
Present period	—	Neo-colonialism
Future period	—	Neo-neo-colonialism

These phases are very essential in imperialism. The role of international organisation as an instrument of imperialistic dominance is emphasized. They help in completing the metamorphosis of the periphery nation into a completely dominated nation of the imperialist.

It is noted that some countries are go-betweens for some imperialist countries. While Galtung never gave examples from Africa, Delancy (1979) like Timothy Shaw (1977) gave examples of Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Zaire as sub-imperialists in Africa. Usually, Ivory Coast is used in West Africa, Nigeria by Britain but in the case of ousting Goukoni Weddeye from the Chadian Government house, it was Nigeria and the OAU that were used by the United States and some Western European countries.

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THE FIVE TYPES OF IMPERIALISM

Type	*Economic*	*Political*	*Military*	*Communication*	*Cultural*
Centre Nation Provides	Processing Means of Production	Decisions Models	Protection means of destruction	News, means of communication	Teaching means of creation
Periphery Nation Provides	Raw materials markets	Obedience imitations	Discipline traditional hardware	Events passage goods	Learning validation dependence

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African States try to shake off the imperialistic relationship between them and their former metropoles. For instance, the following African States had declared for themselves various shades of Socialism:

The Republic of the Congo	—	15th August, 1963
Somali Democratic Republic	—	20th October, 1970
The Republic of Benin	—	30th November, 1974
People's Republic of Mozambique	—	25th June, 1975
People's Republic of Angola	—	11th November, 1975
Malagasy Republic	—	30th December, 1975
Socialist Ethiopia	—	20th April, 1976

The extent of their success has been directly related to self-reliance and the non-acceptance of aid from the imperialists. Ironically, they received aid from or trade heavily with them thereby enhancing neo-colonialism. As Shaw and Newbury note (1979) "despite the characteristic adoption of policies of African Socialism and self-reliance, these nations are still dependent on foreign trade and capital, external support and material." Other countries try to tackle the question by diversifying external trade or change partners if possible, some partially nationalise the multinational corporations in their domain. While these actions are steps to reduce the influence of imperialists, they do not solve the problems of being their satelite.

Would it then mean that African states have to break entirely with their centre nation? I.I. Potekhin gives a possible solution:

> When we speak of the achievements of economic independence by the African countries, what we mean is not that they should cut off their economic ties with the outside world, but that nature of those ties should be changed so that they accord with the interest of the African countries and their development. (Potekhin, 1968)

African states however found it difficult to act in their own interest alone without taking their former matropoles into consideration. They have been permeated by the powers in all the convertible types of imperialism as theorised by Galtung.

According to the structural theory of imperialism, the second phase of imperialism is neo-colonialism. Neo-colonialism is not a direct form of imperialism as found in colonialism. Rather it is a control aided by transport and communication through linkage which can be referred to as international organisation whose main job is to influence the centre of the periphery nation. These international organisations can be found

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for all five types of imperialism:

Economic type— private or governmental multinational corporations (BINGO'S)
Political type — international governmental organisations (IGO'S)
Military type — military alliances and treaties and organisations (MIGO'S)
Communication type — shipping and air companies, also International Press Agencies (CONGO'S)
Cultural type — international non-governmental organisation (INGO'S)

On all these types of international organisations, the Western Powers have equivalents either bilaterally or multilaterally as can be seen below:

Type	*France*	*Britain*
Economic	EEC-ACP Paris Club	London Club Banking Operations
Political	Franco-African Summits	Commonwealth
Military	Defence Pacts	Training of Soldiers
Communications	Air Afrique, Agence France Press	BBC, British Caledonia
Cultural	Television Centre Scholarships in France	British Information Unit, British Scholarships

Thus the domestic and foreign policies of African states are closely teleguided by the Western Powers. To support this claim, we may have to go into specifics. First French colonial policies in Africa.

Since France gave independence to its colonies in 1960, it has never hidden its desire to continue having a 'special' relationship with them. This special relationship has often been described as neo-colonial which sometimes has forced the weak states to waive their own national interests in favour of France. (N'Dongo, 1976) President Pompidou once said that:

> France has no reason to hide that she wishes to maintain a certain influence, a certain political, moral and cultural influence... if we leave, others will replace us and no one would gain anything from that... (and that)... the politics of cooperation is the continuation of European politics of expansion in the 20th Century...(Fuchs 1973, p. 125)

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The French neo-colonial policies have not been limited to the Francophones. It has cunningly extended its network to cover the anglophones as well. It once wondered why there was the absence of the French language in Nigeria. French companies in Nigeria have swollen from about four in 1960 to over forty in 1980. It has tilted the balance of payment in its favour since 1977. It is the third trading partner of Nigeria after Britain and US. This does not mean it has a large control over Nigeria but in some ways, it can cause some forms of economic tremor. Equatorial Guinea has changed its national currency to CFA Francs and automatically belongs to the Franc Zone. French neo-colonial policies are studied here under four major headings: diplomacy, military, economic and apartheid support.

DIPLOMACY

Article I of 1961 Cooperation Accord gives the French Ambassador in any of the Francophone States the deanship of the diplomatic *corps*. This places the French ambassadors in a special position over other diplomats representing other countries which in effect gives weight to their 'advice' to the host government. This role has often been overplayed that some countries declared their French ambassador *persona non grata*. Embassies which are accepted internationally, as the ambassador's country in which the host government cannot exercise police right over have immensely given French embassies cover to perpetrate its neo-colonial acts. It is not uncommon for French embassies in the Francophone states to harbour what the host countries consider subversive elements.

Franco-African Summits

Every year the President of France and African Francophone Heads of State meet to discuss issues relating from economy, energy, politics to foreign policy of the day. In this context, Africa is regarded as one unit while France is also regarded as a unit. Summits are arranged to alternate between France and African states annually. Thus France is accorded a position equal to the sum of African States. The summit that developed from economic issues in 1973 has involved itself in African politics by 1977. In 1977, the conference was concentrated on African political problems: the invasion of Shaba Province in Zaire, the invasion of Benin and the means of guaranteeing security to African governments. President Giscard d'Estaing suggested on this occasion a "median way (to) build Eurafrica" which would be united to ward off the enemies of African states. (*Marches Tropicaux et Meditarraeans*, 26 May 1978.

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Thus, the Franco-African summits create an atmosphere for France to shape, influence and/or control the African Francophone States' foreign policies; thereby widening the gap between them and other African states. Fuethermore, France uses this occasion to discuss on a personal level with leaders of each present country on their various foreign policies. Hence, multilateral and bilateral connections are made during such occasions. Nigeria since 1978 has been attending the Francophone Summit as an observer.

AFRICAN FRANCOPHONE ORGANIZATIONS

The prevailing Brazzaville spirit among African Francophone States after independence led to the formation of *Union-Afro-Malagasy* (UAM) which was later changed to *Organisation Commune Africain Malagasy* (OCAM). This group formed the core of the Monrovia bloc before the formation of OAU in 1963. The major unifying factor is not only the French language but the continuous interest France has shown in this organisation. For instance, in 1966, all the African Heads of State that participated in the OCAM Summit in Tananarive were invited to Paris for discussion with General de Gaulle.

Coming out of Elysee Palace on this occasion, General Soglo of the Republic of Benin (then Dahomey) said that:

> We have made a tour d'horizon of African problems... we have on the other hand discussed the results of the conference which has just finished at Tananarive and more particularly, the questions of the Sugar Convention and the Francophones. We want to constrict around France, all the African countries of French language, comprising also foreign nations to African continent like Canada to form a French Commonwealth. (*Africa Research Bulletin, 1965*)

Although the French-speaking Commonwealth first suggested by President Borguiba of Tunisia in 1965 never materialized, the solidarity within the Francophone States is strong and poses no problem to actual African unity. This has further accounted for the disinterested attitudes of African states on continental issues excepting neighbouring states. One must however add here that certain 'large' countries in the continent show interest more than other 'small' ones on continental issues; examples are Nigeria and Egypt.

Language

France also exploits the language differences in Africa to further balkanize the continent in a bid to influence and/or control the

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policies of the Francophone States in particular. This was recognized in Dahomey and Niger on separate platforms: Kerekou of Benin in 1973 asked:

> If in Europe an economic group is possible between Francophone and Anglophone countries, why not in Africa? (*AFP* Paris, 29-30 April, 1973)

In a similar vein, Hamani Diori of Niger at the height of his 'militancy' in 1973 said that:

> The Africans have some problems of language... to discuss with France. (*Le Moniteur Africain*, 20 December 1973)

The 'united language tactic' has helped France to support its cause in Africa. During the Congo crisis, the French-speaking countries, except Guinea, supported Congo Democratic Republic. In the UN, during the issue of banning atomic tests in Sahara, only Guinea, Mali, Togo and Senegal voted while others followed France in its abstention. Thus, France closely monitors its orbital states' policies to a great extent. The result is reactionary governments with little or no interest in African affairs emerging in African francophone states; this invariably accounts for low-level of foreign policy directed towards continental issues.

Military

According to the Cooperation Accord, "in order to assure the standardization of its armoury, (the Francophone States) will turn first to the French Republic to maintain and to renew the materials and the equipment for its armed forces... if a supply cannot be given free of charge, the financial terms will be fixed by a mutual accord. If a supply cannot be made by the French Republic, the Francophone States reserve the right to accept aid of other countries." (Ronen, 1975)

It is the practice of France to take active sides in what can be considered internal strifes in the African countries. In some, its wishes had been accepted by the use of force while it lost in some. In Gabon, when President Omar Bongo was about to be overthrown, France intervened militarily and reinstated him compulsorily. During the Nigerian Civil War, France supported Biafra and militarily aided Biafra which unfortunately prolonged the war to the detriment of the 'Biafrans' its was supposed to be supporting. After the war, the Nigerian authorities did not accept relief from the French Government. This is an

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example of where France militarily intervened and failed.

In Zaire, during the invasion of Shaba Province, France literally fought the war almost alone so as to keep the favoured puppet leaders of the country in government. French fortunes changed during the Benin invasion when the hired mercenaries recruited for a forceful seizure of power failed woefully. France was named as an accomplice and it retaliated by stopping the supply of arms to that country. As a stop-gap measure, USSR supplied Benin some arms in the interim while Nigeria signed a military pact with it.

In Chad, France used Nigeria as a tool to instal Hissen Habre's faction in the capital N'djamena, and since assumed command of the civil war in the country leaving the opposing Goukone Weddeye and his supporter, Libya, in a pitiably poor position. France was ably supported by USA on this occasion. Another of such intrusions into African affairs occurred during the 1985 Burkina Faso—Mali War supposedly over a suspected mineral-rich region. France openly suggested itself to the two factions as a mediator. All the efforts made by the OAU to resolve the dispute failed but the West African Francophones gathered together and halted the war under the close teleguide of France. All these go to show the extent France has been going to intervene in African affairs by force.

Under the auspices of Houphouet-Boigny's Ivory Coast, which is a stooge of France, a military association of the Francophones in West Africa (ANAD) was formed. The Republic of Benin did not join but has been an observer in all its meetings. In its first outing during the Burkina-Faso-Mali war, it successfully stopped Libya and Nigeria from mediating in the dispute and then forced Thomas Sankara, the revolutionary leader of Burkina-Faso, to rescind some of his decisions that were anti-French; many corrupt political leaders that were earlier jailed by the regime were asked to be released. That was France making a remote control out of the Francophone. The murder of Sankara was not condemned by France but the new regime of Compaore was quickly recognised.

Economic

France is the largest trading partner of all the Francophone States in Africa. To a considerable extent, it is competing well in the Anglophones too. Before giving independence, it left some monetary institutions in the Francophones which were later formalised in the 1961 cooperation agreements. These institutions will now be considered.

The West African Monetary Union (UMOA) is the West African branch of the Franc zone. Its *Communate Financiere Africian* (*CFA*)

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is under the aegis of the '*Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (BCEAO), whose headquarters was based in Paris until 1974 when it shifted to Dakar. The CFA Franc is guaranteed and convertible to the French Franc. It is obligatory for member states to deposit a sizeable proportion of their foreign reserves with the French Treasury in Paris. When the newly converted Equatorial Guinea could not get enough money to deposit to the bank, the French Government gave it 55 million French Francs *gratis*. Any intending state is allowed to join the bank if member states agree. There is the freedom of transfer of capital between France and member-states. The BCEAO regulates trade and centralizes members' monetary resources. It is also empowered to control monetary policies of members states. The bank's eventual goal is to create an economic union among members states. The formation of CEAO is a line in this direction.

The BCEAO has the power to use the reserves of all to offset a member state's deficit balance of payment. This is a source of tension to member-states who feel the burden of others, especially Ivory Coast. The bank also gives many types of monetary assistance to member states.

The monetary arrangement as a whole gives France a high leverage over the Francophone States and it actually dominates the monetary policies of the Franc zone. This was demonstrated in the automatic proportionate devaluation of the CFA Franc almost immediately after France devalued its currency. One wonders if the African states cannot get out of this monetary arrangement. Ivory Coast's government once described the system as a 'straight jacket' but advises that "anyone who wishes in the name of independence to become free may do so providing that he considers suicide as the supreme act of independence." (Morton 1968, p. 22)

France, through carefully executed aid has always maintained its special relationship with its colonial territories. In giving out aid, France set up two institutions: *Caisse Centrale De Cooperation Economique* (CCCE) and *Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation* (FAC). The CCCE is the agency through which French governmental aid to Francophone Africa is channelled, banked and administered. While FAC takes care of the French aid and cooperation; it transfers monies through CCCE. These two institutions stricly guide French aid and see to their thorough execution.

The extent of influence France uses its aid to get may never be easy to know. In several cases, "the exact totals are different to determine as much is hidden through accounting tricks and there is a tendency by France to use aid figures as proof of the growing economic sufficiency." (Ibid) Citing Allard's study, Potekhin notes that "in 1958, US, British and French aid to developing countries came to 3,500 million dollars,

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while the losses incurred by those countries due to the slump in prices on their raw products ran into 5,000 million dollars." (Potekhin 1968, p. 16)

This situation is aggravated by the fact that aid to the developing countries was indirectly utilized by former metropolitan powers through the construction of infrastructures along the routes of their investments rather than providing the essentials needed by the populace of the conceived countries. Furthermore, some of aid was given to personnel from France as salaries and which was later transferred back. Most of the time, it is obligatory to buy goods from the donor country—France. In essence, most of the aid foundits way back to France. The clear imbalance in the economic relations between France and Africa is being exploited to the fullest by the former thereby influencing the latter's domestic and foreign poltcies. Vivid examples are in Benin and Burkina Faso when they showed socialist tendencies and France reacted by withdrawing budgetary aid from them to put them back in line. In view of these countries' economic weaknesses, they had but to water down their domestic socialist policies. One may now look at the role France has been playing in South Africa.

French role in South Africa is a replica of the British and that of the USA. It rhetorically condemns the apartheid regime but at the same time acts in several ways to suppress and oppress the fundamental human rights of the blacks in South Africa. Its pre-1960 notion that the blacks in general cannot properly govern themselves is still manifest in its actions and reactions towards the apartheid regime in South Africa. Perhaps its economic interest in the subregion has been far more important than supporting the granting of the fundamental human rights to the black; we will therefore have a cursory glance at the French economic interests in South Africa.

French multinationals are not only thriving in South Africa, they have been multiplicated in other African countries that have vowed to oppose the obnoxious apartheid regime till extinct. For instance, the French major oil companies ELF and TOTAL are present and thriving not only in South Africa but in Nigeria and other Francophone States—at least in oil marketing where they are not exploring and producing unlike in Gabon and Nigeria. Other French firms thriving in South Africa and other African states are *Dubonnet, Dumez, Flo Petrol* and *Peugeot*. These multinationals cut across language barriers. Better put, the multiplicity of the South African-connected multinationals are in both Anglophone and Francophone states alike. The implication of this is that the Nigerian oil finds its way through these multinationals to the apartheid South Africa which makes a mockery Nigeria's anti-apartheid strong stand. Conversely, South African goods found their way to

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Nigeria through the same connections. The South African manufactured cigarette—Rothmans—that is sold publicly and almost every town in Nigeria is a good example.

On the question of who supplies arms to South Africa, France is the third largest supplier of arms to the apartheid enclave. France sells armoured vehicles, military aircraft, rocket designs, submarines and nunclear reactors to South Africa (*Socialist Forum* No. 6, 1983) For the avoidance of doubi, the French companies involved in the actual arms production and sale to South Africa are: *Aerospatial, Airliquide, Alsthon, Dassualt-Bragnet, Thompson CSF.* (Ibid) Thus any cry of France against the apartheid regime is only on the rhetoric side. France has been over-publicising its subtle moves against apartheid. Thus, the French believe in a strategy that will work in their favour so as to keep their African market as well as maintain their stay in the cream of the apartheid society.

Another method France uses in maintaining its blance in African states and South Africa as well is the use of African leaders to propagate subtle means of change in South Africa. The case below may suffice.

Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Cost has been the leader of the postulators of 'dialogue' as a means of settling the apartheid problem in South Africa. Some Francophone leaders have joined Boigny in his dialogue-proposal while others who could not oppose him (or France) in the open have kept mute on the issue. In sum, France uses its privileged position to tailor the thinkings of the Francophone African States towards its own activities and roles in the apartheid South Africa.

An overview of France in Africa is that of a high-handed teacher and students relationship whose superiority should never be challenged or questioned. The carrot and stick system has manifested in the dealings France has been having with the Francophones. Some Anglophones resisting France have found themselves within the French sphere of influence and are finding it difficult to move out. Ghana is a classical example where the last civilian regime was very close to Paris. Nigeria's balance of payments with France which was once favourable to it has been systematically made otherwise. Many intra-Africa states organisations have either been formed under the auspices of France or are directly sponsored by France in order to keep its hold on its traditional special privileged states. The *Communaute Economique d' Afrique Occidentale* (CEAO) was specifically formed to stop the formation of ECOWAS. The balkanization method of the French-speaking countries has continued unabated with the creation of organisations like ANAD, *Fonds Africain de Development* (created in

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November 1972) under the aegis of *Banque Africain de Development* to mention a few. The Franc Zone properly hooks the Francophone States in a 'straight jacket' and no state has ever got out without begging to go back into the fold. Guinea, Mali and Mauritania had tried it at different times and had to beg before they could be readmitted into the Franc Zone. The states that have dared to declare socialist inclinations in recent time—Benin and Burkina Faso—have never ventured out of the Franc Zone; besides their impetus, like their predecessors, have been seriously lowered not only by French reactions but also by Francophone stooges of France in Africa.

Thus, due to French inspired institutions in Africa and its continuously effective liaisons with African leaders, its neo-colonial policies have been multidimensional and effectively entrenched. Hardly will France think of a new way to relate with Africa for a long time to come.

British neo-colonial policies are not as bare-faced as those of the French but are equally devastating. The so-called British diplomacy has covered the atrocious neo-colonialistic tendencies of the British. Bilaterally and multilaterally, Britain has consistently dominated the politics and the economy of many African states. Few examples will suffice.

The economy of Nigeria is heavily tied to the West through the manipulations of Britain. Nigeria now survives on British or American goodwill. This was clearly manifested in the adoption of American type of presidential government The Nigerian legislators had to travel to America trying to understudy the political system so as to work the 1979 Constitution. The role of Britain in Nigeria is well discussed in Falola's book, *Britain and Nigeria-Exploitation or Development?* (Falola, 1987). Ihonvbere and Falola in a chapter assert that,

> The British state and bourgeoisie thus exploited Nigeria by creating internal conditions of instability and depopulation.... The educational system itself contributed to the alienation of Nigeria through severe miseducation and diseducation thus consolidating the subservient mentality and outlook to the world. (Falola 1987, p. 27)

On other fronts, British banks and companies conspired and connived to siphon Nigeria's money without executing any contract. The Johnson Mathey Bank scandal has exposed the extent British organisations have looted Nigeria's Treasury thereby increasing the penury of Nigeria.

The domination of Nigeria by Britain was further entrenched by the complicity of Nigerian leaders. In 1961, the Balewa Government defended Britain against criticisms of the latter for supporting the Portuguese over the killings and riots in Angola. It was Jawa Wachukwu, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, that replied critics: "It is not the

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duty of any country to interfere in the internal affairs of another independent state." (Aluko 1981, p. 43) In the same vein, Prime Minister Abubakar Tafewa Balewa said that he did not think that Britain had "let down the African members of the Commonwealth over the issue of Universal Declaration of Independence by Rhodesia in November 1965." (Ibid)

Like France, Britain has used aid, trade and diplomacy through multilateral organisations to dominate African states while the OAU looks helplessly. The colonial umbilical cord that was not severed at independence is the Commonwealth of nations. This organisation is supposed to be a loose association of equal nations numbering 49 or thereabout. It discusses issues of general interests to members. It does not, however, discuss internal affairs of member-states or disputes among members except with the express permission of both parties. It seeks to promote collaboration in trade, economic development, educational scientific and cultural contracts among members. The Heads of Government of member-states meet biannually during which intimate discussions are made. Consultation binds all the Heads of Government together as opposed to any Constitution.

In reality, the Commonwealth has become a vehicle of imperialism. Strong states in the Commonwealth have been breaching the sanctions against the apartheid enclave. Britain has been sending arms to South Africa on a continuous basis. (*New Nigerian*, 4 August, 1970) New Zealand has been having sporting links with the apartheid South Africa unabashedly. This culminated in a boycott of the Montreal Olympics in 1976 when all black nations refused to participate in protest against the presence of New Zealand at the Olympics having just concluded a rugby tour of South Africa. As a matter of fact, one time Prime Minister of New Zealand Robert Muldoon, once threatened to pull his country out of the Commonwealth unless the organisation agreed that member governments have no obligation to ban sporting links with South Africa. (*Guardian*, 23 July, 1986)

The original dominions—Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Britain as their leader—usually gang up within the Commonwealth so as to block the effectiveness of the organisation and increase Western imperialism on the helpless developing states in the association. This is done over issues ranging from the liberation of South Africa to economic freedom of the African states. Britain must have realised that a possible Commonwealth's strong drive against the apartheid regime in South Africa would affect Anglo American relations. The London-Washington romance has been responsible for the original dominions to be in a club within the Commonwealth against other members so as to bring ineffective sanctions and resolutions against apartheid South Africa.

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It is for these and other reasons that many see the Commonwealth as "patently neo-colonial." (*New Nigerian*, 7 June, 1977) Many Nigerians had indeed called on the government to "re-examine (its) membership of the Commonwealth and take other appropriate measures to safeguard (the) country's and African interests and security if Britain persists in opposing African aspirations in collusion with racist regimes in Africa" (*New Nigerian*, 30 December, 1971) The Nigerian Government under Buhari did give it a thought. When in 1984 the South Africa Prime Minister was given an audience in Britain, Nigeria's Foreign Affairs Minister disclosed to newsmen that Nigeria was already reviewing its membership of the Commonwealth.

Apart from using the Commonwealth as a vehicle of imperialism, Britain has indulged in other bilateral activities among African states to undermine their various national interests. For instance, Britain promised Mozambique some assistance against organised saboteurs provided the country is ready to accept British terms.

All along, the OAU as a body kept mute to the various subjugations its members were subjected to from western powers including American multinationals. The organisation could not grasp the dynamics and mechanisms of Western imperialistic machinations. Perhaps the genesis and structure of the organisation have led to its inability to tackle economic problems and debt burdens that have plagued the various unviable, poor and misgoverned countries of the continent. OAU has not deemed it fit to set up special commissions that will help solve special debt burdens of its members. Consequently, African states remain open to the ridicules of Western neo-colonisation.

When Kenneth Kaunda took over the mantle of leadership he promised to reduce the debt burden of African states that stood at 200 billion US dollars. But at the time he vacated the prime seat, African debt had risen to 218 billion US dollars. (*African Guardian*, 6 June 1988) OAU remained an organisation that could not decipher the real problems of its member states and talk less of getting solutions for them. Perhaps cultural imperialism which is a very dangerous form of imperialism has taken over. Cultural imperialism according to Hans Morgenthau cited by Moses Akpan (1987) is,

> the most subtle, and if it were ever to succeed by itself alone, the most successful imperialistic policies. It aims not at the conquest of territory or at the control of economic life, but at the conquest and control of the minds of men as an instrument for changing the power relations between two nations. (Morgenthau 1973, p. 64)

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Akpan further adds that "In Africa today, cultural imperialism manifests itself in the thinking and behaviour of its citizens, especially, the educated elites... This group of Africans tend to favour Western life styles, clothing, music, literature and ideologies to their African counterparts". (Akpan, 1987, p. 515)

Thus OAU members resort to solving their economic problems through western formulae. They support all forms of North-South dialogues without reflecting on the fact that the imperialists that constitute the North can never be sincere about finding a true solution to the neo-colonial policies perpetrated by them. Hence OAU becomes irrelevant to the real needs of its members. It is part of the grand design of neo-colonialism that Britain, France and America used the OAU forces in Chad along with the unimpressive Shagari Government to perpetrate their wishes in the Republic of Chad in 1982. The fact thus remains that the OAU without capacity and capability to solve the real problems of African states will never be in the interest of Africans themselves. The Organisation should continue to bear in mind Nkrumah's words at the formation of the Organisation:

> Let us return to our people of Africa not with empty hands and with high-sounding resolutions, but with firm hope and assurance that at long last, African unity has become a reality. (*Newswatch*, 6 June 1988)

Perhaps one might quickly add that economic independence is the real hope and assurance that Africans want in the 1990s.

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UNITED STATES-INDIA RELATIONS 1947-1962: STRESSES AND STRAINS OVER COMMUNIST CHINA

By S. C. SAHA*

The United States had an inbuilt constituency in India, a constituency that had its origins in the pre-independent period. Although the British were under fire, they enjoyed a certain amount of respect for their commitment to justice and law. The Indian elites were the products of English education. All these resulted in a love-hate relationship between the Indians and the Anglo-Saxon groups in general. Besides, the amount of importance the Indian nationalist leaders gave to the mediatory role of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the liberal American Press in bringing about India's independence bears testimony to this formulation. Thus in 1947 when India won independence, the United States enjoyed considerable goodwill in India. The United States was willing and far abler than Stalin's Soviet Union to help in the economic betterment of India. The US launched the Point Four Programme, a politico-humanitarian package.[1] *Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, was consciously warm towards it because, apart from other reasons, he found it good tactics to use against domestic communism, and the collapse of the Telengana rebellion in Southern India proved him right. During his first visit to the United States in 1949, Nehru and President Truman seemed to have achieved a reasonable desire of mutual sympathy in general outlook on world affairs.*

What alienated India's diplomacy from that of the United States most was the difference in their views of the nature of Chinese Communist threat and what approaches could be made about it. The United States had not yet given in to Dulles's pactomania, *nor had the dreadful McCarthy era started. Yet guided by their different experiences, the two countries began to choose their different paths which did not converge until the Communist Chinese massive invasion of India's north-eastern border in October 1962. So conflicting were the approaches of India and the United States that they found themselves ranged on opposite sides on many issues regarding China.*

This worked clearly to the disadvantage of both. The differences discouraged economic assistance to India while the United States lost the sympathy of the emerging Asian nations. My paper examines the various aspects of these Indo-American differences over Communist China in order to define the impact on their political relations. It establishes that the

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'China Question'—the non-recognition by the United States, non-admission to the United Nations, the status of Formosa, etc., created bitter differences between India and the United States till the China War of 1962. This provided cause for an unparalleled deepening of the Indo-US involvement.

THIS paper has been written in the full knowledge that scores of works have been published examining the US-China or US-India relations, and with the understanding that a narrow look into the India-US relationship over one country would leave many gaps because any focus is bound to overlook some vital aspects of the entire relationship. There is hardly any systematic study covering the three countries. In short, existing works deal mostly with Indo-US relations in the global context and only occasionally brings in Communist China as a cause of discord. Questions to which answers are sought in my paper include: (1) Why did both the countries differ so much initially on the Chinese recognition and admission? (2) How did the legislative branches of India and the United States react? (3) To what extent did the generated tension affect the public mood? (4) Was there any fundamental difference between the approaches of Truman administration and those of the later years? (5) To what extent did the Indian crisis of 1962, arising out of the Chinese invasion, influence India's relations with the US?

DIFFERING ATTITUDES

China was the critical problem of the Far East. Almost from its inception the rise of Mao Tse-tung in China created a great deal of confusion in America. American officials did not denounce the progress of Communism at once. In his letter of transmittal, which prefaced the White Paper, Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, assigned the responsibility for China's problems to the Chinese themselves.[2] But the potential critics of this policy feared that the communists might shut the 'open door' and thus deprive American scholars, travellers, missionaries, officials and merchants of their former access to a traditionally protected land. The American public opinion, as expressed in the newspapers, speeches and meetings, played an important role. The Communist victory in 1949 appeared to many Americans as the initial triumph of Soviet aggression as it moved into the Asian sphere.[3]

On the other hand, Nehru's views on Southeast Asian affairs were to some extent misperceived, supporting a low Chinese threat evaluation. To him, the communist bogeyman was invented, a name given to what was actually the legitimate nationalism of countries like China. As well presented by Michael Brecher in his political biography of Nehru, the Chinese revolution to Nehru was a culmination of Asia's political

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renaissance. Nehru believed that the Chinese revolution was too old, too deeply rooted to succumb to Moscow.[4]

Unlike the United States, India attached much more importance to the Chinese factor both in the East Asian politics and in the world scene. In an address, Nehru, the maker-in-chief of India's foreign policy, went so far as to say that 'non-recognition of the People's Government of China into the United Nations was the root cause of all international troubles during the past four years'.[5] If Nehru himself testified to the centrality of the Chinese Question (recognition and admission), the influential left wing of the ruling Indian National Congress Party considered it a channel through which to externalize their political, social and moral values.[6] One of the major goals in India's foreign relations during the years 1949-1962 had been not only to make the world more acceptable to China, but also to make China more acceptable to the world.[7]

On the other hand, the officials of the Department of State in the United States and the pro-Chiang Kai-Shek pressure groups attempted to belittle the significance of the American isolation from most of the world on China policy. Nancy B. Tucker suggests that President Truman knew little about Southeast Asia and kept himself marginally informed; as such he was guided by others.[8]

It is relevant to know the Chinese policy towards the United Nations. It appears that the new regime did not wholly ignore the UN. On 15 November 1949, and on 8 and 15 January 1950, the Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai cabled Lake Success demanding the ouster of the "Kuomintang reactionary clique representatives from international organs."[9]

Recognition Issue

The recognition issue forced the United States and India into polaristic postures. As far as India was concerned, it was mainly a question of Peking being able to maintain effective control over nearly six million Chinese and to rule that country with undisputed, though totalitarian, authority.[10] It is possible to argue that India's security demanded a co-existence with Communist China. B.V. Keskar, one time Indian Defence Minister, admitted in Parliament in 1951 that "the best way of protecting the frontiers is to have a friendly Tibet and a friendly China."[11] In sponsoring the Chinese entry to the United Nations, India argued that the United Nations should not be an exclusive club of like-minded nations, but "should reflect the world as it is."[12] The other major argument was provided by Krishna Menon, Nehru's closest adviser. The Indian envoy declared in the United Nations General Assembly that the Chinese admission "would be the most substantial contribution

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towards establishing stability in Southeast Asia."[13]

To the United States both the recognition and admission issues appeared to be two sides of the same coin. The official arguments had been so varied that at times they were chaotic. President Truman and his Secretary of State Dean Acheson feared that the recognition would enable Communist China to plant subversive agents in embassies and legations.[14] John Foster Dulles, the Special Consultant to the then US Secretary of State in 1951, developed the theme of Chinese subservience to international communist forces. To him, Communist China was an agent of the Soviet Union.[15] Governor Adlai E. Stevenson, US Ambassador to the United Nations, argued in a speech that to recognize Communist China "would be ignoring the warlike character...of the rulers who dominate 600 million people and who talk of the inevitability of war...."[16] It appears that there was a crisis of confidence in the United States.

Apparently, the State Department was concerned with the abnormal Chinese behaviour. Many anti-American atrocities were committed in China by the Communists. The Vice-Consul of Shanghai was subjected to torture, detention and physical injuries.[17] But to the Indian mind, these incidents could not be the real reasons for the continued American hostility towards China. Nehru, regarded generally as free Asia's leading spokesman, asked, "Why should the United States not recognize China?" Apart from liking or disliking the Chinese regime, he declared, one could scarcely ignore its existence or its place in Asian affairs.[18]

What is significant for our present review is that the routine affair of recognition became a serious bone of contention. The American Ambassador in New Delhi, Loy Henderson, a confirmed *Cold Warrior* who had already framed the Soviet Union as an evil state, contended that India's sponsoring of Communist China was not a sign "of judicious state of mind."[19] A reviewing panel assembled by the State Department recommended that "we should...show the fallacious basis of the present policy of India." R.H. Scott and N. Pritchard, Assistant Under Secretaries, reported that "Nehru was rationalizing the negativism and passivism which found its roots in Hindu emotion and philosophy."[20]

On the other hand, Mrs. V.L. Pandit, Nehru's sister and India's Ambassador in Washington, tried to prevail upon the State Department by explaining that Communist China wanted only a greater say in Asian affairs.[21] The Indian press also became critical of the American stand. *The Times of India* spoke of the American policy of non-recognition as "one of the most tragic and costly major mistakes made by the democracies in recent years."[22] *The National Herald* characterized it as "a first-class blunder in history."[23] A number of newspapers blamed the United States for being so intransigent as to leave Communist China no

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alternative but to seek the close friendship of the Soviet Union.[24]

The recognition issue created so much discomfort that the State Department recognised that "divergencies between the United States and Indian views toward China and Indonesia are serious foreign policy conflicts blocking closer understanding with India."

The Korean War hardened the differences between India and the United States largely because it got mixed up with the China Question. India saw the Korean War less and less as a vital demonstration of collective security, and more and more as an American-Kuomintang threat to reopen the Chinese civil war.[25] Nehru's conviction was that the key to the joint puzzle of ending both the aggression and the war rested with China's admission to the United Nations. When he asked for a big power conference, Stalin readily agreed.

Dean Acheson expressed his unwillingness to mix the issue of China's representation in the United Nations with the issue of the Korean War. He felt that since the United States played an important part in regulating world affairs, to give a seat to China there would be to strengthen the Communist bloc in the world body.[26] Along with the United States Government, most of the American newspaper editors were up against Nehru's admission policy. "Pandit Nehru would surely concede that if Communist China had been admitted to the Security Council earlier the Council would never have acted in the defence of South Korea."[27] The Press in the United States was inclined to agree with Secretary of State Acheson that Nehru should not try to mix the question of seating China in the United Nations with the Korean problem. Ludwell Denny of the *Washington News* called India's proposal a "rope trick."[28] To the Truman Administration, the North Korean invasion of South Korea was proof of Soviet imperialistic designs on Asia. "We must therefore recognize the possibility that armed aggression may take place in other areas."[29] To meet this challenge of alleged Soviet aggression, Truman ordered the United States' Seventh Fleet to defend the island of Taiwan. Later, Eisenhower-Dulles revisionism led to further stronger action in Korea. The major difference between the Truman and Eisenhower administrations as far as the Far East was concerned was the latter's willingness to associate itself openly with Chinese nationalist aspirations to reconquer the mainland, a move that Truman and Acheson had carefully avoided. In 1953 Dulles informed the Chinese that unless they agreed to a truce, the United States would strike at their Manchurian bases. The Republicans thus committed the administration to the indefinite non-recognition of the Peking regime.

On the other hand, Indian opinion favoured restoration of Formosa to Communist China. "America's commitment in Formosa is morally the weakest point in her foreign policy."[30] *The Hindu* commented that

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Dulles's suggestion that Peking may represent China in the General Assembly while Formosa with a veto would speak for the Chinese in the Security Council seems most improper and unhelpful.[31]

As expected, the Chinese involvement in Korea and India's sympathy for the new government in mainland China affected the request for economic assistance. Doubts were cast in the United States' diplomatic circle regarding India's request for two million tons of food grains so badly needed in parts of India suffering drought. The diplomat Loy Henderson posed a question in a top secret letter, "What are the advantages to the US?" Assistance to a country that had excused the Chinese aggression in Korea was believed to be a questionable gesture. In the end Henderson came to the realization that the United States should demonstrate that it was not using its economic power merely to forward our international policies."[32]

A group of Congressional leaders led by Congressmen Walter Judd and William Knowland, whom Congressman Celler, a friend of India, called "China Firsters," had consistently tried to bring in the Chinese question every time a discussion on India took place in the Congress.[33] Congressman Rankin joined Cox in describing Nehru "the Communist leader of India."[34] Senator Styles Bridges held that India which was a reluctant partner in the Second World War should not tell the United States what should be done with regard to China, Formosa or Japan.[35] India's voting record in the United Nations and its refusal to join the United States in condemning China as an aggressor in Korea were among the arguments put forward by these Congressmen. Indian foreign policy was ruthlessly discussed in all its aspects. A total of 143 references to India were made in Congress, twenty articles relating to India were inserted in the *Congressional Record*.[36] Outside the Congress, diplomats were highly critical. For example, John Foster Dulles, then a member of the US delegation to the United Nations, euphemistically called India "the so-called neutral."[37]

As the first of its kind, the debate in the United States Congress was instructive. Humanitarian concern for India's plight coupled with fears of dangers to its infant democracy were the dominant themes, yet the political impact of aid eventually sent was considerably diminished by the bitter opposition expressed by some important members of the Congress against India's China policy, and the extreme length of the debate. An emergency request was received in February 1951, but the necessary legislation was not completed until 15 June of that year.[38] It was felt in India that it was not Indian democracy *per se* that was seen to be important, but its value as a counterweight against the Chinese Communist threat.

The Indian reaction to adverse debate was quick, Nehru wanted no

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"political strings" attached to the bill. The United States Government assured India formally. The US Ambassador Henderson noted hopefully that this time the Indian "irritation" was not directed against the executive branch.[39]

Of course, this irritation did not prevent further inflow of US economic aid to India. The Indo-US Technical Cooperation Programme established in 1951, provided the first institutional arrangement for American aid. Chester Bowles, the US Ambassador to India, openly interpreted his mission as an opportunity to help save India, and through India Asia, from the collapse of democracy which he believed China to have suffered. His *Ambassador's Report*, remains a valuable introduction to some of the possibilities for success in American relations with India. India received about ten billion dollars worth of aid between 1956 and 1975,[40] but economic assistance had been inspired as measures to strengthen the economic defences of freedom against communism. Politics had thus been inherent in the American position from the start. So the assigned role to win over the uncommitted created distrust.

The China factor also affected other spheres of US-India relationships. India refrained from signing the Anglo-American Peace Treaty with Japan partly because of India's China policy. Members of the Congress did not spare India when the Indian note on the Japanese Treaty referred to China.[41] India informed the United States Government that it would not send representatives to San Francisco to sign the Japanese Treaty because Formosa was not designed to be restored to China.[42] Regarding Formosa, the American note pointed out that even according to India's suggestion, the future status of Formosa would remain undetermined since it maintained that "the time and manner of such return might be a subject of separate negotiations." The note further pointed out that for the sake of Formosa the Japanese Treaty could not be delayed.[43] Any hint by India of a desire to include Communist China in the conference regarding the Japanese Treaty created serious resentment in the Congress. Senator McCarren remarked angrily, "Perhaps it is time for us to tell our friends abroad that friendship is more than a one-way street."[44] Thus US-Indian relations reached a critical stage; both the political parties in America were very critical of India's position on China. *The New Republic*, usually friendly to the Nehru Government, commented that Nehru was obsessed by "Asia for Asians," and that he was blind to the Chinese aggression.[45]

Public opinion in India approved of Nehru's policy. Indians in general liked Nehru's repeated denunciations of the United States which was regarded as an external Power in Asia. It was more or less a modern version of the Monroe Doctrine for Asia. On China's exclusion. the *Hitavada* commented that the absence of China deprived the Japanese Treaty of a moral sanction,[46] The differences of opinions over Japan

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combined with that of the recognition of China greatly strained Indo-American relations. Chester Bowles, the, US Ambassador to India, found that Indo-US relations had reached a critical stage.[17]

The opposite approaches towards China affected the temper of the delegates of the two countries in the United Nations. When Sir Benegal N. Rau, the Indian delegate, attempted to set a full-bodied ceasefire proposal over the Korean hostilities in January 1951, a complete polarity between the Indian and the United States delegates was reached. Each side was convinced that the other was not only wrong, but sinfully wrong.[18] A diplomatic crisis developed over the interpretations of the misleading and unclear Communist Chinese response to the ceasefire proposal. Indian delegates, mainly misinformed by Panikkar, showed a blind wishfulness, while the United States representatives continued to exhibit unusual impatience. The US delegate had reasons to worry about the last clause of the stated five principles. It stipulated that after the ceasefire was agreed, an appropriate body would meet with the Big Powers—the Soviet Union, the US, the UK and the People's Republic of China—to negotiate the "Far Eastern Problems", which in effect meant discussion on the status of Formosa and the Chinese representation in the United Nations. The US was opposed to the fifth clause.[19] The two sides began to attack each other. The American delegates in the reassembled Committee 1 of the General Assembly directed their remarks to the Indian delegation. "The United States has the greatest respect for India, and for the security of the representative of India," stated the US delegate Warren Austin, who then remarked that although he admired that representative's efforts, he could not agree "that the further communication Peking had addressed to the Indian Ambassador changed the situation very much.[50]

One is also amazed at Krishna Menon's retort to Senator Knowland (Republican) during the 1956 Session of the UN General Assembly, after Knowland had characteristically taken it upon himself to accuse India, and Menon in particular; for being the "floor leader for the Soviet drive to bring China into the United Nations." Not to be outdone, Menon described Knowland's statement as "a state of mind", suggesting that there was something unbalanced in it,[51] Menon's retort showed the depth of his irritation. His speeches left deeper scars on American public opinion Since there was no reconciliation at the United Nations, the debate over China continued to cast its gloomy shadow over most of Indian-American relations.

PUZZLED AMERICA

Indeed, the United States looked askance at India's great enthusiasm for Communist China. In the early 1950s, India was intensely friendly

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to the Cnmmunist regime in Peking; it exchanged extensive cultural missions with it. In the name of "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai",[52] it had gone out of the way to befriend the Chinese. India made perhaps the greatest sacrifice in the UN in the winter of 1951. The US sounded India whether it would take a permanent seat in the Security Council. When Nehru's opinion was sought, he sent a message to India's representatives at the UN to say, "We must stand by the People's Government of China coming into the Security Council."[53] This was puzzling to the United States. The invitation to Communist China and the omission of South Korea and Formosa from the India-dominated Colombo Conference (1954) was bound to create a deep distrust in the United States. No other nation was fraternized by India with such intimate gestures. Naturally, a large section of Americans felt that India considered Communist China as its partner in the leadership of Asia, and that India therefore considered American influence as a menace to that leadership.[54] In this game of power politics, India reckoned without the threat of aggressive tendencies of Communist China.

STRAINED RELATIONS—1954-58

The period approximately 1954 to 1958 witnessed the lowest level of Indo-American relations due to various other reasons. Opposition to neutralism reached its highest point in the United States Congress and this was accompanied by strong hostility towards the type of socialist economic policy laid down in India's Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956.[55] With the advent of the Republican Administration in 1953 India saw an increased emphasis on military factors. When the blockade of Commiunist China was being discussed at the highest level of the new administration, an alarmed Nehru, remarked, "All this talk of the blockade of China or other such steps obviously is not talk that leads to peace or settlement, whatever else it might lead to." The enunciation by Secretary Dulles of the doctrine of "massive and instant retaliation at times and places of our choosing," evoked intensified criticism of the foreign policy of the United States in India. *The Hindu* in a leading editorial entitled "Time to Stop" deplored the sudden turn in the US policy which made the threat of hurling atom bombs to stop communism.[56] To both countries, India and the US, Communist China became the centre of the world.

It is clear that the majority of Asian nations followed India in its strong criticism of the American policy towards China. In Asia there was a single overwhelming fear of a new world war, and any militant American posture was bound to create suspicion. The tragedy is that the

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Americans failed to appreciate the attitude of India in particular, and Asia in general.

On a few occasions, India agreed with the United States over China in the United Nations. For instance, during a debate over Chou En-lai's accusation that the US had violated the Chinese air space and bombed Manchurian villages, India supported the US demand for a Commission of Inquiry. India supported the American position and opposed the Russian resolution.[57] But here India took a legalistic view arguing that an allegation should not be accepted without investigation. Also, India's voting record over China in the UN has been misinterpreted. A breakdown of votes on the representation shows that India voted with Russia five times when America was in direct opposition.[58] "With regard to the proposals relating to China, the voting pattern of India in the General Assembly shows a definite tendency towards aiding or aligning with Sino-Soviet wishes," observed Gertrude Boland.[59]

But it would be a mistake to discover a causal connection between this voting record and the fact that India's relations with the United States were not generally happy. A basic satisfactory explanation lies in the fundamental premises of India's foreign policy. In the first place, India believed that, China should be admitted to the UN less for the sake of China than for the United Nations and the world. Second, it would be better that a country is strong and nobody's came follower, even if under a communist government, than that it be defended against Communism by methods which would weaken its nationalism. Thirdly, India believed that, nationalism of countries recently freed from colonialism is more allergic to the former colonial powers and their associates than to the social and economic contents of Communism. One may accept or reject these premises, but they, more than hostility towards the United States, explain India's desire to bring a nation state under the organized world body.[60]

Besides the recognition issue, some isolated incidents regarding China generated heated debate among the public in India. The issue of the American airmen imprisoned in China furnished an occasion for serious arguments between India and the United States. Most Indians believed that the Chinese Government had a case which merited a hearing at the UN. For instance, *United Asia* argued that the "Chinese charges are on the whole legitimate." "Asian opinion has by and large accepted the Chinese version.[61] Likewise, Nehru's opposition to the American sponsored embargo on shipment of strategic materials to Communist China was a move unpalatable to America since it was the US who had sponsored the resolution.[62] Even a small quantity of thorium nitrate, a source material for fissionable atomic energy, shipped to Communist

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China by India in 1953 created a controversy between India and the US.[63]

Of course, at times attempts were made to mend the rift over China. A personal contact between the Prime Minister and the President was planned by some diplomats in the United States. In making the recommendation to the President to ask for Nehru's visit to the United States during 1955, the US Acting Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs recognized, among other things, "that our policy towards Communist China has been a continuing source of disagreement with India," and so the visit of Nehru was advised.[64] If the Chinese Question along with other basic differences were not resolved, it was argued in the memorandum, "the Congress might be tempted to cut off special economic assistance to India." Dwight Eisenhower, the only American President to pay a visit to India,[65] did not discuss China in public, but his speeches hinted at 'new China'. He said in 1959 with a clear suggestion, "We who are free must support one another," the idea being that the USA would come to the rescue of India in case an emergency arose.[66] In fact the situation had changed; the Chinese "question" had become by now the Indian "problem." The revolt in Tibet in March 1959, and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India forced a new link in Indo-US relations. The Senator, Kuchel, represented the general Congressional attitude towards India when he remarked in August 1959, "All peace-loving peoples will strongly approve of Mr. Nehru's forceful response to the Communist invasion."[67]

CHINA'S AGGRESSION

In the wake of the changed American attitude towards India, the Indian delegates in the UN did not take the lead in proposing the Chinese admission and this was a clear deviation from the traditional China policy of India.[68] The 86th Congress concluded its session in an atmosphere well-disposed to changing India. Only five years earlier American policy had driven democratic India into the lap of unpredictable China, and by 1959, the Chinese policy of reckless incursions drove India into the arms of the US to the satisfaction of the anti-China crusaders in America. Bewildered India was set for a new direction.

Mao's China led a massive ground attack in October 1962, on the northern borders of India. Perhaps China had its own reasons. In the late 1950s, the United States expression of friendship towards India and its definition of India as an alternative model to China in Asia deepened Peking's hostility. In this case the healthier American-Indian relationship victimized India as China took up arms to force India to reorient its perceptions of both the US and China to a large extent. According

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to Chinese calculations, India, in the years 1959-1961 received aid or promises of aid from the US to the tune of $ 4,100 million, whereas in the twelve preceding years it had received only $ 1,900 million.[69] He who pays the piper calls the tune, seemed to be the argument of China. The adoption of India as an alternative model to China was a good enough reason to make Peking wish to put India in its place.

No one would seriously argue that China attacked India because India was coming closer to the US. Yet one may tend to reason that the declared policy of the United States might have created a suspicion in China. Secretary Dean Rusk said, "We must assist the sub-continent of Asia in its competition with Communist China "[70] This type of observation might have had its reaction in China that wanted to build a militant anti-US front. Whatever might have been the motives, it is clear that the China War forced India to embrace the United States. A desperate Nehru said in appreciation. "Indo-American relations have seldom been as close and cordial as they are now."[71]

The war produced a complex variety of influences on Indo-American relations. Though India obtained timely military aid, ironically it created more friction. Indian impatience to achieve self-reliance in arms had to be reconciled with American expert opinions. Also, the US wanted India to play a more central role in the struggle against Communism in Southeast Asia.

Besides, there was some evidence of disagreement between the two countries as to the extent of the Chinese threat. The relative absence of official and Congressional comment on the potential threat from Peking is most noteworthy compared with the frequency of comment on potential aggression, subversion, etc., in Southeast Asia. Resentment was expressed in the Indian Parliament concerning a statement by General Maxwell Taylor, in testimony before the House of Representatives' Appropriations Committee, to the effect that he did not know who crossed into who's land first or who shot first, and also that NEFA boundaries were not properly marked.[72] Nehru intervened to say that these remarks had been taken out of context and as such did not represent a correct opinion of the US.[73] Apparently, American coolness might stem from a desire not to embarrass India's efforts to maintain the policy of non-alignment, in spite of the Chinese threat.

The differing estimates of India's military requirements led India to negotiate substantial arms deals with the Soviet Union,[74] causing some concern in the United States, particularly with regard to jet aircraft.[75] America's brilliant diplomat Averall Harriman, while emphasizing the need for India to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union, claimed that this was equally to America's interest.[76] This seems to reflect the American strategy of encouraging the Moscow-Peking ideological split,

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there being a general assumption that the Chinese border war had drawn India closer to the US. But official spokesmen were careful in making comments on its "peaceful non-alignment." On the Indian side, continued improvement in American-Soviet relations allowed India to maintain at least the outward form of non-alignment, but the emphasis was now far more on the protection of immediate vital interests than on playing the role of mediator in China affairs, an office Nehru liked most.

It is not easy to establish that the United States lost sympathy in Asia due to its China policy alone, because the anti-US sentiment was the outcome of many factors. Several countries supported the US stand towards China. Thus the majority of the nations attending the Bandung Conference refrained from urging admission of Communist China to the UN.[77] A commentator observed in the *Baltimore Sun* that if this Question of China's admission had been raised, it would have been lost by 17 to 12 votes.[78] The conference took a stand which was opposed not only to Western colonialism, but also to Communist aggression, and thus it gave a tacit approval to the United States policy towards the recognition of China.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, it may be restated that the China factor was a sore point for about a decade. This was because the United States failed to conform to a reality, while India remained sentimental. As Nehru rightly stated, "The point at issue is that China is a great nation which cannot be ignored."[79] The global military strategy of the United States to contain Communism was an unprincipled philosophy to Nehru who had reordained Ashoka rather than Kautilya as the model of India's political aspirations. There was a dichotomy between the moral mind of India, which disdained the use of force and the threat of force in international relations, and the technical mind of the United States, which relied heavily on military preparedness. Dean Aeheson's disgust "with Nehru's holier-than-thou lecturing on international morality,"[80] was representative of America's impatience, and when that sentiment was made known to India a friction came to surface. The China War in 1962 removed the major irritant in Indo-US relations. The Indian reappraisal of the communist menace in Asia, and the ending of the US's eager and blind prodding of India to join the Western bloc created a friendly atmosphere necessary for substantial economic cooperation.

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NOTES

1 Indo-American relations during this period were at a formative stage. The United States was not seen generally as a colonialist power and as Nehru frequently acknowledged, Indian political thinking was considerably influenced by American liberal and democratic ideas. (See for instance Nehru's Address to a Joint Session of both Houses of the US Congress, 13 October 1949, Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy and Selected Speeches*, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New Delhi, 1961, pp. 589-92. There is good evidence that the Point Four Programme was the result of no clear policy formulation and was based on vague humanitarian sentiments and a dim recognition of the existence of Asia, a recognition that was soon to become far sharper with the Communist takeover in mainland China. It appears that the "Point Four" was not included in the first draft of Truman's speech. The President wanted his speech to be "profound" and of world-wide significance. Benjamin Hardy of the State Department helped him. See also B. Salomon, "Point Four—A Study in Political Motivation and Administrative Technique," Ph. D. thesis, University of London, 1957.

2 Department of State, *United States Relations with China*, Washington DC, 1949, pp, xix,xv.

3 *Congressional Record*, (Washington, D.C.), *Congress*, 81st Session, 9 September 1949, Pts. 10,12, 758.

4 Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography* (London, 1959), p. 587.

5 Robert P. Newman, *Recognition of Communist China: A Study in Argument* (New York, N Y., 1964), p. 145.

6 Yaacov Y. Vertzberger, *Misconceptions in Foreign Policy-Making* (Boulder, Colorado, 1984), p. 67.

7 *The Statesman* (Calcutta), 6 November 1954.

8 Nancy B. Tucker, *Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950* (New York, 1983), pp. 38; 147; Allen S.Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (Stanford, 1960), pp. 30, 86; Allen Whiting argues that perhaps inexperience prompted Peking to expect immediate admission. See also Byron S. Weng, *Peking's UN Policy: Continuity and Change* (New York, N.Y., 1972), p. 225.

9 Ibid.

10 Both India and Pakistan recognized China almost at the same time, mainly for geographical reasons. But Pakistan maintained cordial relations with both America and China while India was in the bad books of the US. Perhaps the US failed to see through the stage-managed anti-communism of clever Pakistan. See also Robert Strausz, *American-Asian Tensions*, p. 15. Robert Trumbell suggests that Nehru had an additional basis for the acceptance of China. If China could be treated equally and be persuaded to adopt an independent policy like India's, the entire Russian position in the East would collapse. Robert Trumbell, "Behind India's Foreign Policy", *The New York Times Magazine*, 5 October 1952, p. 12.

11 Lok Sabha Secretariat, *Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents. 1947-59*, New Delhi, 1959, pp, 101-109. India's speedy recognition of the PRC, its acquiescence of China's forceful re-entry into Tibet in 1950 and its support of Peking's claim for the United Nations seat were manifestations of this security aspect. M.W. Fisher and J.V. Bondurant, *Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations* (Berkeley, California) Indian Press Monograph Series No. 1956.

12 Indian Council of World Affairs, *India and the United Nations* (New York, N.Y., 1957), p. 56.

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13 UN General Assembly, *Official Records, 9th Session, 492nd Plenary Meeting*, 6 October 1954, Para 107.

14 Nancy B. Tucker, *Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations*, n. 8, pp 38-39.

15 "Sustaining Friendship with China," *The Department of State Bulletin* (Washington D.C.), 28 May 1951, pp. 843-845.

16 Adlai E. Stevenson, *Looking Outward: Years of Crisis at the United Nations* (New York, 1961), p. 59.

17 There were several bad incidents involving the United States staff in New China. "Confessions" were obtained by the Chinese authorities, *Department of State Bulletin*, 12 December 1949, p. 908; 2 January 1950, p. 23; 26 December 1959, p. 953.

18 *Commonweal 60*, 15 May 1954, p. 131.

19 Dean Acheson, 30 December 1950, "Department of State Policy Statement (secret)," Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the US, 1951*, Vol. V, p. 1480.

20 Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the US, 1951*, Vol. VI, Part 2, p. 1655.

21 *India News Bulletin*, 24 February 1951.

22 *The Times of India* (New Delhi), 27 August 1952.

23 *National Herald* (Lucknow), 23 August 1952.

24 *The Tribune* (Chandigarh), 30 October 1951. Even *The Statesman*, which is pro-Western and which did not support China's entry earlier, became now critical of American opposition to Chinese recognition. *The Statesman*, 4 October 1953.

25 In Nehru's opinion,the Peoples Republic of China had intervened in Korea because "it was convinced that the US was intending to use Korea as a base for the subsequent invasion of China itself." US Department of State, *Foreign Relations, 1951*, Vol. VI, Part, 2, p. 2124. William J. Barnds also summarizes Nehru's perception. The American decision, Nehru held, to protect Taiwan with the Seventh Fleet while coming to the assistance of a beleaguered South Korea re-injected the United States into the Chinese Civil War. William J. Barnds, *China and America: The Search for a New Relationship* (New York, N.Y., 1977), p. 204.

26 Nehru's letter to the Secretary of State Acheson and Marshall Stalin on the Korean Problem, 13 July 1950; Acheson's reply to Nehru, 18 July 1950; Nehru's reply to Acheson, 19 July 1950, in Rajendra K. Jain (*Ed.*), *A Collection of Government Documents: US-South Asian Relations, 1947-1982*, Vol. I (New Jersey, 1983), pp. 136-138. See also, *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 23, 31 July 1950, p. 170.

27 Editorial in *New York Times*, 20 July 1950 and 22 July 1950.

28 Ludwell Dennyi, "Rope Trick," *Washington News*, 16 August 1950.

29 Truman's Statement of 19 July 1950, *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 23 31 July 1950, p. 165.

30 Editorial in *The Statesman*, 29 January 1955.

31 *The Hindu*, 10 Augnst 1953.

32 Department of State, *Foreign Relations, 1951*, Vol. VI, Part 2, p. 2092.

33 Quoted in Pramod Vyas, *Dawning on the Capital* (Calcutta, 1966), pp. 88-89: *US Congressional Record 1st Session*, Vol. 97, Part 4; 1951, p. 5617. In a debate in the House of Representatives, Cox asked, "Is India our friend?" To substantiate his argument that India had become communist, he quoted from Dr. Bharatan Kumarappa who remarked at the United Nations that India did not bother about communism. Kumarappa criticized the US for opposing China's entry.

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34 *US Congressional Record, 1951*, Vol. 97, Part 4, p. 5618.
35 Ibid., *82 nd Congress, 1st Session*, Vol. 97, A 5432 and A 6060.
36 Ibid., Part 4, p. 3511.
37 *New York Times*, 1 November 1953.
38 *US Congressional Record: 82nd Congress, 1st Session*, Vol. 97, Part 2, pp. 1920-3362.
39 Department of State, *Policy on India*, 1 December 1950; "Indian Request for Foodgrains," Paper Presented in the Department of State, January 1951, quoted in Rajendra K. Jain, *US-South Asian Relations*, Vol. 1, pp. 180-184. It was found by the policy-makers in the Department that "relations between the US and India are esentially good," and the "admission of the Chinese Communists to the UN need not be regarded as incapable of solution." Of course, Nehru's "misguided" policy towards. China was noted. "India's Request for Foodgrains: Political Considerations," 24 January 1951, in Jain, *US-South Asian Relations*, pp.158-159.
40 John W. Mellor and Phillips Talbot (*Eds.*), *India: A Rising Middle Power* (Colorado. 1979), p. 53.
41 *US Congressional Record, 1951*, Vol. 97, Part 8, p. 10766. The United States Government resented the Indian note sharply. The Indian note said that to leave the future of Formosa unsettled was neither "just nor expedient." See US Reply of 25 August, *Department of State Bulletin, XXV*, 3 September 1951, pp.387-388. *The Times of India* sarcastically reported that Dulles' draft is "more interesting for what it omits than for what it contains." *The Times of India*, 3 April 1951, p. 4.
42 Margaret Carlyle (*Ed.*), *Documents on International Affairs*, Published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1953, Vol. 1951, pp. 606-608. The US viewed the Indian position as being identical with the Communist bloc.
43 *Department of State Bulletin*, 3 September 1951, pp. 387-388.
44 *US Congressional Record*, 1951, Part 8, pp. 10766, 10743.
45 *US Congressional Record, 82nd Congress. 1st Session*, Vol. 97, pp. A5432; A6060.
46 Margaret Fischer (*Ed.*), *Indian Press Digest*, Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 23-25.
47 Chester Bowles, *Ambassador's Report* (New York, 1953), p. 3.
48 UN General Assembly, *Official Records, Fifth Session, Annexes*, item 76, p 13.
49 Ross N. Berkes and Mohinder S. Bedi, *The Diplomacy of India* (Stanford 1958), pp. 123-123.
50 UN General Assembly, *Official Records, Fifth Session*, Committee 1 and 2,538.
51 UN General Assembly, *Official Records, Eleventh Assembly* (1956-1957), Committee 1,220,
52 *Hindi-Chini* slogan was based on five principles: mutual respect, recognition, non-interference, equality and co-existence. This was the highest point of India's intimacy with China, and also this was a period of high tension between India and the United States not only over China but also for Kashmir.
53 Pran Chopra, *Uncertain India: A Political Profile of Two Decades of Freedom* (Mass., 1968), p. 148.
54 "Get the United States Out of Asia," *US News and World Report*, 13 May 1955, pp. 37-38.
55 Indian Investment Centre, *Objects and Functions*, Investing in India Series, New Delhi, 1962, pp. 77-78, 81-82.
56 *The Hindu* (Madras), 10 August 1953.
57 UN Security Council, *Official Records, Fifth Year, 501st Meeting, no. 43*, pp. 24-25.
58 P.J. Eldridge, *The Politics of Foreign Aid in India* (London, 1969), p. 203.

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59 Gertrude Catherine Boland, "India and The United Nations: India's Role in the General Assembly, 1946-1957." Ph. D. Diss., The Claremont Graduate School, 1961, p. 126.

60 *Current History*, Vol. 30, February 1956, no. 174, p. 68. It is argued here that while to Nehru communism was a danger, it was only one of the many dangers. See also *Current History*, December 1956. The author suggests that the US failed to respond to the emotions of India. p. 324.

61 Editorial in *United Asia* (Bombay) December 1954, p. 263.

62 Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger. *Misconceptions*, p. 75.

63 US Department of State, *Foreign Relations. Vol., XI. Part 2.* pp. 1772-1773.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 *New York Times*, 12 December 1959. p. 10.

67 *US Congressional Record, 1958*, Part 13, p. 17307.

68 Ibid.

69 *Peking Review*, 17 August 1962, p. 7.

70 Department of State, *Foreign Relations*, Vol. XI, Part 2, p. 1719. Similar sentiments were expressed by others, "India must be helped to compete with Communist China in the economic sphere against the authoritarian methods of Communist China." Statement by Leland Barrows, Director of NEA Operations, ICA, 14 May 1959, in Rajendra K. Jain, *US-South Asian Relations*, p. 235.

71 Jawaharlal Nehru, "Changing India." *Foreign Affairs*, (New York), April 1963.

72 Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, *Lok Sabha Dehates (195I-1964)*. Vol. 17, 4th Session short notice question no. 7, 22 April 1963, Cols. 11046-7.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid., p. 164-5.

75 Ibid., p. 166-7.

76 Statement in TV interview, 9 December. Quoted in *Current History*, Vol. 44, no. 159, March 1963, p. 179.
It appears that the primary emphasis of the Kennedy Administration was that, India should make economic progress by the best available ways. To the extent that Soviet aid assisted this objective, simultaneously relieving the United States of some financial burden, the administration was favourable, despite some residual Congressional hostility.

77 Mutual Security Act 1955, Hearing, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 84th Congress, 1st Session, Testimony of Adam C. Powell, 153-154.

78 Ibid., p. 153.

79 Nancy Jetly, *India-China Relations, 1947-1977; A Study of Parliament's Role in the Making of Foreign Policy* (New Delhi, 1979), p. 44.

80 Gaddis Smith, *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy: Dean Acheson* (New York. N.Y., 1972), p. 375. Dean Rusk also expressed his "anger over Indian self-rishteousness," Warren J. Cohen, *Dean Rusk* (Totowa, N.J., 1980), p. 206. It appears that one important cause of Indo-US irritation was the intolerance of both sides.

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NOTES AND VIEWS

INDIANS IN MALAYSIA : AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

THE Indian community in Malaysia is numerically the weakest, and this is reflected in the weightage that it carries within the political system of Malaysia. The Indians constitute 10.6% of the population, with Malays constituting 53.1% and the Chinese 35.5%. The Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), which is the political spokesman of the community in the ruling political party, the *Barisan Nasional*, occupies a peripheral position. It has little political leverage or influence. The numerical weakness of the Indian community and its geographic dispersal, creates a situation which further erodes its bargaining power. The demands of the leadership for greater representation within the system are brushed aside with the explanation that the Indians do not form the majority in any constituency within Malaysia and hence they are unable to deliver the goods.[1] Political frustration is heightened by the economic frustrations of the community. Over two-fifths of the Indians in Malaysia live on the estates. While the total number of estate workers has remained more or less static for the past ten years, the percentage of Indian estate workers has increased from 42% to 49%, while for Malays it has increased from 36% to 38%. A Research Survey by the Prime Minister's Secretariat showed that the labour force on the estates had few basic amenities, little formal education and a low level of social interaction.[2] The women's wing of the MIC bemoaned the lackof progress of the Indian community on the estates of Malaysia.[3] Samy Vellu, President of the MIC remarked, "while the Chinese community has improved its traditionally strong economic position, the bulk of Indians are still estate labourers, car drivers, gardeners and watchmen despite the New Economic Policy."[4] Recent trends in the Malaysian economy have not been too favourable. The Annual Report of the *Bank Negara* revealed that the economy suffered a net decline of 2.7% in 1985 compared with the 1984 gains of 13.5%. In particular, there is a slump in the prices of Malaysian commodity based exports which account for more than 50% of the Gross National Product This has direct import for the Indian estate workers on the rubber and palm oil estates.[5] Frustrations are further heightened by the linguistic and educational policies of the government. A policy of reserved seats for the *bumiputras*, is a disadvantage to many deserving Indian students.

The strength of the community in terms of its bargaining position is

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not likely to improve within the present structure of the Malaysian political system. It might be relevant to analyse how this position developed historically, and would be interesting to explore, albeit hypothetically, whether the Indian community might have been able to achieve more weightage if it had pursued an alternative method of political development. In this context, it is pertinent to examine the choices before the Indian community and its leadership within an alternative framework.

As is well documented, the bulk of the Indian migrants to Malaysia were Tamils, but there were also Sikhs, Telegus, Malyalis and Gujeratis. The majority of them were brought in as indentured labour. An article in the *Selangor Journal* in 1896, described them as "Quiet, amenable to discipline, very quick to pick up and adapt themselves to any kind of work." It further added "...they will often settle down on an estate and remain there content with considerably lower wages than they might procure elsewhere, if they are treated with fairness and consideration."[6] Since they had no effective strength to improve their position, initially it was pressure from India which focused attention on them. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, on a visit to Malaya in 1937 stressed "...Indians must claim equality of status and wages with others."[7]

In pre-war Malaya a number of Indian Associations developed, but these were primarily communal and sectional affiliations like the *Adi Dravida Sangam*, the *Nadar Sangam*, the *Sanathana Dharma Sabha*, etc. Basically, it was in the inter-war years, with the participation of Indian Independence League (IIL) and the Indian National Army (INA) that brought to the fore a consciousness amongst the Indians. At the Bangkok Conference (15-20 June 1942) organised by the IIL, about 150 delegates from all over the East attended, including two million members of the Indian community.[8] Through the 1930's, there were a series of strikes (the Railway Strike in Kuala Lumpur in 1936, in the Batu Arang Collieries in 1936 and in the Singapore Traction Company in 1938) which were spear-headed by Chinese left wing organisations, but in which Indians also participated. Indian civilians and ex-soldiers of the Indian National Army joined in the guerilla activities in Malaya through the 1940's.[9] Through the 1940's, a number of Indian leaders were active in organising and participating in strikes—R.H. Nathan (sub-editor of *Tamil Nesan*), Balan, R.K. Thangaiah, Veerasenan, S.A. Ganapathy (President of the Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Unions in the post-war period), S. Amalu, G.S. Iyer and K.B. Subbiah. Speaking of a strike on a Malacca estate in April 1948 the Assistant Commissioner of Labour described it as a battle to decide whether the INA or the management controlled the estate.[10] In the post-war years many Indians joined the Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU). Many Indians on the estates gave support to the *Thondar Padai* (Youth Corp of the Malay-

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an Communist Party (MCP). Some INA ex-members, S. Ganapathy and P. Veerasenan joined the MCP. Some joined the New Democratic Youth League in 1945. Their effective presence in the 1940's at many levels was observed by British officials "...their natural political agility had got them far more say in government affairs than was either right or necessary."[11]

The declaration of emergency in 1948 pushed the left wing groups underground, while the PMFTU was declared illegal. In the 1950's many Indians supported the Malayan Labour Party, the Malayan Democratic Union and the Independence of Malaya Party. During this period Malayan Labour Party also had widespread support from Indian white collar workers. Indian leaders who were prominent in the party were D.S. Ramanathan, V. Veerappan and V. David. The Independence of Malaya Party and Dato Onn were supported by Indians like R. Ramani, V.M.N. Menon and E.E.C. Thuraisingham. In Singapore, the Singapore Labour Party and the People's Action Party were supported by Indians and their leaders like C.V. Devan Nair and S. Rajaratnam.[12] This period then, saw the emergence of an Indian elite which was truly non-communal and which commanded allegiance from working class communities. It is significant that at the Annual Session of the MIC in April 1954 the session voted decisively against merger with the Alliance of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA).[13]

Through the 1950's, the Indians were also becoming influential in the labour unions on the estates; for example, the Negri Sembilan Indian Labour Union, Perak Estate Employees Union, Johore Plantation Employees Union, Malacca Estate Employees Union, Kedah Plantation Workers Union and Selangor Plantation Workers Union. These six unions had a combined membership of 56,000 in 1952, of whom more than half were Indians.[14] These unions combined to form the National Union of Plantation Workers (NUPW) under the leadership of P.P. Narayanan. Indian leadership was dominant in the trade union movement—V.M. Menon was a founder member of the Malayan Trade Union Conference, and Secretary of the All Malayan Trade Estate Staff Unions in 1946, while John Emmanuel was Assistant Secretary General of the NUPW and Chairman of the Perak Branch of the Malayan Trade Union Congress (MTUC).[15] The MTUC was led by P.P. Narayanan, E.E. Nathan and M.P. Rajagopal.

In May 1946 the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) came into existence but it was not very effective. In March 1950, the member system was introduced whereby Malayans would be appointed as Heads of various governmect departments. However, not a single Indian was included. In February 1954, the MIC sent a memorandum to the Federal Elections

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Committee asking that reserved seats be created in plural constituencies, that these seats be only contested by Indian candidates and that 10% of the seats in the Legislative Council except those representing special interests be reserved for Indians.[16] Meanwhile, the UMNO and MCA came together in an electoral alliance to contest the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Council Elections in January 1952, and got 26 seats as against only 1 seat for the Independence of Malaya Party. The UMNO-MCA Alliance was formally inaugurated at a national convention held at Kuala Lumpur on 23 August 1953. Though initially the MIC had reservations about joining the Alliance, after considerable debate it joined the Alliance in October 1954, and till today is a member of the Alliance.

It is significant that the Indians who had a history of participation and leadership of left wing organisations and trade unions, and who till the early 1950's had espoused non-communal participation, adopted ethnic representation and accommodation within the system. This established the framework within which they would be represented, with lack of manoeuvribility and effective participation. A brief outline of the last four General Elections in Malaysia bears this out. In 1969, only 2 MIC representatives were elected as members of Parliament.[17] In the 1974 General Elections, the MIC had 4 parliamentary and 7 state candidates.[18] In 1978 the MIC got 3 parliamentary seats,[19] while in '82 it got 4 parentliamentary seats.[20] Over the past many years, the parliamentary represatives of the MIC has increased from 2 to 4, nowhere effective enough to bargain a position for the Indians. At the opening of the UMNO General Assembly in 1980, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohammed remarked, "We like to see that the Chinese are represented in the Government."[21] Ironically, but hardly surprisingly, there was no mention of the Indians. Indian leadership, of late, has been publicising that the Indians are not getting their share of the cake. Samy Vellu, President of the MIC made pointed references to the disadvantaged position of the Indians in civil service appointments.[22] At the MIC Annual Party Congress, 20-21 July, 1985, the Chief Guest Mahathir Mohammad, showed a great degree of ambivalence in the face of demands for greater Indian representation.[23]

A question can be raised, though hypothetically, that if the Indian leadership had adopted a different course of action in 1954, what would have been the position of the Indian community today? It can be contended that the educated and dynamic leadership with its experience of the inter-war years could have concentrated on providing leadership and support to non-communal organisations and could have widened the base of the support by bringing in the labour unions.[24] As it is, it has isolated itself as a peripheral community. In this context, it should be borne in mind that the Chinese are in a different position as they have

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both numerical and financial weightage.

A history of factionalism and internal feuding within the MIC has also contributed to weakening the position of the party and the people it seeks to represent. At the General Assembly of the MIC in 1980, riot police stood by as rival factions quarrelled. In May 1981 when a meeting was called to discipline Vice-President Subramanian his supporters turned up to demonstrate against the President Samy Vellu. Recently, the MIC was again in the news when Samy Vellu was sued in Court by V. Govindraj who had been suspended from the office of the Vice-President by the Party. Subsequently V. Govindraj founded the Democratic Malaysian Party. The infighting in the MIC and the inability to provide a leadership for a broader base highlights the weaknesses that have been created due to narrow communal adjustment contributing to the non-effective position of the MIC within the National front.

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE PROBLEM OF CHANGE

A Review Article*

NORTH East India, the like of which you do not find any where in the world, is the most polyglot region. 2,55,000 sq km in area, inhabited by 26.6 million people consisting of all religions in the world, with difficult and tortuous terrain where insurgency is endemic, an area of tensions of one kind or the other, where 142 languages/dialects are spoken, inhabited by diverse races and communities, tribals and non-tribals, density of population varying from 255 per sq km in Assam to 7 in Arunachal Pradesh, mainly rural in character—agriculture being the main industry, people are prolific in nature, percentage of literacy varying from 59.50 in Mizoram to 20 in Arunachal Pradesh, divided into seven states, has a number of problems. The book under review deals with all the problems comprehensively and competently with philosophic knowledge acquired during the course of two decades as a member of the Indian Administrative Service. The conclusions arrived at are reasonable though some of them may not be acceptable to the discerning eye. All the libraries in the country should have a copy of it on their shelves. My own understanding of North East India has been strengthened by the reading of it but I find some of the statements made in the book are not correct.

1. In the Prologue, the author says that he witnessed the creation of the sub-state of Meghalaya. The sub-state plan suggested by the Government of India was summarily rejected by the APHLC No sub-State was created. On the other hand the autonomous state of Meghalaya which is fundamentally different from the sub-state was established and it existed just for two years and the autonomous state was converted into a full fledged state.

2. Again, the author says that Sylhet was included in Assam in 1873. The Chief Commissionership of Assam was formed in August 1874. But Sylhet was not incorporated with Assam at first because the Secretary of State was opposed to the inlcusion of Sylhet with Assam on the ground that it was mainly a Bengali-speaking district and anticipated some opposition to its inclusion by the Sylheties. But the Bengal

*B.P. Singh: *A Study of North East India*. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1987, xii, 222 p. Rs. 110.

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Government assured the Secretary of State that there would be no opposition to the proposal. So on 12 September 1874 Sylhet was transferred to Assam.

North East India is mainly the creation of the British. All the areas of North East India were never under the Ahom Rule before their annexation by the British. The geographical North East India, includes the Darjeeling district which is a part of West Bengal. The British conquered territory after territory and added it to Assam. Before adding them to Assam they did not consider the ethnic problem. They were only concerned with administrative convenience. As long as the British ruled India they suppressed ruthlessly any agitation by the ethnic groups. The ethnic differences came to the surface after the establishment of the Sovereign Democratic Republic. Immediately after Independence, some of these ethnic groups, like the Nagas and the Mizos, demanded independence and when it was not granted they started irsurgency. These ethnic groups were not touched by the Indian National Movement. Further, they lived at the border of the country. On the other side of the border, their own kinsmen, speaking their language and professing their faith, lived, and with a view to protect the frontiers and keep them contented their demand for independence was met half way by the creation of states by the dismemberment of Assam.

Dealing with language conflict, the author asserts that the Bengali Bhadralok prevailed upon the British to declare Bengali and English as the languages of the administration. There is no conclusive evidence to support this contention. It is based on assumption. This was also the view of the Assamese of the Brahmaputra Valley. I investigated into this question. The language conflict is as old as the formation of modern Assam. From 1826, when Assam was constituted into a Commissionership for a period of seventeen years, according to Anandram Dhekial Phukan, Assamese was the court language. "It was used with great facility and convenience and with universal satisfaction for about fifteen years, in almost every department of public office." Suddenly, Assamese was supplanted by Bengali. Some of the British administrators thought that Assamese was the perverted form of Bengali. This was the view of the Commissioner of Assam, Hopkinson. But Philips, a district officer held the view firmly that Assamese was different from Bengali. There was a great debate on this question. This debate was started not by the Assamese but by the American Baptist Mission. In their evidence before the Mills Committee (1854) they pleaded for the introduction of Assamese as the Court language and as the medium of instruction. They started a printing press. They translated the Bible into Assamese with the help of an Assamese scholar. They published *Orunodia*, a newspaper in Assamese. Thus, the credit for the introduction of Assamese as the

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court language must go to the American Baptist Missionaries, particularly to Bronson, Brown, Cutter and Danforth. It was in 1871, that the Lt. Governor of Bengal decided that Assamese should be the court language and the medium of instruction.

Again, the author seems to believe that the British followed the *policy* of encouraging the Christian Missions to play an active role in North East India. I do not think that the British formulated any *policy* with regard to Christian Missions. The administration was more guided by expediency than by any policy. On several occasions the British administrators refused permission to the Christian Missions to enter into any and every tribal area. They were against the wholesale conversion of the aborigines to Christianity. They discouraged the introduction of western culture and western ways of life in the tribal areas. The main concern of the British Administration was to maintain law and order at less cost. They found the Missionaries as a convenient instrument to achieve the end. The Christian Missions availad of all opportunities to carry out their work. Further, the Christian Missions established two institutions which were very popular with the rustics, education and medical relief. The impact of the activity of the Christian Missions was the spread of Christianity like forest fire in the tribal areas. It may also be noted that no other mission came forward to render service to the tribals, for obvious reasons.

The popularity of Christian Missions was due to various factors. Christianity is based on monotheism, while Hinduism was based on polytheism. One God principle appealed to the common man. Again, there was equality of treatment in the church. In the Hindu temples, all were not admitted to the *Garbdudi*—sanctum sanctorum. Third, among the Christians there was no caste system as among the Hindus. Fourth, the Christian Missions selected fanatical type of missionaries who were prepared to sacrifice their lives for the spread of the Gospel. The churches they built were imposing and on Sunday all the Christians went to the church.

The impact of Christianity was perceptible. It established peace and tranquility. It taught the sanctity of human life and thereby put an end to head hunting. It provided enlightenment and developed intelligence in the savages. It put an end to inter-tribal warfare. It improved the diet and clothing of the tribals. It taught the value of prayer; in Nagaland, before the commencement of meetings, a prayer is offered.

At the the same time it should be said that the converted Christians were like adopted sons, who do not have real affection for the adopted parents. Their faith in Christianity was skin deep and as one of the Deputy Commissioners remarked they were "stomach Christians" converted to Christianity by beads and rice cakes.

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The author touches the most controversial point, on which different opinions have been expressed—whether the Christian Missions were responsible for the development of separatist tendency among the tribals? The orthodox Hindu politicians of the Brahmaputra Valley firmly hold the view that Christian Missions were primarily responsible for developing the separatist tendency in the tribals. I investigated this allegation. I am not a Christian. I am a Hindu. I do not belong to this region. I discussed this question with Bimola Prasad Chaliha, the Chief Minister of Assam, sober, realistic and one who anchors his boat near the shore lines of reality, who is respected by the minorities; he simply said, "We have no evidence." Then I went to Archbishop Roberio of the Catholic Church at Shillong. He told me that the Church was not concerned with politics. "We belong to a religious community. Our loyalty to the Indian Constitution is unquestionable." When I went to Mizoram, I had been to Rev. Zeirama for the same purpose. Rev. Zeirama frankly admitted that "one Welsh missionary tried to indulge in anti-Indian activity. We asked him to leave the country." Rev Zeirama is an honest man. The author did not discuss this question in detail. Perhaps his position in the Government did not permit him to do so. The missionaries have left. Now the Bodos in Assam, Vidarbha in Maharastra, Telengana in Andhra, Jharkhand in Bihar, Uttar Kand in Uttar Pradesh are demanding separation. Which Christian missionary instigated these people to demand separation?

Again the author says that the British encouraged the Muslim immigration into Assam. This is not true to facts. The districts of Mymensingh, Pabna, Rangapur and other areas were over populated and there was starvation. The Mymensinghias, as they were popularly called, came to Assam wave after wave and began to occupy charlands, the riverine lands. The Mymensinghias were magnificient cultivators, enterprising and frugal in habits. The indigenous cultivators were lazy indolent and non-economic. The Mymensinghias improved the economy of the areas they occupied and increased the revenue of the state. But the British administrators realised that unrestricted immigration would seriously affect the interests of the indigenous population. So they devised the 'Line system.' The 'line system' intended to restrict immigration was implemented by Higgins in Nowgong. The 'line system' proved to be ineffective because of the existing land system. In 1942-43, there was the Bengal famine and there was acute shortage of food grains. A large number of Muslim immigrants were permitted to enter to increase production of food grains. But the immigrants were more concerned with the cash crops and not with food production. They (Muslims) produced more and thereby created the fear complex in the Hindus. Finally, before Partition of 1947, India was one and the Indian citizens

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had the right to move about freely, acquire property anywhere in the country and settle down. It was only after 1947, the problem of immigration became important.

It is also interesting to note that the 'line system' brought about the Hindu-Muslim conflict. All the Muslims were opposed to it and all the Hindus supported it. The Muslims called the 'line system' as the *Hindu Muslim Line.*

The author deals with the Inner Line policy of the British The author seems to believe that the Inner Line Policy was devised with a view to contain the spread of Hindu nationalism into the tribal areas. The Indian National Congress condemned the Inner Line on the ground that it was devised by the British to prevent the spread of Indian Nationalism into the Tribal Areas. There was a great debate on this issue in the House of Commons while the Government of India Bill 1935, was under discussion. I submit that the British devised the Inner Line policy in 1873, long before the foundation of the Indian National Congress in 1884. It is the result of British pragmatism. The tribals raided the plains frequently, demanded *posa* (blackmail) and carried away women and cattle. Further, the rich from the plains occupied fertile lands in the tribal areas and rendered the indigenous people beggars. For a tribal land was the only source of livelihood. In the Khasi Hills, where there was no Inner Line regulation, the rich from the plains occupied vast areas for habitation. The Khasi Hills are a fine health resort. So to protect the tribals as well as the plains the British devised the inner line policy. Nehru who condemned the Inner Line regulation before he became the Prime Minister of India, did not abolish it after he became the Prime Minister of India. Today, the tribals and non-tribals are demanding the introduction of Inner Line regulation. Even the Assamese are asking for it.

Dealing with the character of the people, the British Administrators called them provincial/parochial in nature. The author seems to support the British view. The only difference between the author and the British is that the former uses a highly sophisticated term '*distrust*'. All the people of this region are provincial in nature. To eliminate provincialism in the Assamese, the first Chief Commissioner, Keatinge thought that it would be advantageous to the Assamese youth to resort to Bengal for higher studies. In Bengal, the Assamese students would come in contact with a high standard of culture and wider interests. This was also the view of Sir Henry Cotton. In 1899, when a proposal was made for the establishment of a college in the Assam Valley, Sir Henry wrote, "I am not anxious to give any encouragement to the feelings of provincialism which I find to be unfortunately too ripe in the Assam Valley districts and would rather impress upon the educated

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Assamese of the present generation that they cannot be independent of Bengal, in their language, association or in the advancement of their prosperity. They are so dependent on Bengal as the Welshman is dependent on England. Such dependence is not inconsistent with true national sentiment. But the province cannot prosper in isolation and attribute the slowness of progress, in a large measure, to the unwide fostering by the Assamese among themselves of a policy of national exclusiveness. The establishment of a new college would, I am afraid, give a new lease of life to the existing tendency, and any proposal for encouraging higher education lies, therefore, in the direction of helping successful students to continue their studies, not in Assam but in the metropolis of India". But the British Administrators did not realise the fact that of all things in the world, human nature is the most intractable. After the British had left, the parochialists invented a new term, when they found that the old one 'parochalism' gathered bad odour about it. It is 'identity' which is nothing but parochialism. Further, identity is a myth and yet the people of this region are hugging to it as the child hugs to the breast of its mother. All those who are not assammese are called by various terms, *videshi, paradeshi* and *bobiraghatta.* In Manipur, they are called *Mayongas* and in *Mizoram Vais.*

It must also be said that the immigrants wers partly responsible for strengthening and intensifying this feeling, particularly the Bengali element in Assam. The Bengalis always thought that they were far superior to the indigenous people in every respect. They sing the song

Amar sonar Bangla Ami thumoi Bhalabashi

The reaction to this song is—

O mor aponar desh O mor chikuni desh

The author deals with development of regionalism. The term regionalism is comparatively a new term. It was first used in 1874. It had no wide currency. It is no doubt popular in certain parts of the country. Regionalism is of two kinds, integrating regionalism and disintegrating regionlaism. The term is applicable at various levels, international national, and local. Sovereign States may come together and form a regional council for certain common purposes. This is international regionalism. International regionalism may be of two kinds, self-imposed (European Economic Council) and imposed (Eastern European Council). Pan movements are a kind of regional movement.

At the national level, some States contiguous to one another, may

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come together and form a union. This also may be of two kinds, self-imposed and imposed. The North Eastern Council belongs to the first category—self-imposed. The States in North East India are at liberty to be or not to be members of the NEC The establishment of NEC brought into existence regionalism of the second type and the concept of *seven sisters*. This regionalism has brought about some amount of integration. The Council meets once in six months, the Governors and the Chief Ministers meet and exchange views. True, there are some problems like the border disputes which have yet to be settled. Still some amount of understanding exists. When mind meets mind, the mists of suspicion and icebergs of hatred disappear.

The author says that the reorganization of the States on the basis of language gave impetus to regionalism but what kind of regionalism, disintegrating or integrating. Linguistic basis of States may encourage Cachar to get away from Assam, Ladakhis from Kashmir, and Jammu from the Kashmir Valley. Even the states organised on the basis of language may break up, Vidarbha in Maharashtra, Jharkhand from Bihar, Telengana from Andhra, Darjeeling from West Bengal.

We no doubt agree with the author when he says that with the strengthening of Indian nationalism regionalism and separatist tendencies would disappear. The condition for the break up of the separatist tendencies is the development of communications. Development of communications is a two-edged weapon. It facilitates the free flow of commodities and the free flow of ideas. Ideas are more important than merchandise. The second condition is that the regional political parties must also disappear. National parties like the CPI should be strengthened. The third condition is that education, particularly higher education should be nationalised, and the medium of instruction should be common throughout the country. This does not mean that the mother tongue should be ignored. Besides the mother tongue, there should be a link language as the medium of instruction throughout the country. In the whole of North East India, the medium of instruction is through one language. To sum up, if all the principles enshrined in the Preamble to the Indian Constitution—democracy, secularism and socialism are implemented freely and fully, there emerges the Indian Nation.

Again, the author's contention that the regional forces secured greater representation and polled larger percentage of votes during the period 1952-72 may not be accepted because he arrived at this conclusion by clubbing the independents and regional groups together. Many independents were rebel Congressmen who contested as independent candidates when they were not given Congress tickets to contest the elec-

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tion. After the election, several of the independents were admitted into the Congress fold. Others belonged to no party. The motives that compelled others to contest elections are too complex for analysis.

The recent trends in the functioning of political parties clearly demonstrates that the future of the regional political parties is bleak. In North East India, most of the regional political parties had their origin in the Hill areas. Some of them functioned successfully. In the plains of Assam a regional party came to power for the first time in 1985. A regional party claims always that it is national in character and most of them simply follow the same programme and policy as that of the Central Government. In course of time, either they merge themselves with the existing national parties or disspppear.

The author deals with the sources of tension. The first source is the fear of Bengali domination, which began with the declaration of Bengali as the court language supplanting Assamese. The Assamese, aided by the American Baptist Mission, opposed the imposition of Bengali as the court language and ultimately succeeded in the reintroduction of Assamese as medium of instruction. It must also be said in fairness to the Bengalis that they did not support Bengali as the court language. Some of the eminent Bengalis like Romesh Chandra Dutt ICS, an eminent Bengali scholar and administrator, said that Assamese was different from Bengali. Some of the British district officers also said the same thing. It is true that Col. Hopkinson was in favour of Bengali as the court language. But he was overruled by the Bengal Government and Assamese was declared the court language and medium of instruction in schools.

Although Assamese was declared as the court language, the fear of Bengali domination continued. But I think this was manufactured by interested parties. For, the Bengali Hindus of Sylhet and Cachar did not like to be a part of Assam. They agitated for reunion with Bengal. The Muslims of the Surma Valley were divided on this issue. The Hindus of the Brahmaputra Valley were anxious to get rid of the Bengali element from Assam. The Assam Legislative Council, at the instance of an Assamese, passed a resolution recommending to the Central Government the transfer of Sylhet and Cachar to Bengal. The Bengal Government did not welcome the idea because both the districts were deficit districts. Further, Sylhet was predominantly a Muslim populated district and would increase the existing Hindu Muslim tensions. Third, though racially the Bengalis are one, the Calcutta Bengalis did not like the Dacca Bengalis. Finally, the Bengal Government agreed to accept the resolution passed by the Assam Legislative Council subject to certain conditions. First, Cachar which was never a part of Bengal, though

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inhabited by Bengalis, shall not be accepted. Second, the deficit in the Sylhet budget shall be met by the Government of Assam. So nothing was done till partition of Bengal in 1947. When partition was decided upon, Muslims who were not willing to go to Bengal, were anxious to go to East Pakistan. The Hindus who wanted to leave Assam and join Bengal were anxious to remain with Assam. The Assamese Hindus did not like to have Cachar and other areas, inhabited predominantly by the Bengali Hindus, given to India by the Radcliffe Award. Now Cachar desires to become an independent political unit in the Indian Republic and the common man of Brahmaputra Valley welcomes the idea thinking that Assam would become homogeneous with a distinct identity. But the Assamese will be disappointed if they are under any such impression. Assam is an extremely polyglot area inhabited by various races. Although identity cannot be established, the fear complex is a myth. Assamese are not the people who will permit any one to dominate them. Demographically this is not possible. In Cachar Assamese population is not significant. In the Brahmaputra Valley the Bengali population is below 20 per cent of the total population. The percentage of Bengali population in the Assam Valley varies from district to district. Fear psychosis, is the creation of the intelligent to play on the sentiments of the unintelligent to achieve their ends. If Cachar is separated from Assam, the fear of Bengali domination may disappear if one recognises the recent trends in the thinking of the Bengali population of the Kamrup district. The Bengalis of the Brahmaputra Valley supported the AAGSP for the elimination of the foreigners. They also agreed to have Assamese as the medium of instruction in the Bengali schools. Again, the Universities in the Assam Valley permitted the students in the Cachar district and the post graduate students in the Valley to write their answer scripts in English. Thus in the whole of North East India, English has become the medium of instruction. If Cachar is separated and if West Bengal does not interfere in the internal affairs of Assam, the Bengali residents of the Assam Valley may change their attitude towards Assamese and accept Assamese as the medium of instruction. They must go further and call themselves as Assamese and assimilate with the Assamese. The best means by which this assimilation can be brought about is by the inter mixture of blood. All this will take time.

The author also deals with the fear of Muslim domination. The Assamese Hindu politicians think that another Saadulla might appear on the scene. It is a fact that the Muslim population in the present territories of Assam has increased from a mere five lakhs in 1901 to 56 lakhs. Jinnah at one time wanted to annex Assam to East Pakistan. It

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is also argued that Muslims are permitted by their religion to marry four wives at a time. This custom resulted in the increase of Muslim population. This is a fanciful argument. Without further going into the details of this argument, I submit that the Muslims constitute only 25 per cent of the total population and are under represented in the Legislature, both Central and State. It was only in 1983, that they secured adequate representation in the Legislative Assembly. It must also be admitted that the Hindu population also increased. Therefore, the fear of Muslim domination is a myth.

For the integration of North East India, economically and socially, the North Eastern Council has been brought into existence. The NEC established in 1972, has acquitted itself creditably so far. But it is only an advisory body. It has no executive power. If it is to serve the purpose for which it was established it should be endowed with enough powers and functions. We would suggest that a new type of federation should be brought into existence. Instead of having a two layer federation we may have a three layer federation, Central, Regional and State Governments. The regional federations may be headed by a Deputy President with a Legislative Assembly and a Council of Ministers. It should be endowed with certain powers and functions of regional importance. The whole of North East India should be regarded as a region. Since North East India has a long international border with China, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Burma, the headquaters of the Eastern Command should be shifted to some place in North East India. The para military forces must be under a single control.

One of the good features of the reorganization of North East India is the common High Court for all the seven states. Recently, a suggestion was made by the Prime Minister for separate High Courts for each state. It was not accepted by Parliament. There is no need for separate high courts. To relieve congestion of work in the Gauhati High Court, separate Benches have already been established. That is enough. We also say that there is no need for the District Council courts. They did not command the confidence of the common man because untrained persons were appointed as judges of these courts. Therefore, they do not have enough work to do. The salary paid to the judges is waste of money.

The author also discusses the work of the Law Research Institute of the Gauhati Court. The Institute has been entrusted with the codification of customary laws. We do not suggest the codification of customary laws because customary law differs from place to place within the same district. The customary law that operates in Tura does not exist in the interior. Instead of codifying the customary law the District Council,

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consisting of elected members on the basis of adult franchise, may enact laws. They would have better reception than the codified customary laws.

The author discusses the methodology to be adopted to establish unity in North East India, whether by total assimilation or by integration. Some of the members of the Constituent Assembly, ignorant of the psychology of the tribals, advocated the assimilation of the tribals into the mainstream. They were against the creation of the District Councils. They argued that the District Councils would develop the separatist tendency in the tribals which already existed. Social anthropologists did not support this view. The policy of assimilation would bring into existence, resistance on the part of the tribals. Instead of assimilation the policy of integration was suggested. The policy of integration would tolerate the existence of different customs and manners and at the same time certain things would be common to all.

The author discusses the further reorganization of North East India. Theoretically speaking, there should be one political organization for the whole of North East India. But this is a day dream. We must anchor our boat near the shore lines of reality—ethnic, linguistic and geographical considerations compel us to agree for further reorganization of North East India. We must concede the demand of Cachar on linguistic and geographical grounds. Similarly Karbis (Mikir Hills) and the North Cachar Hills should be separated from Assam. The difficulty with regard to the creation of Udayachal is that the Bodos do not live in a compact area. They are spread over the whole of Brahmaputra Valley. How to satisfy the demand of the Bodos? I do not know. At first their demand was limited to the creation of a District Council. Now they are demanding statehood called Udayachal. It is just possible that the present Meghalaya may break up and the Garos may wish to secede from Meghalaya.

The author suggests the establishment of bicameralism in the states of North East India. Assam had a bicameral legislature during the period 1937 to 1947. It did not work satisfactorily. So it was abolished. In recent times, there was a movement for abolition of the upper houses in some states like Madras and Andhra. So there is no need for a bicameral legislature.

Nor should we revert to the common governorship for all states in North East India. These states are not willing to have a common Governor for some reason or other. At present there are four governors in North East India.

We suggest that Darjeeling, which is now in West Bengal, is geographically a part of North East India; politically also it must be a part of

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North East India. If Darjeeling becomes a part of North East India, Sikkim also must be a part of North East India. This region should have a sub-federation with a Deputy President and all the states in North East India should be members of this sub-federation. The sub-federation should have a common planning commission.

To conclude I must say that the book under review is a very valuable contribution to the subject on North East. I wish that the title of the book should have been *North East India: Problems and Prospects.*

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POLITICAL AFFAIRS

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH: Essays from the Poor to the Rich. Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan, Bombay, 1983, vi, 88 p., Rs. 30.

IN the spring of 1982, John Kenneth Galbraith, a former US Ambassador to India, presently Paul M. Warburg Professor of Economics Emeritus, Harvard University, delivered the Rajaji Lectures on the invitation of the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. The present book is the collection of these lectures as rewritten by the author in the form of essays. It was published in 1983 and it is being reviewed full four years after its publication. But the theme of the essays—'the relations between the new states and the older industrial lands, socialist and non-socialist'—is of importance even today.

Through his liberal eyes Galbraith finds fault with the approaches of the Soviet Union as well as that of the US to the solution of the problems of underdevelopment. Both the Super Powers inappropriately prescribe their respective economic systems as best suited to achieving rapid economic development by the newly independent states of Asia and Africa. In their folly, the Soviet Union and the US stand together on one side representing the rich countries or the older industrial states juxtaposed to the poor countries or the new nations. What is the nature of the former's folly? They have equally misunderstood 'the nature of national development', or more basically, they have failed to perceive that development is a historical process and the economic design that is appropriate for the highly developed economies cannot be so for the less developed ones.

By an adroit twist of the theme he suggests that the rich nations should take the message from the poor ones in conceiving the economic system that is appropriate for their progress. Why during all these post-war years, it is the rich nations that have dictated the remedy for the poor nations' ills? Instead of simply saying that he who pays the piper calls the tune, Galbraith points out the fallacy that informs the conduct of the rich nations, namely, that intelligence in such matters is correlated with income. The rich nations actually betray their inanity in trying to transplant their respective systems—socialism by the Soviet Union and the creed of free enterprise by the US—to the newly independent countries.

Socialism cannot work in the poor countries because it "required a large and competent administrative apparatus of high integrity, and in all early stages of political and cultural development such administrative capacity is a scarce resource." (p. 9) Like all scarce assets this also must

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not be frittered away in 'comprehensive socialist effort'. Has not Marx opined that socialism can come only after 'the preliminary socializing effort of capitalism' has led to 'the development of industrial discipline?' (p. 10). The classical concept of the supremacy of the market is also a myth and, therefore, cannot be relied on for efficient management of the economy.

The highly industrialized countries are at a stage of development in which the provision of industrial capital goods is the *sine quo non* of further development and well-being of the people. The same condition cannot be appropriate for achieving development by the newly independent poor countries. In the early stages of development of the new rich countries the emphasis was 'not on capital investment but on political and then cultural development'.

From his major premise that economic development is a historical process and each country must accommodate itself to the conditions of the stage of development in which it is in at a point of time for achieving sustained development, Galbraith deduces that without having a stable, predictable, honest and effective political system and compulsory and free basic education first, a newly independent poor nation cannot make real economic advances. All the industrially developed nations had to fulfil these preconditions for economic development at their early stages of development.

The most critical precondition is the spread of education. Without mass education the culture of poverty to which the people become quite reconciled cannot be discharged. It is general education "which opens windows through which those caught up in the culture of poverty can look. And so seeing, they are motivated to escape." (p. 18)

The technology developed by the rich nations is correlated with the stage of their development. But the same is being pushed into the poor countries for whom such technology is quite inappropriate and unsuited to meet their social, economic and cultural needs. Therefore such export of sophisticated production techniques and technicians to handle them leads to unpleasant tensions in the relations between the countries concerned as it is evident from the experiences of the "Russians in China, the Americans in Iran, the Russians in Egypt, (and) the Americans in Indochina." (p. 21)

It becomes even more disastrous when such export of technical skill involves advanced military know-how. The policy of providing considerable amount of arms by the rich to the newly independent nations for building up their military power is particularly reprehensible. For in many new nations this has been a prelude to the replacement of civilian power by military power and dissolution or suspension of democratic institutions. Galbraith denounces the arms culture which represents the

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bitter competition between the US and the Soviet Union in arming the poor countries by selling or even making gifts of weaponry. This nourishes antagonisms between the poor countries themselves who throw away their scarce resources in fighting with each other with the lethal weapons acquired from their mentors. For the poor countries, "the cost of arms and training in their use is, quite literally, bread and rice from the mouths of their people." (p. 47)

The rivalry in developing weapons of ever greater destructive capacity is also suicidal for the great powers themselves. Such an arms race is being fuelled by the erroneous belief that only by outbidding the other in the race a great power can safeguard its economic, political and social system. Capitalism and socialism, asserts Galbraith, "are highly sophisticated products" of the historical process of development and both are doomed to destruction in the event of a nuclear conflict between them. The poor countries will also go down with the fall of the colossi.

Apart from the forebodings of a nuclear holocaust, the arms race bodes ill for economic progress as shown by Ruth Leger Sivard in her work, *World Military and Social Expenditures*, 1981 (Leesburg, Virginia: World Priorities, 1981). p. 19. It reveals, as quoted by Galbraith, that the rate of growth of investment of productive activities has been the lowest in those countries where the proportion of military expenditures to the Gross National Product has been the highest. This is so because an arms race leads to diversion of investment and research resources from productive activities to unproductive ones. Consequently, growth of output of goods of civilian consumption becomes sluggish, and competitive capacity of the country concerned in the field of international trade weakens.

The arms race, however, serves 'the economic interests of the arms merchants' of the rich countries at a heavy cost for the poor ones. Therefore, Galbraith implores the poor countries to realize this and stand up jointly against arms flows from the rich ones. This is the wisest course of action for the former from whom wisdom should flow to the latter.

The systems of economic management both in the capitalist and socialist countries have not been, according to the author, satisfactory; they have been 'functioning far below their promise'. He does not elaborate the failings of the socialist management of Soviet economy, but rules out that socialism can at all be appropriate for the poor countries; for, "The choice between Capitalism and Communism emerges only after there is capitalism." (p. 41) He, however, shows the shortcomings of the system of economic management of the capitalist countries, particularly that of the US The main thrust of his criticism is that these countries have not been accommodating themselves to the historical process. Says Galbraith:

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"The large-scale production of the twentieth century with its enormous investments and its long time horizons would be impossible were prices, costs and sales volume left to the uninhibited and wholly unpredictable movements of the classical market." (p. 67)

Secondly, 'the engine of historical change' is organization which represents the modern state with its large and pervasive apparatus, the big corporations, trade unions, farmers' associations, etc. These organizations are powerful enough 'to take power away from the market' and dictate the prices of the commodities and services. The rich capitalist countries, particularly the US and UK, are required to adjust their systems of economic management to this historical process and adopt appropriate wage-price policy in order to overcome the problem of creeping inflation associated with recession instead of relying on the 'classical market fantasies' and monetarism.

Coming as it does from the pen of the writer of a number of international best-sellers like, *The Affluent Society*, *The Great Crash, 1929 The New Industrial State*, *Ambassador's Journal et al.*, this little book is highly readable. Never for a moment Galbraith abandons rationality in favour of emotion. One may differ with him in respect of the starting premise but once it is accepted one can hardly differ from what he has said. Brevity, wit and candour are the cardinal marks of the book and, therefore, it is quite captivating.

In today's world the two opposing ideologies—socialism and capitalism—so sharply divide the intellectuals and the politicians that liberalism is suspect in the eyes of the committed whether to the one or the other order. Galbraith, in his own words, is 'an abiding liberal' (vide, J.K. Galbraith, *Annals of an Abiding Liberal*, Clarion Books, 1980) even as, for his liberalism, outspokenness and active support to liberals, he was for long forty years (1931-1971) under surveillance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He spoke about this unhappy and somewhat amusing episode with his tongue in cheek in his essay, "*My Forty Years with the F.B.I.*", (pp. 155-181).

It will, therefore, be too much to expect that Galbraith's liberal views will prevail upon the policy-makers even in his own country, that is, USA.

More importantly, the concept of economic aid by the rich to the poor, which is a post-Second-World-War phenomenon, has not been so much informed by the liberal economists' dictum—poverty in one part of the world is a drag on plenty in the other—as by the self-interest of the rich countries in creating markets for their products and plants and machinery which become absolescent in the course of rapid technological progress. Also, the nature, terms and conditions, quantum and timing of providing aids are so determined by the great powers as to expand

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and strengthen their spheres of influence. It is not for nothing that the developing countries have been demanding almost in one voice: let there be more trade rather than aid. They have also been asking for a new economic order which will make it possible for them to produce more and export more to the nations, genuine wisdom; but who cares?

Galbraith is, however, an optimist. His optimism arises from his faith in the historical process. If the countries—whether rich or poor—do not accommodate themselves to the historical process, woes would betide them. And that will bring about the awareness and the urge for pursuing the right path. He asserts: "Not even the most committed ideologist can resist history in an enduring way if the suffering is sufficiently great." (p. 81)

How correct Galbraith was in professing this lesson of history is evident from the fact that the US economy is currently in a state of turmoil. The dollar has been sinking as the budget and trade deficits have been mounting. There are apprehensions that the US economy is heading for another great depression. The stock market crash on Black Monday of 19 October 1987 is a pointer to the impending disaster to avoid which restructuring of the system of economic management is a must. The mischief of the magic of the market are exposed and, as Galbraith has recently commented on this development elsewhere, the market signs represent the writing of the last chapter of "Reaganomics."

The Soviet Union which achieved spectacular economic development leading to the country's emergence as the second strongest economy over a period of less than six decades, has been facing the problems of shortage of goods to meet the growing needs of the people. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, in his report presented at his party's 27th Congress held in February 1986 admitted this and outlined the strategy for accelerating the country's socio-economic development. The programme of action pronounced by him emphasizes restructuring ('*perestroika*') of the economy in an atmosphere of openness (*glasnost*') and democratization ('*demokratzatsia*') of the decision-making process. He has also outlined a formula for a rational economic order based on "disarmament-for-development."

All these happenings suggest that the world economic order is bound to change and also that the pressure for straightening up the warped ties between the rich and poor nations will mount. Yet, can we dream of the day when the advice of the poor nations will prevail upon the rich nations in formulating the latter's policy of how best to help the former?

Agartala, Tripura.

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ADI H. DOCTOR: Issues in Political Theory. Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1985, ix, 204 p., Rs. 100.

ISSUES in Political Theory by Dr. Adi Doctor has been written with two main objectives, firstly to clarify and analyse concepts of political theory, and secondly to create commitment to the liberal democratic values. While the first objective seems appropriate, useful and achievable, in the second one, the author has certainly set for himself a tall task.

The book focuses on description and understanding of some key issues such as liberty, equality, nature of political authority, justice, etc. These issues are described and interpreted multidimensionally. Of his own acceptance, the author has shown implicit faith in the liberal democratic state and thereby, to liberal value which according to him is the ultimate goal of human life.

Till this point, one finds it easy to agree with his viewpoint and he even succeeds to an extent in arousing the reader's interest and curiousity so that the reader turns to subsequent pages to find out how these values change over a period of time. It is here that the author could have met his reader's interest by presenting his own views about how these values change and what variables contribute to one's changing value system. Unfortunately, one almost feels cheated at the abrupt manner in which the author skips the whole exercise and moves on to an equally abrupt conclusion. One expects the author to compare and contrast the differing value systems of two very different societies, the Indian and the United States, thereby providing a more concrete and deeper understanding of the process of acquisition of value system. (Chapter 2)

As regards the resolution of conflict between the two competing value systems, the author suggests that it can be rationally resolved through fearless and a frank criticism. Here, the author seems to have ignored the fact that in a typical Hindu society, there is existence and rationalization of conflicts which find its resolution through philosophical means and orientation of one's own thought process. Epics like Ramayana and Mahabharata justify violence to solve social and political injustice, while religious faiths like Buddhism and Jainism advocate a complete nonviolent course of action. Here therefore, author's treatment of conflict which has been the mainstay of any society is casual and the solution offered is by no means new or unexplored. (p. 34)

Further, one is inclined to agree with the author's remark that an individual's value preferences can change over a period of time and that the value formation takes place in the classroom with a teacher playing an important role. Presumably what the author is trying to convey is that for an individual, the proper understanding of 'issues' would lead

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to formation of necessary value systems. If that is so, the author fails to put the necessary emphasis on the point. In fact this being one of the main objectives of the book, one wonders as to why the author is so casual and abrupt about such an important issue. The author should have grabbed the opportunity of indicating other equally potent sources like one's socio-economic environment, socio-cultural background which exert and play a significant role in evaluating one's adherence to political issues and thereby towards the formation of value premises.

The above lacunae in the book are evident, especially against author's statement regarding the pecuniary object of the book. However, as regards to other objectives of interpreting and analysing the issues, the author has compensated by making an encyclopaedic presentation of views of various schools of thought on Politics, power and authority, natural law and natural rights, The problem of general will (obligation and resistance, liberty, equality, justice and constitutionalism. (Chapters 4 to 11) All those who matter from the Greeks to the present are mentioned with their views and the reader gets a compact but multidimentional view on above issues. Still one cannot help noticing the lack of author's own contribution in the form of conclusion or remarks towards the end of each chapter. In some places, the author does venture to draw his own conclusions and occassionally makes sketchy reference to Indian conditions (p. 174) but these are not consistent with the body of literature discussed therein.

On the whole, the book lacks originality and with heavy quotes and views of various author's and schools of thought, one feels that it is a concise form of history of political theory from the Greeks to present day. Yet, it can serve as useful introduction to those who wish to have a glossary of political issues and ideas at one place. The language of the book is lucid and simple and its presentation of ideas logical. Its reference would benefit the students considerably.

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VEENA KUKREJA: Military Intervention in Politics. NBO Publisher's Distributors, New Delhi, 1985, xi, 223 p., Rs. 125.

THIS well-written and highly readable book is largely the young author's dissertation for her M. Phil degree from the University of Delhi. It discusses in depth the phenomenon of military intervention in politics, endemic to what Z.A. Bhutto called the 'coup zone' comprising mostly the developing countries in the light of the Pakistani experience in the last forty years. The writer who is now a lecturer of Political Science at a Delhi University college has brought to bear on her study not only a wealth of research but also an insight free of political or other bias. Although apparently she has had no opportunity to visit Pakistan—which is a sad reflection on the state of relations between our two countries—Veena Kukreja has not allowed value judgments to colour her understanding and analysis of Pakistani developments. This has enriched the book.

A descriptive recapitulation of the three phases of military rule in Pakistan, from 1958 to 1965 of direct martial law and indirect military control of the administration under Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the 1969-72 Yahya Khan interlude and the 1977 takeover by Gen. Zia-ul Haque which continues to this day even if in a diluted form, is followed by an incisively written comparative analysis. In this context, the author has rightly concluded that "the persistent praetorian nature of Pakistani society, particularly the institutional poverty of the political system, coupled with emphasis on patrimonial type of politics, is responsible for the cycle of *coups*. The impetus for military intervention on all the three occasions came from the political situation. While Ayub Khan's seizure of power in 1958 was welcomed by the people as relief from unending political instability and corruption, the Yahya and Zia regimes owed themselves initially to their promise to save the country from the then prevailing chaos and civil strife. They were thus meant to be holding operations, although as in 1958 they, too, ultimately asserted the "manifest destiny" of the military to safeguard national interests. Because of the higher level of political mobilisation of the people in 1969 and 1977—compared to 1958—there was resentment at, if not resistance to, the military intervention. In this context, the author brings out the systematic erosion of civilian, democratic institutions by Bhutto in the name of radicalisation of politics. In 1969, after leaving the Ayub Government, he had gone out of his way to destablise not only the military dominated administrative system but the entire political setup as well. In 1977, as Prime Minister, he destroyed all avenues of popular initiatives and even used the electoral system—regained by the people after three decades of struggle—to perpetuate his rule. That had enabled

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the military, although discredited in 1971, to assume the role of protector of national interests and resume a political role.

Against this background, the author critically examines the current approaches to, or theories of, military intervention in politics of western scholars and shows them to be inadequate for an understanding in perspective of a Pakistan-like situation. Their main drawback, as she points out, has been an overemphasis on the nature of the military establishment to the relative downplaying of the strength or weakness of the civilian political institutions and the impact of domestic socio-economic (and perhaps political also) developments and the international environment. The case study of Pakistan illustrates the relevance of all three summary variables for understanding the phenomenon. Both India and Pakistan shared the British legacy of civil-military relations based on overall civilian control and "military aloofness" from politics. But after about a decade of abortive attempts to evolve a suitable civilian political system Pakistan lapsed into recurring spells of military rule. India, on the other hand, has established what seems to be durable civilian political and administrative institutions. The main reason for this is no doubt Nehru's leadership which was marked by zealous development and protection of democratic institutions, reinforcing the inherited British practice while the leadership in Pakistan failed to do so for a variety of reasons. So the military became the source of stability.

Among the factors which contributed to Pakistan's experience was the accent since 1954 on beefing up the military muscle in the name of ensuring the security of the country against the perceived Indian threat. The military aid from the US strengthened this trend and led to the economic and other disparities between what was then West Pakistan and its eastern wing. The rest is history.

Veena Kukreja also discusses in parenthesis the possibility of a similar situation developing in India and dismisses it as improbable. While it is true that a country of India's size, diversity and experience is unlikely to come under military rule or remain under it for long, if it happens, one has to note some alarming trends. What is called modernisation of the military with massive investment of resources in the defense forces and acquisition of newer and newer weapons systems is not very different, qualitatively, from what happened in pakistan in the 1950s. Secondly, there is a growing tendency to involve the military in the solution of political problems. Thirdly, there is rising incidence of violence in public life and corresponding accretion of strength to a centralised state power in the name of maintaining law and order. Fourthly, civilian institutions are being recklessly eroded. Last but not least, there is a new philosophy which identifies centralisation and strengthening of the coercive apparatus of the state with safeguarding security and even na-

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tion building. What the cumulative effect of these developments will be time only can say.

An excellent and thought-provoking book.

New Delhi G.S. BHARGAVA

NEERA CHANDHOKE : The Politics of United Nations Sanctions. Gitanjali Publishing House, New Delhi, 1986, xi, 300 p., Rs. 150/-

VERY few episodes of contemporary history stand comparison with the Rhodesion politics of the seventies as a testimony of the distressing impotence of the UN, as an evidence of the fact that the Security Council was "no better than an academic society dealing in abstracts that cannot be translated into palpable results" (an Arabia, quoted in the book under review, p. 56). A similar dark comedy is being enacted now in South Africa, where the lessons learnt from the Rhodesian situation could be a pointer for the students of International Politics. Dr. Neera Chandhoke in *The Politics of UN sanctions*," attempts a post mortem of the interactions of all the *dramatis personae* involved, the Security Council, UK, the Third World countries, South Africa, some of the neighbouring countries and the culprit—the UDI regime of Ian Smith. She has more or less a critical attitude, though her overall sympathy for the international organisation taking punitive measures against the rebel does not remain unconcealed, specially for the so-called "farsightedness" of the Security Council. (p. 70)

Chandhoke's elaborate examination of primary and secondary sources makes it clear that the international organisation was theoretically prepared to take steps against, though the UDI Government, aided by South Africa stubbornly persisted that the Rhodesion Question was not an international one, it was a matter of Britan's "domestic jurisdiction only". (p. 192) Nevertheless, at least at a legal level, it did not remain a matter of "domestic dimension" (heading of Chapter 6) only, international sanction was imposed through the UN, but even a cursory reading of the materials presented by Chandhoke would reveal that the liberation of Zimbabwe was more a product of regional factors (like Mozambique's liberation in mid-seventies) and domestic efforts (national movement of the Black people), than of international pressure, however well meaning the latter had been. One small sentence from the book will explain the ineffectualness of the UN sanctions—"the Sanctions Committee (of the Security Council) proved powerless to

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persuade states to apply sanctions on an effective scale." (p 82) The UN Committee on Collective Measures had to admit that the sanctions were being "honoured more in the breach than their observance, (p. 83) and while the violations of the sanctions by Portuguese Mozambique and the apartheid regime of South Africa were direct, the member countries of UN theoretically condemning UDI caused the breach in a more subtle manner. The statistics given on page 86 show that 1599 metre tons of Rhodesian tobacco entered world markets in 1967 as against the Mozambican tobacco; and among buyers, there was France, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium and Luxembourg, besides Portugal. The impressive figure of indirect exports of Rhodesia (p. 91), aided by the South African customs Union makes the comedy of the situation clear. I quote Chandhoke: "Copper from Inyati mines, was being sold as of Mozambicean origin, and the Edmundian mines in Mozambique, largely in disuse, had been bought with a view to using it as a front and cover up operation." (p. 102) Numerous violations of the oil sanctions, the 'Gemstone Scandal in Japan, German shipment of 3300 bags of graphites from Rhodesia in 1969 (p. 107), the lack of cooperation from even an African country like Liberia in detection of sanction busting—all these reveal what Chandhoke rightly calls the "inbuilt structural limitations" of the Sanctions Committee. In context of these depressing details of the violations of sanctions, the demonstration of "unprecedented international solidarity of the later sanctions" (of 1976-77) does not appear meaningful in its impact, specially when we note that the domestic exports of Rhodesia (excluding gold) in 1976 earned 748 million US Dollars! Pan American World Airways Corporation was being operated in Rhodesia in 1976, package tours were organised by American travel agents during the same period. Twenty militarised versions of Cessna 337 aircraft were sold to Rhodesia by an American company called Reins Aviation in June '77. This fails to convince us of the efficacy of the "latter sanctions." The constant violations of sanctions, either overtly or through escape clauses, understandably angered Somalia, whose representative in the Security Council said sarcastically in 1972 that the Sanctions Committee had "become a postbox for the few reports of violations which were brought to notice intermittently by member states." (p. 118) Even an additional power to "collect, sift, and analyse all reports of known or suspected violations of sanctions, no matter what their source" did not change the situation in any effective manner till the geopolitical changes (liberation of Mozambique) and the intense guerrilla activities inside Rhodesia endangered the UDI regime. "Repeated international condemnation can operate as a form of psychological pressure and undermine the morale of the target state," (p. 63) but in the Rhodesian case, it did not do so

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as has been amply revealed by Chandhoke herself in Chapter 6, and as such one may not find her criticism of John Galtung's scepticism, valid. The "far-sightedness" of the Security Council eulogised by Chandoke which changed the sanctions from 'voluntary' to 'mandatory' in 1966, did not change the reality of the situation in any meaningful way. While a member state, legally authorised to use force against another state violating the sanctions, never used that authority, the illegal regime in Rhodesia used various forms of force to withstand possible effects of sanctions and converted their closed society to a police state.

As a citizen of a Third World country we are prone to take pride in what the Afro-Asian Bloc does or at least strives to do in the UN to promote international justice. Chandhoke emphatically stresses the point that Britain agreed to take punitive measures against Rhodesia due to the pressure put by this Bloc. (pp. 46 and 58) One can hardly rejoice about the overall affect of this pressure when one finds that counter sanctions by Rhodesia against UK and Zambia, by repudiating loans, (p. 220) was a loud retort, which caused immense harm to Zambia. The plight of Zambia (Regional Dimension) clearly reveals the hollowness of the international response to the Rhodesian situation, particularly of the Western Bloc. Zambia, the newly independent country, had to bear the brunt of the situation due to its varied dependence on Rhodesia (coal, electricity, for its copper stock, supply of food, *et al*). The reality of the situation allowed Rhodesia to retaliate, the culprit itself took punitive measures against a member country of UN (comparable to what South Africa is doing to the 'frontline states' now and as per the communication to the UN Secretary-General in 1968. Quoted on p. 171). The assistance from the UN member states—Zambia in its days of adversity, was regrettably regligible. The oil pipe line from Dar-es-Salaam (a port already far too congested to tackle additional burden from Zambia) and the Great North Road saved the situation partly only and the completion of the construction of the Uhuru Railway by the Chinese coincided with the liberation of Mozambique. It should also be noted that the western member states of the UN turned a deaf ear to President Kaunda's appeal for assistance to build the railway so that he could divert Zambia's exports to the north, which ultimately led him to look for help elsewhere. Help came only after 1973, when the damage to the Zambian economy was already done. One may admit that during the later years Rhodesia did feel the pinch of the sanctions economically (p. 240-243); some of the transnational companies cut down their activities in Rhodesia in 1977-78, and shifted their interest to black African countries. (p 236) But that was rather an effect of the two contributory factors already mentioned—Mozambiques' independence

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and growth of militant African nationalism in Rhodesia. That the survival of Rhodesian economy with the help of transnational companies cannot be ruled out is indirectly supported by Chandhoke when she suggests: "Also in any future attempt at sanctioneering, definite curbs should be imposed on the activities of the various transnational corporations." (p 110) One can hardly suppress a sardonic smile when one looks at what is happening in South Africa now.

Calcutta. DHRUBA GUPTA

D.R. GOYAL (*Ed.*): Nuclear Disarmament: The Six-Nation Initiative and the Big Power Response. Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1987, xiv, 84 p., Rs 60/-

THE slim volume is a collection of the speeches by parliamentarians including serving and former ministers, academicians and other distinguished public men on the occasion of the Third Anniversary of India's initiatives at Non-Aligned conferences designed to bring about nuclear disarmament. Towards the end of 1986 an anniversary seminar was organised by '*Secular Democracy*' whose Editor-in-chief, D.R. Goyal has contributed a short introduction to this volume.

Minister of State for External Affairs, Natwar Singh in his contribution "New Approach: Hopeful Signs" draws attentions to the efforts of the six nations (Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania) to persuade the nuclear 'haves' to take two specific steps namely:

1 Evolve a comprehensive test ban treaty; and
2 Prevent extension of the arms race into outer space.

The Non-Aligned have at every opportunity been appealing to the nuclear powers to stop further testing, to stop adding to their nuclear arsenals and start cutting down their stockpiles. As Natwar Singh recounts sadly, only one great power has been ready to act as suggested. The other great power, in contrast, has plans for building new missiles and high technology space weapons. France and China want the Super Powers to cut down their arsenals drastically before they can think of reducing theirs, thus indirectly supporting the continuance of the arms race.

Former External Affairs Minister, B.R. Bhagat recalls, appropriately, Indira Gandhi's description of NAM (Non Aligned Movement) as

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"History's biggest peace movement." He also recalls Soviet Union's positive proposals at Reykjavik suggesting drastic reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the Super Powers. It had also unilaterally stopped testing of nuclear weapons hoping that US would follow suit, Stopping nuclear tests would be a positive step towards the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

Romesh Bhandari discusses the costs and hazards of USA's SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative). He mentions that (as of 1986) USA may have had about 25,000 nuclear warheads and the Soviet Union possibly about 23,000 to 32,000.

Robert McNamara, however, estimates in his *Blundering into Disaster* (UBS Publishers), that USA has about 20,924 nuclear weapons not taking into account 'reloads' for these weapons, while its rival may muster about 19,774 warheads. Whether the sum total of the weapons held by the two adversaries is 40,000 or 50,000 is an academic question. A tenth of that number exploded on population centres, water supply and other critical points will be sufficient to wipe out life on earth.

The pernicious doctrine of a limited nuclear war maintains that a war during the course of which only a few of the infernal weapons are discharged can be waged and won and at the end of it, 'it will be business as usual' for aggressor. It is not that the US strategists are unaware of the hollowness of this argument. The danger to the world, including USA itself, is that responsible US leaders talk lightly of waging nuclear wars and unwittingly initiate a nuclear war. In 1981, for instance, as quoted by Robert McNamara, the Executive Director of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament had said—

> I think it is possible to survive a nuclear war....Nuclear war is a destructive thing, but it is still in large part a physics problem. Hiroshima, after it was bombed, was back and operating three days later.

Vice President George Bush had also said in 1980, that "if you have survivability of command and control, protection of 100 per cent of your citizens, your industry and if you can inflict more damage on your enemy that he does on you, you can survive."

All available data pertaining to nuclear explosions and their possible effects on life on earth and the environment points to the fact that nuclear wars between two nuclear powers can be devastating. This reviewer would like to stress that USA's nuclear policy has been to threaten the use of nuclear weapons and to use them, if at all necessary, only against non-nuclear countries and among them those believed to be friendly to the Soviet Union. The other point, as is evident from the recent action of USA's trigger happy armed forces in the Gulf in shooting down a

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civilian aircraft operating on a scheduled civilion air route without any provocation, is that US forces may, by accident, miscalculation or loss of nerve, start a nuclear war. This is possible if the precautions to release nuclear weapons only on the command of the President fail for whatever reason. USA's aim is to ensure that it maintains overwhelming nuclear superiority—if necessary by dominating space as well—so that no country or combination of countries can stand up to it.

There is an economic dimension to this. USA believes, as stated by Nobel Prize winner Professor Wald (quoted by Prof. P.N. Srivastava), that USA can retain its position as the world's dominant economic power only if it continues to be the world's top-most military power. There is a moral in this for the Non-Aligned. They have to work towards closer economic cooperation among themselves, raise their industrial growth rates and upgrade their technologies while acting unitedly to prevent the economic exploitation of the underdeveloped by the world's strongest power.

The Non-Aligned Movement thus has to serve the political as well as economic interests of the weak besides promoting world peace. We want as Jawaharlal Nehru had once said, 'a generation of peace'. Professor Rais Ahmed, T.N. Chaturvedi, S.S. Gill, A.N. Pandeya, Bilgrami, Sadhan Mukherjee and P.K. Bansal are the other distinguished contributors to this volume.

The volume also includes eight useful appendices.

New Delhi. R. RAMA RAO

HIREN MUKHERJEE: Georgi Dimitrov—Titan of Our Times. Vision Books, New Delhi, 1982, 140 p., Rs. 60.00.

HIREN MUKHERJEE: In Dimitrov's Footsteps—Study of Socialist Bulgaria. Vision Books, New Delhi, 1983, 135 p. Rs. 60.00.

THE two books under review deal with the evolution of Bulgaria as a socialist state—first under the leadership of Dimitrov and later on in his footsteps under Zhivkov. In the first publication, the author highlights the key role that the legendary revolutionary leader Georgi Dimitrov played in the allround social transformation of Bulgaria. In the second publication, the author highlights the continuation of this process under the able leadership of Todar Zhivkov. Hence, needless to add that the two publications are complementary; this the author has rightly submitted in the preface to the second publication. Georgi Dimitrov

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dedicated himself to the cause of proletarian internationalism in general and Bulgaria's social, political and economic emancipation in particular. Whether as an active participant in the anti-fascist upsurge in Bulgaria in 1923 or as a defendent in the fake Reichstag Fire Trial (1933-34) in Nazi Germany, Dimitrov demonstratcd his exemplary courage and conviction as a revolutionary leader. Dimitrov is truly the "maker of New Bulgaria."

After Dimitrov it is Zhivkov who has given guidance to Bulgaria's ongoing process of development and modernization. Zhivkov played a a crucial role in carrying forward the task of socialism as planned and charted by Dimitrov.

The two books together provide an overview of Bulgaria's socio-economic and political transformation since its emergence as a modern socialist state.

The author is an eminent public man and a sound academician. He has ably studied the lives and times of two outstanding leaders of Bulgaria—Dimitrov and Zhivkov. Admittedly, it would be rather over simplistic to consider these publications as the result of rigorous academic efforts. Nonetheless, these publications do provide a good introductory account of contemporary Bulgaria's transformation. In this endeavour, the eminent author with his appropriate political and academic background has been successful.

SHIVAJI GANGULY

RAGHAVAN IYER: The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi: Vol. I, Civilization, Politics and Religion. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1986, xix, 625 p., Rs. 200.

SINCE Attenborough's film, interest in Mahatma Gandhi and his thought has increased dramatically at all levels especially in the West, if not in India. Therefore, there is a demand for books containing his writings, in the academic field, and there is a need for a deeper investigation of Gandhian thinking in terms of solutions to current issues of scholarly interest. Of course, there exists the corpus of *Collected Works of Gandhi* exceeding ninety volumes, but the great mass of material creates problems when one wants to look for specific answers or references; this eminently readable, manageable and not too concise a collection of Gandhi's writings provides an answer to the quest of people who have no time to read all the volumes of *Collected Works*.

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The title of the book, in tune with the author's earlier writing, is *The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi*, and the author is Raghavan Iyer who is internationally known to students of Gandhi. This book reflects the carefully sifted essence of Gandhi's thinking in his earlier book, although it is not an original piece of writing, but only a collection or "an anthology" of Gandhi's writings, as a perceptive writer calls it. This new book of Raghavan Iyer is in three volumes, and we have for review only the first volume on *Civilization, Politics and Religion*; Volume two will cover *Truth and Nonviolence* and volume three will deal with *Non-violent Resistance and Social Transformation.*

In addition to an introduction manifesting the author's analytic precision and his philosophic interest, Volume I contains selections from Gandhi that are put together into six broad headings, and each of these is divided further and sub-divided subject-wise. The material selected in each category is meticulously drawn in keeping with the essence of Gandhian concepts, ideas, perceptions and solutions. The six broad headings into which Gandhi's writings are categorised are: (1) Gandhi on himself and his mission; (2) Influence and books read; (3) Hind Swaraj, Modern Civilization and Moral Progress; (4) Politics and Religion; (5) Religion; and (6) God. This book is an ideal source-book and an absolute necessity for ready reference for any library.

It seems appropriate to start wth what is termed as Gandhi's most dynamic and the most creative gospel of power; that "hatred cannot be conquered by hatred, the sword cannot be conquered by the sword." Now how does Gandhi establish this most dynamic concept of non-violence in the *Bhagavadgita* in which Krishna advised Arjuna to fight on the battle-field which implies a policy of violence, extermination of the enemies? Let us, therefore, turn to the third heading in the third section *The Bhagavad Gita*, in which the first subheading is "The Gita and Non-violence."

After all, in the Gita Krishna admonishes Arjuna to fight on the battle-field; Gandhi therefore, accepted the "karmayoga" of the Gita, but on the other hand, he refused to take the text of the Gita simply at face value. Thus he says that on a closer study of religion and the Gita he discovered that Gita does not refer to any physical warfare, that non-violence rather than violence is the central theme. Arjuna never discussed war with Krishna, he merely recoiled from killing his own kith and kin. Therefore, Lord Krishna says to Arjuna: "Thou hast already done the killing. Thou canst not all at once argue thyself into non-violence. Finish what thou hast already begun." Lord Krishna thus advised Arjuna to follow his *swadharma*—the essential duty of the *Kshatriya.* (warrior).

Here, the following selection from Iyer's material seems to fit in

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perfectly:

> But, then had Arjuna's obstinate refusal to fight anything to do with non-violence? In fact, he had fought often enough in the past; on the present occasion, his reason was suddenly clouded by ignorant attachment. He did not wish to kill his kinsmen. He did not say that he would not kill anyone...Shri Krishna is the Lord dwelling in everyone's heart. He understands the monetary darkening of Arjuna's reason. He, therefore, tells him: 'You have already done this killing.' (Iyer, p. 82)

Non-violent Krishna could give Arjuna no other advice. "But to say that the Gita teaches or justifies war...is as wrong as to say that *himsa* (violence, killing) is the law of life", says Gandhi. And then he transposes the teaching of the Gita to a higher level and points out:

> The field of battle is our own body. An eternal battle is going on between the two camps (of higher and lower impulses). Krishna is the Dweller within, ever whispering in a pure heart. (Iyer, pp. 82-83)

In this context Gandhi also notes *Abhaya* (freedom from fear) which the Gita teaches. He says:

> He who fears, who saves his skin...must fight the physical battle, whether he will not, but that is not his *dharma*...*Himsa*=Violence will go on eternally in this strange world. The Gita shows a way out of it. But it also shows that the escape out of cowardice and despair is not the way. Better far than cowardice is killing and being killed. (Iyer, p. 83)

Here Gandhi clarifies his position further in following words:

> Personally, I believe that Duryodhana and his supporters stand for the Satanic impulses in us, and Arjuna and others stand for Godward impulses. The battle-field is our body. The poet-seer, who knows from experience the problems of life, has given a faithful account of the conflict which is eternally going on within us. Shri Krishna is the Lord dwelling in everyone's heart who is ever murmuring. His promptings in a pure *chitta* like a clock ticking in a room. If the clock of the *chitta* is not wound up with the key of self-purification, the indwelling Lord no doubt remains where He is, but the ticking is heard no more. I do not wish to suggest that violence has no place at all in the teaching of the Gita. The *dharma* which it teaches does not mean that a

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person who has not yet awakened to the truth of non-violence may act like a coward. Any one who fears others, accumulates with violent means, but violence does not, for that reason, become justified as his *dharma*. There is only one *dharma*. Nonviolence means *moksha*, and *moksha* means realizing Satyanarayana. But this *dharma* does not under any circumstance countenance running away in fear.

The examples from the selections of Gandhi's writings on *the Bhagavad Gita* are significant enough to reveal the impact of *the Gita* on Gandhi's thinking as he himself confesses that, "the more I study the Gita, the more I am made aware of its uniqueness. For me, it is a spiritual dictionary. Whenever I am in doubt as to what I should or should not do, I fall back upon it."

With this thought in mind, the selections from Gandhi's writings on *the Gita* seem to be categorised as 'influences'. This indicates how the selections are done under a coherent set of concepts that would serve as guidelines to research scholars. Of course, some basic questions may remain all the same, if these are the most important parts of influences why not some others? One may also ask whether the categories chosen are descriptive or analytical; but as the author says it was necessary to sift the material drawn from the *Collected Works*' with a stringent criterion. In doing this, Iyer has certainly succeeded in presenting a 'balanced and easily accessible' collection of Gandhi's writings, with rich nuances of angle and emphasis.

The above selections will illustrate how a research scholar interested in some specific issues of Gandhian thought can easily identify and sharpen one's focus with required references without looking into the entire complex of the *Collected Work's* volumes.

Again, to take another example of Iyer's selection, let us turn to *Hind Swaraj*, which has a key position in his writings and which was written, as Gandhi himself says, "in answer to the Indian school of violence and its protoptype in South Africa." In this he was specifically referring to violence as a method of attaining swaraj or self-rule and he traced it to violence rooted in modern civilization; he believed that as long as modern civilization continues to occupy a pivotal position in shaping man's destiny, violence will naturally stay. Therefore, Gandhi insists that, "violence was no remedy for Indian ills and that her civilization required the use of different and higher weapons for self-protection and self rule."

Iyer's selections from *Hind Swaraj* clearly highlights this thought of Gandhi, and very important aspects of his message. Here Iyer departs from his usual format and reproduces the entire *Hind Swaraj*; in this section, in answer to the question, how can India become free? Gandhi

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states:

> We brought the English, we keep them. Why do you forget that our adoption of their civilization makes their presence in India at all possible? Your hatred against them ought to be transferred to their civilization. But let us assume that we have to drive away the English by fighting, how is that to be done?
> Reader: In the same way as Italy did it. Gandhi replies: 'What substantial gain did Italy obtain after the withdrawal of the Austrian troops? The gain was only nominal. The reforms for the sake of which the war was supposed to have been undertaken have not yet been granted. The conditions of the people in general still remain the same.'

Here one may look into Iyer's references from Mazzini which are very illuminating. Mazzini, with his *Duties of Man*, is given special attention by Gandhi. Mazzini's nationalistic writings were popular in India around the turn of the century. Gandhi however, chose to emphasize the letters to Italian working men, which Mazzini had written in London, and which placed duties above the rights of man. The duties which Mazzini speaks of are Duty to God, Humanity, Country, Family and Oneself. Mazzini stresses non-violence, self-control, fearlessness. In tone and scope his book reminds us very much of Gandhi's own writings. Gandhi, in *Hind Swaraj*, demonstrates the difference between Mazzini's Italy and the real Italy. He underscores the fact that forces other than those desired by Mazzini had brought about national unity and that Mazzini's Italy was not yet free. He uses this as an example for his own hopes and his own doubts about the directions of Indian nationalism. The rise of Fascism in Italy provided an even more forceful realization of Gandhi's words of 1908.

The quotations from Gandhi that follow in the selection, are significantly titled as Civilization, East and West, Modern Civilization and Progress—Moral and Material. Iyer's categorising focuses on Gandhi's critique of modern civilization as total and not only about a few aspects of it. Iyer's selections would help a scholar who wants to look deeper into this aspect and what Gandhi meant by, "obsession of present day civilization" and why he calls it 'Satanic'. Besides, scholars would be able to undertake research investigation in the theoretical and empirical implications of *Hind Swaraj*. In addition Iyer has put in footnotes in many places which are also very useful. Finally, one more example of the selections seems to be appropriate in view of the current situation in India, the moral distntegration and the erosion of the traditional value system that have occurred as a result of the secularisation of modes of

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thought. Here Gandhi's ideas on 'Polities and Religion' (Iyer pp. 281-396) clearly point to a way of 'spiritualising politics', and cleansing the entire vitiated political atmosphere; he says:

> It is commonly known, though perhaps not believed, that I claim that at least my politics are not divorced from morality, from spirituality, from religion. I have claimed and the claim is based upon extensive experience that a man who is trying to discover and follow the will of God cannot possibly leave a single field of life untouched. I came also, in the course of my service, to the conclusion that if there was any field of life where morality, where truth, where fear of God, were not essential that field should be given up entirely.

The above quotes are drawn with a view to indicate how the book would be a valuable and easily manageable source book for scholars interested in a study of Gandhian thought.

Centre for Development Studies and Activities,
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INDIRA ROTHERMUND

NALINI KANT JHA: Internal Crisis and Mrs. Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy. Janaki Prakashan, Patna, 1985, xv, 180 p., Rs. 100.

THIS small book (which seems to have grown out of author's M. Phil dissertation though he no where reveals this) presents a survey of Indian foreign policy (hereafter FP) including foreign economy policy (hereafter FEP) during 1975-77 emergency. The main strength of the book lies in describing systematically and in considerable detail the various FP and FEP initiatives of Mrs. Indira Gandhi during those twenty-one fateful months when the country experienced what Morris-Jones has described as 'creeping but uneasy authoritarianism' (*Government and Opposition*, Vol. 12, No. 1, Winter 1977) leading to crisis of legitimacy, at home and abroad, for her Government. The author's basic argument is that through these policy initiatives in India's relations with various individual countries and regional groupings, more particularly in its relations with the two Super-Powers, the Middle East, South and South-East Asia and Eastern and Western Europe, Mrs. Gandhi sought the legitimation of her emergency regime.

In the blurb of the book the author claims the work to be in the broad framework of linkage politics and he has indeed tried to examine

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the linkages between the internal crisis and FP and FEP.

To conceptualize the relationship between legitimacy and FP is both interesting and challenging and, therefore, the author's attempt to view FP of Mrs. Gandhi's Government during the emergency as a means of legitimizing her rule at home is well-taken. However, this relationship itself can be of two types: pursuit of certain FP measures may lend legitimacy to the regime at home particularly if the FP is in the direction of asserting independence from outside powers *a la* Tito; alternatively, it may be used to legitimize certain measures of the regime at home in the eyes of outside powers. The author seems to vacillate between these two positions. While in chapters one and four he takes the first position, in chapter two and three it is the second. However, he does not seriously explore the demonstrative effect at home of an independent FP and the extent to which it led to the defusion of legitimacy crises.

The author is right in his observation that declaration of emergency instead of defusing further aggravated the legitimacy crisis. The present reviewer is also inclined to accept, as at least partly correct, Pushpesh Pant's view which the author has approvingly quoted implying therein that diplomatic effort during the emergency was devoted not to the furtherance of the country's national interest but was preoccupied with perpetration of Mrs. Gandhi's personal rule. The point, however, is that even when the diplomatic effort is claimed to be devoted to the furtherance of the country's national interest it is nothing more than national interest as perceived by the ruling elite. Thus, in class-based societies national interest is bound to proximate with the interest of the ruling class, if not the ruling elite. In fact, most analysts tend to view FP erroneously as a series of measures to protect the vital national interests, while the domestic politics is rightly viewed as pursuit of power to protect self interest. Apparently, such a general thesis about FP might appear plausible and probably partly valid also, but on closer scrutiny one would find that, in the ultimate analysis,even FP is nothing more than maximising the power of the ruling elite and the ruling class. It seems that the author fails to see this crucial point. There is some degree of looseness in his use of terms which is reflected in his interchanging such narrow terms as the conduct of FP by 'the regime', 'by the operators of the regime', 'by Mrs. Gandhi's Government' with relatively wider terms like 'the party leaders', 'the Indian efforts' and 'the Indian attempts'. (pp. 22 ff).

No social phenomenon can be fully attributed to just one cause. There is always a cluster of variables that explains it. This is as true about issues of FP as those of the domestic policy. It would, therefore, be difficult to maintain that FP initiatives were influenced, much less determined, solely by the compulsions of buying legitimacy for the emergency

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regime. In fact, in the concluding chapter the author himself concedes that the emergency alone "could not produce any drastic change in the overall content" of India's FP. (p. 126) A little later he is more forthright when he says that "the shifts in India's foreign relations had occurred in most of the cases mainly owing to international circumstances. Internal crisis and the emergency proclamation themselves could not produce any drastic change" in India's FP "vis-a-vis the changes produced by the internal crisis" in FP of "the countries like Bangladesh in August 1975." (p. 134) At some level of generality one can argue that decisive shifts in FP occur only when there is a qualitative change in the nature and class character of the regime. So long as the nature and class character of the regime does not change, the changes in FP would only be of cosmetic and peripheral nature. Even the general expectation regarding major changes in FP which had been aroused after the Janata Party came to power in March 1977 did not come true because there was no change in the class character of the regime.

Despite its merits, the study lacks depth and sophistication. This is so because evidence which the author has used in order to substantiate his whole argument is limited to the use of foreign and domestic mass media by Mrs. Gandhi's Government and statements and foreign visits of central ministers and Congress (I) leaders. In order to convincingly make his point the author should have shown that the use of these measures during the emergency was of an usual nature and/or magnitude. The point is that the shifts in FP and FEP, if any, would have come out clearly if the author had made some longitudinal comparisons of the nature and magnitude of the measures used during the emergency with the ones followed during the pre and the post-emergency periods. In the absence of such a longitudinal comparison the basic thesis of the author is not proved. I am not implying that it is disproved either. All that I am implying is that it is not attempted. Hence, the author's central argument is neither proved nor disproved. In fact, one is inclined to legitimately feel that support to the various national liberation movements, anti-racialism, anti-imperialism, non-alignment, bi-lateralism as the basis of relations with the neighbouring countries and commitment to the ideals of global peace, nuclear disarmament, etc., which the author has highlighted, have been consistent features of FP of all the Congress (I) Governments. Similarly, the demand for NIEO, search for markets in Africa, West Asia and Latin America; North-South dialogue, South-South Cooperation, etc., have all along been the core issues of FEP of Congress (I) rule. Since the author limits his analysis of FP and FEP to a short span of less than two years he finds it difficult to make any theoretical generalisations like the ones so competently and convincingly made by Surjit Mansingh (*India's Search For Power: Indira*

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Gandhi's Foreign Policy, 1966-1982 (New Delhi, Sage, 1984).

The author claims that his is a "critical analytical, prescriptive and issue-oriented study, without ignoring the chronological and descriptive aspects." (xv) To say the least, this is a tall claim, not borne out by the study. The study, as far as I could understand, addresses itself to the question as to how internal crisis affected FP and FEP during the emergency; not what varied responses were possible and which one of these possible responses was actually chosen and followed and which one ought to have been. Also, the author does not at all visualize the possibility that pursuit of a certain FP and FEP may create problems for the legitimacy of the regime instead of helping it. Probably, this lapse on the part of the author emanates from the fact that he begins with the assumption that FP and FEP during the emergency was invariably directed at defusing the legitimacy crisis, an assumption which he never examines critically.

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T.R. SHARMA

ECONOMIC ISSUES

G.C. SRIVASTAVA: Urbanization, Capital Formation and Labour Productivity in Agriculture—A Case Study of Ranchi. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1986, xii, 205 p., Rs. 65.

THIS study explores the impact of Ranchi urban centre on the agricultural economy of its hinterland. While several studies highlighted the inter-relationships between urbanization on agricultural growth, through product, market and factor contribution, the issue of capital formation in the agricultural sector due to urbanization, has not been analysed.

Really the study provides empirical evidence about employment and wage structure, investment on farm and capital formation, income on the farms located at different distances from urban centres. It brings out the effect of distance from the city and the acreage with cultivating households on chosen economic parameters.

The study tends to support the 'diffusion' model, by arguing that the interdependencies between urban activities in the city and agricultural activities in the neighbourhood, lead to efficient utilization of agrarian resources and to higher level of investment. The hypothesis here about the growth impulses in a hinterland of the city have important impli-

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cations for urban development based on horizontal growth of smaller cities.

The policy implications of this study can be further extended to employment, productivity and wages in agriculture. It was found that the percentage of area irrigated and the intensity of cropping was highest in zone one. But the per hectare labour use was lowest in this zone, showing more rational use of this resource input.

Moreover, this study also tries to establish that a large urban centre, over time, transforms the agrarian structure in its vicinity, leading to better utilisation of land and labour and higher level of farm and non-farm incomes. The overall results are still tentative because the sample size is too small and the generalisations worked out on basis of micro level data are of limited value for a state or national framework.

The study extends over 144 farms spread in 12 villages under six development blocks of Ranchi district. With a view to make data amenable to cross section study, the villages around Ranchi in all the four directions were stratified into three zones. The farms of each selected village were arranged in ascending order of their operated area and stratified into small, medium and large. To test the hypothesis, tools like simple averages, percentage estimates and regression analysis have been used. Functional analysis was planned on: (i) Factors affecting capital formation; (ii) Production efficiency and resource productivity; (iii) Factors affecting labour productivity and (iv) Measuring productivity of farm family labour.

Major problems in this area are soil erosion and inadequate irrigation facilities which are really the limiting factors in optimum land resource use. The diffusion on investment on farms and capital formation proved the hypothesis that there is a high rate of investment on farms and capital formation near an urban centre and it tends to decline with increasing distance from the urban centre.

Institute for Social & Economic Change, Bangalore.

RAMESHWAR TANDON

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ABRAHAM JOSEPH: India's Trade with Japan—Constraints and Opportunities: A Study in Trade and Investment. Gian Publishing House, Delhi, 1988, xiv, 248 p., Rs. 225.

THE book discusses the importance of Japan in India's foreign trade and brings out some salient points: (1) In 1938, Japan was the second largest importer of India's products (8.9 per cent) as well as the third largest exporter to India (10.1 per cent). In 1973 also, Japan enjoyed the same position accounting for 13.8 per cent of India's exports and supplying 9 per cent of India's imports. However, India's share in Japan's total exports declined from 2.9 per cent in 1951 to 0.9 per cent in 1973 and that its imports declined from 3.6 per cent to 1.5 per cent. India's share in Japan's total exports further declined to 0.7 per cent and in imports to 0.8 per cent in 1984. (2) Between 1970-71 and 1982-83, India's imports from Japan increased by 1,100 per cent, while its exports to Japan increased only by 286 per cent. As a result, India's trade deficit with Japan increased rapidly.

Until 1973, iron ore was the principal item of India's exports followed by raw cotton, frozen shrimps and oilcakes. In this respect, the composition of India's exports to Japan was significantly different from that to the world as a whole—more than half of India's exports to the world consisted of processed and manufactured products. What is surprising, however, is that the growth in India's exports of iron ore to Japan had been unable to keep up with the growth in demand in the Japanese market. Even during the period 1973-85, iron ore, shrimps and raw cotton comprised over 62 per cent of India's exports to Japan.

Joseph has also made a comparative study of India's export performance and that of other developing countries. "Between 1960 and 1978, manufactured exports from developing countries grew at 11.6 per cent per year. India's manufactured exports, however, grew at only 6.8 per cent." (page 24) He has also made a comparative evaluation of India's performance under GSP (pp. 194-97), and points out that "Under the GSP scheme, imports from India were a mere 16 billion yen whereas imports from countries like Republic of Korea 267 billion yen, Taiwan 62 billion yen, China 96 billion yen and Philippines 79 billion yen." One significant point brought out by Joseph from these figures is that "imports under GSP have increased from those countries where Japanese investments were made."

The author has referred to India's high debt serving ratio which increased from 9 per cent in 1982-83 to 15.5 per cent in 1984-85 due to large reliance on commercial borrowings. The debt service ratio is now estimated to be around 25 per cent. The position is now serious in view of India's poor export performance which is rightly ascribed by the

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author to lack of competitiveness. The Government of India has been attempting to seek a solution to the problem by providing more and more incentives (pages 23 and 192), which according to the reviewer may not provide the right solution. Incentives are like crutches which the user finds very difficult to discharge. The ultimate solution would lie only in ensuring a competitive atmosphere in the country which will compel the Indian industry to reduce costs and improve its efficiency. The Abid Hussain Committee referred to the disadvantages faced by the Indian exporters due to domestic policies and suggested that the export promotion policies should provide more than just a compensation for these disadvantages. Fortunately, as a result of the recommendations of the Committee, some steps have been taken to provide some degree of competition both internal and external. The reviewer, however, feels that before allowing external competition, ground should be prepared by allowing keen internal competition for an adequate period of time. The author, of course, refers to the fact that there has been a change in the nature of incentives. Efficiency in production rather than simple subsidization is now being recognised and the constraints on the expansion of production capacities are being relaxed. Import of capital goods is also being liberalised with the same object in view. But the proposals would be considered on a case (by case) basis (page 213), which leaves room for a lot of bureaucratic delays.

Japan is one of the largest economies of the world achieving high rates of economic growth. The manufacturing sector has become the most important sector in the economy. Within the manufacturing sector, there is a shift from the light labour intensive sector to capital intensive sector. Japan has large and diversified import demands. Far Eastern and South East Asian countries have taken the opportunity to export light manufactured goods to Japan which has been possible due to Japanese investment and transfer of Japanese technology.

Discussing the prospects for increasing India's exports to Japan, Joseph points out that Japan is likely to accelerate the pace of the policy of import liberalization followed by it in recent years. Also, India has not taken the maximum advantage of Japanese GSP. Joseph has referred to the possibility of Japanese shifting some of their production bases abroad to reap the advantages of international division of labour and make its products competitive. The strategy for energy conservation also requires more efficient use of energy intensive industries abroad. As a result of all this, Japan is likely to expand its import of products with lower technological sophistication. The likely areas are textiles, ceramics, cutlery, machine tools, bicycles, precision machinery and textile machinery. India could take advantage of this shifting of industry bases by Japan and could use this as an effective tool for

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correcting its import surplus with Japan.

Joseph has referred to a number of factors which hamper India's exports to Japan—higher prices, in many cases due to higher prices of raw materials, overall decline in the demand for iron ore, lack of suitable infrastructure, freight disadvange, high cost of production due to obsolete plant and technology in cotton textiles and supply constraints in shrimps. Joseph has pointed out that China is making inroads in the Japanese market for cotton textiles due to cost effectiveness of its exports.

Joseph has made a number of suggestions for increasing India's exports to Japan. He has rightly pointed out that India's export incentive scheme has been more oriented towards maintaining profitability of exports through subsides. He has therefore emphasized the need for improving competitiveness by reduction in costs. But it is very doubtful whether any reduction in wages as suggested by him (pages 9 and 209) is practicable. Reduction in raw material costs is possible if the government is willing to sacrifice the revenue realized by high excise duties. Of course, an improvement in productivity is possible in respect of output per worker and the output-input ratio.

After giving examples of how Korea increased its exports following Japanese investment in Korea, Joseph has also pleaded for an increase in Japanese foreign investments in India. This will naturally involve import of technology. Here again, the author has rightly pointed out that import of technology *per se* is not a sufficient condition. What is important is the ability to build capacity and the infrastructure to absorb and further develop imported technology. He has also referred to the inability of the Indian firms to get the best technological package because of their inability to offer acceptable terms to the suppliers. One would tend to agree with Joseph when he says that it is necessary to ensure that the imported technology is of the appropriate level consistent with requirement and resources.

Joseph has also referred to the constraints felt by Japanese companies: (1) restriction on foreign equity ratio, (2) restriction on the repariation of royalties, (3) high tax rate on royalties, (4) bureaucratic and procedural delays which affect every stage of management, (5) problems stemming from deficiencies of infrastructure, and (6) plans of hasty indigenization of the products together with immediate ancillary industries. He has also quoted an Indian study to refer to the problems faced by Indian collaborators: rigid approach of Japanese collaborators, inadequate guidance in implementing the projects, high prices for components, strong preference for Japanese machinery and components, casual attitude towards training, indifference towards programmes of

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indigenization, export, research and development and restrictions on diffusion of technology. He has also referred to areas where India is keen and where Japan could transfer technology: digital systems, computer systems, micro-packaging technology, auto ancillaries, selected industrial machinery, machine tools, machinery for electronics industry, optics and optical instruments, electronic and electro-mechanical products, high technology electronic components and sub-assemblies and automation systems including robotics.

Joseph is right when he says that till recently there was a certain amount of reluctance in making major changes in policy. But with recent liberalization in India's economic and fiscal policies, prospects for greater Japanese investment and transfer of technology have become brighter.

To sum up, Joseph has made a thorough analysis of the trends and prospects of Indo-Japanese trade and presented his conclusions and suggestions in a lucid manner. The Government and the industry would do well to examine the suggestions made by Joseph carefully so that the deficit in Indo-Japanese trade could be brought down to managable limits.

The book could have been improved a lot by proper editing. The need for proper editing could be illustrated by two examples: (i) "In 1973,... there was an increase in iron ore prices in the international market. MMTC tried to increase the prices agreed on a long term basis, but was only able to secure a small increase, enough to offset the devaluation of the rupee in 1966." (pages 51-52). There does not seem to be any connection between the increase in iron ore prices in 1973 and increase in prices secured to offset the devaluation of the rupee against the dollar in 1966. (ii) The last para on page 52 begins with "The trend in the world steel industry would discourage India from exporting iron ore in a more processed form." What follows thereafter quotes a UNIDO study to show that developing countries would increase their foreign sales of seven major ores from $10 billion in the late 70s to $54 billion (when not stated) by processing all their current mineral output into a more refined mineral stage.

At many places, the language used is defective as, e.g., imports to India (page 175) and alternative sources for exports of marine products from India (page 163). At places, there is lack of clarity in what the author wants to convey. For example, "The results of analysis on the cost structure of cotton fabrics and handtools manufacturing sectors with respect to Japan, India, South Korea and the USA would indicate that it is essential to keep the efficiency factors at *low levels* in order to be successful in promotion of exports. Lower efficiency—wages and efficiency material—cost of an industry implies higher efficiency and com-

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petitiveness of its exports, provided that similar technology prevails." (pages 115-16). Again, "Among the fiscal concession provided for exports, duty drawbacks from sales tax for exports had been an important incentive to exporters." (page 129).

Abbreviations have not been explained, e.g., *E and C* on page 23. There are plenty of grammatical mistakes (page 24, para 1, for example). There are many printing mistakes too, for example, 5th line on page 48 "in thc 19?0s"; 3rd line on page 64 'throughout' in place of 'through-put'; footnote 7-"devaluation in 1956" and page 225 (last but one line) —'united' in place of *untied*.

The price of the book at Rs. 225 seems to be too high and makes the book out of reach of the average user.

New Delhi. R.C. VARSHNEY

LALITHA NATRAJ: An Analysis Into the Political Aspects of Planning in India. Inter-India Publications, New Delhi, 1986, x, 189 p., Rs. 120.

DEVELOPMENTAL planning is an amalgamation of three variables: economic, social and political. The book under review is primarily an attempt to analyse how politics and considerations influenced by political interaction affect the process of developmental planning.

One should remember that it was at a time when the exuberant exhibition of patriotism following the freshly acquired political independence had not yet stabilised at the realistic ground level that our Planning Commission was set up as an advisory body and we began our tryst with developmental planning by launching our First Five Year Plan in 1951. Months and then years ticked away and the distortions in our planning process slowly began to surface in bold relief specially after assumption of office in various states by parties opposed to the ruling party at the centre. It began to be realised that the Planning Commission was in reality an organisation minus its teeth. The author in Chapter V has rightly stated: "A singular one (contradiction) is that it operates within a federal structurc which demands multi-level planning but where a proper assigning of role is absent". And the most glaring contradiction is that "there is a great deal of centralisation in decision-making although this has never been accompanied by the really important feature of a centralised economy, viz., control over the commanding heights of the economy."

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Notwithstanding the official explanation there is no denying the fact that with the passage of time the planning process came under heavy political pressure and the politically powerful states or personalities started to use the Planning Commission as the forum through which they could extract more disproportionate to their needs or capacity for proper utilisation of resources. In other words the planniag process started to serve the interest of these much more who were already economically and/or politically powerful. One can cite scores of examples where the Planning Commission was made a party to many controversial decisions in the name of balanced regional development, which actually created more regional imbalances. One such case is that of freight equalisation policy for steel and coal. In this case the producing states are debarred from any benefit of location advantage and have to bear the cost of freight of these commodities to far-flung areas. In other words a consumer of steel in West Bengal or Bihar pays as much as his counterpart say, in Himachal Pradesh or Kerala does. Similarly because of telescopic freight charges for coal, a consumer in Gujarat or Maharashtra pays almost as much as a consumer near the coalfields in Bihar or West Bengal has to pay. It would have been fine if the idea behind the freight equalisation policy was to treat all natural resources as national reources irrespective of their regional origin for the purpose of allocation to the consumers. Unfortunately it is not so. As a result the textiles mills situated in Tamil Nadu or West Bengal have to pay much more than the textile mills in Maharashtra where cotton is mostly grown, because there is no freight equalisation for cotton. As such a consumer in Maharashtra pays much less for cotton *vis-a-vis* his counterpart in West Bengal and gets his steel at the same price as his counterpart in West Bengal gets and thus enjoys the double benefit. If this is not a case of discrimination then what it is?

One can go on citing endlessly such cases where considerations other than techno-economic rationale decided the locations for setting up of industries in the public sector. In short whether one likes it or not in reality political variable has become most dominant factor in our developmental planning process. As a result the Planning Commission from its earlier exalted position as an advisory body has slid down to the position of an integral part of the government and the National Development Council; the supreme decision-making body has become at best the highest debating forum of the country which occasionally meets and accords formal approval to a document prepared by the Planning Commission.

The book under review is primarily concerned with the theoretical framework of the subject but the author has also quoted some examples to substantiate her theory as in the case of Karnataka. "An example

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normally cited is the heavy investment in infrastructure and irrigation in the north districts of Karnataka following the succession of Chief Ministers from this area since 1956 to 1972." The author should be congratulated for her attempt although one wonld have liked it to be a more elaborate one considering the explosive subject but then one should also realise the limitations of a revised version of a doctoral thesis.

New Delhi P. GHOSH DASTIDAR

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INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By V. Machwe

The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the social sciences.

Asian Perspectives: *How Soviet Scholars Evaluate Asian Relations Meet 40 Years After*. Navyug Publishers, Delhi, 1987, x, 81 p., Rs. 20 (Paper).

Papers presented by Soviet scholars at the Commemorative Session of the Asian Relations Conference 1947, held on 2 October, 1987 in New Delhi. The papers deal with various aspects of Indo-Soviet relations and with Soviet relations with other Asian countries. Includes the inaugural speech of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to the Commemorative meeting.

BELOUS, Vladimir *Star Wars or Star Peace*? Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1988, xvii, 140 p., Rs. 40 (Paper).

Outlines the development & implementation of the United States' Strategic Defence Initiative programme and deals with developments in technology of other weapons meant for use in outer space Explains the Soviet Union's efforts to keep 'space' peaceful.

BERGESEN, Albert (*Ed.*) *Crisis in the World System* (Political Economy of the World System Annuals, 6). Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1983, 311 p., $ 28,00.

Papers presented at the Sixth Annual Political Economy of the World System Conference, University of Arizona, 1982. The volume consists of, in addition to the introduction by the editor, three parts, *viz.* (i) Global crisis: General perspectives; (ii) The United States in Crisis and (iii) Specific Historical Crisis. Some of the chapters in these parts deal with : Cultural Crises, succession crises in the global political system, economic status of women in the world system, hegemonic decline in Great Britain and the United States and with African economic development: the effects of East, West and Chinese penetration.

CHOPRA, Surendra (*Ed.*) *Perspectives on Pakistan's Foreign Policy*. Guru Nanak Dev University Press, Amritsar, 1983, ix, 476 p., Rs. 100.

Collection of papers presented at a seminar held at Guru Nanak Dev University and some other papers. The papers cover various topics like—foundation and determination of Pakistan's foreign policy, role of elites and the military, relations with super powers, with other South Asian and muslim countries, Pan-Islamism and with international issues like new international economic order and United Nations Law of the Sea Conference.

DHAṬAVKAR, Bhaskar (*Ed.*). *Catalogue of Maps in the Bombay Archives*. Vol. 2

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(Sr. Nos. 1001 to 5000). Department of Archives, Government of Maharashtra, Bombay, 1985, xviii, 429 p., Rs. 21.

Bulk of the map collection catalogued consists of Survey of India Maps prepared during the British rule. A large number of maps catalogued pertain to Bombay City and Island; other maps included pertain to former provinces of the British India and some to the neighbouring countries of India, mainly the Middle East.

DUBE, R.P. *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Study in Ideology and Social Change*, Mittal Publications, Delhi, 1988, vi, 288 p., Rs. 130.

Delineates, against the background of major events and the role played by important leaders of Indian National Movement, the idea system of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who, first as a key figure in the National Movement and later as India's first Prime Minister, influenced the course of social, political and eeonomic changes in India. Nehru's interpretation of Indian history and his role in shaping India's international outlook are discussed in two separate chapters.

GHOSH, Suniti Kumar *The Indian Big Bourgeoisie: Its Genesis, Growth and Character*. Published by the Author (Distributed by Subarnarekha, 7 M.G. Road, Calcutta, 700009). 1985, 303 p., Rs. 50.

Marxist study critical of the views of other economic historians and political scientists. Contends and shows that the predominant interests of the Indian big bourgeoisie coalesced with the imperial capital and contradiction between the two was of secondary nature.

GOYLE, L.C. *The Law of Easements and Licences*. Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1988, 260 p. Rs. 88.

Divided into two parts, the book explains, with the help of case law, the principles underlying the law relating to the complex and changing subject of easements and licences. The text of the Indian Easements Act 1882, is given in appendix.

GUPTA, M.G. *The Prime Ministers of India*. M.G. Publishers, Agra, 1989, x, 608 p., Rs. 375.

Depicts the life-stories of Prime Ministers from Pandit Nehru to Rajiv Gandhi. The main events in their lives, especially succession to the post of premiership, their outstanding qualities and weaknesses, achievements and failures and their interaction with contemporaries are described and commented upon by the author. This book of contemporary history contains large and many quotations culled fram published sources like biographies, memoirs, newspaper reports, books and periodicals.

Haryana District Gazetteers: *Jind, Haryana Gazetteers Organisation*. Revenue Department, Government of Haryana, Chandigarh, 1986, II, IX, 312+map.

HEGDE, Ramakrishna *Planning and States' Rights*. Government of Karnataka, Bangalore, 1988, 47 p., (Paper).

Former Chief Minister of Karnataka (who resigned on 10 Aug., 88) criticises, in the light of constitutional provisions, Jawahar Lal Nehru's views and findings of various commissions on centre-state relations, Central Government's policy of by-passing the State Governments and dealing directly with district administration.

INDIA, HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT (Ministry of—), WOMEN AND

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CHILD DEVELOPMENT (Department of—), *National Perspective Plan for Women 1988-2000 A.D.: Report of the Core Group.* New Delhi 1988, xvi, 197 p., clvii p.

The plan evaluates the impact of development plans and programmes in different sectors of women's lives and suggests a long-term overall policy for Indian women. Annexures contain annotations and relevant chapters from twenty-one important Indian and international policy and related documents.

INDIA, LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT *Parliamentary Committees.* (The Author) New Delhi, 1988 iii, 127 p., Rs. 50.

Factual survey covering eleven countries, including India, France, Japan, U.K. and the USA. Includes a bibliography.

INDIA, LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT *South Africa and Apartheid.* (The Author) New Delhi, 1987., 106 p., Rs. 20.

Brochure on the origin and evolution of the *apartheid* policy and its varied ramifications. Discusses the role played by India, the United Nations, the Non-aligned countries and the Commonwealth in the struggle against the *apartheid* policy. Annexures contain the texts of relevant resolutions, statements, declarations, etc., and a select bibliography.

INDIA, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBANISATION (C.M. Correa, Chairman) *Reports.* Vols. 1 and 2 Printed by Manager, Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1988.

The first two volumes (total seven volumes) of the Report of the Commission, whose interim report was submitted in January 1987 (Vol. 1 contains two chapters, viz., (i) Issues and Strategies and (ii) Recommendations, Vol. 2 deals with the dimensions of urbanisation (based on 1981 Census) and with urban issues like poverty, housing, transport, people's participation, *etc.*

MISHRA, G.P. (*Ed.*), *Regional Structure of Development and Growth in India.* 2 Vols. Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1985, Rs. 500 for two Vols.

Papers contributed by well-known scholars to the Seminar on 'Development and Inter-Regional Disparities in India', held under the auspices of the Giri Institute of Development Studies, Lucknow. The situation with regard to the regional development in India since the beginning of planning process is dealt with in these papers. The first volume covers the following topics: (i) Regional income inequality; (ii) Structure of development and growth; (iii) Agricultural development and rural poverty; (iv) industrial disparities and (v) Labour force. The papers in the second volume, jointly edited with A. Joshi, are concerned with the question of centre state transfer of resources and funds and include studies relating to inter-state variations in the levels of public services and infra-structure facilities.

MUKHERJEE, Hiren *The Gentle Colossus: A Study of Jawaharlal Nehru.* Oxford University Press, Delhi. (by arrangement with Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund), 1986, 239 p., Rs. 55. (Paper)

Re-issue of the 1964 book written by the well-known Marxist scholar and friend of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.

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NAIR, S.V. *Afghanistan: Perspectives for Reconciliation and Peace.* Panchsheel Publishers, New Delhi, 1988, xii, 56 p., Rs. 40. (Paper)

Impressions and recent history by an Indian journalist who visited Afghanistan on the occasion of the beginning of Soviet troops pull-out. Includes photographs and the text of Geneva Accords.

NOSSITER, T.J. *Communism in Kerala: A Study in Political Adaptation.* Oxford University Press, Delhi (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London), 1982, xv, 426 p., Rs. 130.

Based on wide range of sources—like official and party documents, newspaper reports and interviews—this study of political history of Kerala, mainly covering the period till mid-seventies, deals with the nature of the communist movement in Kerala, its future prospects, the objectives and performance of the communists and the topic of centre-state relations.

PATRI, Umesh, Hindu Scriptures and American Transcendentalists. Intellectual Publishing House, New Delhi, 1987, 215 p., Rs. 125.

Reviews the earlier studies written on the theme of cultural exchanges between India and the United States. Points out the pre-eminent influence of Hindu scriptures and philosophical works on the writings and life styles of major American thinkers like Emerson and Thoreau and on the writings of other American transcendentalists.

SAHA, A.N. *Criminal Reference*, Edn. 4. Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1988, 1560 p., Rs. 215.

In this edition new statutes like Dowry Prohibition Act 1961, and Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940, have been added and a total of twenty nine statutes have been commented upon and discussed under various sections put under prominent headings. The author has pointed out when there is an occasion, the impropriety of judicial decisions when they are in conflict with some forensic principle or are contrary to the law declared by the apex court. The book contains a brief addenda on 'Indira Gandhi Murder Verdict: Kehar Singh & Others v State (Delhi Administration).

SAHA, A.N. *Marriage and Divorce.* Edn. 5, Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1987, 849 p. Rs. 225.

This revised edition discusses the subject of matrimonial law, taking into consideration the recent changes in the statutory and case law relating to the subject.

SARAN, P. *Government and Politics of Sri Lanka.* Metropolitan, New Delhi, 1982, viii, 146 p., Rs. 50.

First of a series of volumes on the government and politics of select Asian countries, the book gives background information on the land and people, studies the two Constitutions of 1972 and 1978 and describes the role of various political parties and other interest groups till the year 1981.

SHAH, Ghulam and Ghulam Nabi Reshi. *State Subjectship in Jammu and Kashmir.* Jupiter Publishers, Srinagar, 1988, 155 p., Rs. 140.

Research study giving historical, legal, political and administrative aspects of the concept of state subjectship which gives a distinct position to the State of Jammu and Kashmir among the other states of the country. The authors who were connected with

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the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly, have explained with ample quotations from constitutional provisions and statutory and case law the concept which has important bearing on the acquisition, sale, lease, etc., of immovable property, claim for services and scholarship and other privileges of the state subjects. The book, which contain to several appendices containing the texts of relevant acts, rules and forms, is a useful guide to the topic.

SHMELYOV, Mikhail *Soviet Peace Initiatives 1946-1987.* Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1987, 145 p., Rs. 35 (Paper).

Consists of an introduction by Soviet scholar U.N. Bykov, giving the Soviet standpoint and contains brief description and analysis of several initiatives taken by the Soviet Union since the end of the Second World War, regarding arms limitation, disarmament and peace.

SRIVASTAVA, M.P. *The Korean Conflict: Search for Unification.* Prentice Hall of India, New Delhi, 1982, v., 120 p., Rs. 29.

The conflict is analysed in terms of Super Powers; strategic and foreign policy interest and other aspects studied are:
Kim Il Sung and the personality cult; the role of the other major power, viz, China, in the conflict and the various unification proposals,

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IMPROVING INDO-BRITISH RELATIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES

By H.S. CHOPRA*

Owing to known historical reasons Britain's relations with India have been and continue to be multi-dimensional in that there is hardly a sphere of activity in this country, even domestic, which does not bear even now directly or indirectly the British impact. This, however, does not suggest that India has not adequately diversified its linkages (in the security and/or economic/industrial fields) with other major world powers. Rather it is despite the evolution of its significant linkages elsewhere that any social or economic occurrence in Britain gives rise to some commotion in India particularly at the elitist level. In any case, the two-way relationship is no more than a mix of a little cheer with a heavy dose of despair. That seems to have been the pattern ever since India's independence, often described in common parlance as one of a "love hate" variety.

I

DIVERGENCES IN WORLD VIEWS

THE reason for the frequent disappointments in its relations with Britain has been the divergence in their world view as well as their perspective on internationnl peace and security. India being the world's largest, but a young democracy, had genuine expectation that Britain (whose credentials as a "Mother Democracy" remain indisputable) would extend ungrudgingly a helping hand in its plans for economic modernisation as well as of its security. This was particularly so because Britain itself had used up India's sterling balances to clear part of its war debts. More or less India's expectations were belied. Then, in the late 1940s, it came to be perceived in India, that not only Britain itself sided but also induced the US to join it in abetting the anti-democratic factors and forces in India's neighbourhood, often at damaging costs to India's security. Perhaps, India was passing through its adolescence: it tended to take its democratic symbiosis more seriously than the seasoned political democracies in the West did. Is it not for this reason that in any serious discussion whether on security or on industrial cooperation, any reference to the democratic nexus evokes derisive response, thereby indicating its low place in western *realpolitik*. Hence there came about a kind of credibility gap that impeded their coming together even when there existed points of convergence: both of them, for instance, were among the first to give recognition (of course for their own different reasons) to the People's Republic of China soon after its inception.

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Credibility Gap

Since India's independence, three major causal factors have exacerbated the credibility gap between the two. First, there exists a widespread belief in India that its partition was the result of a grand British design (strengthened now by Wali Khan in his work *Facts are Facts*)[1] which set the pace for its political fragmentation, of which multi-ramificatory effects continue to be felt even forty years after independence. Much to India's dismay, Britain has continued to extend political patronage to its breakaway component. And without doubt, at the initial stage itself, the interfacing of big power political and strategic interests had begun. The breakaway component was hooked to the western stance through its admittance to the western-sponsored network of military alliances, such as the Baghdad Pact, the SEATO and the CENTO. Even though these arganizations have become extinct, the after-effects on the policy approaches of the two sides have not as yet faded out. To illustrate, Harold Wilson, the British Premier, castigated India as an aggressor in the Indo-Pak War of 1965. Its effect stayed on even after he admitted later that his assessment was based upon some misinformation.[2] And as a consequence, Britain's credibility with India nose-dived in-as-much-as it easily yielded its place to the USSR to mediate in January 1966 between the two belligerents in the subcontinent.

Secondly, the two sides had diametrically opposing *Weltanschauung* and therefore divergent approaches to conflict management. As such even though India soon after its independence became a Republic and opted to be a member of the newly formed Commonwealth, it pursued the path of non-alignment, keeping itself away from the United States and United Kingdom initiated Cold War military alliance systems as well as from those of the Soviet bloc. Yet, Britain (while adhering to the well-known "three concentric circles" formulation of Winston Churchill, and also in the same context, maintaining "special relationship" with the US), could not shed its intention at moulding the Commonwealth to subserve its global interests.[3] As a result, it failed to join the EEC when the Europeanists urged it to do so in the 1950s. But again, when it did finally decide to join the EEC in the 1960s, it failed to do so principally due to Gaullist France's intransigence. Added to it on the other side of the fence, Britain failed owing principally to India's vigorous resistance to transform the Commonwealth into a new type of its sphere of influence. This formulation bears out from India moving closer to the People's Republic of China in the early 1950s, and to the USSR since the mid-1950s, and then its critical stance on the Korean

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Question, the Musadaq Episode in Iran in early 1950s, the Anglo-French-Israeli Aggression against Egypt in 1956, and several other western-initiated crises, such as the Congo and the *Apartheid* regime in South Africa. Thus India's divergence from Britain resulted in as much from India's vigorous pioneering role in non-alignment as of Britain's equally vigorous role in the operations of NATO since its inception in 1949.

Thirdly, but necessarily interconnected with the preceding factor, Britain, because of its political disenchantment with the Commonwealth and economic malaise at home, made an abortive bid in 1962-63 to join the EEC—a step which was decried by India and other member-states of the Commonwealth. To extricate itself from out of its self-created imbroglio, it adopted the policy of withdrawal from the East of Suez in the mid-1960s. This also perhaps set the pace for its gradually diminishing role in this region in the economic and industrial fields as well. But then came the Bangladesh Crisis which compelled India (for geo-strategic reasons) to neutralise the western and Chinese patronage of Pakistan by concluding the Indo-Soviet Treaty in 1971. Since then, there has continued to exist a misperception of the Indo-Soviet relationship as of alliance linkage, notwithstanding India's endeavours to correct it. As such, Britain (like the USA) came to view somewhat erroneously India as having digressed from its nonaligned path and also having been hooked to the Soviet strategic sub-system. And therefore, the United Kingdom and the United States viewed disapprovingly India's "nuclear implosion" in 1974.[4]

II

FROM POLITICAL UNEASINESS TO DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Political uneasiness in relations between Britain and India in the 1960s was further compounded by their domestic political and economic crises. Britain's attempts (made twice in 1960s) to salvage its economy through entry into the EEC were frustrated by Gaullist France. In the 1970s, even after it successfully entered the EEC, it could not rid itself of the dilemma whether to continue to be in it or to get out of it. Its economy, which was already in poor shape in the 1960's, plummetted to its lowest depths in the late 1970s due to the "second oil shock". Its growth rate came down to 45 per cent of 2.5 per cent average for all the OECD countries. Its GDP per capita was then lower than that of its major West European neighbours, the Federal Republic of Germany and France. Added to the double-digit inflation, its unemployment figures rose from about 2.6 per cent in 1973-74 to 5.7 per cent in 1977-78, mainly because of increase in the work-force and not the number of people employed. Manufacturing output also declined so that nearly sixty per

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cent of the industrial firms showed under-utilization of their manufacturing capacity.[5]

In India, despite its much publicized "Green Revolution," its political and economic situation remained critical through the 1960s and 1970s owing to (a) the Sino-Indian Conflict of 1962; (b) Indo-Pak Wars of 1965 and 1971; (c) Confusion and instability caused by turbulent-changes in its political leadership; (d) nationalization of its banking and insurance companies; and then (e) energy crisis bearing damaging effects upon its revenues. Added to these factors was the population explosion which India sought to manage through coercive family planning techniques. The result a series of short-lived political changes in the government took place upsetting policy-making processes in critical areas of national interest.

India's Trade Ties—From Deficits to Buoyancy

After de Gaulle's disappearance from the French political scene, and the Federal Republic of Germany's balancing of its *Ost* and *West-politik*, Britain succeeded in gaining entry into the EEC in 1973. The Instrument of its Accession was accompained by a Joint Declaration of Intent (JDI), which enabled the Commonwealth member-states either to become associates (as in the Lome Convention I) or conclude separate agreements with the EEC on economic and industrial cooperation.

With Britain's entry into the EEC, India was the first to have concluded a Non-preferential Commercial Cooperation Agreement (CCA) with the latter in December 1973.[6] The Accord has since been renewed first in 1981 and then in 1986. With its scope having been widened, it came to be designated as the "Commercial and Economic Cooperation Agreement." (CECA)

India's exports to the EEC during 1974-1981 increased only threefold, while its imports therefrom quadrupled. Since 1977, India has continuously suffered deficit in its balance of payments. It is understood that five member states of the EEC (UK, FRG, France, Belgium and Spain) account for 85 per cent of India's total trade deficit vis-a-vis Western Europe.[7]

Since the mid-1970s, Britain has been one of India's major trading partners. Within the EEC, it has been alternating with the FRG for the fourth or fifth rank, the first two positions since 1980 going either to the United States or the USSR, and the third to Japan. (See Table I)

Excepting the United States and the USSR, India's deficit in balance of payments with the rest of its major trading partners (Japan, UK and the FRG) has become chronic. Together the UK and the FRG account

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TABLE I

INDIA'S VISIBLE TRADE WITH MAJOR COUNTRIES

(*In Us $ Million*)

Country	1980-81			1981-82			1982-83			1983-84			1984-85			1985-86		
	Imports	*Exports*	*Total*	*Imports*	*Exports*	*Total*	*Imports*	*Exports*	*Total*	*Imports*	*Exports*	*Total*	*Imports*	*Exports*	*Total*	*Imports*	*Exports*	*Total*
UK	1051 (3)	545 (4)	1596 (4)	954 (5)	521 (4)	1475 (5)	913 (4)	464 (4)	1377 (4)	1110 (4)	539 (4)	1649 (4)	856 (5)	563 (4)	1419 (5)	1015 (5)	438 (4)	1453 (5)
USA	1925 (1)	1086 (2)	3011 (1)	1597 (1)	991 (2)	2588 (2)	1329 (2)	970 (2)	2299 (2)	1739 (1)	1354 (1)	3093 (1)	1400 (2)	1486 (1)	2886 (2)	1696 (1)	1622 (1)	3318 (1)
FRG	966 (4)	453 (5)	1419 (5)	1030 (4)	429 (5)	1459 (4)	820 (5)	349 (5)	1169 (5)	1088 (5)	363 (5)	1451 (5)	1091 (3)	396 (5)	1487 (4)	1254 (4)	412 (5)	1666 (4)
Japan	819 (3)	779 (3)	1598 (3)	1056 (3)	776 (3)	1832 (3)	1079 (3)	820 (3)	1899 (3)	1413 (3)	802 (3)	2215 (3)	1042 (4)	892 (3)	1934 (3)	1462 (2)	968 (3)	2430 (3)
USSR	1523 (2)	1474 (1)	2997 (2)	1299 (2)	1691 (1)	2990 (1)	1484 (1)	1615 (1)	3099 (1)	1610 (2)	1267 (2)	2877 (2)	1515 (1)	1390 (2)	2905 (1)	1360 (3)	1575 (2)	2935 (2)

Note : Country Ranking in regard to each item is given in brackets.
Source : *Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade of India, Economic Survey*

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for half of India's imports from, and half of its exports to, the EEC and over half of its trade deficit.

From 1973 to 1977, India enjoyed surplus in its balance of visible trade with Britain. The year 1977 bears a two-fold significance: (a) it was in this year in the decade (1973-83) that India reached an high in its exports to Britain (£ 383 m); and (b) it was in this year that the EEC, under the inspiration of the French concept of "organized free trade", embarked upon the much criticized protectionist stance. After 1977, India has incurred deficit continuously in its balance of visible trade. In 1981 however, its exports reached the lowest ebb since 1976 to £ 294 million, moving to an all-time high—£ 572 million in 1984. In 1984, perhaps an exceptional year, India's imports from Britain also decreased thereby narrowing down its deficit. Since 1985, its exports have not shown any significant reversal of the trend. Its exports increased only marginally by £ 9 million in 1986, but its imports went up by £ 46 million in the same year.

From the statistics given in Table II, it may be noted that there has been a drastic reduction in India's exports even of its traditional items as well as some so-called non-conventional items in 1986 as compared to those in 1984. To illustrate, tea exports came down from £ 117.5 million to £ 55.4 million (less than half), tobacco from £ 32.8 million to

TABLE II

BRITISH VISIBLE IMPORTS FROM INDIA
—SOME MAJOR COMMODITIES

£ *Million*

	1980	*1981*	*1982*	*1983*	*1984*	*1985*	*1986*
Fruits, nuts and vegetables	5.8	6.8	9.1	9.5	11.2	12.5	12.7
Sugar and honey	7.0	0.1	9.6	4.2	3.5	0.1	—
Tea	66.2	38.4	58.6	59.5	*117.5*	46.2	*55.4*
Tobacco	20.8	27.3	31.1	34.6	32.8	19.9	18 8
Oilseed cakes, etc.	8.7	15.6	19.2	20.8	22.9	17.0	13.3
Crude animal and vegetable materials	5.3	5.6	9.2	9.0	10.9	14.3	10.6
Leather and leather manufactures	14.4	14.4	17.2	20.9	30.9	*38.2*	*26.9*
Cotton textiles woven	23.1	15.2	6.9	15.0	*35.6*	22.9	*17.6*
Jute manufactures	9 8	15.8	5.6	5.7	7.4	9.8	6.7
Silver unwrought	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil
Clothing	42.4	39.4	45.2	43.4	68.8	73.0	71.0
Engineering goods	28.3	32.7	79.9	41.7	73.2	25.7	32.8
Total (including others)	315.9	294.3	379.2	366.9	571.5	431.8	440.7

(Courtesy: The British High Commmission, New Delhi.)

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£ 18.8 million, cotton textiles woven from £ 35.6 million to £ 17.6 million (nearly half) and engineering goods from £ 73.2 million to £ 32.8 million (again less than half).

From the foregoing analysis, it becomes clear that deficit in India's visible trade with the United Kingdom as well as other members of the EEC has become one of the most ticklish and long standing issues. Therefore it calls for some more analysis as to why it persists, and what India on its part is doing to overcome it, and in what ways Britain, bearing in mind its own constraints as well as its own interest, could afford to contribute in its own way to enable India to bring about near equilibrium in its visible trade.

The year 1987 seems to have further added to the problems of deficit owing to "the rising import bill caused by the recent firming up of crude oil and petroleum product prices", and also additional import of pulses, oil seeds and deep drilling rigs for providing drinking water in the drought-infested areas.[8] Furthermore, exports of some traditional items, such as tobacco, tea, coffee and jute went down because of fall in demand in the West European markets. Then there has been a sharp fall in India's project exports particularly to the Gulf countries which had gone up from Rs. 64 crore in 1973-74 to Rs. 1705 crore in 1981-82. Thereafter there has been a steady decline so that their exports now (in 1986-87) average between Rs. 200 and Rs. 250 crores annually.[9]

However in 1987 there has been a noteworthy increase in our exports by 25.6 per cent as against 15 per cent in imports, principally because of a spurt in exports of textiles including garments, leather and its products, gems and jewellery, marine products and chemicals. As per latest data, exports between April and October 1987 increased by Rs. 1861.88 crores to reach Rs. 8707.74 crores as against Rs. 6845.86 crores in the corresponding period last year. Imports during the same period amounted to Rs. 12,191.72 crores as against Rs. 10, 924.32 crores in the corresponding period last year. The trade deficit has thus declined from Rs. 4078.46 crores (during April-October 1986) to Rs. 3483.98 crores in the same seven months this year.[10]

The foregoing statistics in the international context are deceptive and need not make us excessively jubilant for in the past more than a year, there has been a substantial devaluation of the Indian rupee in relation to the US dollar, which in turn also experienced an unprecedent devaluation relative to the *Yen*, and the *Deutschmark*. As such, the rise in exports in dollar terms may be no more than 15 per cent. Therefore, India has to double its efforts to continue on accelerated increase in exports so as to meet the debt-servicing ratio of 17 per cent which is likely to rise to 21 per cent in a couple of years and also to maintain imports at the present level.[11]

However, the "amazing buoyancy" witnessed in India's exports in 1987 seems to have been due to (a) government's successful coordination

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with industry in facilitating an increased capacity for export production; (b) some upgradation of technology through liberalization of import of machinery and equipment, and (c) improved access to capital goods and raw materials on equal international prices. It is also believed in the Indian official circles that the new policy measures for 1985-87 adopted in the case of engineering goods, chemicals and related products may bear noteworthy effect in 1988. The export outlook for bicycles and their components may improve in the next two years with the government decision to allow import of sophisticated machines under the Open General Licence (OGL) and reduction in duties. Apropos, the EEC has approved a plan for technological upgradation of the bicycle industry in this country. Indian manufacturers may have to bring out new models, such as BMX models, sports cycles, light weight models, etc., to meet the changing requirements of buyers in the UK, FRG and other western markets. In the United Kingdom, a warehouse is being arranged by the Atlas Cycles so that supplies can be made off the shelf to foreign buyers.[12]

The government policy[13] announced on 2 October 1987, intended to bail out 100 per cent export-oriented units, EOUs facing rough weather almost since inception and bring them at par with units in the Export Processing Zone (EPZs), seems to have been subjected to severe criticism. The EOUs may be allowed, on case by case basis, to sell 25 per cent of their production in the domestic market subject to payment of customs duties. *The Times of India* has commented in its editorial:

> Two fascinating additions have been made to the language of double speak through the formulation and implementation of the Indian Government's policy designed to promote exports. The first, which has been known for some time, is that an export-oriented unit need not export. As if this were not enough, an even bolder principle appears to have been evolved; which is that nothing succeeds like failure. This is the only conclusion that can be drawn from the government's latest package of concessions for export oriented units which should in fact have been derecognized if the yardstick of export performance had been applied.[14]

Derecognition of the affected EOUs (suggested in the editorial note) seems to be more in tune with the harsh standards set in the industrially most advanced countries such as Japan, and not with the presently prevailing uncertain industrial environment in this country, for which in all fairness, Indian industry alone is not to be held responsible. However, there is a point for reconsideration at the government level whether EOUs really have to be given five long years to be able to get out of the

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rut and make their products acceptable in the international market.

The export upswing this year should not make the government or industry complacent. Indian manufactures need increased credibility first at home and then their marketability abroad would automatically follow. At a seminar recently organized jointly by the Confederation of Engineering Industry (CEI) and Bureau of Indian Studies at New Delhi, it was pointed out that modernization of industrial technology had become *sine qua non* to improved quality as well as productivity so as to enable Indian manufactures to compete in the international market.[15] Equally important is the need to improve infrastructural facilities, such as efficient transportation at all levels, rail, road and shipping, telecommunications, uninterrupted supply of energy, raw materials and financial credits on competitive rates. Practical implementation of these measures may certainly help improve the industrial environment so as to strengthen its competitiveness internationally.

Notwithstanding the already noted upswing in India's exports this year, its deficit has not been brought down within an acceptable healthy growing economy's limits. It has been realized rather late in the day that updating of technology is a must for improved performance in intermediate technology-related industries, and also a pre-requisite to breakthrough in the High Tech arena. Indian industry during the past two years has not kept pace with the planned development. In 1987, industrial growth rate is reckoned at around 6 to 7 per cent as against 8 per cent envisaged in the Seventh Plan.[16] With our rising ambitions to usher in the new High Tech and also bearing in mind the actual somewhat tardy growth in industry so far, Indian Government has set up a high-powered Technology Information, Forecasting and Assessment Council (TIFAC) under the Department of Science and Technology, with a view to bridging the technological gap in the industrial sector.

Increased Development Cooperation

Now something about the British economy. Sir David Goodall, the British High Commissioner to India, in his speech on 25 June 1987 to the Bombay Chambers of Commerce described the prospects of increased cooperation for development between India and Britain as bright. For in his view, Britain is presently pulsating with restored confidence, as if it "has at last found its new place in the world" and is "looking to the future with optimism...." Then he added, "Britain has in this decade emerged as one of the most dynamic of the developed economies."[17]

Without doubt, despite its noticeable economic decline since the end of the Second World War, Britain has continued to be one of the leading industrial nations; in the area of High Tech it compares favourably with the USA, Japan and the FRG. A recent study made by the West

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German Institute of Systems Engineering and Innovation Research shows that in six spheres of research (Genetic Technology, Lasers, Robots, Enzymes, Solar Cells and Sensors), the Federal Republic of Germany ranks ahead of Japan, and is second only to the United States. However, in the field of automation technology, it is acknowledged that Britain along with the USA, FRG and Japan is a leading exporter.[18]

However, it is understood that Britain's economy is not as yet out of the woods. The monetary policies pursued by Mrs. Thatcher have in recent months come in for trenchant criticism, particularly in relation to their adverse effects on employment, wages and growth in the manufacturing industries. Some comments made by Nicholas Kaldor in his article "How Monetarism Failed" may be excerpted:

> Nobody watches the money-supply figures any longer with any interest; government ministers, though professing complete consistency in their policies, are increasingly forgetful about money and increasingly emphatic about the need to moderate the excessive rise in wages—something that is quite contrary to Milton Friedman's philosophy. The economy has been recovering slowly since the middle of 1982, though the foreign-trade position in manufactures continued to deteriorate. Britain, for the first time in centuries, became a net importer of manufactures, which, after the 1967 devaluation was on a slowly rising trend up to 1979, declined by nearly 20 per cent in 1980-84. Unemployment, at 13.5 per cent of the labour force, is far higher than that of any other developed industrial country. There is nothing to set against these losses, in terms of greater mobility between industries or in the field of quality and product innovation, that would enable one to say that the monetarist experiment brought some improvements as well as imposing large losses of output relative to Britain's enlarged potential.[19]

We may also allude to the EEC Commission's analysis of 29 July 1987 which shows "that the scope available to monetary policy for actively stimulating growth is limited or has largely been exhausted."[20] Achin Vanaik and Minhaz Merchant seem to agree with Nicholas Kaldor, when they portrary Mrs. Thatcher's experiment with monetarism as failure. Nonetheless, the former concedes that:

> As evidence, it can be said that Britain is beginning to enjoy higher average growth rates and productivity levels than its European rivals. But the Thatcherite vision can at its best mean a 'two-thirds', society with one-third left out of the 'good times' to come....[21]

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And Merchant acknowledges that "unemployment in Britain has now been falling for 16 months in succession, by a total of half a million—the largest sustained fall on record."[22] Interestingly at the commencement of her first term of office in 1979, Mrs. Thatcher had cooly claimed that "she needed three terms in office to put Britain back on its feet."[23] It is therefore asserted that she would now on priority devote herself to ameliorate living conditions of the remaining third of the populace in the inner cities and in other deprived areas of the country. In all fairness to Mrs. Thatcher, the trend for decrease in unemployment has set in. What, however, matters is that this has to be sustained in 1988, a difficult year, for it may have to bear the odious effects of the "Stock Market Crash" of 19 October 1987. ("Black Monday")[24] Therefore unfortunately, the year 1988 may not help the British Government to attain its objective. The "stock market crash" has already had its telling effects on the British as well as US economies.

By now it is clear that the British economy is not in its top form, as is officially claimed. Nor would it be accurate to fall in line with its critics who describe it as a complete failure. A balanced view, therefore, seems necessary. With this objective, we touch upon some major attainments of the British economy hereunder:

(a) Apart from bringing down inflation from 18 per cent to around 4 per cent, Britain has succeeded in reducing unemployment from 12 per cent in 1986 to 11.3 per cent in 1987.
(b) Britain's economy has grown by 4 per cent in 1986, and growth is estimated at 3.1 per cent in 1987, which is the highest in the EEC.
(c) Britain's rise in industrial productivity by 2 per cent a year since 1979 is by no means a negligible achievement. Even if it started from a low base in 1979, it has successfully reversed the process of decline.[25]

Despite the controversial nature of Mrs. Thatcher's monetarism Britain continues to be one of the leading developed economies. India could accelerate its development through collaborative arrangements with British firms in several fields. Two points made by the British High Commissioner in his exposition deserve our attention particularly for our industrial growth: (i) "Old industries such as steel and textiles have undergone a swift transformation and those units which have failed to adopt have simply disappeared." (ii) "And new high-technology industries, which accounted for only 11 per cent of our industrial output in 1976-78, have increased their share to nearly 20 per cent by 1981-83—a higher share than in the United States or Japan. In information technology, micro-electronics, lasers, biotechnology and renewable sources of energy, for example, we are among the world leaders."[26]

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Britain, which a few years ago was not in a position to pay due attention to India's industrial development, now expresses owing to its own expanding industrial potential, its willingness to extend cooperation in accord with the principle of comparative advantage and mutual benefit in various forms to enable us to attain speedier industrial development.

Despite the understandable strains in bilateral relations, Britain tops the list of joint industrial collaboration agreements concluded with India between 1957 and 1986. In this period, out of a total of 11,295 industrial collaborations, British firms have been responsible for 2.258, nearly 20 per cent. Many collaboration agreements have been concluded with public sector corporations and others with private firms. Some of the major British firms involved in joint ventures with Indian industry are—Imperial Chemical Industries, English Electric, Unilever, Dunlop, Leyland, Rolls-Royce, etc. In the first eleven months of 1987 however, the total number of approved foreign collaborations has come down to 720 as against 957 in 1986 and 1024 in 1985.[27] The quantum of financial participation in these ventures has also come down to Rs. 62 crores in the first nine months of 1987 as against Rs. 107 crores in 1986 and Rs. 126 crores in 1985. Even though the number of financial participation proposals has increased during the last two years, the financial quantum has not risen commensurately. The investment approvals have been mostly for SMEs (small and medium enterprises) which seek technology transfer. In the seven years of this decade (1980-86), a total of 5,000 collaboration agreements have been concluded with various countries such as UK, USA, FRG, Japan, Switzerland, France and Italy, including NRIs. The UK, USA and the FRG together have less than 40 per cent of these collaborations.

Since 1980, the United States has been ranking the highest in joint industrial ventures, and since 1982, the Federal Republic of Germany has taken the second position, thereby pushing Britain to a third position. A list of on-going Indo-British joint ventures may be seen in Table-III. Here below we discuss some of the developments that have taken place in this year.

Owing to the enormous expansion in the agricultural and industrial domains, India's demand for electricity/power is increasing at the rate of 10 per cent per annum. As at present, its requirement is assessed at 47,000 MW. But this year, owing to shortfall in the monsoons' India is faced with tremendous crisis both in relation to power and drinking water supply as well as large-scale drought through out the country. India therefore needs to acquire advanced technology from the external source to mitigate the present on-going crisis.

In the power sector, British Electricity International Ltd., which has made successful contributions in the past to the Indian power sector, seems willing to transfer relevant technology for the latest size of

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TABLE III

SOME OF THE JOINT INDUSTRIAL COLLABORATION AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BETWEEN BRITISH FIRMS AND INDIAN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISES

British Firm	*Value of the Contract/Project*	*Details*
1	2	3
STC Telecommunications	£1.5 m.	To establish the first official fibre-based railway communications network for the Western Railways in India.
STC, STC Submarines System	£57 m.	Contract recently awarded for the supply and installation of a 2000 km. under-water telecomunications system between Fujairah in the UAE and Bombay. Expected to be completed by the end of August 1987.
British Telecom Collaboration Agreement with Mahindra and Mahindra, January 1986	—	Creating modern digital telecommunications net-works and widening of the application of information technology in commercial and administrative organizations.
British Telecom's Second Collaboration Agreement with Multitech International Ltd. (A Dalmia Group Company)	—	For the provision of British telecom-designed customer equipment to be manufactured and sold in India.
RASCAL's joint agreement with Electronics Corporation of India.	—	To manufacture high-frequency communication receivers made by Rascal of Britain under a collaboration programme between the two companies.
Lancashire Industrial Science and Technology (LIST)'s Agreement with LUCAS TVS Ltd., Madras, and the Motor Industries Research Association in Pune.	—	To transfer computer-aided design and manufacture methods to the two Indian firms cited opposite.
ICL (now part of the STC Group) is long-standing collaboration with its Indian associate International Computers Indian Manufacturers (ICIM).	—	Ongoing programme between the British and its Indian associates.

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TABLE III Contd.

1	2	3
Mining : Dosco Overseas Engineering collaborates with the Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation, Durgapur.	—	The Agreement encompasses both a commercial agreement and a training programme.
Mining : Gullick Dobson collaborates with Jessop & Co., of Calcutta.	—	The agreement includes the transfer of the technical expertise and know-how associated with manufacturing self-advancing hydraulic roof support systems.
Mining : Anderson Strathclyde, Gullick Dobson and Dowty.	—	Installing mechanized longwall systems in the SCCL mines at Ramagundam in 1983 and Kothagudam in 1984.
Power : Drax Coal-fired power station in North Yorkshire.	—	It became the largest thermal power station in Europe in June 1986 when its 2000 MW extension was completed raising its capacity to 4000 MW.
British Electricity International Ltd., collaborates with National Thermal Power Corporation.	—	First of the two units, each of 500 MW, of Rihand Super Thermal Power is reported near completion.

National Thermal Power Corporation's Generators—500 MW Units. It is reported that the first of the two units of 500 MW of the Rihand Super Thermal Power Station is near completion. Besides, Britain provides training facilities to Indian power engineers under the Colombo Plan. In early 1970s, only ten places were earmarked for India. In 1985-86, the number of slots allotted for training across the whole range of managerial and technical power sectors has risen to 200. Additional training facilities are extended under the United Nations Development Programme.[28]

Power in India largely depends on coal, and India plans to more than double its total coal output by 2000 AD. British mining technology, supported by British aid, is helping India to realize its objective.[29] British Minister for Overseas Development, Christopher Patten, was in India from 4 to 14 December 1987. During his visit to the coalmines of Singareni Collieries at Ramagundam (Andhra Pradesh), and Northern Coalfields Ltd., at Singareni, he announced grants worth £27 million for

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longwall mining sets for the former project. Then, the British Minister also announced grants worth £ 9 million for an urban development project in Vishakapatnam, £ 3 million in support of the UNICEF water drilling programme in drought-affected areas. He also signed two aid agreements, one of which is an extension of the Hindustan Fertilizer Corporation's Indo-British Fertilizer Education Project. This project will cost about £ 22 million.[30] The other agreement covers a substantial programme of technical assistance.

About Britain's aid, it has to be noted: (i) that it is mainly bilateral and usually comes in grants rather than loans; (ii) Britain has only last year selected India (alongwith China and Indonesia) for soft loan packages for industrial projects, "with India receiving mixed credit support for contracts worth upto £300 million over five years." Its aid also helps India in its exports to Britain. As Sir David Goodall, British High Commissioner says, "they include goods funded by British aid, of which we give over Rs. 200 crores worth every year to India. They also include Indian imports of diamonds, which India imports only to process and re-export them to other countries. These two categories of imports account for well over half the current bilateral deficit."

Aid does not help much in realizing development goals. But it does help a country to overeome its immediate crisis situations. Presently, India is passing through an exceptionally difficult situation. Therefore aid is welcome. And, as stated officially in the British documents, India is the largest recepient of British aid. It received grants worth £115 million and £ 111 million in 1985-86 and 1986-87 respectively. Since June 1975, all British aid has been in the form of grants; no interest charges or repayments have to be made. Since June 1985, all British loans to India have also been made interest free.

British aid programmes for 1986-87 fall into three main categories.[31]

(i) *Tied Capital Aid* Expenditure in 1986-87, about £ 65.0 million or Rs. 130.0 crores)—used to finance British goods and services: e g., underground and open cast coal mining equipment for Coal India Ltd., equipment for a coach factory and the locomotive manufacturing units and workshops of Indian Railways, gas turbines and other exploration equipment for the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, gas filled cables, power systems and meters for Electricity Boards, steam turbines for fertilizer projects, equipment for a cable belt system for the National Aluminium Company, a research vessel for offshore mini exploration for the geological survey of India; equipment for the Super Thermal Power Station at Rihand, and for the Bharat Aluminium Company's, Cooperative Power Plant at Korba. M.P.

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(ii) *Local Costs Aid* Expenditure in 1986/87—about £ 31.0 million or Rs. 62.0 crores—used to finance Indian goods and services for development projects and programmes. Allocations have been made for projects for which British goods and services are also being provided (e.g. Rihand, STPS, Amlori Coal Mine) and also for "poverty focused" activities such as the India-wide housing and habitat improvement programmes of the Housing and Urban Development Corporation, a family welfare project and an agricultural extension project in five districts of Orissa, an agricultural extension project to promote the use of fertilisers by farmers in Assam, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. a habitat improvement programme in the twin cities of Hyderabad-Secunderabad, and for projects designed to improve the standards of primary education in Andhra Pradesh.

(iii) *Technical Cooperation* Expenditure in 1986/87, about £ 15 million or Rs. 30.0 crores—used to finance consultancy services, over 1,000 traning places a year in Britain for Indian nationals, links between British and Indian technical institutions and equipment for research purposes.

Britain seeks to align different forms of assistance wherever possible. For example, apart from financing British goods for a particular project, local costs aid, consultancy services and training in Britain might also be provided. This, in the British Government's view, increases the quality and effectiveness of the overall British contribution and gives better "value for money."

III

SIKH PROBLEM—A CAUSE FOR SERIOUS MISGIVINGS

Having analyzed economic relations at the bilateral level, we now make an attempt to understand one of the most complicated internal problems which seem to have caused serious misgivings in relation to the "design" of the external forces/factors at India's "destabilization." Since the early 1980s, the Sikh problem in India has acquired international dimension, particutarly in regard to Britain, Canada and the United States. It has also often been an uneasy subject in most of the diplomatic dealings with these countries.

In Britain, there are about 300,000 Sikhs, who are divided between the moderates and extremists. While the former favour peaceful solution to the Sikh demands through negotiations within the framework of the Indian Constitution, the latter support the creation of an independent

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"Khalistan". Not only fierce debate between them has resulted in a number of killings particularly of the moderates, thereby creating a law and order problem in the UK, but also there have been threats to the lives of the top and medium ranking diplomats as well as Indian dignitaries visiting that country. Jagjit Singh Chauhan, self-styled President of Khalistan operated from Britain, and coordinated with like-minded Sikhs in the US and Canada. Khalistan "passports" and even "currency notes" were issued. The extremists interviewed on the BBC often used threatening language against the Indian leaders. With the result, India had to approach the British Government to contain the objectionable activities of the Sikh militants. During the visit in April 1986 of the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe to India, India's Foreign Minister, B.R. Bhagat told him:

> It is difficult for our people to understand how a small group of such elements in the United Kingdom can operate openly with impunity.[32]

And he added that despite cooperation in some fields, a cloud hung over Indo-British relations.

The Background

In order to understand this problem, it seems necessary to delineate its background. Since the "Operation Blue Star" of early June 1984, the Sikh problem has become complicated (owing to its effects on the Sikh psyche) and problems have been further compounded by the November 1984 riots, which were broadcast by the BBC, with damaging effect upon the communal situation both in the UK and India. The BBC reputation was also affected adversely perhaps for the first time in this country. The Sikh problem bears no analogy with Britain's Irish problem, excepting that the root cause in both the cases happens to be somewhat communal. Britain has been experiencing this kind of strife in Northern Ireland for more than two decades, and has not had much success in ending it. Britain however, successfully managed the critical issues of sub nationalism in Wales and Scotland in the mid-1970s.

Unlike the Irish Catholics, who are economically less developed than their Protestant compatriots, the Sikhs in India have until recently been considered as the standard-bearers of national defence. Their role in agriculture, in industry, in the civil services, and in sports has been impressive. Per capita income of the Sikh-dominated Punjab was the highest in India; its unique feature was that its rural populace, comprising mostly Sikhs, was more affluent than those of the urban areas in the state.

It may be seen that the Sikh problem emanates more from its small minority community complex rather than its economic deprivation,

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Though it may be equally true that while the leadership of the faction-ridden Akali Party[33] remains in the hands of the feudal landlords, it is by and large opposed to any movement for secession from India.

Britain's Covert Support to Sikh Militants

There is a wide-spread suspicion about Britain's covert support to the Sikh militants for two reasons. First there exists an historical nexus which may not bear much significance now. Yet this factor deserves brief description, for now there has been an oft-repeated charge of some external factors interested in fomenting political destabilization of India. During the British period, Sikhs along with some Hindus and Muslims were categorized as "martial", to be differentiated from the other large mass of peoples, disdained as non-martial. This formula subserved British imperial rule. The success of the British ingenuity has been so effective that its pernicious effects have not faded out even after forty years of its independence. This kind of legacy of the British Raj made difficult for the new democratic polity in India to persuade the well entrenched, though infinitesimally small, privileged peoples to shed off undue privileges bestowed upon them by the alien rulers and to submit willingly to the new norms of a national democratic setting. Secondly, the preceding factor is further reinforced by the fact that the Sikhs, even if a small community in Britain, are vocal and bear some importance in elections both at the local and national level. To illustrate, in October 1986 when Kuldip Kaur, wife of Professor Mohinder Pal Singh Bedi, a prominent member of the British Conservative Party and also Chairman of the Anglo-Asian Conservative Society, was apprehended at the Delhi airport, and was subsequently detained for interrogation, not only did the British High Commission intervene in the matter but also a Tory MP Terry Dicks flew in especially to "rescue" her from the Indian security and arrange for her return to the UK[34] Evidently, this does not suggest any particularist interest shown by Britain in the Sikh community. However, it did create a furore in bilateral diplomatic circles.

Under India's continuous pressure, the British Government has been seized of the Sikh terrorist problem within and out-side India, particularly in the UK. And it has expressed of and on its willingness to cooperate with India in its fight against the terrorist menace. On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of India's independence, Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, conveyed his message as follows:

We have not just talked. We have acted. Following the series of attacks on moderate Sikhs in Britain last year eight people have been convicted by our courts. They have been given a total of seven life

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sentences and 51 years in prison. There have been convictions in respect of every major attack. Following the dreadful murders in Southall on 11 November two men have been arrested and charged.[35]

It may thus seem that the British Government has brought to book some of the guilty militants. This however, does not help India in realizing its objective of bringing back 50 extremist Sikhs for trial in Indian courts on account of crimes committed by them in India.

India's Call for Extradition Treaty

Over the years, there has come about a general impression in India that Britain is a safe haven for the Sikh extremists. It is for this reason that India has been asking for a separate Extradition Treaty. Britain's initial reaction was "no" to any new pact. But then India threatened to stop purchasing arms (including Westland helicopters) from Britain, which would have further accentuated its unemployment problem. Besides, India bears considerable weight in terms of its political and economic influence in the Third World which Britain could not afford to ignore. As such Britain relented and negotiations between Natwar Singh, India's Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs, and the British Foreign Office were held in April 1987. India in principle accepts the limitations of British law to accommodate India's viewpoint. The draft treaty drawn up proposes[36] that "incitement and conspiracy to commit a terrorist act are grounds for extradition. But if the conspiracy to commit a crime in India takes place in Britain, the accused must be tried in Britain, and may not be deported." It removes the "political factor" from crimes of violence as tenable defence against extradition. Further it is also added that any crime which bears a sentence of 12 months or more would be a case for extradition. The Indian Minister expressed satisfaction and believed that with the conclusion of the Treaty Indo-British relations may return to normal.

India, during the past more than eight months, has not responded to the draft treaty. It was only during Eduardo Faleiro's meetings, held in London on his way back from the United Nations, with the British Minister in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, that this subject was once again broached. The Indian side is reported to have conveyed to the British the inadequacy of the draft treaty and stressed on the desirability of a wider treaty. Its contents have not as yet been worked out. However, it is learnt that it may comprise two parts. While one part may provide for extradition, the other would indicate measures to curb terrorist activity in the two countries. "The wording of the Treaty

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could be such that, the concern of the two sides about political offences, grave affects of crime committed in one country or the other and the humanitarian aspects could be met.[37]

Notwithstanding the fact that during the latter half of 1987, several ministerial visits from the two sides have taken place, this does not by any means suggest that Britain would agree to India's new position on the Extradition Treaty. First, Britain might argue that it has not signed any such treaty with any country except Ireland. "The cricumstances of its relationship with Ireland were quite different than those with India. While Indians need citizenship or permit to work in Britain, the Irish do not.[38] But then it is also reported that owing to immense public pressure, the Irish Republic has eventually agreed to ratify the European Suppression of Terrorism Treaty, while making an exception in the case of Britain. Furthermore, the Irish Republic has also given powers to its Attorney-General to examine any request from Britain for extradition of a fugitive as to whether "there is an intention to prosecute the concerned accused and also if there is sufficient evidence for a *prima facie* case. Mrs. Thatcher, the British Prime Minister has expressed her anguish and told the House of Commons that making the Attorney-General the arbiter in the extradition proceedings was a step backward, which would in fact make Britain the least favoured nation in Europe in the matter of securing extradition of fugitives."[39]

It would thus seem that extradition of fugitives is a tricky business. For nearly two centuries now, western democracies have been giving asylum to political offenders. It is only now that in the face of widespread terrorism in all parts of the world, exceptions to the earlier conventions are sought to be made through new and wider extradition treaties. Yet not in all cases, public opinion is ripe to help the concerned governments to waive "the political defence" or the "reciprocal grave effects" clause in the extradition treaties. Nonetheless, India is within its legitimate right to exert pressure on Britain to help it out of the unseemly situation arising out of the terrorism problem.

IV

PROBLEM OF INDIAN IMMIGRANTS

Added to the Sikh extremist question is the problem of Indian immigrants (about 750,000) who have settled down in the UK. Often there has raged a controversy as to whether they really are an object of racial discrimination. There is a strong impression gaining currency in India about Britain becoming more and more of a racist nation rather than a socially healthy composite society. First, there is an indirect inference being drawn from the British approach to the racist regimes in Israel and

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South Africa; but for the US-UK support these regimes would not have survived for so long. Secondly, Britain's new legislative enactments appear to be particularly discriminatory against the peoples of sub-continental origin. On 1 September 1986, the British Government made obligatory pre-entry visas for visitors from India, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Ghana and Pakistan. The British Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd had maintained that modifications in the immigration rules had been necessitated by congestion at the prlncipal points of entry into the UK. An official spokesman for the Indian Government reacted on 3 September 1986, describing the imposition of visa restrictions by the UK as a "discriminatory measure...motivated by considerations of race and colour", and that it "might adversely affect relations between the two countries."[40] Thirdly, on 23 November 1987, the British Government announced details of an educational shake-up, which "the opponents fear and a Minister admits" may "set Britain up for a racially divided school." Closely related to this episode is a "nation-wide scandal" created by 25 white parents "pulling their children out of an Asian-majority school in a small Yorkshire town...on the ground that they were being denied 'Christian education.' " Lady Hooper, Under Secretary of Education, had said on television that if the government was offering freedom of choice to parents, "we must allow that choice to operate," and that "even if it ends up with a segregated system, then so be it." The Labour Party Chief Neil Kinnock accused the Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher of tolerating *apartheid* abroad, and also of encouraging it at home.[41] The latter returned the charge by saying that, "You are talking about segregation. I am talking about good education."

It is an acknowledged fact that Britain during the past few decades has turned into a multi-racial and multi-religious society. This sociological metamorphosis owes to the economic compulsions of the post-war epoch when immigrants from Commonwealth countries were welcomed to make inputs in its endeavours towards industrial reconstruction through their technical skills and or even unskilled labour. In early 1960s. Britain began tightening up the immigration laws. It was then hoped that, as and when Labour returned to power, it might relax these restrictions. But to everyone's surprise, Labour rose to and fell from power, but nothing of this kind happened. Indeed history of the past more than two decades has been the story of increasing agony experienced by the immigrants at various levels. A few years back, Asian females at the time of entry into Britain, were subjected to genetic tests; they had to be given up under pressure from India and other Commonwealth member states.

The Education Bill has therefore to be viewed from the perspective as to whether it bears an healthy effect on the basic ethics of a soeially

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composite society that is in the making in the UK. "Good education" is good only if it strengthens the sinews of social pluraliam. In this particular case, this is doubtful for there is no such prespective guiding the new education policy.

Furthermore, there has been a new official pronouncement that immigrants may be required to declare their ethnic origin in the next national census to be held in 1991.[42] In 1981, there was such a proposal that they may be asked to choose between 10 racial groups, but it had to be abandoned under pressures from within and without. This time, the question may be simpler. "People will be expected to tick one of three boxes White, Black or Asian." Asians then will have to indicate whether they are Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis or Chinese, etc. The stated official position is that accurate data on the ethnic complexion of the population would help the government in divising special programmes for the benefit of various ethnic minority groups and this may also eventually help eliminate racial discrimination through appropriate policy measures. The ethnic minority groupings have expressed their disapproval of the new official approach on the question of racial origin.

V

AN ASSYMETRIC RELATIONSHIP

As stated earlier, Britain and India belong to different international frameworks; they have different approaches to the management of international conflicts and they follow different roads to economic development. Britain is one of the two key nuclear powers in the western bloc, participating in the strategic decision-making apparatus of NATO. It is well known that Britain, in the 1940s and 1950s, enjoyed a "special relationship" with the United States, which somehow wore thin in the 1960s and 1970s. But then it seems to have been revived through close ideological identity/compatibility forged by President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher since the early 1980s. Britain also belongs to the Trilateral Commission and is, along with USA, a key member of the "Group of Seven". In a nutshell, if the North has to be understood in terms of its economic military prowess, one would have to really understand the basic potentialities of Britain and the United States. These two powers for the most part provide functional impulse to the operations of the North, when contending against the South and of the West when contending against the East.

India, on the other hand, is one of the founding members of the Movement of Non-Alignment. It lends it a certain lustre in the "Group of 77" and a critical role in the North-South dialogue. Just as Britain

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pursues vigorously its path in the western capitalist system, so does India in the groupings of the South. It is then in the nature of things that the equation between the two is assymetric: indeed, that is the reason that the two are on the opposing sides of the contest.

Apartheid South Africa: Major Irritant

There is hardly any national or international organization that now extends support to the *apartheid* regime in South Africa. But then there is hardly any doubt in anyone's mind on one critical point in this context, that this much accursed system has continued to thrive for so long only with overt and covert support of the United States and the United Kingdom. And this has been a major irritant in the relations between Britain and India. In September 1986, the NAM Summit held at Harare, under the leadership of Mugabe, adopted a thirteen-point package programme of economic sanctions against South Africa, which would be applied forthwith on adoptions by the UN Security Council of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter.[43] In November 1986, the UN General Assembly adopted eight resolutions on South Africa, with the support of the non-aligned nations, but persistent opposition from the UK, USA and France, seeking to impose comprehensive sanctions against the racist regime in South Africa. In one resolution, the Assembly voted to censure American and British policies in the area and asked both to reconsider their position.

At the Commonwealth Summit Conference, held at Vancouver from 13 to 16 October 1987, India's Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi once again repeated his warning that "the only way to destroy *apartheid* without a terrible bloodbath was to impose comprehensive sanctions."[44] He wanted the Commonwealth Summit to carry forward the process set in motion at the last session held in Nassau. But the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, doggedly pursued her "almost terminal allergy to any sanctions against South Africa."[45] In fact, as reported in the press, Mohammad Hussain Al-Shaaly of the UAE, Chief of the Committee set up by the UN Security Council to ensure compliance of the UN mandatory embargo on arms supplies to South Africa, released a statement on 30 December 1987 that "despite a mandatory United Nations embargo on arms supplies to South Africa, large quantities of weapons and other military equipment is clandestinely reaching the racist regime there." The statement further added:

It appears that often inadequate or even spurious export licenses and shipment documents, as well as inaccurate goods descriptions are

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used in order to avoid the scrutiny of the authorities in the countries of origin.

The Western Governments may not be blamed directly for the non-compliance of the UN mandatory embargo on arms supplies to South Africa. However, it is clear that the arms merchants in the West capitalize upon the ambiguity in their official policy-approaches. Sir Geoffrey Howe, in the House of Commons Foreign Affairs debate on 26 June 1987, stated:

> There is, however, a growing realization of the complexity of the problem. The difficulties of the region, both in South Africa and in neighbouring states, are hard enough; mandatory sanctions would only make matters worse. Practical measures, not empty gestures, are needed. We shall go on pressing the case against violence and for dialogue, for fundamental change and for an end to *apartheid*.

And then he added:

> We shall sustain our programme of help to South African neighbours. We have given them more than $ 1 billion worth of aid during the past five years.…In food and other aid, this year alone we have already committeed £ 33 million to help Mozambique.[16]

There is no doubt that the NAM cannot match with the western sources in financial terms. Besides, EEC also extends financial support under *Stabex* and *Sysmin* to the Frontline African states (most of them being partners within the Lome Convention framework), which may certainly be much more than what the NAM sponsored Africa Fund could do for them.

Yet there is no gainsaying the fact that the key to this problem lies with the United States and UK. Until such time they do not apply sincerely comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa, the latter would not abandon its policy of racism. Their arguments against comprehensive sanctions, that they may entail adverse implications for security and, or, economic interests of the Frontline states, seem to be specious, particularly when the latter are prepared to take risks; that indeed is only a part of the price that they may have to pay for the liberation of South Africa. Also they unjustifiably apprehend that as and when the *apartheid* regime gives way to the black revolutionary regime, the latter may turn against them, thereby jeopardizing their economic and strategic interests. This is further compounded by a general belief in some right-wing western circles that

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"one man one vote formula" might lead to an Africa style authoritarian black regime. Such a view is however not shared by those on the left. One Federal Republic of Germany's Social Democrat leader, Erler, regards "minority safeguards for whites as superfluous, claiming that there are no black racists in South Africa." Furthermore, it is well understood that such a thing has happened neither in Zimbabwe nor in Zambia.

However, the question of comprehensive sanctions against South Africa seems to have receded into the background owing to the economic and military vulnerability of the Frontline states. Apropos, Shridath Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary General observed, "Attention has also been diverted from sanctions to economic and military aid to the Frontline Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth states."[47] Misorientation of the Frontline states from the principal objective would only help prolong the *apartheid* regime in South Africa, causing irreparable damage to the valiant struggle launched by the African National Congress for emancipation of the Black majority from the racist shackles of the White minority.

Britain's Dubious Role in Fiji

Somewhat closely resembling the racist issue in South Africa is the new ethnic conflict that has surfaced in Fiji in the South West Pacific as a result of the military *coup* staged by Col. Rambuka. Initially there seemed to be convergence in the approaches of both India and Britain to the illegal overthrow of the constitutionally elected government of Timoci Bavadra. But the events have moved fast. While India, Britain, Australia and New Zealand were registering their protests the *coup* leader was busy consolidating his position. The Governor General Ratu Sir Penaia Ginalau was persuaded by the British to resign; the result, Fiji was declared a Republic. And then Ginalau was invited to take over as its first President.

The new Republic bears a racist complexion in the sense that its principal theme-song is that Fiji is primarily for the Fijians and not for the outsiders who now constitute a majority of the population. In other words, the people of Indian origin would be reduced to second class citizens, thereby sounding the death-knell of the experiment of a multi-racial parliamentary democracy.

The Fijians of Indian origin do not fail to note the dual role played both by Britain and Fiji's Governor General Sir Ginalau; while Rambuka was criticized for his *coup*, attempts were being made to fortify him in his new position. Appropriately, a reference may be made here to Britain's dubious role in this episode. It is reported that at the Commonwealth Summit at Vancouver in October 1987, while Rajiv

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Gandhi, India's Prime Minister, was busy sounding out other Heads of Government on the possibility of a concerted Commonwealth move to restore the constitutional democratic process in Fiji, there was a courier with a message from the Queen's Secretary already on his way to Suva to persuade Sir Ganilau to step down from Governor-Generalship. The British support to the new regime became manifest from Mrs. Thatcher's statement:

> You do not abandon the country at its time of need. Sometimes you have to do business with people.[18]

Then she also did not agree that Fiji was already out of the Commonwealth. India realized rather late in the day the depth of the British ulterior motivations behind the installation of a new racist regime in Fiji at grave costs to the majority of Fijians of Indian origin. Because of its changed status the Fiji Republic had to be out of the Commonwealth. But then no attempt was made to keep it in. For in the absence of unanimous support from all the Commonwealth member states it would have, anyhow, failed. Even economic sanctions half-heartedly applied by the Western Powers would not bear any effect on the new regime, which indeed seems to have become a *fait accompli.* Besides Britain, Australia and New Zealand have since revived their interactions in various fields with the Fiji Republic.

Britain Extends Support to Indo-Sri Lanka Accord

Notwithstanding the divergent approaches of the two countries on several international issues (already discussed) there are some gray areas where their policies seem to converge. For nearly two years now Sri Lanka has been witnessing communal strife with grave ramifications in the adjoining areas in India. After several mediatory attempts made by India, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President Jayawardene of Sri Lanka concluded an accord in July 1987 after due consultations with the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) to diffuse the crisis and restore peace. With a view to arranging a surrender of weapons by the LTTE and also ensuring peaceful implementation of the political aspects of the Accord, an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was deployed. Unfortunately, the Indian peace keeping attempt has not fructified as yet. Rather as is reported in the press, more than 350 Indian Army officers and jawans have lost their lives and several hundreds have been rendered permanently disabled. The casualties on the side of the LTTE are said to be quite large. The Tamil Tigers have not as yet surrendered; they are continuing their terrorist activities. The British Government has in the meantime extended its support to the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and

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has also offered assistance to the tune of £ 20 million in support of a three-year programme of reconstruction in Sri Lanka. This is in addition to relief assistance agreed to in September 1987. On this new aid pledge, Christopher Patten, Minister for Overseas Development, said:

> The reconstruction programme has been drawn up following the signature of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord earlier this year. Britain welcomed the Accord as the way to peace in Sri Lanka and we are very glad to give our full support to the reconstruction effort.[49]

As per the latest press reports, the IPKF is expected to complete its anti-terrorist task and would start withdrawing from Sri Lanka by July 1988. This is only an expression of intent. Much would depend how the concerned parties play their role in bringing back peace and restoring normal functioning of the political processes and the rule of law in this beleaguered country.

VI

CONCLUSIONS

Having analyzed Indo-British relations in the political and economic fields, as well as their diverging/converging approaches to some of the critical international issues, we now seem to be in a position to arrive at a few broad-based conclusions. First, India's changing salience in the world economy has not received due attention in Britain. India's share in Britain's total trade is less than 1 per cent. Its investments have also been declining in the past few years. India does not seem to figure in Britain's priority calculus, as it deserves, owing perhaps to the known variations in their perception of the interplay of the principal actors in the international system. Perhaps, like the Americans, the British also erroneously believe that India, by and large, belongs to the Soviet bloc, forgetting that if the totality of the systemic symbiosis is appraised, India would be seen as more aligned with the West than with the Soviet Union. Much, however, depends upon the mode of thinking in Britain as elsewhere. This partly explains how on technology transfer, bearing strategic significance, India unwittingly became a victim of the COCOM type of restrictions, which were made applicable on supply of industrial goods of strategic importance to the Soviet Union and its allies during the Cold War, and then again "New Cold War" in the early 1980s. There is, however, no denying the fact that India receives nearly 70 per cent of its arms supplies from the Soviet

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Union, but without any significant loss of its independence particularly in relation to major critical issues in international politics. Then it also purchases arms from the Western Powers, such as the UK, France, FRG, Sweden and the United States. In this regard, an American military analyst, Anthony H. Cordesman says:

> The Indians have also bought Anglo-French Jaguars and French Mirage 2000 in an attempt to diversify their arms sources, but their acquisitions for 1979-1983 were spread among seven other suppliers with the most significant supplying only 18 per cent (UK).[50]

Besides, in the last few years, India has purchased from the UK Westland helicopters, Sea Harriers, *HMS Hermes* (now INS *Virat*), and intends buying in 1988 the *Sea Eagle* anti-ship missiles as well.

In India, it is believed that the leading democracies in the Western bloc, particularly the United States and UK, seem to be pursuing policies which are more expediency-oriented rather than serving the higher cause of democratizing world politics. In the name of pragmatism, they have by now created a wrong tradition of propping up military dictatorships as their allies at damaging costs to political democracies, especially in the Third World. Such a gap in their thinking explains incongruity in their approach to "high politics". And it is conceded that it cannot be bridged in the present-day prevailing objective situation. Therefore, our concern has to be with the mundane affairs, described as "low politics."[51] It is in this context that it can be argued that there exists considerable economic potential in India that Britain could help tap to their mutual benefit.

In Britain, the generation that knew India well is fast disappearing. The new generation may not be well acquainted with India's recent attainments in economic and industrial domains. It makes little difference if India is described as a threshold industrial power or as an "economic Superpower" in South Asia. As Dr. Lyndon H. Larouche, an unconventional American thinker, is reported to have put it.[52] The reality is that India's economic/industrial development is a challenging enterprise.

While India's economy is passing through a critical phase, Britain's is also faced with new problems arising from the recent international economic and financial upheavals. Therefore, bearing in mind the advantages of the historical nexus and common sharing of the English language, it would be mutually beneficial if there is increased interaction between the two sides in the economic, scientific and technological fields. Also, perhaps, there is now better perception in Britain of the need to redress India's chronic deficit in balance of

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payments. A common institutionalized strategy may help attain this objective. Some reflections on what can be done in this regard seem to be necessary.

Of and on, India has been told that it must avail fully of the quotas agreed to under the EEC's Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP),[53] and further it must make its industrial goods competitive both quality-wise and cost-wise. It is also admitted that, there is often lack of information regarding India's capability to supply "High Tech" components in engineering and electronic sectors. This is partly sought to be bridged by setting up an Indo-British industrial forum between the Confederation of Engineering Industry in India and the Confederation of British Industry.[54] Furthermore, according to Harve de Carmoy, Director and Chief Executive of Midland Bank, London, the coming together of the Midland Bank and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation internationally has strengthened world-wide the Bank's position through its raised capital base. It is also said that the Midland group was one of the first to have grappled with the situation arising out of the debt problems of the Latin American countries. And now it proposes to increase its presence in India and help its Indian customers to increase their exports to diverse markets and enter into joint ventures with companies overseas for setting up projects in India as well as Third World countries.[55] Midland Bank and other financial/banking institutions could also perhaps help boost India's exports through "offset" trade. Unlike the traditional counter-trade and barter, "offset," according to Gilbert Nockles, Counter-Trade Director for Midland Bank, is not primarily a "short-term measure designed to fund imports in the absence of sufficient hard currency.... Properly applied, it can promote long-term industrial and trade development."[56] "Offset" deals are already in vogue between several MNCs, such as Pirelli, Rolls Royce or Daimler Benz, and countries like Saudi Arabia, Yugoslavia, Turkey and the Soviet Union. Under this arrangement, the buyer's leverage may be used to require the seller to "offset" the sale, e.g., by transferring technology, marketing or distributing exports, or creating jobs by investing or buying locally.

Secondly, the prolonged debate on the Extradition Treaty seems to have revealed how Britain initially was reluctant even to deliberate on it, but when pressures affecting its arms sales to India were exerted it changed its position and agreed to conclude such a treaty almost on terms suggested by India. Its purpose is only to facilitate bringing to book the concerned accused. And since India expressed its satisfaction with the Extradition Treaty concluded with Canada, it may be considered whether a similar treaty with Britain could serve its purpose. For a solution to the Punjab problem, however, India has to work

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sincerely for a political solution which may be long-lasting. Any other mode of conflict management, particularly through the use of state power, is likely to produce temporary results, with long-lasting adverse social and political implications.

Finally, owing to known divergences in their *Weltanschauung* and political perspectives, which determine their behaviour/role in world politics, their approaches to 'high politics' of global strategy and security, as stated earlier, have been different. It is however, worth noting that one of them rightly claims to be the 'Mother Democracy', and the other is the largest democracy in the world. Both of them are engaged (in their own ways) in the gargantuan task of building composite social systems and are endeavouring to overcome violent resistance of the obstructive/obscurantist forces, which seem to threaten their political stability. It is only axiomatic to say that with the strident advancement of the means of communication and the resultant inter-mixing of the peoples belonging to different social/ethnic systems, the concept of social pluralism would not only have to be accepted as a social reality, but would also have to be rendered a healthy look. This requires a new vision, and a new understanding of the emerging social trends. Social strife stemming from social heterogeneity in different societies are inevitable. And they have to be handled with care. If the past experience is any guide, state power, wrongly used, could be counter-productive. There can in any case be no single neatly defined formula to resolve the social conflicts of this nature in all parts of the world. But one thing could be stated clearly that use of state power must be resorted to only in rare extreme cases, and that too after exhausting all other methods, such as persuasion and conciliation. Both in India and Britain, if these last stated two methods are applied, even at this late stage, honestly and sincerely, perhaps their conflicts may be brought within the realm of management, if not resolution.

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"In acting so, both the British and Jinnah were 'blinded by self-interest'. The British wanted to build in Jinnah a strong counterpoise to the Congress so as to thwart its demand for independence and thereby prolong the life of their Indian empire.... The creation of Pakistan under Wavell's 'Breakdown Plan' was to serve as Britain's most strategic bastion."

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NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME AND THE SOVIET UNION

By K.D. KAPUR*

An international regime may broadly consist of a 'set of purposes, norms, rules and procedures', which are intended to affect, channel, contain and shape patterns of behaviour. Such a " 'regime is either a conscious creation' of actors or at least is recognised and consciously used by them regardless of its manner of creation."[1] *The nuclear non-proliferation regime which the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS)—USA, USSR and UK, had sought to establish ever since the 1960s fulfils most of the parameters of the international regime.*

The germs of the non-proliferation regime can be traced back to the policy of denial and secrecy adopted by the United States and the Soviet Union in the early phases of the development of nuclear energy and technology. The Western Suppliers' Group (WSG), a precursor of the 1975 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), formed in 1954 at the initiative of the United States, was meant even at that time to control the sales of uranium to prevent the spread of nuclear capabilities. The WSG consisted of South Africa, Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, Australia and the United States.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which was established in 1957 with the concurrence and explicit support of the Soviet Union, was on the one hand meant to provide the peaceful use of nuclear energy and on the other to create an international safeguards system to check and control the diversion of nuclear materials for non-peaceful purposes. Over the years the IAEA with all its safeguard measures has emerged as the key component and instrument of the international non-proliferation regime.

EVOLUTION OF NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME

THE non-proliferation regime received its complete shape and juridical framework when the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force in the year 1970. NPT is an essential and pivotal constituent of the non-proliferation regime. It has created a framework under which the states could be persuaded to sign the treaty and thus "accept a legal obligation not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons."[2] As a matter of fact both Western and Soviet sources

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have considered NPT as a part of international law.[3] In the Soviet view the treaty provides an international legal basis to regulate the participation of various parties in the sphere of peaceful uses of nuclear power. The underlying basis of the treaty is that the problem of nuclear proliferation could be solved by persuading the states to accept a legal obligation not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons. The incorporation of the treaty in the non-proliferation regime is supposed to give the regime a major claim to being international in nature, in the sense that there is an international commitment on the part of both the NWS and the NNWS, wherein the NNWS agree not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and NWS agreeing not to transfer directly or indirectly to any recipient the nuclear weapon or other nuclear devices. Moreover, the commitments made by the NNWS through NPT are comprehensive and verified applying to all peaceful nuclear activities of the NNWS and requires the acceptance of IAEA safeguards on all nuclear materials in both current and future activities.

The NPT is supplemented by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, commonly known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was opened for signature in Mexico City on 14 February 1967. The Soviet Union has even signed and ratified the Additional Protocol II on which it earlier had reservations along with the other NWS. This Treaty also contains provisions establishing the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL); to ensure its compliance and it also requires safeguard agreements with IAEA. The emergence of Nuclear Suppliers Group in the 1970s marked another majar development in the evolution and the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. The Guidelines of the NSG, and the Zangger Committee's Trigger List are the essential components of this regime. It may be mentioned that the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is the successor of the Western Suppliers Group (WSG) whieh was formed in 1954 at the initiative of the United States, in pursuit of its policy of nuclear denial. The basic purpose of the WSG at that time too was to prevent the spread of nuclear capabilities by requiring bilateral and subsequently IAEA safeguards on uranium sales.[4]

In addition to this the other multilateral treaties which constitute this non-proliferation regime are: the Treaty on the Prohibition of Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea Bed and the Ocean Floor in the Subsoil Thereof, better known as Sea Bed Treaty, which is in force since 1972; the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Spacc, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty in force since 1967); and the Antarctic Treaty (1958), which prohibits the militarisation of the Antarctic or its use for nuclear testing

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and explosions and dumping of radioactive wastes. All these along with the NPT, which, of course, is the cornerstone of this regime, provide a basic legal structure of the Non-Proliferation regime. In addition there are a large number of safeguard agreements of various types which exist outside the context of the treaty.[5]

Since the mid 1970s, the non-proliferation regime has become the subject of debate and has been consistently under stress and strain, rather, there has been a virtual threat to its coherence and legitimacy. Events like India's peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, Israel's raid on Iraq's nuclear power reactor in 1981, Israel's denial of nuclear capabilities to its Middle Eastern enemies, energy crisis of 1973, and growing depletion of the traditional energy resources all over the world have shown the weaknesses and the vulnerability of the regime. Still the main threat to the regime is considered to be coming from the horizontal and vertical proliferation. The energy crisis of the 1970s started attracting more countries towards civilian nuclear power as an alternative energy source. Moreover, more and more states started showing interest in the development of nuclear weapons for political or other reasons. Thus, the desire on the part of some so-called politically unstable states to acquire nuclear weapons was viewed with serious concern by the NWS. In addition, the growing interest of the states in the fast breeding reactor technology—considered to be more economical—was viewed as a hazardous development. All this obviously created problems of safeguards since the now increasing volume of nuclear material needed safeguards. The NPT regime had not covered the sensitive aspects of a full nuclear fuel cycle—including plutonium reprocessing, uranium enrichment and the fast breeder reactor cycle. The NPT safeguards were basically directed towards the nuclear materials—fuels and reactors. Safeguards were actually seen as a bargain for assured supplies of materials. Moreover, the NPT regime also permitted peaceful nuclear explosions.

The events of the mid 1970s signalled the beginnings of a period of "increasing doubt about the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime."[6] The result was a change in the politics of the nuclear exporters both at the individual and collective level. It also created tension among the suppliers and the haves and have-nots. The prospects of "increasing use of nuclear power, of growing stockpiles of plutonium, and of development of national enrichment capabilities," created fears among the NWS that "weapon usable material could be more readily available and less easily controlled than formely."[7] Moreover, the development of nuclear capabilities both through indigenous efforts and international transfers has threatened the regime and also the position of the nuclear suppliers.[8]

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In the 1970s, USSR emerged as the supplier of large quantities of enriched uranium. The USSR was catering to the growing needs of enriched uranium of Europe—both East and West. It is thus argued that the monopoly of the United States having been broken, it could not enforce its anti-proliferation policy, by controlling enriched uranium, forgetting that notwithstanding US stand on non-proliferation, it was responsible for selective proliferation in the case of Israel and South Africa. The Non-Proliferation regime came under acute stress because of the "unprecedented proliferation of reprocessing uranium enrichment capabilities." It may be pointed out that even before India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs), proliferation was being viewed by the NWS in terms of exports or acquiring of sensitive nuclear equipment and material supplies.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty had elaborated the definition of proliferation to include all nuclear explosions—whether peaceful or otherwise and not just proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the context of the happenings of the mid-1970s the proliferation problem was further defined ahd redefined. Nuclear proliferation was seen in a different perspective. It was seen in terms of the possibilities that a state might acquire capabilities that could at some future date be used to support a weapons programme. This new definition in terms of capabilities was given by the NWS at the first NPT Review Conference. Their concern was that the simple possession of civilian nuclear capabilities could provide options to the states to go nuclear. The focus, of course, now shifted from nuclear production and clandestine diversion to civilian nuclear capabilities. It was now accepted that a state which possessed a full nuclear fuel cycle or at least enrichment and reprocessing facilities would have such an option to produce nuclear weapons. This option could also be "available to a state which has accumulated large amonnts of reactor grade and weapon usable plutonium."[9] Thus, the NWS desired that the development of plutonium breeding and recycling and "sensitive technologies" should be either discouraged, delayed or controlled. The new definition of proliferation was accompanied by changes in *nuclear legislation in their respective countries, moral persuasion, political pressure and actual or threatened embargoes. In addition, the other steps being the establishment of regional fuel cycle centres and plutonium storage facilities under international control.* The main idea behind these policies being that the states should be allowed access to nuclear facilities and stockpiles under international control. This way the need to develop national capabilities and stockpiles could be avoided. This could also help in tackling the problem of diversion of nuclear materials. With this, all movement of nuclear materials could be put under international control. A state could, thus, not have plut-

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onium and have it extracted from spent fuel without itself having either a reprocessing capability or a significant plutonium stockpile under its national control. This could lead to the institutionalization of dependence or international nuclear markets. The other suggestions to cope with the redefined problem were the creation of international fuel banks and delays in adopting plutonium breeding and recycling programmes, so as to reduce pressure on plutonium economy. At the same time there have been explorations of technical measures that would either avoid or at least reduce the risks seen in the large scale production and use of plutonium.[10]

The fears and apprehensions of the NWS of the erosion of the legitimacy and effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime motivated them to resort to more and more stringent measures to control transfer of nuclear technologies to the NNWS, whereas on their own part, they continued with an unabated vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is not possible here to go into the question of the maintenance and contestability of any regime as such, except pointing the fact that a regime generally reflects the choices of a dominant state or dominant states and it is always an exercise in power and interest. The international non-proliferation regime, thus, mainly reflects the power and choices of the NWS which they have made for the NNWS and in the process has mixed up the interests of the NWS and the NNWS. And since the regime does not take into account the interests of the weak or the have-nots it is being disputed, contested and challenged by the countries of the Third World as hegemonic, discriminatory, unjust, inequitable, monopolistic, unrealistic, mischievous and insincere.

SOVIET SUPPORT FOR NPT REGIME

The focus in this section is on the Soviet position with respect to the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system and other safeguards, like Guidelines of the NSG, etc., outside the context of the treaty. It has subscribed to all its rules, norms and procedures more sincerely and in certain respects more enthusiastically than the other nuclear weapon states committed to the preservation and strengthening of the regime. An analysis of its views on some of the important constituents of the regime would help in understanding the Soviet non-proliferation policies and its attitude to non-proliferation.

The Soviet Union is a strong supporter of the non-proliferation regime with all its measures—legal, political and technical. In addition it has sought rigorous safeguards from the recipients of the nuclear reactors either through bilateral agreements or through agreements between the recipient and the IAEA,

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The Soviet Union is the staunchest supporter of the NPT. It expects it to become universal; so much so that it has insisted that every non-signatory state should sign and ratify it. In its thinking the treaty is the most important instrument with which to avert a nuclear war.

Speaking on the occasion of the signing of the NPT, A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, said that "the treaty marked a major success for the cause of peace" and that it was "an important step towards that goal." He said that it checked "further proliferation of nuclear weapons and thereby reduced the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war."[11] He pointed out that the treaty was an important milestone in international relations and a step towards the "great goal of achieving general and complete disarmament." Reflecting on the dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons, *Izvestia* wrote: The "globe, if saturated with nuclear weapons, would be like a gigantic powder keg ready to explode at the slightest spark."[12]

On the occasion of the ratification of the NPT by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Foreign Minister Gromyko stated that the primary goal of the NPT was to prevent the dangerous spread of nuclear weapons, to put up barriers to the emergence of more and more nuclear weapon states, and thereby to lessen the danger of outbreak of a war in which these weapons could be used.[13]

The Soviet stand on the NPT, it is argued, "stems from the Leninist peace-loving foreign policy aimed at ensuring peace and security on the earth."[14] I. Dmitriyev, in an article in *Pravda* on 30 May 1976, linked the problem of arms race and disarmament to that of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and said that the solution of the problem lay in preventing an increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons. The process of development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, he went on, entailed widespread proliferation of nuclear material and technology on our planet and that this in its turn aggravated the danger of spread of nuclear weapons. As was well known, he added, power reactors produced plutonium which could be used to create weapons of mass destruction. The NPT, he said, was an important instrument in averting the dangers of a nuclear war. Stressing the need to make the NPT universal, he wrote:

> The Non-Proliferation Treaty could play a still greater role if all states that have nuclear industries or facilities or intend to have them in the near future would sign it. There were still some non-signatories with significant military potential. It was precisely for that reason that there was necessity to take further steps to widen the circle of signatories.[15]

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Konstantin Borisov in an article in *New Times* asked the NNWS to sign the NPT. He pointed out that it was necessary "*to get more countries to accede to the treaty, which should be made truly universal.*"[16] He strongly urged for the adoption of "measures that would rule the creation of nuclear weapons by countries that for one reason or another are not signatories of the non-proliferation treaty."[17]

The USSR did not criticize India's PNE harshly. Nor did it pressure India to accede to the NPT before it agreed to give heavy water to India for use in the Rajasthan Atomic Power Plant. In most other cases, however, and especially in cases involving those non-signatory states which had links with the Western bloc like Israel and South Africa, it was extremely critical. It was notably unhappy about the way the members of EURATOM dragged their feet about signing the NPT. It was pleased when, in 1976, Belgium, Italy, the Luxemburg, the Netherlands and West Germany ratified their adherence to the NPT. An article in *Pravda* noted that for certain reasons the NPT had not become a universal instrument of non-proliferation. It alleged that the NNWS of EURATOM had been resorting to all manner of "tactics to slow the practical implementation of effective inspection of its atomic industry by the Agency."[18] They had not manifested any concern, it said, for the military ambitions and nuclear activities of Israel and South Africa and the failure of those two countries to accede to the NPT. It added that if the racist regime acquired nuclear weapons, it would cause an immediate security threat to the African states. It took serious note of the military alliance forged between the Republic of South Africa aud Israel with the support of the NATO.[19]

All the members of the Warsaw Pact are signatory to the NPT and have subjected themselves to the stringent safeguards imposed by Moscow. Those outside the bloc like Finland have also signed. Cuba, though not a signatory, has agreed to put all its nuclear facilities under IAEA inspection safeguards. India, also a non-signatory, has practically accepted all IAEA safeguards while striking a deal for heavy water in 1976. These safeguards are quite stringent.

Regarding this issue, Soviet commentators feel that an effective implementation of both the multilateral and unilateral political and legal measures are supposed to have succeeded in preventing horizontal proliferation. The present international non-proliferation regime based on the NPT, other treaties and multilateral and unilateral measures and international practices—has proved quite viable and effective. However, for further strengthening of this regime, there is a strong need for new and far-reaching steps to reinforce the NPT.

Soviet commentator Konstantin Borisov holds that the international non-proliferation regime should be further made effective by ensuring

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the universalisation of the NPT. All 30 countries including China and France, which have so far declined to sign the NPT, should be convinced and persuaded to sign it at its earliest. In his view, it was particulary 'disquieting' that roughly a dozen 'near nuclear' or 'threshold' states were reluctant to accede to the treaty. Significant among them being Israel, South Africa and Pakistan. All the three, somehow, make no secret of their nuclear ambition and in some cases it is virtually accepted that they have acquired the nuclear weapons. The real threat to the proliferation regime comes from the threshold countries. The possession of nuclear weapons by them, it is assumed, is likely to result in a chain reaction leading to the development of nuclear arms by other non-nuclear countries in the Middle East, South Asia, Latin America and elsewhere. The possibilities of the use of nuclear weapons by these countries would have global implications and threat to international peace and security, holds the Soviet writer.

Another major step suggested is that the IAEA's safeguard system should be further strengthened, perfected and made effective by providing more sophisticated technical facilities. In addition to it, it is equally important to tighten the control over nuclear exports. Every aspect of the nuclear export should be carefully examined and all the nuclear activities of the receiving non-nuclear country should be put under the Agency's control or "coordinated control measures" should be extended to all the exporters of nuclear material, equipment and technology.[20]

No doubt, thus, the problem of non-proliferation is most complex and can be solved only if it takes full cognizance of the interests of a wide range of states, large, small, nuclear and non-nuclear. But at the same time the disastrous effects of the nuclear war on all the nations can hardly be ignored. This perhaps is the most impelling reason for preventing the use of nuclear power for military purposes. There is thus a strong need for a concerted effort of the whole world community to avert such a catastrophe. The treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in this context is supposed not only to provide for the stabilization of the composition of the nuclear club, but also to urge the NWSs to reduce their nuclear armaments. Thus, though NPT is primarily aimed at preventing the "horizontal" proliferation—emergence of new nuclear states, it is "by no means isolated from other measures aimed at curbing arms race and bringing about disarmament. It is for the first time that 130 countries pledged at the Third NPT Review Conference to hold negotiations on a vast spectrum of disarmament problems under Article VI of the treaty whose main objective is to provent 'vertical' proliferation of the Nuclear weapons.

Explaining the Soviet stand to the problem of non-proliferation, Mikhail Gorbachov in his message to the participants to the Third NPT Re-

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view Conference said: "True to its obligation under the treaty, the Soviet Union has been doing and will do all in its power in order not only to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons but also to stop the arms race and turn it back."[21] This statement by the Soviet leader was not hollow rhectoric. It was followed by a concrete proposal on 15 January 1986, wherein the Soviet Union proposed wide ranging initiatives for the complete and universal elimination of nuclear weapons. The signing of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty and negotiations for 50 per cent reduction of the strategic weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union, amply speaks of the sincere and genuine efforts of the Soviet Union in the direction of the phased reduction and ultimately, elimination of the nuclear weapons from the face of the earth by the end of the century. Its efforts "would make it possible to bring about nuclear disarmament and put peace on a defendable basis in a nuclear free world."[22]

The treaty, in the Soviet view, though prohibits non-nuclear countries from developing and producing nuclear weapons or explosive devices has not hindered or obstructed cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy or deprived the non-nuclear weapons countries from the enormous advantages and achievements of nuclear physics and technology. As a matter of fact effective and reliable safeguards against proliferation will enable states to cooperate on a mutually beneficial basis in the peaceful uses of nuclear power. The increasing flow of technical aid from IAEA to the developing countries substantially supports this. During the period 1970-85, it increased from a modest figure of $ 4.2 million to $ 38.1 million. The geographical distribution of this aid was: Asia 28.3 per cent, Latin America 22.8 per cent; Europe 13.1 per cent; Africa 20.8 per cent and Middle East 1.6 per cent and another 13.3 per cent was allocated for inter-regional projects. The Soviet Union, a strong supporter of nuclear energy, stands for wider international cooperation in peaceful utilization of nuclear power provided it does not lead to increased opportunities for developing nuclear weapons.[23]

Support for IAEA Safeguards

The USSR today is perhaps the strongest supporter of the idea of extending IAEA safeguards to the nuclear industry of the NNWS, whether signatory or otherwise to the NPT. It not only stands for strict enforcement of IAEA safeguards and inspection but also scrupulously observes safeguards and insists on control over supply of nuclear material, technology, or equipment in its bilateral agreements. Since India's PNE in 1974, the USA and other NWS, including the USSR,

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have insisted increasingly on strict control and safeguards as regards export of civilian nuclear technology to the states of the Third World. A reference could be made in this context to the United States Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 1978, which seeks to impose "full scope" safeguards on nuclear exports to non-nuclear states which are not signatory to the NPT. Soviet Union has made a number of recommendations to create a "reliable barrier" to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.[24] Speaking on the occasion of the conclusion of the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosion between the USA and the USSR on 28 May 1976, Brezhnev said that the USSR. in "cooperation with the other countries", was "prepared to move energetically along a broad front of measures leading to the curbing of the arms race and to disarmament."[25]

Next day *Pravda* carried an article by I. Dmitriyev, appreciating the IAEA's work in assuring verification. Dmitriyev, however, felt that there was still a great deal to be done to make this verification effective and the "possibility of the use of nuclear materials for purposes incompatible with the peaceful uses of atomic energy is to be ruled out." In the course of a review of the Soviet role in the IAEA's activities, he wrote that the "Soviet Union actively participates in the Agency's activity; it is working out new and *improved verification methods and procedures for the Agency and in training Agency personnel engaged in inspection activity*." He suggested a number of measures, including the use of political pressure, to seek the adherence of the non-signatories to the NPT. He said: "Along with the task of inducing a broad range of new states to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is necessary to take measures to deprive countries that for one reason or another have not signed the treaty, of the possibility of creating nuclear weapons." He also sought implementation of the agreement reached by twenty-two countries, including the USSR, "stipulating that nuclear materials and equipment should not be made available to Third States without IAEA verification." He hoped that the non-signatories would play a very positive role. He said that the non-signatory states should not be delivered equipment and nuclear materials and not provided "any *other assistance in the peaceful uses of atomic energy unless they pledged not to use these materials to create nuclear explosive devices.*" Moreover, according to him, states supplying nuclear materials and equipment should see that the recipient state submitted to IAEA verification of its activities in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As for the USSR, he said that it would be "prepared to follow such an export policy if other supplier countries also adopt it."[26]

This position has since been repeated at various levels and in almost all Soviet official publications.

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In a Memorandum to the Thirty-First Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the USSR stressed that the states which supplied nuclear materials, equipment and technology had a special responsibility and that strict guarantees were required to ensure that international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy did not become a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Foreign Minister Gromyko pointed out that international commercial exchanges of nuclear materials were still on the increase and that it was not sufficiently certain that the possession of fissionable material would not be used for dangerous purposes or that the means of developing nuclear weapons would not fall into the hands of irresponsible persons, adventurists or just madmen. This was not a question of trade, he declared, but of politics and seeurity.[27]

The USSR has always insisted that exporters of nuclear material should abide, in their export policy, by the most stringent rules so as to plug all loopholes and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It has also insisted that while delivering nuclear materials to a non-nuclear state, the donor should get the recipient to accept IAEA safeguards and also give definite "official assurances that the materials, equipment, and technology obtained would not be used to manufacture nuclear explosive devices." If such material was re-exported, the deliveries should be effected "on the same terms as those on which they had been received as a result of the initial export."[28]

Soviet Union has been steadily increasing its voluntary contribution to the IAEA's Technical Assistance Fund. During the period 1975-1987, its contribution to IAEA increased from 500,000 to 3,434,000 roubles. This money is utilized to deliver Soviet equipment, instruments, installations and materials to developing member states of the Agency; train field workers holding IAEA grants and set up courses of instruction in the Soviet Union.[29] Soviet Union has extended all possible help to IAEA in its efforts to establish a strong and powerful nuclear safety regime. It has strongly advocated and adhered to IAEA's nuclear safety standards for nuclear power plants like: optimization of radiation protection during transport; evaluation of the radiological impact of the transport of radioactive material; the application of the dose limitation system; the designing of the radiation protection system; operational radiation system; irradiation monitoring, limiting radioactive release and the principles and methodologies for the protection of general public. The Soviet Union strictly subscribes to IAEA's draft regulation for the safe transport of radioactive material; code of practice on the management of wastes from the mining and milling of uranium and thorinm ores and from nuclear power plants, post-accident assessment, recovery operations and emergency response facilities.

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Further development of modern nuclear power production, firmly holds Soviet Union, should not only be to expand international cooperation for greater nuclear safety in broad terms, but such cooperation should be given a qualitatively new dimension and effort should be made to work out an "integrated system of international safeguards in the military, political, economic and technical aspects of nuclear safety, committing all countries to ensure safe nuclear power development."[30]

It is the frequency of accidents at the nuclear power plants which has brought in focus the immediate need for indepth development and international cooperation in the field of nuclear safety. Incidently by 1986, a total of 150 accidents involving radioactive release were registered, specifically in US, Britain, West Germany and the Soviet Union. The growing anti-nuclear lobby and the protest movement against the nuclear powers, the question of regulation of further activities in the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes can be partly attributed to nuclear accidents. Any opposition to the development of nuclear energy is to "prevent errors and mishaps fraught with grave consequences for human health, life and the environment."[31]

Chernobyl and Safety of Nuclear Power Plants

The Chernobyl accident of April 1986 it is held was a "tragic reminder of the formidable forces of runaway nuclear energy" causing loss to human life and radioactive contamination of the surrounding territory on an area of 1000 square kilometers. This was the world's worst nuclear power plant disaster. However, Soviet Union, avoiding any secrecy about the accident, kept the International Atomic Energy Agency informed about the radiation at and around Chernobyl on the Western borders of the Soviet Union. Interestingly, it was for the first time that the Soviet Union provided the most detailed information on the accident and the recovery operations to the Experts Meeting of IAEA at Vienna in August 1986. The primary objective being to caution the other countries to take appropriate measures to improve nuclear safety and learn a lesson from the Chernobyl tragedy.

The Chernobyl accident and such similar happenings in other countries brought into focus the urgency for the establishment of an international safety regime, progress of nuclear energy and promotion of extensive cooperation in ensuring maximum safety for the public and the environment. The exhaustive analysis of the cause of Chernobyl led the Soviet Union to work out detailed proposals for setting up an international system for the safe development of nuclear power production. The programme of action was formulated by Mikhail Gorbachev on 14 May and 8 June 1986. It called for a set of specific measures to provide a scientific and technical basis for the development of nuclear power

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industry and establishment of international nuclear safety regime. The proposals became the basis of a Draft Programme to set up International Modalities for Safe Nuclear Power Development, which was subsequently submitted for special consideration by a special session of the IAEA General Conference on 24 September 1986.

The provisions of the programme were supposed to establish a system of extensive cooperation of all states in building the material, scientific and technological basis for the safe development of nuclear energy. The system could be further strengthened by evolving international legal standards and agreements. The programme proposed the following basic provisions to establish an international nuclear safety regime. They were; creation of system of early notification of nuclear accidents and failure of nuclear power plants involving a release of radioactivity with the threat to its transboundary transfer; to establish an international data bank on radiation background levels on individual agreed geographical points; to adopt common international standards regarding accident-prone concentrations of radio-nuclides as well as regarding the circles of local radioactive contamination; to create an effective machinery for relief in the event of a hazardous accident or as part of the international modalities for safe nuclear power development; to draw up international recommendations for the methods to be used for eliminating the consequences of nuclear accidents and for anti-accident planning; to agree that all countries in their nuclear activity proceed from recommendations worked out by the IAEA regarding nuclear plant safety and countries exporting nuclear equipment and nuclear fuel; observe the IAEA recommendations on nuclear plant safety; create a bank of information on nuclear accident and further expand and develop this system; to elaborate jointly a project or projects of new generation thermal and fast neutron reactor systems reflecting the latest achievements of countries in the field of safety in the tackling of a number of technical problems, such as decreasing the sensibility of a reactor system to personnel errors reducing the possibility of a nuclear core meltdown and control over hydrogen; to work out a reliable system of measures to prevent attacks on nuclear facilities; to draft an appropriate international convention whereby all states would assume an obligation not to attack the plants of the nuclear industry; to devise a reliable system of measures to prevent nuclear terrorism in any manifestation by reaching a separate agreement on that score or by solving this problem as part of the general effort to combat international terrorism;[32] to bring into effect the International Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials as quickly as possible; to draft a multilateral juridical document that could envisage the liability of states both for damages on an international plane for trans-boundary consequences of nuclear accident

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and for the influction of physical and moral damage resulting from unjustified action carried out with the plea of protection from the effects of nuclear accidents (the spread of dishonest information, the introduction of unwarranted restrictive measures); to enhance the role and the resources of the IAEA—to broaden the sphere of the activity and to use more fully its accumulated experience in the development of various aspects of the nuclear safety problem and the experience of such specialized agencies as WHO, UN Environment Programme and UNESCO. Its role could be further expanded with the active participation of international organizations, carrying out of joint coordinated studies and exchange of experience on the various questions with a view to ensure the further development of the nuclear industry.[33]

Since civilian nuclear energy could hardly be separated from its military use, the Soviet Union sincerely called for vigorous international efforts to eliminate nuclear arsenals. In pursuit of this goal the Soviet Union from time to time has been taking initiatives in this direction like unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and Gorbachev's 1986 proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth by the end of the century. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons, establishment of a comprehensive system of international security and the safe development of nuclear power, in Soviet view, can be achieved simultaneously. For safe nuclear power development, the Soviet Union called upon all the countries concerned and international organizations to cooperate in this major undertaking for the sake of preservation and further progress of human civilization.

The Soviet proposals and the initiative in the direction of the international nuclear safety regime was instrumental in the convening of IAEA's Experts' Meeting to work out agreements on prompt notification of accidents at nuclear power plants and on the creation of an assistance system, in case, such events were to occur again. Two draft international conventions—the Convention on Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents and the Convention on Assistance in the case of Nuclear Accident were the result of a Special Session of IAEA General Conference held from 24 September to 26 September 1986. According to the Convention on Early Notification, the parties undertake the responsibility to immediately notify the other countries of a nuclear accident likely to have transboundary consequences. They also commit to provide full information relating to the accident. The second convention binds the parties to extend assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency with a view to minimize its consequences. It also lays down a procedure for giving assistance, particularly the means available at the IAEA level.[34]

Soviet Union, as expected, immediately signed and subsequently ratified both the Conventions. Even the United Nations General Assembly appealed to all the states to accede to these conventions as soon

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possible. Soviet Union appreciated the results of the Forty-first Session of the General Assembly; in a statement it said that, "the collective elaboration in such short a time of Conventions of Notification and on Relief in the Event of a Nuclear Accident, their approval by the IAEA General Conference and its signing by a large number of states provide a cogent example of a joint and effective solution of the urgent problem of our time." The Soviet Union, on this basis, it said, was proposing to advance further along the "path of creating international modes for the safe development of nuclear power engineering."[36]

After Chernobyl the Soviets have become extremely cautious, and keen for the development of an international nuclear safety regime. The growing awareness amongst the people and their governments and the steps taken by the international community towards establishing models for safe nuclear power development promise an optimistic future for global nuclear power engineering. However, at the same time the steps which are being taken to strengthen the international nuclear power safety regime are likely to contribute towards further tightening of the NWS' nuclear export policies and there is every possibility of a further recession in the civilian nuclear market. The nulear weapon states' commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation regime would also become all the more strong.

Control of Transferred Technology

The USSR has consistently held that the exporter should exercise control not only over nuclear materials and equipment but also over the technology transferred. It has also said that IAEA safeguards should apply to installations connected with the chemical processing of irradiated fuel or uranium enrichment and the production of heavy water (which is used as a moderator in certain types of reactors), as also to other installations of such nature in the recipent country.[37]

After Chernobyl, the Director General of the IAEA Hans Blix visited the Soviet Union. Soviet officials, during their meeting, reinforced their country's continuing support for international measures to strengthen nuclear safety within the framework of the IAEA. They also expressed their interest in the Agency's programme of Operational Safety Review (OSARTS) and their country's readiness to contribute experts to OSARTs mission.[38]

The USSR has so far been "considerably more consistent and effective than the United States in promoting policies to prevent the nuclear spread."[39] Its control over nuclear exports has been more rigorous and tough. With a view to promoting a truly impermeable nuclear non-proliferation regime it has pleaded for "*even firmer controls*" to be

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"established over the nuclear exports." A Soviet writer, Zheleznov has suggested a number of measures to achieve such a nuclear non-proliferation regime. First, according to him, the exporter of nuclear materials should agree to set up an international regime, a regime which would be binding on all exporters. Under such a regime IAEA safeguards would apply to the complete nuclear fuel cycle in any non-nuclear recipient contry and would cover the whole nuclear activity of that country. The establishment of such a regime, he has pointed out, would also bring an end to the rivalry involved in the marketing of atomic materials and equipment.

Another suggestion made by Zheleznov is to tighten the measure of control over nuclear exports, to lay down even more far-reaching conditions for exports, and to extend IAEA controls to cover the nuclear activities of all the NNWS. Efforts should be made to institute concerted measures to control all exporters of nuclear materials, equipment and technology.

Finally, Zheleznov also called for the establishment of a stringent regime regards deliveries of equipment bearing on those elements of the nuclear fuel cycle connected with the production of fissionable material fit for nuclear weapons.[40] Thus the USSR has stood for strict safeguards *"to prevent international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy from becoming a channel for spreading nuclear weapons."*[41]

Multinational Regional Fuel Centres

In the Soviet view nuclear activities of a number of countries, including some developing countries' activities, like the creation of "an industry for the enrichment of uranium and the processing of irradiated fuel with plutonium recovery" are "fraught with dangerous consequences from the point of view of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons."[42] Such activities are not only dangerous but "would be economically disadvantageous for these countries."[43] The USSR has, therefore, suggested that it is necessary to create "multinational regional centres for the atomic power fuel cycle." This will not only be in the interest of the participating countries but would also make "atomic power engineering more economical." It would, further, "concentrate the radioactive waste of the nuclear industry at a limited number of points on our planet" and afford the "greatest possible safety from radiation' and guarantee the most effective IAEA verification.[44] The Soviet Union, on its part, has been rendering a number of countries assistance in the enrichment of their natural uranium at Soviet installations and has cooperated with these countries in this field. The enrichment facility

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has been availed of by a number of European countries. The Soviet Union stands for wider international cooperation in peaceful utilization of nuclear power. However, at the same time it holds that, this should not provide opportunities to those countries to develop nuclear weapons.

Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

Another important measure aimed at the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which the Soviet Union has repeatedly suggested is to ensure "the physical protection and safeguarding of nuclear materials."[45] It has always argued that no unauthorised use of nuclear material was to be permitted. Soviet Union ratified the "Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials" on 4 May 1983. Though the Convention was opened for signature since 3 March 1980, it has so far not come into force since it has yet to be ratified by at least 27 states. Only 15 states had ratified it by mid 1986. The Convention has evolved a level of physical protection to be applied to nuclear materials under international transportation. The Convention also is applicable to nuclear materials that are in the process of utilization, storage and transportation inside the country.[46] There is always a possibility of fissionable material being stolen by individuals, terrorist organizations, or criminal gangs for political blackmail or for other malevolent purposes. It is with this view that the Convention provides for the exchange of information with respect to thefts, blackmail and extortion of nuclear materials and also provides for the measures that should be taken.[47] In view of this the USSR thinks that "it is absolutely imperative that urgent international measures are needed to increase accountability for the safeguarding of nuclear materials in the process of their use, stockpiling or transportation." For its own part it has always set it as a "mandatory condition that the recipient country carry out physical protection measures on the basis of recommendations worked out by the IAEA."[48]

Thus, in order to ensure the physical protection of nuclear materials, the Soviet Union on its own part has always sought a firm commitment from the recipients of these materials, technology, equipment, installation, special non-nuclear materials and services on a level not lower than that recommended by the IAEA. The Convention it is assumed "operate as a factor for nuclear security" and a reliable set of measures be adopted to prevent nuclear torrorism.[49]

However, certain developments which have been discussed earlier, accelerated the pace of negotiations amongst NWS to take steps to control the export of sensitive materials.

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SEVENTIES SEE NEW NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS

The redefiners of policy pursued their goals at two major forums: the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). In view of the growing dangers from plutonium, INFCE represented an attempt to find an alternative to plutonium. The NSG was mainly to coordinate supplier's safeguard policies, particularly relating to the supply of 'sensitive' technologies such as reprocessing. However, both had been opposed by certain suppliers and purchasers.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is the successor of the Western Suppliers Group (WSG), which was formed in 1964 at the initiative of the United States in pursuit of its policy of nuclear denial. The basic purpose of WSG at that time too was to prevent the spread of nuclear capabilities by requiring bilateral and subsequently IAEA safeguards on uranium sales.[50]

It was in the 1970s that a strong need for international regulation of nuclear exports was felt by the nuclear weapon states, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, primarily because of the fast development of nuclear exports and of major international commercial transactions in the early and mid-1970s on transfer of nuclear materials and equipment to some NNWS including the non-signatories to the NPT. Moreover, the relaxed international climate was conducive for Super Power agreements regarding strict measures to control the nuclear transfers ty the NNWS, particularly to those not party to the treaty. A broad agreement emerged after the meeting between President Brezhnev and President Richard Nixon in Moscow in 1970, on the occasion of the signing of the Vladivostok Agreement for adopting measures to strengthen the non proliforation regime.

In June 1975, Brazil, a non-nuclear state, not a signatory to the NPT, and West Germany concluded a most controversial nuclear deal. Under this deal West Germany agreed to sell a complete nuclear fuel cycle to Brazil. It was a multi-biliion dollar deal which involved supply of eight large atomic power reactors with a capacity of 1300 MWe. With the transfer of enrichment and irradiated reprocessing technology Brazil attained the capability to produce on short order fissionable fuel for nuclear weapons. In 1976 France agreed to sell a plant for processing irradiated nuclear fuel to Pakistan, a non-nuclear state not signatory to the NPT. However, the deal had to be cancelled under pressure of world public opinion. Moreover, the nuclear exporters like USA, UK, France, West Germany and Japan got into an intense competition to export nuclear materials which was supposed to undermine the non-proliferation regime. Regulation of nuclear exports was also sought to be used to persuade or compel the NNWS to sign the NPT. It was also considered essential to identify the items that would

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be covered by the IAEA safeguards. Safeguards were also extended to the transfer of facilities for reprocessing irradiated fuel, uranium enrichment and production of heavy water.[51]

After India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974, the United States' pursuit of non-proliferation resulted in the enactment of the most controversial Non-Proliferation Act 1978—a move to legally and officially control the export of nuclear technology to NNWS.

In addition to this act, the United States took active initiative in restricting proliferation of nuclear supplies to the non-nuclear members. It was under US leadership that NSG started meeting in London from early 1975 to draw outlines regarding the export of nuclear items. Its original membership of seven rose to 15 (Soviet Union, France, FRG, Canada, Britain, Japan and the United States (original), GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland joined subsequently). The Soviet Union right from the beginning, had insisted on a "broad participation of potential exporters, in addition to the current exporters."[52] Earlier in the London meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers in 1975, a group of specialists chaired by Claude Zangger, a Swiss national, which subsequently became "Zangger Committee" met frequently and drafted a list of such supplies whose export was to be controlled. These were further refined in 1978. After prolonged discussions among the various supplier nations in 1977, the NSG agreed on a final set of Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers and drew a list of nuclear materials and equipment (known as the Zangger List) which was to be restricted by the suppliers. The list was subsequently submitted to IAEA and was approved by it. It has come to be known as "Trigger List".

The Soviet Union as a founder member of the NSG, and a powerful champion of the non-proliferation regime strongly advocated rigorous controls over nuclear exports to NNWS which were not signatory to the NPT. Soviet Union played a very active role in the convening of the meeting of the representatives of the states exporting nuclear materials, equipment and technology in London in April 1975.

Interestingly, it may be noted that during the debates on the regulation of transfer of nuclear materials, the Soviet Union along with the other socialist countries supported the most stringent controls, while the United States finally sided with France, West Germany and Japan, who stood for limited controls, and finally agreed that IAEA safeguards would be applicable exclusively to the items of transfer identified in the 'Trigger List', meaning thereby that the transfer of these items would trigger the applicability of IAEA safeguards.[53] It also laid down the guidelines for the physical protection of nuclear materials. The delivery of any item in this list to any NNWS, not party to the NPT, was prohibited.[54]

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The items included in the "Trigger List" were not to be exported to non-signatory countries of the NPT unless the recipient state accepted the IAEA safeguards which were designed so as to detect the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to military purposes. Thus the export of the listed nuclear materials would 'trigger' the application of IAEA safeguards to the facility for which items were supplied. The guidelines briefly provided for adequate physical protection for exported items : IAEA safeguards for transferred items; IAEA safeguards for any application of sensitive technologies; extension of export controls to any retransfer of supplied items or items derived from them with the original supplier's consent required for major items; consent of the nation and notice to the IAEA for the use of the transferred technology to produce uranium enrichment to more than 20 per cent; support for IAEA safeguards and design of equipment to facilitate safeguards.[55] Safeguards were also extended to the transfer of facilities for reprocessing irradiated fuel, uranium enrichment and production of heavy water.[56]

It was made obligatory for importers of nuclear technology to give a formal undertaking that they would not use nuclear technology of any description to produce any nuclear explosive device for any purpose, whether a weapon or supposedly peaceful nuclear explosion.[57] It was also decided that if any member of the group suspended nuclear supplies to a country on account of a dispute, none of the other members would fill the breach. A list of equipment and material was appended to the guidelines, and it was stated that the misuse of any of the items listed would "trigger" unilateral stoppage of supplies. This "trigger list" included everything that might even be remotely connected with power reactors. In this are listed such items as graphite of certain specifications, heavy water, enrichment plants, coolant pumps and related equipment.[58] However, the "trigger list" has been flouted quite often. Now the "Trigger List" is being expanded and made more comprehensive. Claude Zangger, who drew up the "trigger list", was himself responsible for clearing the Swiss export of gas fuel equipment to Pakistan's centrifuge because it was not included in his "trigger list."[59]

The 1978 guidelines of the London Club did not include "full scope safeguards", meaning thereby that when nuclear equipment is supplied all the nuclear facilities of the importing countries should be covered by IAEA safeguards. As far as the United States is concerned it passed in 1978 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act which sought full scope safeguards to all its nuclear exports. Soviet Union in its writings was critical of this loophole in the Club's guidelines saying that these principles did not demand that "countries which are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty place all their nuclear activity under international control

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when importing materials, equipment and technology." In other words, non-nuclear weapon countries "could indirectly utilize the imported materials and equipment in nuclear activity which has already been carried out and which is not under international countrol." Thus it was perfectly obvious that "*only complete control over all the nuclear activity of such countries can ensure to the maximum extent a strict regime for the non-proliferation of the most dangerous weapons.*"[60]

The London Suppliers Group (LSG) and the nuclear Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) seem to have assumed the role of a nuclear policeman, though unjustly and at the cost of Third World developmental needs which in turn are directly linked with the availability of nuclear energy. The Soviet Union, being an active member of the LSG, cannot escape the criticism which is levelled against the other Group members for pursuing unequal, unjust, hegemonic, discriminatory and monopolistic policies on the issue of transfer of nuclear technology to the countries of the Third World. The Soviet Union as a member of this Group has "*been no less vehement in its insistence on the enforcement of stricter safeguards by the nuclear exporting countries.*"[61] However, at the same time it may be mentioned that the Soviet Union has an unbroken record of extending support to the countries of the Third World on a number of problems which they have been confronting *vis-a-vis* the industrially developed countries.

The difference between the USA and the USSR, on the issue of the enforcement of IAEA safeguards, seems to be that of pattern only. Whereas the Soviet Union has "preferred to leave this unpleasant responsibility of compelling the buyer nation to submit to stricter safeguards to the IAEA", the USA in most cases has sought adherence to these safeguards bilaterally and has negotiated such safeguard agreements directly.[62] For example, in 1976, it was on the Soviet insistence that India agreed to accept the stringent IAEA safeguards when the former supplied 260 tons of heavy water for the Rajasthan Atomic Power Plant I (RAPP I).

Moscow's insistence for stricter safeguards has been backed by concrete action and it has gone to "considerable lengths to prevent any recipients of its technology from obtaining physical control over those materials and facilities that could undermine a non-proliferation regime."[63] Its record of nuclear export to its allies and other countries substantiates the above conclusion. The Soviet Union has not provided any opportunity, by virtue of laxity of safeguard controls, by which nuclear material could br diverted to fissionable materials to be used for nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has conducted researches on inspection techniques and has been providing the results to IAEA. In 1977, the USSR granted a 250,000 rouble loan to IAEA to study the technical

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aspects of inspection.[64]

International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE)

President Carter was convinced that it was not enough to safeguard just some facilities or some materials. He felt that full scope comprehensive safeguards were absolutely necessary. Nuclear proliferation, in his view, could be stopped by "resorting to alternative fuel cycles" on a global basis, by adopting fuel cycles which were less proliferation prone, than the ones which were proliferation oriented.[65]

It was in pursuit of these alternative fuel cycles that President Carter convened a conference of INFCE. The outcome of the INFCE deliberation being that non-proliferation was purely a political and not a technical matter as was being made out by the Carter Administration. INFCE as well as NPT Review Committees have confirmed that IAEA safeguards as technical control instruments are one of the basic components of the international non-proliferation efforts.[66] "The INFCE had its own quota of differences, in which redefiners were out numbered and thus the idea of 'technical fix' did not get strong support.

The Soviet Union, though initially not very enthusiastic about the conference, did participate in the INFCE exercise. But at the same time it was unwilling to discuss its own nuclear fuel cycle. It did co-chair a working group on fast breeder technology. Though there is a strong anti-fast breeder lobby in the United States, the Soviet Union on its part is absolutely convinced about the utility of the fast breeder technology and does not view it as proliferation prone unlike those who are opposed to fast breeder reactors. It has continued to affirm that "at present the most promising branch of atomic power engineering appears to be that which is concerned with fast breeder neutron reactors."[67] Its lukewarm attitude reflected that it had no desire to get caught up with its own reprocessing programmes.

Third World and the Non-Proliferation Regime

Despite the persistent efforts and insistence of the NNWS of the Third World, the NWS have failed to provide any credible and effective security guarantees against the use of nuclear weapons against them. It is actually preposterous to even think of any security of the NNWS (excluding the bloc members, NATO and WTO, whose security is taken care of by the bloc leaders USA and USSR) in the presence of the massive arsenals at the hands of NWS and in view of the fact that there is absolutely no guarantee that these weapons will not be used against them. It may be mentioned that the issue of the security of the NNWS of the Third World which are mostly non-aligned was debated at length

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in the process of the conclusion of the NPT. But nothing positive emerged out of that. The situation would all the more be serious if one regional actor possessed nuclear weapons; presently China in Asia and the crypto nuclear states like Israel and South Africa.

To cut the story short it may be pointed out that the only security guarantee available to them is in the form of the UN Security Council resolution which is based on the declaration of intentions by the USA, the USSR and UK; it provides that in case of any attack by the NWS, the NNWS could approach the UN Security Council for relief. The security guarantees, however, as provided for in the UN Security Council resolution are absolutely inadequate and of no significance in view of the ineffective role which the Security Council has so far played to solve the problems of political confrontation. Moreover, the Security Council can take decisions only within the framework of the provisions of the UN Charter. Furthermore the security guarantees are not legally binding and the Security Council has no machinery whatsoever to enforce them; rather the resolution may not even be adopted because of the exercise of the veto.

It is, thus, obvious that neither the UN Security Council system nor the declaration of the intentions by the NWS, in any manner whatsoever, increases the commitment undertaken by them in the Charter. The security guarantee thus has little or no meaning at all. However, the agreement signed between the US and the USSR in 1973 for the prevention of nuclear war, cannot be considered to have created more security for the non-nuclear weapon states, though it may be argued by some that it creates more global security or the security of the Super Powers, but certainly not of thestates of the Third World. In the absence of any credible and effective security assurances to non-nuclear parties to the NPT, it has a negative effect on the credibility of the treaty and certainly has weakened the objectives of the treaty and also exposes the weaknesses, the vulnerability and insincerity of the edifice of the non-proliferation regime as being structured by the NWS.

All the three NPT Review Conferences have failed to provide any security to the NNWS, though the issue was invariably deliberated in these meetings. The first NPT Review Conference took up the issue of the security of the NNWS but refused to accept the Third World proposals. Subsequently the Soviet Union even abandoned its 'Kosygin Plan' and reiterated continued support for the UN Security Council Resolution. It may be mentioned that in 1966, Prime Minister Kosygin, in his message to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDG) had offered to include a clause in the NPT "prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear states/parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons on their territory." The 'negative' type

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of security known as 'Kosygin Plan' was welcomed by the Third World countries. But it was opposed by the Western Powers, particularly Canada.[68] The Second NPT Review Conference ended in confusion, even without a formal declaration. There is no commitment even in the Third Review Conference. Actually this conference in its declaration, accepts its failure to reach a 'common approach' acceptable to all "on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", which could be "included in an internationally legally binding instrument" and expressed its intention to "continue to explore ways and means to overcome the difficulties encountered in its work and to carry out negotiations on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons."

In the conference's view the most effective guarantee against the possible use of nuclear weapons and the danger of nuclear war is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In its thinking adherence to NPT by the NNWS was the best means of "reassuring one another of their renunciation of nuclear weapons" and as one of the effective means of strengthening their mutual security. The Conference also performed a ritual by reiterating that refraining from threat or the use of force in relations between the states involving either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons as per the UN Charter would help in promoting the objectives of the treaty and also strengthen the security of non-nuclear weapon states parties.[69]

Such declarations, sometimes lose much of their meaning when they are juxtaposed to the actual actions of the NWS, whose thirst for new generation of nuclear weapons and technologies remains unquestioned and the increase in nuclear weapons goes on unabated. Actually what is needed is a forthright declaration on the part of all the NWS, a commitment not to use nuclear weapons at all, eitheir against each other or on the NNWS and declare their use a crime against humanity.

Despite all this, the Soviet Union has sincerely believed in the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Soviet position, as compared to its counterpart, the United States of America, on the issue of use of nuclear weapons is different. In addition to signing agreements with the United States to check the bilateral possibilities of the outbreak of a nuclear war, the Soviet Union on its part has time and again reiterated that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons against the NNWS and it strongly feels that the world should be made free from nuclear weapons. But at the same time, it has also insisted that all the other nuclear weapon states should undertake similar commitments. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in his January 1986 declaration regarding the proposed programme to eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the

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earth by the end of the century reiterated his country's pledge that it would not be the first one to use nuclear weapons.[70]

It may be pointed out that as early as the year 1978, in a letter to the UN Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, proposed that an international agreement amongst nuclear nations not to use atomic weapons against non-nuclear states should be signed. He also proposed that a treaty to this effect should be signed by the NNWS and NWS who should renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons. He emphasised that the Soviet Union on its part would never use nuclear weapons against any NNWS, since such countries were making an essential contribution to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and thus lessening and, in the long run, elimination of the threat of the outbreak of the nuclear war.[71] In a message on 22 December 1982, addressed to "Parliaments, Governments political parties and the people of the World", the Central Committee of the CPSU reaffirmed the Soviet stand that "*in accordance with the commitment it has undertaken the Soviet Union will not resort to the first use of nuclear weapons* and once again called upon the other nuclear powers to undertake a similar commitment."[72]

The biggest and the most dangerous threat to international security emanates from the unabated vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons by the NWS, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union. The failure to fulfil the commitments and obligations undertaken by the NWS, parties to the treaty, to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and 'complete disarmament' is perhaps the biggest challenge to the stability of the non-proliferation regime created by them. The ceaseless pursuit of nuclear arms by them would ultimately undermine it. Despite the bilateral and multilateral efforts by the USA and the USSR on the arms control front, the situation has worsened; arms are piling up and the achievement of the goal of general and complete disarmament seems more illusory.

The Soviet Union has strongly felt that the only way to check further proliferation of nuclear weapons is to sign a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. However, the history of the nuclear test ban efforts have not been very encouraging. The reason partly lies with the obstructionist attitudes of the United States and its allies. The United States on one pretext or the other, has always turned down any such suggestions, though on the other hand, Soviet Union has always been keen for full-scale talks on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The United States score in this field somehow is quite dismal, so much so that some of the agreements signed by it have yet to be ratified, like the 1974 Agreement limiting the size of underground tests to 150 kilotons and the 1974

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Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions.

One of the major technical issues which has stood in the way of a comprehensive test ban is verification. The Soviet Union has always held that verification was no issue at all. The United States. however, has always made this a necessary condition. It was in view of this deadlock that the six non-aligned nations in their Mexico Appeal offered to supply manpower and funds to carry on the on-site inspection and seismic monitoring of nuclear tests conducted both by the USA and the Soviet Union. Given the political will, it has been argued, the problem of verification could be solved without much difficulty. The Soviet Union accepted and responded positively to the non-aligned countries proposals that the nuclear powers hold consultations with a view to extend the 1963 Moscow Treaty (PTBT) banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outerspace and under water, to the underground tests. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, while spelling out Soviet peace proposals in January 1986 pointed out very clearly that verification should not be considered as an obstacle to moratorium. For the Soviet Union, he felt, verification was no problem. He further stated that "if the US agrees to stop all nuclear explosions on a reciprocal basis, the due verification of compliance with the moratorium will be fully ensured by national technical means as well as through international measures including on-site inspections wherever necessary."[73]

Further, in a letter to President Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev offered to let American inspectors visit underground nuclear test sites, provided the United States also accepted a moratorium on future testing. However, there was no positive response from Washington. Thc negative response from America is based on the allegations that the Soviet Union has developed and completed its programme of tests and also the problem of verification. This variance is primarily because of the diametrically opposite stand on the issue of verification. Whereas the United States emphasises 'intrusive' on-site inspections, the Soviets prefer 'satellite surveillance'. The Soviets apprehend that on-site verification could be used for military intelligence. Soviets however, have never shown any rigidity on the issue of verification and feel that modalities of verification could be mutually worked out once there was an agreement in principle. With a view to achieve an agreement on tbe Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Soviet Union came forward with major concessions on the issue of verification and agreed for on-site inspection and also were prepared to accept US seismic monitoring stations on its territory even at the risk of national security as part of the test ban treaty. In another significant concession, it allowed ihe United States scientists to establish their monitoring seismic stations near its test site in Kazakhistan following an agreement between

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the Soviet Academy of Sciences and National Resource Development of the USA.

The Soviet Union further supplemented its efforts to achieve a nuclear free world by declaring a unilateral moratorium of nuclear testing effective from 6 August 1985. However, it was compelled to call it off in March 1987 in view of US refusal to reciprocate. Whereas, the Soviet Union kept on extending the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, the United States carried on its nuclear testing during this period and by the time the Soviet Union terminated the unilateral moratorium, it had already conducted a total of 25 nuclear tests, the last one being at Nevada. Most of these tests were meant to produce deadlier weapons including the much dreaded nuclear explosion powered x-ray lasers. Thus, whereas the Soviet Union has been keen that disarmament should be achieved, the United States by its actions at various levels has sought to undermine and hurt the disarmament efforts. In reality what the United States has been pursuing is not disarmament but military superiority.

General Secretary Gorbachev, in his peace proposals of January 1986 offered the United States to join Soviet Union in this initiative so that moratorium could be extended indefinitely. Stressing the importance of banning nuclear tests, he said that there was an agreement amongst scientists, politicians and military men that a "cessation of tests, indeed, would reliably seal the channels of upgrading nuclear weapons." He further emphasised that "*mere reduction of nuclear stockpiles unaccompanied by a prohibition of nuclear tests, offer no way out of the nuclear threat dilemma, because the remaining weapons would be modernized and there would still be an opportunity for developing increasingly refined and deadly nuclear weapons and testing their new types at testing grounds.*"[74]

The moratorium, the Soviet Union strongly felt should become first bilateral and subsequently multilateral. On the issue of complete and general prohibiton of nuclear weapon tests, the Soviets have shown readiness for immediate multilateral test ban negotiations in the framework of the Geneva Conference guidelines on disarmament in which all nuclear powers should participate.[75] Complete cessation of nuclear tests, held Gorbachev, was the only practical step towards destruction of nuclear weapons.[76]

The unresponsive attitude of the United States forced the Soviet Union to terminate the unilateral moratorium. Its continuation, in the Soviet view, without positive US response, would hurt the Soviet interests. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Yuli Vorontsov said, "Soviet Union could not jeopardise its national defence requirements indefinitely in case the US refuses to join the Soviet Union in its fight for a nuclear free world."[77]

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In Soviet thinking, the reasons for US rejection of its offer of moratorium on nuclear testing was because of its serious engagement in the modernization of nuclear weapons programme particularly the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) with an aim to deploy nuclear weapons in outer space. The Soviet Union has accused the United States of frustrating all efforts towards the conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty. The US Secretary for Defence Casper Weinberger, while rejecting the Soviet proposal argued that "the Soviets keep deploying nuclear weapons and keep on adding new systems. It is convenient for them to suspend them for a while for propaganda." "Nuclear testing of weapons", he argued, was "essential as long as we have nuclear weapons." Moreover, one could be certain of the "effectiveness of the nuclear weapons only if they were tested frequently."[78] In addition, so long as 'nuclear deterrence' was a valid strategic doctrine accepted by both the United States and the USSR, nuclear weapons would require nuclear testing.[79] The United States simply brushed aside the six non-aligned nations appeal to suspend all nuclear testing. As usual the United States accused the Soviet Union of having caused "dangerous disparities in nuclear weapons buildup." Moreover, in the US circles, these tests were considered essential to counter the so-called "massive Soviet buildup" and maintain international security. Thus, in US perception any attempt to ban its nuclear weapon testing would ultimately "undercut" efforts to move to a more strategic balance.[80] Thus, the outright rejection of all proposals for suspension of nuclear weapons testing, whether emanating from the Soviet Union or from the six non-aligned nations' appeal could be considered a serious blow to any effort to make the world free of nuclear weapons. The Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, in a package of peace proposals announced on 15 January 1986, suggested the most radical steps 'for ridding mankind of the fear of nuclear catastrophe' and stage by stage elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth by the end of the century.[81]

The signing of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF) on 8 December 1987 between President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, after long and protracted negotiations, for the complete elimination of 1550 medium range missiles by the USSR and 440 missiles by the USA from Europe, marks a most crucial step in the direction of the achievement of nuclear disarmament ever since nuclear weapons came into existence four decades ago. Much of the credit however, for the initiative and boldness should in this respect go to General Secretary Gorbachev.

The main direction of Soviet foreign policy in the coming years is to implement the programme put forward in the statement of the General

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Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee of 15 January 1986, "for destroying weapons of mass destruction and averting the threat of war."[82] Thus, the Soviet 'new thinking' on international relations stresses the establishment of a world free from nuclear weapons, arms race and violence. The positive political thinking is reflected in its overall change in its attitude to the issue of war and peace. The CPSU thus, reaffirmed in "unambiguous" terms the defensive character of the Soviet military doctrine, which primarily emerges from the fact that the USSR is a "strong opponent of nuclear war in any of its variants."[83] It is in that context that the Soviet Union considers the 'prevention of war' the main task of its armed forces. The new political thinking in the sphere of foreign policy has been incorporated into the new party programme adopted at the 27 Party Congress of the CPSU, which subsequently was endorsed by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation at Berlin in May 1987. The main foreign policy strategy as outlined in the CPSU is, "to provide the Soviet people with the possibility of working under conditions of durable peace and freedom" and precisely for that reason, the "struggle against nuclear threat and arms race for the preservation and consolidation of universal peace must remain the direction of the Party's activity on the international scene in the future."[84]

The fundamental principle of the 'New Outlook', according to Mikhail Gorbachev, is that, "nuclear war cannot be a means of achieving political, economic, ideological or any other goal."[85] Consequently, the Clausewitzian dictum that "war is a continuation of policy by other means has grown hopelessly out of date",[86] and it was for the first time in history that basing "international politics on moral and ethical norms that are common to all human kind as well as humanising relations has become a vital requirement."[87] Soviet Union wants "a world free of war, without arms race, nuclear weapons and violence", not because it was an 'optimal condition for internal development', but because "it was an objective global requirement that stems from the realities of the present day."[88] Mikhail Gorbachev discounts all such linkages which hold that the Soviet peace proposals have been prompted by the ambitious goals set forth by policy of *perestroika*. He argues that "we need normal international conditions for our internal progress. But at the same time, it is also known that the Soviets have been long working towards peace and cooperation and have advanced over the years many proposals, which if they had been accepted would have definitely normalised the international situation."[89] However, under the new realities of international politics, in his thinking, "the world was living in an atmosphere not only of nuclear threat but also of unresolved major

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social problems, of new stresses created by scientific and technological advancement and the exacerbation of global problems." Under such circumstances if no joint solutions were found the future would hang in balance, more so since our world was now more interdependent than ever before and the "stockpiling of weapons, particularly missiles makes the outbreak of world war more probable." Consequently the vast growing military arsenals of the US and the USSR place special responsibility on both of them to take measures to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war which would entail that both reach at least a minimum of mutual understanding needed to resolve issues critical to the world future.[90]

CONCLUSIONS

The Soviet Union has emerged as the most forceful champion of the non-proliferation regime over the years. As primary architect of this regime it has upheld unequivocally its various norms, rules, practices and procedures which have been developed to regulate and control the proliferation of nuclear weapons by the non-nuclear weapon states, which presumably are based on the articles of NPT, its regional counterpart the Treaty of Tlatelolco, IAEA safeguards, guidelines of the London Supplier's Group, Zangger Committee's Trigger List, guidelines relating to the control of transfer of nuclear technology, measures to physically protect nuclear materials and other bilateral and multilateral means which are resorted to by the NWS.

The issue of legitimacy, capability, effectiveness and various other dimensions of the non-proliferation regime require a separate detailed treatment. However, it is worth mentioning here that the regime has been contested, come under severe strains and faced challenges from various quarters since the mid 1970s. The most significant threat to its stability is considered to be emanating from the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons by the NWS, particularly the USA and the USSR and the proliferation policies of other NWS which are outside the NPT regime like France and China, and the selective proliferation by the United States. Thus, a non-proliferation regime, argue the developing countries, whose norms and rules do not touch the fundamental issue of vertical proliferation and does not provide any security whatsoever to the NNWS of the Third World against the use of nuclear weapons upon them, is hardly of any worth.

Soviet Union's strict adherence to the rules of the non-proliferation regime and its conviction that the unsafeguarded supply of nuclear equipment, materials and technology to the NNWS has resulted in its adoption of cautious and go slow policies on the issue of nuclear

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exports to the Third World. Consequently, except for the CMEA countries, with which it has significant nuclear collaboration, the Soviet Union was absolutely reluctant to respond to requests from the Third World countries for the transfer of nuclear technology or equipment. And wherever it provided some nuclear assistance, it was done under extremely strict nuclear safeguards, mostly imposed indirectly by making the recipient country agree to IAEA safeguards. Even in the case of East European allies, after its bitter experience with the People's Republic of China, it first slowed down its nuclear exports to these countries and subsequently never allowed any unsafeguarded transfer and imposed most stringent restrictions and safeguards on the recipients so as to plug all loopholes to prevent manufacture of nuclear weapons. It never allowed its East European allies to develop their own reprocessing and enrichment plants and insisted on the return of spent fuel back to it for reprocessing. All of them were made to sign the NPT and subject themselves to IAEA safeguards.

Its record of nuclear assistance to the developing countries so far is absolutely dismal. Cuba, which for all practical purposes is a Soviet bloc member, has got two power reactors which would be ready for commissioning in 1991. Though it has not signed the NPT, it has accepted the IAEA safeguards. Libya has contracted with Soviet Union for a nuclear power reactor, but so far nothing seems to have concretised. The Soviets however, agreed to supply power reactors only after it had signed the NPT, exercising the political leverage and pressure. India so far has got onlp 450 tons of heavy water under the IAEA safeguards. Of this 200 tons was covered under the 'pursuit clause'. However, though it is known to have wanted India to sign the NPT, it has not made it a condition for any of the agreements signed with it for the supply of heavy water. After prolonged and protracted negotiations India decided to import two 1000 MWe capacity nuclear power reactors from the Soviet Union. Consequently an agreement to build a nuclear power station of two nuclear reactors of 1000 MWe capacity each was signed between India and the Soviet Union on 19 November 1988, when Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev paid an official visit to India. The Soviets, as per this agreement, would provide a credit of Rs. 4,000 crores to build these power reactors. This is the first major agreement signed by the Soviet Union with any non-communist third world country. The Soviets have also agreed to supply enriched uranium fuel for the entire operational life of the reactors. However, without deviating from its well-known non-proliferation policy, it has made India agree to return the spent fuel back to the Soviet Union where it could be reprocessed into plutonium. It has been following a similar practice in

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the case of its East European allies.

It is interesting to note that political considerations have played a decisive role in guiding and directing the non-proliferation policies of both the USA and the USSR despite their commitment to the non-proliferation regime. The United States of America can be accused of indulging in selective proliferation by supporting the nuclear weapons programmes of South Africa and Israel, both non-signatories to the NPT in a big way. Pakistan, another non-signatory, continues to get massive economic aid from the United States despite the fact that the latter administration has enough evidence regarding Pakistan's clandestine development of nuclear weapon capability and its potential to go nuclear any day. Also, of late it has started equating India's peaceful nuclear programme with Pakistan's military-oriented nuclear programme. Despite this the United States has made concessions, amendments and modifications to its own laws frequently to accommodate the Pakistani regime for political gains.

Soviet Union is known to have wanted India to sign the NPT, but it did not make it a condition for the supply of heavy water either in the agreement of 1977 or that of 1980. However, at the same time, in case of Libya, it agreed to give a power reactor only after it had signed the NPT. Moreover, despite the Soviet Union's wellknown stand on the PNEs by the NNWS, it made no comments on India's PNE in 1974. Contrary to the United States' response and attitude reflected in its termination of supply of enriched uranium to India, Soviet Union just reported the event by stating that India's research programme followed India's striving to keep level with technology in the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. Soviet Union in fact did not condemn India openly on this issue, though it was reportedly unhappy about it. Soviet Union is known to have strongly favoured the desirability and usefulness of setting up of nuclear weapons free zones in different parts of the world. Interestingly at the same time it has not supported Pakistan's proposal for a nuclear free zone in South Asia, a proposal having the blessings of the United States but opposed by India.

Soviet Union being a staunch advocate of the non-proliferation regime cannot escape its share of criticism from the Third World countries, that the regime which is sought to be imposed on them is an instrument of technological domination and of a discriminatory, exploitative and hierarchical nuclear world order. In addition the NWS, with the objective of perpetuating a system of nuclear colonialism, are supposed to have exaggerated the dangers of horizontal proliferation beyond all reasonable limits. Moreover, the NWS' argument that NNWS are more liable to trigger a nuclear war also seems to be absolu-

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tely ludicruous; rather on the other hand, they themselves are more susceptible to trigger a nuclear war. The implicit suggestion by the NWS' that the possession of civilian nuclear capability by the developing countries would be covertly diverted for military purposes for making nuclear weapons is highly unprobable and is strongly resented by the Third World. This, contend the NNWS of the Third World, actually seems to be an alibi and an excuse of the 'nuclear haves' to withhold the nuclear technology to the nuclear 'have nots' who are in dire need of it for their developmental purposes, with an avowed objective to keep them in a perennially subservient position. The most serious protest to the non-proliferation regime, emanating from the developing countries is that the restrictions and limitations which the NWS are seeking to impose on the use of civilian nuclear technology virtually amounts to an assault upon thelr sovereign status.

Instead of tightening the stranglehold of safeguards and imposition of all types of restrictions to control the export of nuclear technical knowhow to the Third World, and thus deprive them on one pretext or the other of the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it should try to find ways and means to evolve an international non-proliferation regime in which the major criticism of the NNWS should be met and should also provide enough scope for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, without compelling the developing countries to compromise with their sovereignty and ensure global peace and security making the world free from instruments of human destruction. Rather than engaging themselves in a mad race of armaments they should take immediate steps to cease vertical proliferation and make efforts to achieve the goal of complete and general disarmament at the earliest. The agreement between USA and the USSR regarding the elimination of Intermediate Range Missiles from the continent of Europe, hopefully to be followed by the 50 per cent reduction in the long-range strategic missiles, would be a move in the right direction to assuage the grievances of the developing countries regarding the non-proliferation regime, particularly on the issue of implementation of Article VI of the NPT.

Despite the Soviet role in the emergence and the development of the international non-proliferation regime and the consequent criticism of it by the developing countries, it can undoubtedly be said that it had genuinely shown serious concern over the growing proliferation of nuclear weapons and the unabated arms race which constituted a grave threat to world peace and security. Incidently it may be stressed that most of the arms control and disarmament measures were initiated by the Soviet Union, which somehow were invariably negatively responded

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to by the United States because it clashed with its pursuit of nuclear superiority. A still more significant aspect of this Super Power arms race phenomenon has been that it was invariably the United States which initiated the process of acquisition of a new generation of nuclear weapons while the Soviet Union has always expressed its objections to it.

Soviet Union has never fallen short in its efforts to achieve a nuclear weapons free world; particularly its persistent demand for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, its initiative in declaring a unilateral moratorium for 18 months on nuclear tests and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's peace proposals of 16 January 1986, all testify to its sincerity and conscientious efforts to rid mankind of fear of nuclear weapons and nuclear catastrophe. In the end it may be said that much of the credit for the INF Treaty, signed on 8 December 1986, would go to the initiatives taken by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.

The Soviet 'new thinking' stresses the establishment of a world free from nuclear weapons, arms race and violence. The fundamental principle of the new outlook clearly lays down that "nuclear war cannot be a means of achieving political, economic, ideological or any other goal." Soviet Union, as Mikhail Gorbachev says, "wants a world free of war, without arms race, nuclear weapons and violence, not because it was an optimal condition for internal development but because it was an objective global requirement that emerged from the present day realities."

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In the third stage beginning 1995, all remaining nuclear weapons would be scrapped and by 1999 there would be no nuclear weapons on this earth. At this stage a "universal accord would be drawn to ensure that such weapons will never again reappear."

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AFGHANISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY: PATTERNS AND PROBLEMS

By R. GOPALAKRISHNAN*

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan clearly indicates the strategic implications of its location. The political instability in the region (rise of fundamentalism in Iran, Iran-Iraq War and so on) has added to this significance. Be that as it may, Afghanistan's situation can be expressed in terms of its susceptibility to external pressures and intense factionalism within the land-locked state's dynamic populations. This latter aspect had divided the country several times over. Afghan foreign policy, therefore, has been viewed in this perspective. The present article reviews the stated facts to highlight the geographical significance of the location and its impact on the foreign policy.

Introduction of the armed forces in national politics (this formed an important element in the country's politics right from the beginning) has been the most conspicuous development; it determined the who's and what's of the government. Traditional pressure groups, despite retaining some of their old hold on the society, had given way to radical groups or factions, armed forces and insurgent elements. These penetrated various strata of the Afghan society. Since 1963, when political liberalisation and participation was introduced, disruptive tendencies gradually impinged on the state's activities. Generally, this was evident between 1963-73 and was particularly so after the 1973 coup, *when the Monarchy was replaced by a republican regime under Daud. Both, the Armed Forces and the Communist Party were involved but were sidelined once power was secured. This change did not bring the expected transformations in the patterns of administration. The change was only in name and power was still concentrated with Daud who began to implement his own policies that emerged between 1953-63. The period of his first stint in power coincided with an aggravation of problems, political and economic, caused by a closure of transit facilities. However, this pause was fully exploited by the radical parties who gradually brought the dominant elements of the Armed Forces under their influence, so that, they were able to deliver a* coup d'etat *under the leadership of Tarakki in April 1978. The new regime was not able to maintain effective control over the political situation that for the next twenty months brought internal political instability to its height and*

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compelled the Soviet Union to move (this was perhaps to protect its vulnerable southern underbelly).

The period from April 1978 onwards, saw active non-cooperation, large scale desertions from the Armed Forces and a deterioration of the economy. In addition, open opposition by the religious groups and insurgent elements presented a political picture that has been so vividly illustrated by Afghan political history. Intense factionalism and infighting within the regime saw Amin replacing the moderate Tarakki in September 1979. This led to a worsening of the political situation with the state at war with itself. This compelled the Soviet Union to move into Afghanistan. In a short but bloody war, Amin was disposed and a government under Karmal was established with Soviet support.[1]

These developments then, clearly suggest the need to review the background of the patterns and problems of the foreign policy of Afghanistan as determined and identified by its locational characteristics.

ISOLATIONST PERSPECTIVE

AFGHANISTAN'S external behaviour is, therefore, a geographical expression of the interaction between the internal political milieu and external compulsions keeping in view "... the fact that the geographical location of the state bequeaths it certain sets of spatial relationships *vis-a-vis* other states. . . ."[2] The thrust of the Afghan foreign policy has been to channelize the international currents to consolidate and strengthen the centripetal forces within the state. Paucity of resources, availability of skilled labour and technology had inadevertently forced Afghan foreign policy to be oriented towards economic development and welfare projects in the land-locked state.

Locational Characteristics Determine External Behaviour

The geographical perspective has remained as one of the constant variables influencing the ability and power of Afghanistan to survive as an independent state in the Soviet dominated heartland.[3] Even though, the relative importance of these factors has enhanced recently, it is fallacious to assume that the changing pattern of political interrelationships (both within and outside the state) and various technological developments have intensified the divisive influences of the geographical contents of the state. Albiet, they have also provided a framework on which the Afghan foreign policy has been oriented. It is for this reason that the state expressed duality of purpose irrespective of bearing and differences on political actions and decisions.[4]

It is obvious from various summary boundary reports that Afghanis-

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tan had suffered significant territorial and consequent political economic losses.[5] This had resulted in the inclusion of extensive unintegrative and economically negative areas in the territorial content of the state. The development of these areas against the overwhelming geographical odds, had been a continuous drain on the state's resources particularly from the point of view of development, communication and peopling. In addition, the location of the dense and developed areas along the periphery of the state indicated latent geographical implications on the state's foreign policy behaviour.[6]

There is also sufficient evidence to show that regionalism was an important variable (to minimise its impact the contacts between the various regions of the state were directed by the capital) that provided some indications on the pattern of policies adapted by the decision-makers. Besides, reviewing the strategic significance of the transit terminal points of Chaman, Torkham, Islam Qala and Torghoundi, it is clear that their free and open accessibility was also an important consideration. These terminal points served the vast hinterlands of Kandahar, Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz and Herat region, which together contributed more than 95 per cent of returns. Even a temporary suspension of these transit points or rigid stand undermined the political economic stability of the country. For example, the frequent closure of transit facilities through the port of Karachi (point of entry—Chaman) Pakistan, indicated the heavy dependence on this access to the sea and probably gave little option other than to locate centres of economic activities in other parts of the country in general, and the area north of the Hindu Kush in particular. This latter aspect gave adequate scope only to those parts that were distinctly traditional core regions of the state. Geographical distribution and accessibility, thus, became the key elements in the state's policies.

Qualitative and quantitative aspects of the population have also contributed significantly to the complexity of the character of Afghan foreign policy. International boundaries have cut across ethnically homogenous areas. As a result, it has failed to elicit a desired response from the heterogenous tribal population on political and economic problems arising from such a definition of boundaries. Instead, it has encouraged secessionist tendencies among the inhabitants: this is clearly illustrated by the recent fact of opposition to the regime in Kabul by the essentially tribal community. There are more than a dozen groups with different ideologies and loyalties that are waging insurgency in the state today. All of them have maintained their individual identities, commitments and loyalties. This has perpetuated the traditional differences between the various populations and territories within the state.

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The Pushtunistan issue can be viewed both as a consequence of boundary definitions as well as a basis for anti-state activities of the insurgent groups.

In general terms, these are geographical expressions of the land-locked state to seek a release or at least forge a temporary *status quo* from internal political compulsions, where the Pushtun tribes found themselves at odds with the rest of the population groups of the country.[7] Similar variants and situations as regards other ethnic groups whose affinity to the other side of their frontier pulls them apart, had made itself felt in the state's internal and external relations. The impact on the qualitative participation of the population, if any, has been marginally overcome by establishing better bilateral relations particularly with Iran, after 1973. It also paved the way for major political and economic involvement with the heartland.

Factionalism of Dynamic Populations

Yet, the Afghan borderlands clearly illustrate the influence and impact of nationalism and sub-nationalism. This made it untenable for the Afghan decision-makers to separate the major internal political actions and decisions from their adopted stand in their dispute with Pakistan over Pushtunistan and other issues. This also influenced its non-aligned status. The Afghan irredentism, therefore, illustrated the intensity of the inhabitants to preserve their identity.[8] Territorial exclusiveness and right to retain their (various tribes) freedom of political action is borne out of the fact that the protracted struggle has been a source of triumph for their incipient nationalism.[9] Whatever the Afghans think of themselves or about their country, the fact remains that Afghanistan as a political entity was essential to and for maintenance of regional political stability. In the process, as a zone of convergence of diverse systems, Afghanistan imbibed the impact of changing political trends and power equations in the form of dynamic patterns of internal political structure and foreign policy.

Nevertheless, the perspective of the decision-makers and their tacit understanding of the states and a vulnerable geopolitical situation had a significant impact on the internal situation and external relations. In the eighteenth century, Afghan political life revolved around the King on one side and the *Sirdars* (aristocracy), *maliks* and *mullahs* on the other.[10] Suffice it to say, this enabled the various Afghan rulers to channelise their external contacts and influences to develop a parallel territorial and political base to counteract tribal domination. Amanullah's efforts (1919-1929) to break away from the tribal and regional

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hold on state ended in a fiasco; it nevertheless, provided successive rulers with a framework for reconstruction and reorientation of political decisions affecting the state. These were also influenced by the interactions between the geographical milieu and the social organisation.[11]

However, with the relaxation of control within states, pressure groups emerged (having political overtones rather than tribal or dynastic links) and made significant inroads in the country's policy formulations and behaviour.

The Cold War phenomenon and its consequences in international politics called for significant rethinking for the Afghan decision-makers. This was largely due to the inherent weakness of their agro-industrial base and inert locational characteristics. This was in addition to Pakistan joining the NATO. Their known stand on the Pushtunistan issue and reluctance of Western aid-giving nations for development, compelled the Afghans to turn northwards for this much needed aid for defence and development. Once again, facts or circumstances conspired to take the decision out of the Afghan decision-makers' hands.[12]

Growing complexities in the domestic political evolution between the various groups (both within the ruling elite and among the pressure-elite groups) and intense political rivalry (as evidenced by inter and intra-tribal rivalries as well as intra-regional differences) was reflected in the Afghan foreign policy).[13] Though at one time, there was a close *rapport* between the domestic source of political support and levels of foreign policy activity, yet, political unity of the state continued to be uncertain. There developed a negative relationship that encouraged dissident groups to get deeply entrenched in the developing middle class of the Afghan society. A relatively new phenomenon that owed its revival to moderate policies was adopted after 1963; Afghan middle class provided a support platform that crossed the traditional tribal-dynastic barriers. Be that as it may, persistent internal opposition was felt not only within the ruling clique but also within the elite population. Despite introducing reforms and development through Soviet aid, the Afghan Government in 1953-63 saw active involvement of the population through resistance to reforms and frustration over their failure to resolve their dispute with Pakistan.

It had been a recurrent theme in the Afghan situation that vacillation and hesitancy on the part of the government in effecting the implementation of its reforms and policies in the tribal dominated regions, encouraged the disruptive elements to erode the credibility of the state. The efforts of the Afghan Amirs in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was neither successful in maintaining internal cohesion nor were they able to check foreign interference and domination in their external relations. Partially, this was due to the absence of a standing

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army that was loyal to the Amir. Whatever semblence of an army that existed, was tribal in character; its loyalty swayed between the tribes and the fluctuations of power of the Central Government.

Modest attempts to revamp the structure and organisation to suit the Afghan needs was made by Amanullah (1919-29) with the help of Germany, Italy and Russia. This was frustrated by the British in India who checkmated every move the Afghans made to establish their independence. The way it was achieved through the Third Afghan War (1919-21) is a different story altogether; suffice it to say that it enabled Afghanistan to chalk out its foreign policy direction independently. But, the geographical diversity, lack of adequate communication networks and an even disparity in resource endowment dictated the nature of external relations. Tribal support continued to retain its importance as a source of strength or weakness of the ruling elite. This made the policy selective and restricted in scope.[14]

REALIGNMENT OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS

The post-Second World War brought about a significant realignment of internal and external political inter-relationships in the land-locked state and the region. The vacuum left by the British withdrawal from the sub-continent left the region open to Super Power rivalry. These changes induced profound modifications in the power equation in the state. Breaking away from the isolationist policy of the 1930's and 1940's, Afghanistan went headlong to adopt an active pro-Western stance. But, as noted earlier. its failure to attract Western sympathy for the Pushtunistan issue and aid to modernize its armed forces compelled it to turn to the heartland. This was a geo-political consequence with which Afghanistan had to contend without an alternative.[15]

Soviet Assistance: Natural Corollary of Location

The Soviet military and economic aid to Afghanistan can be summed up as a natural corollary of the impact of its location. It resulted in Afghanistan assuming a rigid stand on the Pushtunistan issue. In the process, it had to suffer from the closure of its transit facilities. This brought home the heavy Afghan dependence for its economic prosperity on the transit facilities through Chaman and Karachi port. This also made the Afghans to reframe their priorities and policies to have alternative access/transit points and facilities. In time, this enabled the Afghans to identify and use the following locations for access, to the sea. These are Islam Qala, on the Iranian frontier and Torghoundi on the frontier with

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the Soviet Union. This was besides Torkham and Chaman along the Pakistan border.[16]

Nevertheless, this assistance from the Soviet Union enabled Kabul to constitute a regular army with which it was able to extend administrative control over the recalcitrant tribes in the border regions of the state. It replaced the traditional support for the ruling elite. The tribal opposition to the Government was to a large extent replaced by an emerging educated middle class (who had in considerable numbers joined the Parcham and Khalq parties). Thus, the military and urban educated elite began to focus increasingly in the internal political milieu.

Complex Interaction of Geopolitical Factors

The level of economic development exerted considerable influence over the domestic political balance and pattern of external relationships of Afghanistan. The essentially agrarian economy reflected itself in a complex interaction of economic and geographic factors which succeeded in dividing the national policy. As a result, the conflict between the government and vested groups became apparent. In their opposition to the frequent changes in the state's external behaviour, these groups were supported by the aristocracy who continued to wield traditional (tribal) political power.[17] These moves were further encouraged by the geographical distribution of resources. Concentration of development activities in the Balkh-Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat and the Kabul Valley, suggested the nature of geopolitical influences that have determined the alignment of the Afghan foreign policy.

To offset the importance of regional foci like Kandahar, Herat or Balkh, serious attempts were made to diversify the sources of assistance. All that was achieved was formation of definite zones of foreign participation in the development activities.[18] To counteract the dominant influences of this aspect of their national outlook, the decision-makers resorted to their traditional Pushtun ideology as the guiding element in their foreign behaviour.[19]

Afghanistan's external relations, under these circumstances, were decisively influenced by its geographical attributes and adjunct location between the spheres of influence of the Super Powers, though in the earlier stages of evolution as a state, geographical contiguity and proximity tended to enhance its apprehension of the involvement in conflict. With the prospects of British withdrawal a distinct possibility, its participation in global affairs increased substantially; it was one of the earliest members of the United Nations.[20] Even after expressing the essential aspects of its foreign policy—of neutrality and non-alignment—Afghanis-

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tan was unable to offset the scope of influences exerted by external economic assistance on its local policy and political behaviour. Thus, the pattern of linkages, internal and external, became distinct and dynamic affecting the internal milieu at every instance.[21]

RELATIONS WITH THE SUPER POWERS

Geographical Contiguity Favourable to Relations with Soviet Union

Geographical contiguity provided favourable conditions for the Soviet Union to have close relations with Afghanistan. Occupying a wedge-like position between Pakistan and Iran, Afghanistan has a 1,280 km long border with the Soviet Union which enabled the latter country to have "...unusual opportunity for determining ... (Afghanistan's) socio-economic .. (and political) relationships ...."[22] This was stated in reference to the areas north of the Hindu Kush but infact is valid for the country as a whole.

Significant changes became evident after the War of Independence in 1919-21. Afghanistan was able to retain and re-acquire its right to direct its foreign relations; it became free of British domination on its external policy. Under Amanullah (1919-29) Afghanistan started serious diplomatic initiatives. It was the first to recognise Soviet Union and concluded its first Treaty of Peace and Friendship with it in 1921. For the first time, Afghanistan was able to have an alternative transit point and facilities thereby relieving itself of total dependence on its eastern access. However, the rapidity with which these diplomatic moves were initiated, found Afghanistan totally unprepared. This resulted in failure. Amanullah's modernization programmes were in a way imposed on an essentially tribal society. The tribal elites saw the dangers of erosion of their power, authority and influence over the general populace. This led to his overthrow in 1929.[23]

The policy of the successive rulers till 1953 was one of caution towards modernization and isolation while ratifying the treaties agreed to by the earlier regime.

In the 1950's loosening of monarchical control on political participation within the country speeded up development and enabled the government to extend its administrative control upto the frontiers. As noted earlier, Afghanistan met with constant refusal from the West to modernize its armed forces which was so essential for Kabul; it nevertheless reeeived development aid from them. This brought this land-locked state right into the Soviet orbit. This significantly altered the

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pattern of development and suggested the necessary re-orientation in its foreign policy.[24]

Trade between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union expanded rapidly. The Soviet Union became the major supplier of capital goods. It provided necessary development aids and grants and became a major market capable of absorbing all Afghan exports.[25] The West also joined the process of growth. Sectors of development and zones of implementation between the Soviets and others in Afghanistan were clearly demarcated; the Hindukush became the boundary—north of it was the Soviet zone for participation in development, while areas south of it became the zone for the other countries to participate in Afghan development.

This once again reinforced the strategic importance of the main axis—the Hindukush—as the dividing line between the heartland and the periphery.

Afghanistan's principal outlet to the sea has been Karachi in Pakistan. Though it is the most natural outlet, it is very vulnerable to physical and political restrictions. The geographical environment of the region in the west had very little to offer by way of incentive; most of the Afghan trade, therefore, had to be routed through Karachi. Whenever this facility was stopped, Afghan exports had to follow the circuitous route through the Soviet Union.

RELATIONS WITH CHINA CORDIAL BUT DISTANT

Afghanistan's relations with China (PRC) have remained cordial and distant. It has an 80 km border in the extreme north-east. The two countries established diplomatic relations in 1955 and concluded peace and boundary agreements in 1957 and 1961. But Chinese assistance and trade was minimal thereby having minimum influence in Kabul. Their participation was confined to the area south of the Hindukush. As an alternative access to the sea, it was completely ruled out.

RELATIONS WITH INDIA FRIENDLY

Afghanistan has managed to keep its relations with India on good terms, these date back to 1921. After independence both these countries made a series of agreements (from 1952 onwards) that not only provided for transit arrangements but also for greater economic cooperation. In this respect, India partipated in the Afghan development programmes.

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NORMALISATION OF TIES WITH IRAN

Despite having similarities in historical and cultural development, Afghanistan and Iran normalised their relations only in 1960 and the agreement regarding it was ratified in 1962. This agreement was significant because it was during this period that there was a long closure of the transit facilities through Pakistan. The route, through Islam Qala in the south-western Afghan province to the nearest Iranian port of Bandar Abbas was long and through difficult terrain. Cost-wise, it was prohibitive and less used, for it either went throught Meshad or Tehran.

However, frequent closure of the transit facilities through the port of Karachi over differences on the Pushtunistan issue, strained Afghan-Pakistan relations. This compelled the Afghans to route their trade through the northern transit points and gradually paved the way to total dependence on the Soviet Union. The resignation of the Daud Government in 1963 gradually brought about a softening in their relations, so that in 1965, both the countries agreed for the provision of additional transit facilities as well as the use of the Pakistani railhead at Landi Khana through the Khybar Pass to Torkham. For Pakistan, such arrangements were benefical because it provided needed capital to update its transportation and communications network in the frontier provinces. Later, in the early 1980's, these arrangements were used to wage insurgent operations against the left-wing government at Kabul. It can be stated also that the existence of inherent tensions in the bilateral relations of the two countries and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan enabled Pakistan to exploit the situation to singular benefit.

PUSHTUNISTAN ISSUE

The Pushtuns are warlike tribes spread over much of eastern Afghanistan and north-western Pakistan. Their homeland was divided artificially by the Durand Line which made no sense either geographically or ethnically. Ever since 1947, Afghanistan has consistently raised this question of Pukhtoon homeland at the cost of closure of transit facilities. In 1963, it also drastically affected the internal political dynamics. This it continues to do so till date. Now, the trans-Indus area is largely used by the insurgents as a base of insurgency operations against the Soviet-backed Kabul regime. The genesis of the problem dates back to the pre-1947 period.

The Afghan interest in this frontier region flows from two factors that have influenced its foreign policy behaviour. These were considered

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pertinent and legitimate; first, the frontier was the Afghan irredenta; secondly, the Pushtun tribes, on both sides of the frontier, had made and unmade the Afghan governments. These combined to elaborate the point which even today has its validity.

Whatever the Afghan reasons for a Pushtun state be, they are closely connected with its quest of free access to the sea. This was reinforced by the fact that (as noted earlier) its economically important areas were located in the periphery, e.g., Kabul and Kandahar region. Despite its closeness to Soviet Union, Afghan history has repeatedly pointed out the importance of the trans-Indus region for the survival of Afghanistan. From the strategic point of view, this area and the nature of its status has always figured in Afghan policies, both internal and external. The resistance from Pakistan to this area that is characterised by ruggedness of terrain and harshness of its environment, has been typical, i.e., resistance to moves and opposition to every move that encouraged independence of this area. After the 1973 revolution and more particularly after 1979, the area which the Afghans have termed as Pushtunistan has become a sanctuary for Afghan dissidents. These dissidents use this area as a launching pad for their insurgent activities into Afghanistan.

Further, after 1979 the Soviet pre-occupation in re-establishing stability has been viewed as a threat by the West and particularly by Pakistan. This has resulted in not only massive military aid to Pakistan but also material aid to the Afghan guerillas. In the process, the West and China have joined hands in providing such material help, that, instead of helping the insurgents has directly increased the military potential of Pakistan thereby upsetting the regional strategic balance. With this as a phenomenon, the Afghan perceptions will continue to view Pakistan with suspicion and propagate a Pushtun state more forcefully. Located strategically, the Soviet influence in Afghanistan's foreign policy has tended to support the autonomy demand of the Pushtuns in Pakistan and thereby attempt to reduce the potential threat. The situation in Iran has further strengthened the Afghan position to adopt a policy that would safeguard its interests. On the contrary, Pakistan and the West (including China) have viewed this as a Soviet attempt to reach the Indian Ocean.

These, then, suggest that locational and regional factors have contributed significantly to the orientation of the Afghan external behaviour. The dominant influences of the heartland on the land-locked state, coupled with peripheral location of major resource regions, make it imperative for Afghanistan to adjust itself to the geopolitical compulsions rather than go against them as Amanullah found himself in 1919-29.

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It is these geopolitical factors that assured its survival as an independent entity, like the Soviets have found despite having a large number of troops. The insurgent activity from across the frontier like-wise is not a new phenomenon; its success will largely depend on the degree of unity possible between the diverse factions with ideological variations. This will also include the amount of support they can mobilise within Afghanistan. Be that as it may, Afghanistan's foreign policy behaviour will continue to be dictated by its location. This in turn influenced and was encouraged by its geography and social relations.

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2 Quoted in Richard Muir, *Modern Political Geography* (London, 1975), p. 56.

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4 See Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (Calcutta, 1969), p. 106; N.J. Spykman, "Geography and Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 32 no. 1, 1938, p. 38.

5 See R. Gopalakrishnan, n. 1.

6 For relationships between size and the general level of foreign policy of a state, See R.J. Rummel, "Some Findings of Nations and Their Behaviour," *World Politics*, Vol. 21, 1969, pp. 236-40.

7 The Durand Line had reduced the potential Afghan manpower considerably. The loss of 5 to 7 million Pushtuns illustrated the loss in terms of size of population along with the area of trans-Indus region inhabited by the Pushtuns. The Afghan stand of, and decision to have closer ties with the trans-Indus Pushtuns, was to offset the possible minority position of the Afghan Pushtuns *vis-a-vis* other ethnic groups in their internal politics. Also see, A.A. Michael, *The Kabul, Kunduz, Helmand Valleys and the National Economy of Afghanistan* (Washington D.C., 1959), pp. 12-14.

8 For details of Afghan irredentism, see J.W. Spain, *The Pathan Borderland* (The Hague, 1963) pp. 228-43; and Mohammad Said Khan, *The Voice of Pukhtoons* (Lahore, n.d.).

9 The result of three Afghan Wars of 1839-41, 1879-81 and 1919 clearly indicate the Afghan resolution against foreign domination and interference in the affairs of the state.

10 This form of reaction was in itself a disruptive element rather than one that consolidated the diverse tribal groups. Emphasising the inner cleavages of the tribal society. the definition of the international boundaries enabled the Pushtuns to reassert their political hegemony in the frontier state time and time again. However, the awakening of consciousness for a separate identity among the trans-Indus Pushtuns not only allowed them to stress their role in the internal

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politics of Pakistan but also enabled Afghanistan to support their demand for regional autonomy within the framework of Pakistan. See R. Emerson, *From Empire to Nation—The Rise of Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples* (Calcutta, 1970), pp. 298-306 and 329-35; Said Khan, n. 8, pp. 36-42. Along the same lines, influence of historical factors and evolution of Afghan national interests had significant impact on the formulation of the Afghan foreign policy. See J.E. Black and K.W. Thompson (*Eds.*): *Foreign Policies in a World of Change* (New York, 1963), pp. 14-16; W.K. Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan; A Study of Political Development in Central and South Asia* (London, 1967) and Varton Gregarion, *Emergence of Modern Afghanistan—Politics of Reforms and Modernization* (Stanford, 1969).

11 Luis Dupree "Constitutional Development and Cultural Change—Pt-1-Pre-1964 Constitutional Development," *American Field Staffs Reports*, South Asia Series, V. 9 (2).

12 Luis Dupree, n. 11, p. 1. This reasserted the geographical and historical divisions of the land-locked state. These are identified as: (i) the Hindukush Axis with prominent Balkh-Kabul-Jalalabad trend and (ii) the Indus Axis with (a) Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar and (b) Herat-Kandahar trendlines. At all times of its history, Afghanistan was continuously influenced by these trendlines. Even today, the internal and external political milieu of Afghanistan shows distinct traces of the influences.

13 In their effort to follow an independent foreign policy,the Afghan decision-makers were confronted with several internal political currents which were struggling to find a balance and competed in the formulation of the Afghan foreign policy. "They were represented among the Afghan elite by pro-German, pro-British, pro-Soviet and isolationist parties. All these groups favoured an independent national foreign policy that would give the country maximum protection from aggression and yet lead to the development of the country." Quoted in L.W. Adamec, "Germany, Third Power in Afghanistan's Foreign Relations" in G. Grassmuck, *et al*, *Afghanistan: Some New Approaches* (Princeton, N.J., 1960) pp. 117-9.

14 L.B. Poullada, *Reforms and Rebellion in Afghanistan 1919-1929: King Amanullah's Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society*, Ithaca, pp. 1-3.

15 Ibid.

16 See P.G. Franck, *Afghanistan Between East and West* (Washington D.C. 1960), pp. 112-14.

17 Ibid., p. 13.

18 S. Newell, "Afghanistan: The Dangers of Cold War Generosity," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. IV, no. 23, 1969, pp. 170-72.

19 Ibid.

20 Such a policy from a strategic location posed difficulties at times of war. The pre-eminence of German, Italian and Japanese participation in the Afghan economic development in the 1930's and 40's was taken by the Soviet Union and Great Britain as an attempt by the Axis Powers to weaken their flanks by inciting the tribes against them. The consequent Anglo-Soviet reaction of curtailing the transit facilities compelled Afghanistan to intern or expel Axis personnel. See S. Newell, n. 18, and R. Newell, *Afghanistan* (Ithaca, 1973), p. 53-4.

21 Afghan reprentatives gradually began to figure in the activities of various organisations of the United Nations, e.g., Dr. Abdul Hakim Tabiti was responsible for the UNCTAD in 1965, Abdur Rahman Pazwak served as President of the General Assembly in 1966-7 and Dr. Nevin in the inter-Governmental Conference

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on cultural policies in Asia and Jogjakata. Also see Martin I. Glassner, *Access to the Sea for Developing Land-Locked States* (The Hague, 1970), p. 216; *Afghanistan Republic Annual, 1974 and 1975* (Kabul).

22 For the nature and importance of this region, see William B. Ballis, "Recent Soviet Relations with Afghanistan," *Institute for the Study of the USSR Bulleten*, Vol. 13, p. 4.

23 However, the resurgence of Soviet influence after a pause and hesitation, resulted not only in a wavering of Afghan foreign policy under Amanullah but also in diminution of internal/domestic political support. This was largely due to the significance of activities in Soviet Central Asia which was dominated by the Muslim inhabitants and Afghanistan as a factor in the East-West relations. See L.B. Poullaada, n. 14, pp 184-7.

24 For an analysis of the impact and nature of Soviet-Afghan trade relations as compared to other developing countries, see Joseph S. Berliner, *Soviet Economic Aid* (New York, 1958).

25 The policy of specialization of Soviet Central Asian Republics on cotton has put considerable strain on the existing railway links with the rest of the country, which traverses long stretches of commercially unresponsive country and occasioned problems. See David J.M. Hoosan, *The Soviet Union* (London, 1965), pp. 284-50; also D. Lois Tretak, "Moscow's Trade with Asia." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. LI, 3 February, May 1966, p. 205.

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BHUTTO AND THE PPP'S SOCIALISM ?

By BABAFEMI A BADEJO*

It is not unusual for many a government in post-colonial states to tag themselves "socialist." One such government was that of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in Pakisian. Not only did Bhutto acquire the nomenclature Quaid-i-Awam *which in Pakistani parlance implies leader of the masses, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) which he led maintained a socialist posture in and out of government. Our intent in this paper is to undertake a review of Bhutto and the PPP's emergence in Pakistan, as well as the policy performance of Bhutto while in office. Consequent upon such a review, we intend to posit that Bhutto's rise to power was a result of intra-factional struggle within the propertied classes in Pakistan. And that socialism was merely expedient for such a struggle.*

I

BACKGROUND

MUCH work has been done that explains the creation of Pakistan as a result of religious concern.[1] This school of thought holds that the Hindu and Muslim communities have always constituted two nations, and Pakistan was the result of an inevitable Muslim political consciousness.

Elsewhere, we have undertaken a critique of the religious bases of the Pakistan position, and have instead reinforced the material interest argument.[2] Though the dominated classes in Pakistan (peasants, the rural and urban proletariat and the landless) might have been led into believing that Pakistan was being created to provide a homeland for South Asian Muslims, there was no doubt that the drive behind the Muslim League which championed the cry for Pakistan was led, not by spiritual leaders, but mainly by merchant capitalists as well as landowners, bureaucrats and other professionals. Bhatia provides an apt summary of the interests of those behind the creation of Pakistan:

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To the big landlords... Pakistan meant a state where they would be allowed unfettered possession of their landed estates without the fear of radical land reforms as the Congress had threatened to carry through when it came to power. Businessmen, bankers and industrialists saw in Pakistan a country where they would be free from competition from their much more advanced Hindu counterparts in undivided India, and have therefore an absolutely free field to grow in wealth and prosperity. To the civil servants and army personnel, Pakistan meant rapid promotions and such high positions to which few could aspire in undivided India....[3]

With the realisation of Pakistan, however, the struggle took a different shape. The demise of the two foremost leaders, one by ill health and the other through the bullet of an assassin led to open struggle over control of the machinery of the state. On the one hand were the industrial capitalists who in terms of the numbers game had no following in Pakistan since they migrated from India. And on the other, were the landlords cum capitalist landowners who had claim to a following in the new state. The civil bureaucrats, on whom the mantle of state fell after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, shared the same plight with the merchant industrialists, i.e., they were also immigrants. And they tended to be more favourably disposed towards the industrialists in the making of public policy.[4] Such struggle amongst the dominant forces in Pakistan continued unabated until Field Marshal Ayub Khan (then a General) intervened in Pakistani politics in October 1958.[5]

While Ayub tried to mediate the intra-class struggle amongst the dominant forces in Pakistan, his economic policies sharply accentuated the inter-class inequality in Pakistan. His development decade saw the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few families and the impoverishement of the peasants, the rural and urban proletariate and the landless. This basic class contradiction that Ayub's development decade entailed was also reinforced by a spatial contradiction which saw the impoverishment of East Pakistan as West Pakistan became more developed. These circumstances as we have pointed out,[6] led to the resignation of Ayub under a situation of strong political unrest. The aftermath of Ayub's departure was the promise of democratic elections by the Yahya interregnum. We will now examine the election process as it relates to the rise of Bhutto in Pakistan, and this will be followed by an analysis of the sort of specific interests that benefited disproportionately from policies made under Bhutto's Administration.

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II

ELECTIONS AND BHUTTO'S EMERGENCE

Bhutto, since his Berkeley days, had been paying "lip service" to socialism. Whether this was a calculated and a long-term political strategy, or a matter of fundamental political belief is not clear. Regardless of purpose and intensity, Bhutto continued to evoke a socialist image while a Cabinet Minister under Ayub Khan. Bhutto demonstrated political cunning in dissociating himself from the Ayub regime, the unsuccessful war with India and the Tashkent Agreement even though he had been an advocate of each.[7] His pro-China, anti-imperialist rhetoric, his stint in jail and of course his steadfast anti-India stance, endeared Bhutto to a nation which had been reared on anti-Indian sentiment and was becoming disenchanted with the Ayub regime and the international partners it had chosen to associate with.

The creation of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Bhutto's strategy of mass appeal introduced populism as a powerful mediating element in Pakistan's political life. The "populist" appeal of Bhutto was not only for the dominated classes, it succeeded with leftist intellectuals and professionals whose earlier attempt at organization got strangled in infancy under the purges that followed the famous 1951 Rawalpindi Conspiracy.[8] The end product of the congealing of a "leaderless" as well as unorganized group of leftists was Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party. Heeger puts the argument this way: "The PPP was a synthesis of a man looking for a party and a yet unformed party of diverse leftist groups looking for a leader...."[9]

The benefits of the "development decade," as we earlier noted, failed to trickle down to the dominated classes. The PPP recognised this situation and exploited it with the promise of "Islamic Socialism." The core of this ideology touched the raw spots that had sent the dominated classes and their student supporters to the streets. For instance, the PPP Election Manifesto in part states:

> The ultimate objective of the party's policy is the attainment of a *classess society*, which is possible only through socialism in our time. This means *true equality of the citizens*, and fraternity under the rule of democracy in an order based on *economic and social justice*. These aims follow from the political and social ethics of Islam. The party thus strives to put in practice the noble ideas of the Muslim faith.[10]

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Bhutto, reminding the working class and peasants that he did not lie to them over the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, went to make a solemn promise of providing "roti, kapra, makaan" (food, clothing, shelter) for the people. In addition, Bhutto also assured the Pakistani people possibilities of the celebration of *Shaıkat-i-Islam* (victory of Islam) in Indian Kashmir.[11] With such a manifesto and assurance, it should not be surprising that Bhutto soon came to be oft times referred to as *Quaid-i-Awam* (leader of the masses).

Those elements that were on the streets and forced Ayub's resignation flocked into the People's Party. The PPP came to comprise trade union leaders, industrial labour, students, agrarian, workers, leftist intellectuals and ultimately, and very prominently, the landowners.[12] Either because it had demonstrated its viability of emerging as the pre-eminent faction, or for other reasons, what is important for the purpose of this paper is to note that the People's Party also received the support and blessings of some important members of the Muslim clergy. As an example, the PPP's real growth in Sind did not come until Makhdoom Zaman Khan, one of the two principal *pirs*. (spiritual leader and landlord) declared his support for the party.[13]

III

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PPP POLICIES

Despite the links we have already established, the point that the PPP was a landowners' party is best demonstrated by the social consquences of the policies of the party after it attained office. In this regard, it is being suggested in this paper that it is difficult in situations short of revolution for any major faction of a dominant class to completely isolate or subjugate another. The differences between the specific interests of the landowning faction as opposed to that of the industrial faction can only be seen in terms of which faction benefits most during a particular regime.

Rupee Devaluation Favours Landowners

For instance it is not just a mere coincidence that one of the very first actions of the Bhutto era was the devaluation of the rupee. On 11 May 1972, Bhutto devalued the rupee by 56 8 per cent. This new exchange rate replaced the multiple exhange rate and Bonus Vouchers Scheme that

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existed under Ayub. This action, resulted in a phenomenal export boom from 1972-74. Pakistani goods, after all, were now competitive because of the reduction in their international prices. For the first time since the "Korean War Boom" Pakistan had a trade account surplus.[14]

More important, however, devaluation is Janus faced. Just as it resulted in a large export boom which landowners, who were the main exporters could benefit from, it was also uncomfortable for the industrialists. First, imports into Pakistan as a result of devaluation necessarily became more expensive. This meant more expensive raw materials and machinery for industrial ventures. The foreign exchange liability which industrialists had incurred through the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan had to be met under the devalued rates. So even when an iudustrialist had paid half of the loan he had taken before devaluation, he still found himself liable for more than the amount of foreign exchange loan he received as a result of devaluation.[15]

Finally, the land-owning faction achieved pre-eminence. Booming agriculture made the industrialists call for higher taxation on agricultural incomes. But Chaudri Mohammed Zulfikar, Chairman, Central Board of Revenue in the Bhutto regime replied to such demands thus:

> ...industrialists were living in a fool's paradise if they thought their suggestion to tax agricultural incomes would be accepted.[16]

He elaborated the logic of his contention by observing that the agricultural sector was politically stronger than the industrial sector.

The industrialists' demand for taxation of the incomes of the landowning faction is significant for our analysis because it brings out more clearly the question of who benefited from Bhutto's devaluation. Increases in the import prices of machinery as a result of the devaluation no doubt cut into the industrial profits. Such an effect however, was minimal since higher costs of production normally passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. The devaluation, however, as we have suggested resulted in a high export boom and hence higher incomes for landowners. If agricultural incomes were to be taxed as suggested by industrialists, some of the landowning factions' income would have been diverted into government coffers as used to be the case in the pre-Bhutto era. But since this was not the case because landowners were now politically stronger, the landowning faction of the dominant class necessarily reaped the full benefits of devaluation.

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Promises Decreed by Land Reforms Come to Nought

Bhutto, in order to give credibility to one of his major election promises, decreed a land reform. The reform as will be established, did not effect the changes it promised. Martial Law Regulation No. 115 set the limits of land that an individual could own at 150 acres for irrigated land, and 300 acres for un-irrigated land. The surplus acreage that was to have been generated by these ceilings, except for the centrally administered 'tribal areas' where these provisions were not to apply, was to be resumed by the government and distributed at no cost to the peasants.[17] The decree, unlike the Ayub land decree,[18] offered no compensation to landowners for resumed land. All land awards made by the previous regime as well as land transactions after 20 December 1971 were nullified.

This reform like Ayub Khan's reform was significant for the fanfare that accompanied it—a fanfare that generated initial support from the dominated classes. The interest of the landowners, however, was well protected by this decree.

The fact that the period fixed for the nullification of land transactions was 20 December 1971, when Bhutto came to power, and not 7 December 1970, when the PPP won elections in West Pakistan, offered substantial time for land distribution within families. An enormously important provision of the decree was that land ceilings were for individuals, not families.

Herring and Chaudhry have shown that by 1974, just 1 per cent of cultivated land had been redistributed.[19] And by the end of 1977—despite a further reform law just before the 1977 elections—land distributed to 135,598 farmers totalled 1.44 million acres.[20] This amounts to an average 10.5 acres for the microcosm of the tenant/landless farmers. 10.5 acres it must also be noted is 2 acres less than the minimum subsistence holding of 12.5 acres promised by the PPP.

The landowners as a whole lost little if at all under the reform. The peasants and the landless in the rural areas that had thought that a victory for the PPP meant a victory for the "people" against the landowners set out to grab lands. They were, however, met with the brute force of the police backed by the government.

So a land reform meant to bring change actually brought little or no structural change to Pakistan. This point is evident from one of Bhutto's statements:

Pakistan will continue to be a country in which a large number of

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cultivators will own land in small holdings, while a small number of owners will have a significant proportion of the cultivated land.[21]

Moves Against Industrialists Cosmetic in Nature

Some actions were taken early during the Bhutto *raj* that could be interpreted as moves against the industrial capitalists. For instance, on 3 January 1972, Bhutto arrested some of the members of the richest twenty-two families in Pakistan and released them later in the month.[22] This action, and some of the more substantive ones as we will show shortly, were in the large part window dressings meant for the consumption of the dominated classes.

On 14 January 1972, the Bhutto Administration terminated all managing agency contracts. These contracts constituted means devised by industrial capitalists for the avoidance of taxation. The agencies, which were owned by industrial capitalists, managed firms in which the industrialists also owned controlling stocks. Through manipulations of sales and purchases, profits of the firms were siphoned off as payments for the services of the agencies.[23]

Later in 1972, Bhutto nationalized ten categories of industries that were deemed of strategic importance and held by the industrial capitalists. The industries affected were : iron and steel, basic metals, heavy engineering, motor vehicle assembly and manufacture, heavy and basic chemicals, petro-chemicals, cement, public utilities, and insurance. During 1973, he further added the following to the list : cotton and rice exporting ; vegetable ghee : petroleum marketing as well as maize shipping. And finally, Bhutto's "New Year Present to the People" on 1 January 1974 was the nationalization of all private domestically owned banks.[24]

The policy of nationalization, La Porte points out "was not a 'pure' form of nationalization, since only the management of the firms was affected not the ownership."[25] The same argument he applied to the termination of management agency contracts.[26] All that the government did was to provide new personnel to manage nationalized industries while the dividends still went to the owners of the firms. The "new" personnel in some cases, were original owners. Despite the jubilation and fanfare by the dominated classes about the "revolutionary" nature of the nationalization, the industrial capitalists were not hurt by Bhutto's actions, Regardless of how the industrial faction might have responded to announcements of nationalization, the industrialists remained the owners of their firms and industries. White

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notes that when the Karachi Stock Exchange reopened after the "nationalization," the share prices of the "nationalized firms" did not decline. This meant the owners did not try to dump their shares because they were confident that the situation was under control.[27] In fact, by 1976, despite all the rhetoric, Bhatia calculates that over 75 per cent of industrial investments still remained in private hands, and this included the important textile sector.[28]

With the bank nationalizations, the Bhutto Administration embarked on a policy of ensuring that "new entrants" would receive loans from banks. Our field interviews in Pakistan revealed that most of the "new entrants" turned out to be landowners who took interest in setting up industrial ventures in the 1970's. Such industrial ventures were mostly agro-based and included wool and textile spinning, straw board manufacturing, ginning factories, dairy farming and rice husking mills. Some of the major landed families that received loans then were the Qureshis of Multan, Syeds in Jhung, Tarars from Gujranwala and the Noons of Sargodha.

The PPP had already won the support of industrial labour on the promise of higher wages and better working conditions. Bhutto's Administration actually increased wages. Burki notes that a government report on the issue showed the cost of implementing these wages to be Rs 250 million.[29] But the consequences of other policies, and especially the devaluation, was inflationary. Evidence available suggests that workers were worse off because real incomes actually declined.[30]

So, despite the fact that Bhutto was *Quaid-i-Awam* the masses did not fare better under the People's Party Administration. As Lodhi puts it : "The non-elite groups who were strong supporters of the PPP before it came to power (landless peasants and industrial workers), failed to receive any significant benefits from the 'reforms' of the Bhutto Government."[31]

But much more important was the alienation of the leftists in the party by the "PPP's decision to employ strong methods to bring about industrial peace...."[32] Leftists who were alarmed by the dominance of the landowners in the PPP were forced to leave, purged, or put in jail. Of such people were Muktar Rana, a former Labour Union organizer, and Meraj Mohammed Khan, a student leader. Both were sent to jail. J.A. Rahim who had approached Bhutto in Geneva about the need for a Socialist Party[33], which materialised in the PPP, the first Secretary General and the architect of its ideological stance, was also cast out after he had been severely beaten by Bhutto's Federal Security Force. Rahim's "offence" was that he opposed the reorganization of the PPP

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to include landowners, industrialists and earlier discredited bureaucrats.[34] Mubashir Hassan, a prominent PPP member, Finance Minister in Bhutto's Administration and Rahim's successor as PPP Secretary General, was also asked to go and by 1976 he set about organizing a socialist bloc to "save Bhutto" from the clutches of the landowners.

From the above analysis it is clear that Bhutto only used ideology to deliver the Pakistani electorate for the specific interest of the social force he represented—the landowning faction. The landowners were largely able to retain their lands, while the land tenure system remained the same. The devaluation of the rupee without commensurate taxation by Bhutto's Administration left the landowners much wealth. While industrialists might not have accumulated at the rate they were used to, they did not lose under Bhutto. It was the dominated classes that experienced a reduction in real income. This fact, made Bhutto's socialist pronouncements suspect. However, Bhutto himself had been frank to his close associates that his espousal of Socialsm was simply for what economists would term "product differentiation."[35] As Gerald Heeger also notes :

> Despite the concerted campaign for Socialism conducted by the Pakistan People's Party during the 1970 Elections, the Constitution of Pakistan, authored by Bhutto and the PPP leadership and endorsed by a National Assembly, in which the People's Party held over a two-thirds majority, omits the term completely, even in its more acceptable lower-case guise, 'Islamic socialism.'[36]

By the time Bhutto called for the 1977 Elections, he realised that he had "milked the socialist cow" dry. So, to ensure the continued dominance of the landowners, the PPP could not but change tactics. Richter notes that the word "Socialism" was completely "dropped from PPP literature and in its place was substituted the more cumbersome phrase 'Musawat-i-Mohammadi' literally translated as 'equality of Muhammad,' that is, Islamic egalitarianism...."[37]

During the 1977 Elections, Bhutto invited the Imams at the mosques at Medina and Ka'aba—which are the two holiest places for Muslims-to visit in Pakistan. The dignitaries visited, led prayers and warmed the hearts of the faithful in major cities.[38] In addition, the Bhutto Administration organized an International Conference on the Life and Works of the Prophet.

This Islamic resurgence of Bhutto and the PPP, it is essential to note,

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was contradictory to the stance of the "Socialist" PPP that got the votes of the masses in 1970. After all, the 1970 Election stance went "to the extent of declaring the question of Islam irrelevant to Pakistani politics since both the exploiters and the exploited were Muslims."[39]

Whether Bhutto's PPP actually won the 1977 Elections is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to note, however, that the results of the elections were doubted, and after a bloody protracted crisis, the military—this time led by General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq—once again intervened.

SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is not difficult to understand why Pakistanis flocked into Bhutto's PPP and Bhutto himself came to be called the *Quaid-i-Awam*. The contradictions inherent in Ayub Khan's so-called "development decade" had become evident, and the Pakistani society was clearly polarized between the haves and the have-nots. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the landowning faction of the dominant class, in an attempt to achieve pre-eminence over their industrial counterparts, preached what people were willing to hear, that is, a relegation of Islam to the background and a call for a change in the economic conditions of the masses. With other landowners initially under cover, it was easy for Bhutto to convince people that their economic problems were largely a result of exploitation by the industrialists. After all, the few industrial capitalists control most of the financial institutions and industrial capital in Pakistan.

This is not the first time that ideology has been used to organize the dominated classes along lines desirable for the material interests of the dominant class. In fact, the creation of Pakistan itself constitutes one of such uses of ideology. However, what is important is that this happened to be the first time that a faction of the dominant class chose a purely economic ideological stance. Since Pakistanis did not need much convincing that their economic woes were a result of the policies of Ayub that largely benefited industrialists, they flocked into the PPP that purported to be a radical alternative.

The basic economic structure of Pakistan remained the same. The reasons that Bhutto gave for the nationalization of a *few* industries was not that he wanted to socialize production relations, but that the industries were of "strategic importance." The banks were nationalized in order to liberalize credit and ensure that "new entrants" got loans. But who were the "new entrants"? They were landowners, that is

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members of Bhutto's faction of the dominant class. The land reforms were also a sham. Instead of such socialist options like land to the tiller or land belonging to society, Bhutto formalized individual ownership under which landowners were able to distribute land to members of their families. The dominated classes it turned out, had nothing to show for their support of Bhutto's "vanguard party." As things turned out, the status-quo that Bhutto's PPP wanted to change was different from the change desired by the masses. Thus Bhutto as *Quaid-iAwam* or the PPP as socialist were contradictions in terms.

NOTES

1 This position is well represented by I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistani Sub-continent 610-1947* (Karachi, 1977). For a summary of the various positions on the creation of Pakistan, see Wayne Wilcox, "The Wellsprings of Pakistan" posthumously published in Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti and W. Howard Wriggings (*Eds.*): *Pakistan: The Long View* (Durham, 1977), p. 28.

2 Babafemi A. Badejo, "State and Class in Pakistan," unpublished doctoral examination field paper, Los Angeles, November 1980. See also Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis* (London, 1946), and B.M. Bhatia, *Pakistan's Economic Development 1948-1978: The Failure of a Strategy* (New Delhi, 1979).

3 B.M. Bhatia, Ibid., p. 10.

4 For a review of the economic policies undertaken during this period see amongst others, B M. Bhatia, Ibid., and Babafemi A. Badejo, "State and Class in Pakistan," n. 2.

5 See Richard Sisson, "Politics and the Military in Pakistan," in John p. Lovell (*Ed.*), *The Military and Politics in Five Developing Nations* (Kensington, Center for Research in Social Systems, 1970).

6 See Babafemi A. Badejo, "Pakistan: Ayub's Demise Revisited," *Asian Affairs*, March 1983.

7 See Anwar H. Syed, "The Pakistan People's Party: Phases One and Two," in Lawrence Ziring, *et. al. Pakistan: The Long View*, pp. 75-76.

8 For further information, see Tariq Ali, *Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power* (New York, 1970), n. 1, pp. 44-45.

9 Gerald A. Heeger, "Socialism in Pakistan," in Helen Desfosses and Jacques Lsavesque (*Eds.*); *Socialism in the Third World* (New York, 1975), P. 296. For a similar position, see S. J. Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977* (New York, 1980), p. 50.

10 As quoted in Anwar H. Syed, "The Pakistan People's Party: Phases One and Two," n. 7. p. 87 (emphasis mine).

11 See Sherifat Mujahid, "Pakistan: The First General Elections," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XI, No. 2, 1971, p. 168.

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12 Gerald A. Heeger "Socialism and Pakistan," n. 9, p. 300.

13 Ibid., p. 300, and Feroz Ahmed, "Structure and Contradiction in Pakistan" in Kathleen Gough and Hari Sharma (*Eds.*), *Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia* (New York and London, 1973), p. 185.

14 S.J. Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-77*, n. 9, p. 111, B.M. Bhatia, *Pakistan's Economic Development 1948-78*, n. 2, p. 72 also notes the boom.

15 For a detailed explication of the effects of devaluation, especially in developing countries, see Lance Taylor, *Macro Models for Developing Countries* (New York, 1979), pp. 49-66.

16 W. Eric Gustafson, "Economic Problems of Pakistan Under Bhutto," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XVI, No. 4, April 1976, p. 369.

17 Bruce J. Esposito, "The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, Vol XVI, No. 4, April 1976, p. 431; and Nimal Senaratne, "Landowners and Land Reform in Pakistan," *South Asian Review*, Vol. VII No. 1, October 1973, p. 132.

18 For an analysis of Ayub's Land Decree see Babafemi A. Badejo, "Pakistan: Ayub's Demise Revisited," n. 6.

19 Ronald Herring and M. Ghaffar Chaudhry, "The 1972 Land Reforms in Pakistan and their Economic Implications—A Preliminary Analysis, "*Pakistan Development Review*, Vol. XIII, No. 3, 1974, p. 80.

20 B.M. Bhatia, *Pakistan's Economic Development 1948-78 : The Failure of a Strategy*, n. 2. p. 165.

21 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Speeches and Statements*, Ministry of Information, Rawalpindi, n.d., p. 44, as quoted in S.J. Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto*, n. 9, p. 139.

22 See Robert La Porte, *Power and Privilege : Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan*, (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1975), p. 109, Fn. 13.

23 For details on how this arrangement worked, see Lawrence J. White, *Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan's* (Princeton, 1974), p. 143.

24 S.J. Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-77*, n. 9, pp. 114-118.

25 Robert La Porte, *Power and Privilege : Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan*, n. 22, pp. 108-109.

26 Ibid., p. 110.

27 Lawrence J. White, *Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan*, n. 23, p. 182.

28 B.M. Bhatia, *Pakistan's Economic Development 1948-78 : The Failure of a Strategy*, n. 2, p. 83.

29 S.J. Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-77*, n. 9, pp. 120.

30 Ibid., p. 166.

31 Maliha Lodhi, "Pakistan in Crisis," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*. Vol. XVI, March 1978, p. 64.

32 Ibid., p. 65.

33 The author in an interview with J. A. Rahim confirmed most of the accounts in Ziring's analysis (cited below) except for the fact that the idea of setting up the PPP as a Socialist Party came up outside Pakistan. It resulted from a discussion between Rahim and Bhutto while the latter was on a visit to Switzerland.

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34 See Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan : The Enigma of Political Development*, (Boulder, Colorado, 1980), p. 123.

35 See W. Eric. Gustafson, "Economic Problems of Pakistan Under Bhutto," n. 16, p. 367.

36 Gerald A. Heeger, "Socialism in Pakistan," n. 9, p. 295.

37 William L. Richter, "Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XIX, No. 6, June 1979, p. 551.

38 S.J. Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-77*, n. 9, p. 179.

39 Mohammed Ayoob, "Two Faces of Islam : Iran and Pakistan Compared," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XIX, No. 6, June 1979, p. 537.

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THE SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE*

By RAMESH THAKUR**

The pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation has been a major international concern of our times. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 is of great historical significance for having created the world's first nuclear-free zone (NFZ). Article 5 of the Treaty prohibits any nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste in the Antarctica. The Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967 established the first internationally recognised Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ) in a populated region of the world, namely Latin America. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 was an attempt to bring in a global regime to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). States in the latter category can adhere to the NPT while accepting a stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories, as long as they do not exercise jurisdiction and control over the weapons. West Germany is an obvious example of such a country. A NWFZ, however, prohibits such stationing of nuclear weapons. The three essential characteristics of a NWFZ are non-possession, non-deployment and non-use of nuclear weapons.

NWFZs can help to strengthen and promote non-proliferation by providing a means of extending and reinforcing the NPT. In fact Article 7 of the latter accepts that, "Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories." The article merely acknowledged that one such treaty had been negotiated more or less simultaneously with the NPT. The second NFWZ in an inhabited region was not to be established for another eighteen years. At the Sixteenth South Pacific Forum meeting held in Rarotonga, Cook Islands, Forum countries adopted the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty on 6 August 1985 (Hiroshima Day). The Preamble to the treaty expresses the commitment to world peace, a grave concern at the continuing nuclear arms race, the conviction that every country bears an obligation to strive for the elimination of nuclear weapons, a belief in the efficacy of regional arms control measures, and a reaffirmation of the NPT for halting nucleor proliferation. The core NFZ obligations are contained in Articles 3-7. Each party agrees not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control—or seek

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to do so—over any nuclear device; not to assist or encourage others to make or acquire nuclear weapons; to prevent the stationing or testing of nuclear weapons on its territory; not to dump radioactive wastes at sea anywhere in the zone, and to prevent such dumping by others in its territorial sea.

Discussions at the United Nations had, by the mid-1970s, identified nine major principles as the guiding elements of a NWFZ: (1) the initiative should come from the countries of the region; (2) the specific provisions of the NWFZ treaty should be negotiated between the regional member states in the form of a multilateral treaty establishing the zone in perpetuity; (3) while adherence to the treaty should be voluntary, the NWFZ must nevertheless embrace all militarily significant states in the region: (4) existing treaty relationships within the zone should not be disturbed; (5) there should be an effective verification system: (6) peaceful nuclear development should be allowed; (7) the zone should have clearly defined and recognised boundaries; (8) in defining the territory of the zone, members must respect international law, including freedom of the seas and straits used for international navigation and of international airspace; and (9) the NWFZ should have the support of the nuclear-weapon states.

Thus the NWFZ concept in established United Nations vocabulary does not prohibit the temporary presence of nuclear vessels during transit or on port calls, and it does not necessarily preclude the acquisition of sensitive nuclear facilities and materials tantamount to having a nuclear-weapon capability or producing untested nuclear bomb components. Nevertheless, it will be useful to follow the UN criteria in order to examine the nature and implications of the South Pacific zone.

REGIONAL INITIATIVE

THE initiative for the SPNFZ not only came from within the region; in fact it has a considerable history behind it which is not unconnected with the fact of the Pacific being the only part of the world to have witnessed the use of atomic weaponry in war, and to have been the scene of several testing programmes by different NWS. The most appropriate agency for pursuing a regional initiative was the South Pacific Forum. At the 1975 meeting in Tonga, Forum countries unanimously commended the idea of establishing a SPNFZ as a means of keeping the region free of the risk of nuclear contamination. On 15 August 1975, Fiji and Newzealand wrote to the UN Secretary General asking that the item of a South Pacific NWFZ be included on the agenda of the forthcoming 30th Session of the General Assembly. Describing the aim as one to enhance the security and welfare of South Pacific peoples and minimise risks to their health and environment, the operative clauses of

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the draft resolution endorsed the idea of establishing a NWFZ in the South Pacific in cooperation with the nuclear Powers and with the possible assistance of the UN Secretary General.[1] Resolution 3477 was adopted in the First Committee on 28 November by a vote of 94-0, with 18 abstentions; and in the General Assembly on 11 December by a vote of 110-0-20. China was the only nuclear Power to vote in favour. Britain, France, the USA and the USSR expressed general sympathy, but abstained on the vote because of fears for their rights upon the high seas.[2]

Labour's hold in office proved too short-lived to develop a South Pacific NWFZ from an idea to a programme of action. The National Party Government of Robert Muldoon (1975-84) was perceived as unsympathetic to such notions. Malcolm Templeton, who was New Zealand's Permanent Representative to the United Nations at the time, has revealed that the new National Government abandoned the NWFZ initiative, leaving him "stuck as the leader of the New Zealand delegation with a proposal which my government no longer supported."[3] The conservative governments of Australia and New Zealand can fairly be described as having pursued a SPNFZ for the purposes of establishing an alibi rather than achieving genuine progress. The political environment changed dramatically with the return of Labour governments in the two countries. In Australia, the Australian Labour Party Government announced its intention to promote a SPNFZ shortly after assuming office in March 1983. It took its proposal to the 14th South Pacific Forum meeting held in Canberra in August 1983, which commended the Australian initiative in receiving the NWFZ concept, but believed that more time was necessary to study its implications and engage in discussions.[4]

The Australians took their proposal a step further at the South Pacific Forum meeting in Tuvalu in August 1984. The Forum decided to establish a working party of officials to look at the detailed issues involved in actually establishing a treaty-based NWFZ. The group examined the whole gamut of legal, political and physical problems over five meetings in 1984-85. The draft treaty was presented to and adopted by the full Forum meeting in the Cook Islands in August 1985.

NFZ TREATY

The goal of a SPNFZ thus clearly originated in the region, was pursued through regional channels, and was adopted by the regional Forum which encompasses all the countries of the region. The zone was established also in the form of Forum countries adopting a formal treaty.

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Membership

The voluntary adherence of all militarily significant states has not been an unrealistic goal for the South Pacific region. The difficulty was how best to convert support for a NFZ in the abstract into signature of a NFZ treaty in the particular. Forum countries had different approaches in respect of the content of the treaty. The conservative pole, represented by Fiji and Tonga, was determined to reject any concrete impact upon existing security policies and practices; they would have preferred to leave open the option of an American stationing of nuclear weapons in the region at a future date. The radical pole, represented by Vanuatu, favoured banning all types of nuclear involvement in the region and extending the zonal boundary to bring Micronesia within its scope. Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands too leaned towards a more comprehensive treaty which banned the transit of nuclear ships through the region. New Zealand, although more radical in its national policy, was prepared to support the Australian draft as a compromise broadly acceptable to the Forum countries. The Hawke Government for its part insisted that ANZUS (Pact between Australia, New Zealand and the United States) obligations and its security relationship with the US were not negotiable.

The Treaty of Rarotonga was signed on 6 August 1985 by Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, New Zealand, Niue, Tuvalu and Western Samoa. Papua New Guinea signed the treaty on 16 September, the tenth anniversary of its independence. Vanuatu, however, broke the Forum tradition of consensual decisions when Prime Minister Walter Lini declared on 7 August (the day after the treaty's adoption) that he would not be signing the treaty. Nauru became the tenth signatory in July 1986. (The remaining two Forum members are the Solomon Islands and Tonga). Only Forum members can accede to the SPNFZ treaty. While the duration of the treaty is indefinite, every party is given the right to withdraw in the event of a core violation of treaty provisions by any member; withdrawal can be effected upon a twelve month notice to the Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC).

Existing Security Arrangements

A major stumbling block to achieving a NWFZ in any given region is a potential clash with the principle of undiminished security for everyone, including all countries in the region and the major powers external to the region. Existing security arrangements adopted and maintained by member countries have consistently been the starting point for all Forum NFZ initiatives, including that of 1975. Nothing in the Treaty of Rarotonga infringes the unqualified sovereign rights of parties to determine their own security arrangements short of nuclear weapons acquisition or

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stationing. The treaty specifically states the right of each party "to decide for itself whether to allow visits...transit...and navigation" by foreign ships or aircraft to its territorial air and sea space (Article 5.2). The adoption of a NFZ treaty was certainly made easier by the fact that the South Pacific was already a *de facto* NFZ. Nuclear weapons were not deployed in any South Pacific country, and there was neither the intention to acquire nuclear weapons nor the wish to station foreign nuclear weapons in the region. The value of the Treaty of Rarotonga lies, therefore, primarily in having formalised the existing situation and precluding changes to the contrary.

Verification

The Treaty of Rarotonga establishes two levels of control machinery to verify compliance of parties with treaty obligations: regional and international. Regionally, the control system comprises the three elements of reports and information exchange, consultations and a complaints procedure. At a regional level, the Treaty of Rarotonga emulates the Latin American model in establishing bureaucratic machinery to facilitate on-site challenge and spot inspections.[5] Internationally, the SPNFZ requires submission to full-scope IAEA safeguards.[6] The Treaty of Rarotonga requires IAEA safeguards to be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of a party, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. The goal of the safeguards system is to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to nuclear explosive devices. Each party is required to negotiate, conclude and bring into force IAEA safeguards within 18 months of the SPNFZ being in force for it.

With such a compliance and control system in force, applied to the complete nuclear fuel cycle for each party to ensure that any diversion of fissile material would be detected in good time, regional states as well as outsiders should have reasonable assurance that the NFZ status is not being violated in the South Pacific.

Peaceful Nuclear Development

As expected, the Treaty of Rarotonga does not prohibit peaceful nuclear activities. However, member parties are forbidden to transfer material or equipment, even for peaceful purposes, to NNWS not subject to NPT safeguards, or to NWS not subject to IAEA safeguards. That is, parties are enjoined to ensure that any transfer of nuclear technology or material conforms to strict non-proliferation measures in order to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful use.

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Geographic Scope

The boundaries of the SPNFZ generally follow the territorial limits of the South Pacific Forum members, and are based on the so-called picture frame approach. To the east, the SPNFZ is joined with the Latin American zone at 115°W; its southern boundary coincides with the outer limits of the Antarctic Treaty at 60°S; its western boundary is formed by Australia's and Papua New Guinea's western borders; and its northern boundary is formed generally by the Equator, with a few ups and downs to fit certain specified contours. This is a considerable area. Indeed, when we examine the zone alongside the adjoining Latin American and Antarctic zones, then Africa and Indonesia are the only areas in the entire southern hemisphere not within the ambit of a NWFZ.

Freedom of the Seas

The eighth criterion demands respect for the law of the high seas and straits. One fundamental difference between a SPNFZ and all other zonal proposals in populated regions of the world is the balance between territorial lands and international waterways. For example, the right to free passage on the high seas does not seriously detract from the significance of the Latin American NWFZ, since the zone is designed primarily to encompass the continental land mass. In the South Pacific, by contrast, territorial lands are typically specks in an ocean vastness. A NFZ which does not extend to the high seas inevitably therefore degrades the value of a South Pacific zone when compared to Latin America.

Attempts to include the high seas within a NFZ scope however would create more problems than it would solve To begin with, verification is a greater problem in this context than if a NFZ was territorially limited. The more serious problems confronting a NFZ which applies to the high seas are legal-political. The law of the high seas originated in the rule that the high seas are not open to acquisition by states individually or collectively. Imposing restrictions on established maritime rights would not be proper because ultimately it would be damaging to the goal of creating a civilised world ruled by law and reason. Restrictions would be unrealistic also because of the impossibility of enforcement. It is difficult enough to enforce the accepted law against the determined opposition of a major power. No South Pacific country individually, nor all of them collectively, could enforce an illegal ban on nuclear ships in the international waters of the South Pacific.

It is also necessary to distinguish between abhorrence of nuclear wars and opposition to nuclear weapons. Deterrence depends upon the guaranteed vulnerability of industrial-population targets to enemy attack,

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and survivability of nuclear weapons against enemy attack. In the strategic triad of land-based ICBMs, bombers and submarines, the last are the least vulnerable, and therefore the most stabilising element in the nuclear equation. Progressively expanding NFZs that included high seas in their geographic coverage would undoubtedly reduce areas of nuclear weapons deployment. But they would also destabilise the US-Soviet nuclear deterrence, and so could make the outbreak of nuclear war more likely, not less.

In the 1975 South Pacific NWFZ proposal at the United Nations, Fiji and New Zealand had accepted that imposing restrictions on the maritime rights of unwilling third parties was neither proper nor realistic. The 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga specifically states that "nothing" in it "shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to freedom of the seas". (Article 2.2)

Nuclear Powers' Support

The final criterion merely recognises the fact that a NFZ which does not obtain the endorsement of NWS is practically worthless. The Treaty of Rarotonga adopts the simple expedient, following Tlatelolco, of containing additional protocols for integrating NWS into the SPNFZ. Protocol 1 is addressed to France, the UK and the USA, and invites them to apply NFZ prohibitions on manufacture, stationing and testing to their territories within the zone. Protocol 2 is addressed to the five NWS and contains the negative security guarantees. In it, each NWS party agrees not to violate the NFZ Treaty, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any treaty party, or in the territory of any party to the Treaty or to Protocol 1. Protocol 3, which does not have a counterpart in Tlatelolco, prohibits the testing of any nuclear device anywhere in the region.

The **Soviet Union**, which has been a longstanding advocate of NWFZs, became the first NWS to sign the SPNFZ protocols (2 and 3) on 15 December 1986. It was unhappy with a SPNFZ which preserves the region as a *de facto* Western lake, permits the operation of nuclear weapons related facilities in Australia and US port visits, while denying transit facilities to any Soviet warship. Its signature of the protocols was therefore qualified: it declared its compliance with Protocol 2 to be conditional on party states not committing an act of aggression in alliance with another NWS or, during such aggression, permitting transit or visiting rights to air or sea vessels of a NWS. This is similar to the Soviet position on the Tlatelolco regime.

In the abortive 1975 initiative, **China** had been the only NWS to

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support the NWFZ resolution without qualification. Similarly, it did not take China long in 1985 to indicate support for the Treaty of Rarotonga; the Chinese Ambassador to Fiji signed Protocols 2 and 3 in Suva on 10 February 1987.

The **United States** and **France** were expected to be the two problematic nuclear Powers. In September 1985, Bob Hawke had approached the United States to exert pressure on France to cease nuclear testing in the Pacific. The Reagan Administration however confirmed the primacy of the North Atlantic over the South Pacific in its strategic world view. The State Department described French nuclear tests as "essential to the modernisation of the French nuclear deterrent;" in any case, the US regarded "these matters as French decisions."[7] The Americans have been less than enthusiastic supporters of a SPNFZ. With nuclear proliferation not being an issue in the region, and with the Soviet profile barely visible even with the aid of powerful technological gadgetry, Washington did not see any of its major security goals being served by the Treaty of Rarotonga. It was reported in April 1986 that the US had adopted a tough uncompromising stand towards the Treaty of Rarotonga. Washington was reported to have concluded that the Australian initiative had been meant as a sop to ALP activists rather than as a serious commitment to regional nuclear arms control; that the SPNFZ would directly benefit Soviet global objectives to the detriment of US interests; and that the SPNFZ could create a serious precedent for the establishment of interlocking NWFZs which would impede the free movement of US forces around the world.[8] Senator Gareth Evans denied in the Australian Parliament on 6 May 1986 that the United States held any misapprehension over Australian commitments to the SPNFZ, although some agencies within the US Administration were sceptical about the whole concept of nuclear-free zones. The formal US decision not to sign the Rarotonga protocols was announced on 4 February 1987; concern over the spread of such zones had triumphed over sensitivity to South Pacific sensibilities. Prime Minister David Lange of New Zealand, recalling the intensive consultations that had taken place in an effort to accommodate US concerns, expressed "deep disappointment;"[9] Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden too expressed deep regret.[10]

If the Treaty helps to appease the strong anti-nuclear sentiment in the region without undermining the US strategic position, then Washington would be better advised to settle for the moderate, Australian-initiated zone than to inflame anti-Americanism by unilateral dissociation. The final text of the Treaty did not limit the movements and flexibility of US nuclear forces in the South Pacific; in fact the Treaty is so innocuous that US officials joked about awaiting a "message in a

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bottle" from the Cook Islands before deciding upon a formal response. One can only hope that the next administration will not be equally blinkered.

As the Australian Defence Minister Kim Beazley conceded subsequently, the Treaty was aimed primarily at **France.**[11] The political fallout from the French sinking of the Greenpeace boat *Rainbow Warrior* in Auckland harbour on 10 July 1985, killing one crew member, focused international attention on French nuclear testing in the region[12] The fact that the French testing brought the first act of international terrorism to New Zealand also strengthened regional opposition to French nuclear activities. The French programme of testing in the South Pacific began with a 25-30kt atmospheric explosion on 2 July 1966. There were 41 atmospheric tests in all, culminating with a blast on 15 September 1974. Australia and New Zealand terminated atmospheric testing with a successful action against France at the World Court; the series of underground testing began with a 5kt explosion at Fangataufa Island on 5 June 1975. France exploded a 150kt device at Moruroa Atoll on 9 May 1985, the sixty-ninth in underground series. It is worth noting that the United States and Soviet Union signed a Threshold Test Ban Treaty in 1974 which prohibits underground tests of more than 150 kt yield.

Even after the international embarrassment of the *Rainbow Warrior* affair, France refused to budge on the issue of nuclear testing at Moruroa. Indeed, President Francois Mitterrand flew to Moruroa in mid-September 1985 to emphasise French determination on the subject, an act that was interpreted—and probably intended—as a calculated rebuff to pressure from the South Pacific countries to cease testing in the region. Although France has so far failed to ratify Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (which commits metropolitan countries to apply the denuclearisation provisions on emplacements and storage to their territories within the Latin American zone), the South Pacific is the only region in the world where nuclear explosive testing is presently carried out outside metropolitan territories. Not surprisingly, the French view the SPNFZ—again, probably correctly—as a means primarily of bringing further pressure to bear on their nuclear programme. French opposition to the SPNFZ is expressed on three counts: the major part of the zone comprises international sea space free of any constraints; risks of horizontal proliferation are minimal in the South Pacific; the five NWS have already given negative security guarantees at an international level.[13] Given such an attitude on the part of the French Government, it would appear unrealistic to expect a modification of their nuclear activity in the foreseeable future. In February 1987, France formally informed the South Pacific Forum that it would not adhere to any of the protocols. Its testing programme at Moruroa continues unabated.

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There were three tests just in November 1987: 20, 60 and 3 kt explosions on the 6, 20 and 30 respectively. The South Pacific countries simply lack the power of military might, diplomatic sanction or economic resources to compel France to terminate its testing programme. Such a conclusion is unlikely to stop regional countries from trying to change French policy since in the long term the basis of opposition to French testing is more durable.

Britain followed suit the following month by stating on 21 March, that signing the SPNFZ protocols would not serve its national interests, although it would not in practice act contrary to their requirements and would keep its formal position under review.[14] The deciding factor with Britain was undoubtedly its relations with its two NATO allies France and the United States. The net result therefore is that the communist countries have signed, and the Western Powers have not: the political repercussions of this alignment may be felt in due course.

EVALUATION

The Third Review Conference of the NPT in its final declaration of September 1985 welcomed the achievements of the SPNFZ as being consistent with the terms of Article 7 of the NPT. Similarly, the 46 Commonwealth Heads of Government, meeting in the Bahamas in October 1985, welcomed the SPNFZ Treaty as an important step in the global and regional efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. The Treaty of Rarotonga in fact goes beyond the minimalist position for NWFZs as set out by the United Nations. Firstly, the title itself is of some significance. A NWFZ indicates an arms control objective. Because the South Pacific countries have been just as firmly committed to environmental goals, the Treaty also prohibits the dumping of any nuclear waste in the zone (Article 7). In this respect the Rarotonga Treaty is an advance upon that of Tlatelolco, and more closely resembles the Antarctic Treaty. The legal implications of the zone for other countries are unclear, but its political message is not: Forum countries are united in opposition to "nukeypooh" being dumped anywhere in their region.[15]

The Treaty also called on parties to it to support the conclusion of a global convention on the matter. After four years of negotiations, a convention for the protection and development of the regions's natural resources and environment, the South Pacific Regional Environmental Programme (SPREP), was adopted at a conference in Noumea on 25 November 1986. The Convention area comprises the EEZs of all Pacific island countries and territories, and also those areas of high seas which are enclosed from all sides by the Pacific EEZs. The Convention obliges parties to prevent, reduce and control" pollution from any

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source; sets up a "blacklist" of substances that cannot be put into the ocean under any circumstances, e.g. mercury, oil and certain plastics; and requires special permission for dumping other substances, e.g. arsenic, lead and nickel. While nuclear testing is not prohibited, parties are committed to sound environmental management in regard to the consequences of nuclear testing. The prohibition of any future dumping constituted a significant concession by France and the United States, both of whom did sign the Convention on 25 November. SPREP thus complements the Treaty of Rarotonga's prohibition on the dumping of radioactive waste in the South Pacific seas, and consititutes a significant international regime for the protection of the marine environment of the region.

The Treaty of Rarotonga is an improvement upon Tlatelolco also in its arms control objectives. The Tlatelolco regime permits parties to "carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes—including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons" subject to certain informational requirements (Article 18). The SPNFZ prohibits the manufacture, acquisition, control or testing "of any nuclear explosive device (Articles 3 and 6). Article 1(c) defines a nuclear explosive device as "any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used." That is, "peaceful nuclear explosions," are prohibited in the South Pacific, but permitted in Latin America.

Rarotonga is an improvement upon Tlatelolco in its entry into force provisions. Article 28 of Tlatelolco stipulates three conditions for the zone to be established: all Latin American republics must sign and ratify; all relevant states must sign and ratify the two Protocols; IAEA safeguard agreements must be concluded. However, a party can waive these conditions, in which case the treaty comes into force for the party upon its ratification. As of 1984, 23 of the 33 eligible countries had exercised the waiver option and brought the Treaty into force for themselves. The exceptions include four significant countries: Cuba, which has not signed; Argentina, which has signed but not ratified; Brazil and Chile, which have ratified without exercising the waiver. As noted earlier, France is yet to ratify Protocol 1. The Treaty of Rarotonga is considerably simpler—and therefore stronger—for having gone into force as soon as any eight parties ratified it, it goes into force for subsequent adherents upon their individual dates of ratification. The zone came into effect on 11 December 1986, when Australia became the eighth country to deposit its instruments of ratification with SPEC. The seven countries which had already ratified were the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, New Zealand (on 13 November 1986), Niue, Tuvalu and Western Samoa.

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The South Pacific regime is stronger than the Latin American precedent also in the related sense of supplementing the NPT. Argentina, Brazil and Chile have all rejected the NPT as discriminatory; the only South Pacific country which does not adhere to the NPT, Vanuatu, is the most radically anti-nuclear country in the region. Rarotonga is an improvement upon Tlatelolco, finally, in introducing a longer delay before the regime can be dismantled. The Treaty of Tlatelolco imposes a three month period of denunciation (Article 30); Rarotonga requires a twelve month notice of withdrawal. (Article 13)

For all these improvements, the SPNFZ has not escaped criticism. There is a slight apprehension among the conservative tendencies in the region that the zone might be a "Trojan horse" which will eventually undermine Western security networks. The more substantial attack comes from anti-nuclear groups. Activities of most concern to such groups—port calls, transit facilities for nuclear-capable aircraft, command, control and intelligence (C^3I) facilities in Australia and New Zealand, movement of US nuclear forces in the South Pacific waterways, etc.—remain untouched by the Treaty. Not only does the Treaty carefully avoid impinging upon the substantial US nuclear involvement in the region; its geographical limits specially exclude US Micronesian territories. Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands has a permanent US missile testing facility; Guam has a nuclear stockpiling site and a strategic bomber base at Andersen airfield; both have C^3I facilities; and the United States has plans for establishing nuclear naval and air bases in Palau and the Mariana Islands.

TABLE 1

ACHIEVEMENTS AND GAPS IN THE SPNFZ

ACHIEVEMENTS	GAPS
Prohibited Nuclear Activities:	Permissible Nuclear Activities:
1 Nuclear Weapons (NW) acquisition by treaty states.	1 NW transit through zone.
2 NW (i.e. warheads) testing.	2 NW-related C^3I facilities.
3 NW basing within treaty states' territorial limits.	3 Missile testing.
4 NW use/threat against zone.	4 Logistic and rest and recreation support for porting and missile testing.
5 Dumping of nuclear waste at sea by treaty states.	5 Joint exercises with nuclear vessels.
	6 Nuclear-armed vessels' transit.
	7 Uranium mining and export.
	8 Nuclear power.
	9 Nuclear waste disposal on land.
	10 Use/threat of NW from within zone by NWS.
	11 Stationing and deployment of NW in Micronesia.

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Some of these gaps were sought to be plugged during the negotiations over the treaty. Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu tried unsuccessfully to define stationing in a way that would include limits on the frequency and duration of nuclear ship visits. As it stands at present, the distinction between formal basing and *de facto* home-porting could be easily blurred; indeed Cockburn Sound in Western Australia hosts a nuclear-armed submarine approximately 25 % of time. Nauru, PNG, the Solomon-Islands and Vanuatu tried unsuccessfully to extend Protocol 3 to prohibit testing of nuclear missiles. And Nauru and Vanuatu were equally unsuccessful in seeking to ban uranium exports. In fact in August 1986, Australia decided to resume uranium sales to France, which rather undermines Australia's disarmament credibility in respect of French nuclear testing in the region. Having failed in their efforts to give teeth to the Treaty, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands led a Melanesian revolt against its softness at the 1986 Forum meeting. Solomon's Prime Minister Sir Peter Kenilorea reiterated shortly before the meeting that until there was a more definite stand against testing and dumping, his government would not be signing the treaty. In effect, and later explicitly, he was calling for the protocols to be signed first by all relevant NWS, including France.[16] Earlier, during a visit to Britain in February, Vanuatu's Prime Minister had accused the Australian Government of haste, political expediency, and dishonesty with its own people in suggesting that the whole South Pacific was being denuclearised, when in fact it was not prepared to make even Australia truly nuclear-free.[17] A newly-formed Fiji Anti-Nuclear Group (FANG), campaigning to give more teeth to the SPNFZ as well, held an "alternative forum" in Suva in August 1986 during the South Pacific Forum meeting; the then (and now!) Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara was not amused.

In the light of these "loopholes" for the entry of nuclear weapons into the South Pacific, the SPNFZ has been described as a "sham" by various opponents. One peace activist concluded that the SPNFZ Treaty "seems more a cosmetic measure aimed at containing and defusing growing popular pressure for regional denuclearization than a serious move towards regional disarmament."[18] Furthermore, because the loopholes are largely in the categories of growing regional nuclearisation, while the achievements lie in the marginal categories in the South Pacific, there is suspicion that the SPNFZ may represent a net liability in serving to demobilise regional efforts at genuine denuclearisation. As one critic put it, the SPNFZ Treaty "permits and implicitly legitimizes the worst aspects of the nuclear arms race and Super Power rivalry in the region.[19] For these reasons, the Treaty of Rarotonga has been ridiculed as an agreement by non-nuclear states to stay non-nuclear, akin to a "Smoke-Free Zone" which applies only to non-smokers. The last

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comment in particular highlights the unfairness of the criticisms. A "Smoke-Free Zone" is fully effective when smokers refrain from lighting up within the zone; they are not required to quit smoking permanently, nor even to hand over all cigarettes and matches to guardians of the zone. Similarly, a NFZ will have achieved its objective if NWS refrain from lighting up their nuclear arsenals within the zone. Elimination of nuclear weapons, while desirable in the long run, is hardly realistic for the moment. This is unlikely to satisfy critics who believe that prohibiting the export of uranium by SPNFZ parties, e.g. Australia, is an eminently realistic non-proliferation goal.

The most serious potential gap in the SPNFZ regime is a lack of machinery for policing compliance with the protocols. A control system is established for verifying the behaviour of Treaty parties, but not for monitoring the behaviour of NWS within zonal limits. The experience of the Falklands War is very instructive in this regard.[20] First, Britain used five nuclear-powered submarines as part of its task force during the war: *Conqueror*, *Courageous*, *Spartan*, *Splendid* and *Valiant*; the Argentinian cruiser *General Belgrano* was sunk by the *Conqueror* on 3 May 1982, with the loss of 368 lives. Article 1 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco restricts the use of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes exclusively; Protocol 1 to the Treaty specifically obliges signatories to apply Article 1 of the text to territories under their jurisdiction within the Latin American zone; the Falkland Islands, even if British, is such a territory. Britain has ratified Protocol I; therefore Britain would appear to have been in breach of its obligations under the Tlatelolco regime. Second, it is far from clear if Britain in fact did not have nuclear weapons aboard some of its vessels in the task force, such as nuclear depth charges. Again there is a *prima facie* case that Britain violated Protocol 2 by carrying nuclear armaments on the task force. The Falklands War therefore reduced the credibility of NWS' assurances by means of signing NWFZ protocols. The Treaty of Rarotonga, in failing to institute procedures for verifying NWS' compliance with the three protocols, leaves intact this most important ambiguity in a NFZ regime.

An international development relevant to this article occurred in February 1985, when a two-year UN attempt to increase the number of NWFZs ended in complete collapse. The 21-nation panel, which included all five nuclear powers, was set up to consider the establishment of NWFZs in the Middle East, the Balkans, Northern Europe, Africa, South Asia and the South Pacific. Bhaichand Patel, Secretary to the group, announced its disbanding because of a failure to reach consensus. He indicated that difficulties arose, not with the major powers, but with countries like India and Argentina, which believed the whole exercise to be an "unrealistic sideshow."[21] These two third world leaders were

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determined to demonstrate that while the NWS did not fulfil Article 6 of the NPT obligations on curbing vertical proliferation, it was not possible to expect non-NWS to reach agreements on limiting horizontal proliferation. The "real issue" is the weapons stockpile of the nuclear powers; seeking to extend the NPT regime for non-nuclear powers through NWFZs is therefore an attempt to evade the problem rather than solve it by confronting it.

Regional disarmament can at best supplement universal disarmament. Efforts towards the first are spurred by lack of visible progress in the latter. Because the effects of nuclear war would be global and species-threatening, all countries have both the right and the responsibility to make efforts towards halting and then reversing the nuclear arms race. The hope is that each step forward such as a NWFZ will lessen the suspicion and distrust that underlies the arms race. The South Pacific zone has already attracted Southeast Asian attention for possible emulation by ASEAN. While comprehensive disarmament remains a long-range goal of the international community, the conviction has grown that immediate and partial measures which would increase confidence and create a more favourable atmosphere for overall disarmament should be pursued. The mega-instruments of death in the Super Powers' arsenals become the more frightening for the micro-ethics of their international behaviour, guided in both instances by apocalyptic theologies. Arms control efforts are open to the criticism that they look too much to the past, that they are reactive and curative. The greater need may well be for measures that are anticipatory and preventive. The SPNFZ can be commended for being prophylactic rather than abortive or therapeutic. This therefore gives it a military significance additional to its political importance as a means of raising the threshold of nuclear initiation and as a confidence-building measure.

The most important contribution of NWFZs is stabilisation of relations so that the international atmosphere can be relaxed and made more peaceful, and confidence that nuclear arms control agreements can be respected verified and enhanced. A NWFZ is primarily a means for influencing the nature of peacetime relations between the Super Powers. Arguably, global arms control talks are more likely to result from rather than lead to reduction in tensions. President Ronald Reagan observed at the Moscow Summit that the United States and the USSR did not distrust each other because they were armed; they were armed because they distrusted each other. Beyond this, governments as well as people must not lose sight of the truth that the course of major wars is littered with broken promises. States at war have little time for paper guarantees not backed by force; the world little cares nor long remembers treaties violated in times of war. Until such time as a reliable

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system of international security is in place, therefore, a NWFZ is a useful collateral measure of worldwide arms control. But it is not a policy of national defence. States will be attracted to a NWFZ only when convinced that their vital security interests will be enhanced and not jeopardised by participation. The Treaty of Rarotonga was adopted in 1985 because the South Pacific countries believe that their environmental and national security interests will be promoted by this NFZ regime.

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5 Any significant development affecting the operation of the treaty has to be reported to the Director of SPEC, which then circulates the reports to all members; the parties are also encouraged to exchange pertinent information through the Director; and the Director is required to submit an annual report to the Forum on the status of the treaty. The Director is further authorised to convene an *ad hoc* Consultative Committee at the request of any party for consultation and cooperation on any matter in connection with the treaty. Each p rty is entitled to appoint one representative to the Committee; a quorum is constituted by half the parties; and decisions are to be made by consensus or two-thirds majority voting. A party suspecting violations of the treaty by any other party must first raise the issue with the latter. If not satisfied with the response, the complainant can request a meeting of the Consultative Committee, furnishing evidence as appropriate. If the matter is not explained to the satisfaction of the Committee, it is empowered to direct that a special inspection be carried out by three qualified inspectors appointed in consultation with the complainant and 'defendant' parties. The inspectors are to be given "full and free access to all information and places" within the territory of any party; they will operate under the direction of, and shall report in writing to the Consulative Committee. The Committee then reports to the Forum members on whether a party is in breach of treaty obligations; if the conclusion does establish such a breach, then the subject is to be referred to a promptly convened meeting of the South Pacific Forum.

6 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), although autonomous, is a member of the UN system and reports annually to the General Assembly on its work. One of its major functions is to apply safeguards to ensure that nuclear materials and equipment intended for peaceful uses are not diverted to military uses. The safeguards system, which constitutes the international community's first attempt to establish a control system over an industry of strategic importance, includes four matn steps: (1) IAEA experts examine the design of a state's nuclear plants to check that it permits effective control; (2) the state is required to keep detailed records of plant operations and flow and inventory of new materials; (3)

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the government concerned supplies periodic reports to the IAEA based on those records; and (4) the IAEA sends inspectors for spot-checks in nuclear plants (inspectors for each country are designated with the consent of that country).

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NOTES AND VIEWS

INDIAN EXPORTS TO UNITED STATES AND SECTION 301 OF THE US TRADE ACT OF 1974

AS is well-known, the United States is one of the most important trading partners of India and we want to further increase our exports to that country. But unfortunately these days, the United States is threatening to adopt a tough trade policy towards developing countries. The framework of this "tough" trade policy is Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974. The purpose of this article is to analyse Section 301 of the US Trade Act 1974, with a view to finding out as to whether the threatened action under the section will actually be justified in case the action is taken against India.

One important plank of attack adopted against the developing countries by the United States is lack of protection being given in those countries to intellectual property rights of the United States. This is a big topic and it cannot be examined here. But I have examined this matter and can say with confidence that this is not the case so far as India is concerned, because in India there is adequate protection being given to intellectual property rights of foreign parties.

SECTION 301

Section 301 of the Trade Act 1974, as amended, authorises the President[1] of the United States to take any action, including but not limited to imposing or increasing import fees and restrictions, in response to certain "acts, policies or practices" of foreign governments or their instrumentalities.[2] Unlike the other trade laws, such as the Anti-dumping, Countervailing Duty, Section 201 "Escape Clause" and Section 337 "unfair methods of competition" statutes, Section 301 is not directed to limiting imports or protecting only the United States market. Rather Section 301 is intended to remedy practices which inhibit the ability of US parties to compete anywhere in the world whether in domestic or foreign markets. Moreover unlike the other trade laws, Section 301 is applicable to practices involving not just trade in goods, but also to trade in services, whether or not related to specific goods, and to foreign direct investment with implications for such trade in goods or services.

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Another difference is that the Section 301 requirement that the practices complained of "burden or restrict United States commerce" is significantly less formal and less stringent than the injury standards that must be met to obtain relief under other trade laws.

PRACTICES COMPRISING VIOLATIONS OF THE STATUTE

The practices for which Section 301 offers relief are any of four general categories of practices of a foreign government or its instrumentality.[3] The four general categories of practices are:

1 Practices which are inconsistent with the provisions of, or otherwise deny benefits to the United States under, any trade agreement;
2 Practices which are unjustifiable;
3 Practices which are unreasonable; or
4 Practices which are discriminatory.

Practices Inconsistent With and Denying Benefits to the United States

This first category of practices actionable under Section 301 has special significance in that, unlike the other three categories of practices for which relief may be granted, a complaining party may not need demostrate that practice complained of also causes a burden or restriction on United States commerce.

Notably, a practice of a foreign government or instrumentality need not actually violate a trade agreement for it to fall under this first category of actionable practices. Rather, a practice need only deny benefits to the United States under a trade agreement by nullifying or impairing concessions.[4]

In any case, the USTR generally has interpreted "trade agreement" to mean exclusively the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)[5] or a trade agreement approved under Section 3(a) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.[6] These approved trade agreements include the GATT codes negotiated during the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.[7] This interpretation has not extended generally to agreements peripherally related to trade.[8]

Unjustifiable

"Unjustifiable" practices are defined in the statute as any "which is

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in violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights of the United States." The statute goes on to note that the term "unjustifiable" includes, but is not limited to, any such practice "which denies national or most-favoured nation treatment", *i.e.*, treating United States firms less favourably than domestic or third-country firms, respectively. "International legal rights" of the United States also include the right to establish an enterprise in a foreign country, or *protection of intellectual property rights*[9] (*such as Copyrights and Trade Marks*). The most frequent basis for a finding of unjustifiable practices is a breach of an agreement other than a trade agreement, such as a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation.

Unreasonable

"Unreasonable" practice is defined in the statute as any "which, while not necessarily in violation of or inconsistent with the international legal rights of the United States, is otherwise deemed to be unfair and inequitable." The statute goes on to note that the term "unreasonable" includes, but is not limited to, any such practice which denies fair and equitable market opportunities, opportunities for the establishment of an enterprise, *or provision of adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights.*[10] Since "unreasonable" acts are not necessarily inconsistent with any international agreements, they represent potentially the most unilateral of actions that may be taken under Section 301.

Discriminatory

The final category of practices that are actionable under Section 301 are those that are "discriminatory." The statute defines "discriminatory" practices as including "where appropriate, any . . . practice which denies national or most-favoured-nation treatment to United States goods, services or investment."

Burden or Restrictions

As noted above, a petitioner must show that the practice complained of, unless it is a violation of a trade agreement, burdens or restricts United States commerce. The statute defines "commerce" to include not only trade in goods but also in "services (including transfers of information) associated with international trade, whether or not such services are related to specific goods", and in "foreign direct investment

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by United States persons with implications for trade in goods and services."[11] The required burden or restriction may be shown in any number of ways and has included a showing of an increase in imports[12] into United States in competition with the petitioner's business, reduced availability of raw material imports into the United States hampering the petitioner's business or, most frequently, displacement of United States export sales either in the country engaged in the practice being complained of or in third countries.

Surprisingly, in contrast with other trade laws, under Section 301 the injury determination is forged in the context of other diplomatic and economic considerations. Moreover, although there must be some causal connection between the practices complained of and the required burden or restriction, it is not a defence, as in actions under other trade laws that other factors are more significant causes of injury.

THE NATURE OF ORDERS UNDER SECTION 301

The President must determine what action, if any, he will take with respect to a petition not later than 21 days after receiving the United States Trade Representative's (USTR's) recommendation. The President must publish a notice of his determination, including the reasons therefor, in the Federal Register.

The statute directs that the President "take all feasible action within his power to enforce (United States) rights or to obtain the elimination of . . practices" which comprise substantive violations of Section 301.

The statute empowers the President to take these actions on a non-discriminatory basis or solely against the foreign government involved. The statute also allows the President to take these actions with respect to *any* goods or *any* sector without regard to whether they were those involved in the practices found to comprise violations of Section 301.

As potential actions, the statute includes but does not limit the President to, removing the concessions under trade agreements, imposing import duties or restrictions, and denying the issuance of or restricting the terms and conditions of any service sector licences, permits or other authorizations issued or applied for under Federal Law.

NEW EMPHASIS ON SECTION 301

The United States Administration recently has placed an increased emphasis on Section 301 as a central element in its tougher trade policy.

In addition, legislation has been proposed which would amend Section 301. These amendments, *inter alia*, would shorten deadlines for

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resolution of Section 301 investigations, and most notably set firm deadlines for cases subject to GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures which have been so far open-ended. In addition, the proposed amendments would increase the role of Section 301 as a reciprocity statute and would increase the role of Congress in influencing the initiation of investigation and in determining the actions to be taken to provide relief from the practices complained of.

CONCLUSIONS

We have seen above that Section 301 of the US Trade Act 1974 has the potential of curbing or restricting India's exports to the United States on the pretext of lack of protection given to the Intellectual Property Rights in this country. We have also seen as to how action is sought to be invoked on this ground[13] in the United States against Indian exports to that country. We have also made the statement above that in India there is adequate protection being given to Intellectual Property Rights. This statement is borne out by, *inter alia*, a large number of cases actually decided by the Supreme Court of India and the various High Courts on four laws, namely the Patents Act 1970, the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act 1958, the Copyright Act 1957, and the Designs Act 1911, comprising the intellectual property laws of this country. From among these large number of cases, to refer to only some of the cases decided by the Supreme Court of India are: *American Home Products Corporation* v. *Mac Laboratories Pvt. Ltd.*:[14] *Gramophone Co. of India Ltd.* v. *Birendra Bahadur*;[15] *K Krishna Chettiar* v. *Ambal and Co.*;[16] *Sumat Prasad Jain* v. *Sheojanan Prasad and State of Bihar*;[17] and *State of U.P.* v. *Ram Nath*.[18]

Thus it will be unfortunate if the United States restricts our exports to that country under Section 301 of their Trade Act 1974, as this action will be entirely unjustified in view of the Indian legal position.

P.S. SANGAL*

NOTES

1 Although Section 301 authorises the President to act on his own motion, as a practical matter Section 301 proceedings are most often initiated as a result of a petition to the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) requesting that the President act.

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2 What is often referred to generically as Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, is in fact a system of provisions now set forth in 19 U.S.C., Ss. 2411-2416. The statute was amended in 1979 and again in 1984. Further amendments have been proposed in recent bills now pending in the Congress.

3 Section 301 does not apply to conduct of private parties.

4 Where a violation of a GATT provision is shown, the complaining party is rebuttably presumed to have had its trade concessions nullified or impaired. Where a contracting party complains of nullification or impairment of its concessions by an action that is not a violation, however, then it must demonstrate such effects, *i.e.*, must demonstrate at least an element of burden or restriction on commerce. 19 U.S.C. S. 2411(*a*) (1)(B) (*ii*).

5 Opened for signature 30 October 1947, 61 Stat. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 27 U.N.T.S. 19.

6 19 U.S.C. S 2503(*a*).

7 Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Relating to Customs Valuation, 12 April 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10,402; Agreement on Government Procurement, 12 April 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10,403; Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, 12 April 1979, 32 U.S.T. 1585, T.I.A.S. No. 9788; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (Relating to Product Standards), 12 April 1979, 31 U.S.T. 405. T.I.A.S. No. 9616; Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Relating to Subsidies and Countervailing Measures), 12 April 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Relating to Antidumping Measures), 12 April 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919 T.I.A.S. No. 9650; and Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, 12 April 1972, 31 U.S.T. 619, T.I.A.S. No. 9620.

8 *E.g.*, Treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation, such as the US-Japan Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 2 April 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. An apparent exception to this general rule occurred, however, in the recent Section 301 matter concerning Semiconductor Products. See Memorandum of 31 July 1986, for the United States Trade Representative, Determination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 51 Fed. Reg. 27, 811 (1986) in which the President characterized the United States-Japan Arrangement concerning Trade in Semiconducter Products as a trade agreement for purposes of Section 301 (in declaring that its breach by the Government of Japan would be an act inconsistent with a trade agreement).

9 See a Report under the heading: "US Car Manufacturers Keen to Enter India", which *inter alia*, says:
"American investment in India—particularly in areas such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals and the new process of arid land management—would have received a big boost but for a few hindrances, like stiff royalty, inflexible licensing policies, delays, and importantly, *the inadequate protection of intellectual property rights, the sources said. He cited the example of certain bulk drugs in which US companies had patent rights. Suddenly, there had been a jump in exports of these drugs from India to the US so much so that the US manufacturers now felt threatened. Consequently, they had filed petitions with the US Government urging appropriate action under Section 301 of the new trade bill. This could result in drastic action against some Indian firms, including the withdrawal of certain items from GSP.*" See *The Economic Times*, 19 January 1989.

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10 See Ibid.
11 19 U.S.C. S 2411(*e*) (1)(B). Prior to 1984, the statute contained no express indication as to whether petitions concerning foreign investments were within the jurisdiction of Section 301. Such jurisdiction was expressly set forth, however, in the 1984 amendments. Pub. L. No. 98-573, Tit. III, S 304(*f*)(1), 98 Stat. 3005 (1984).
12 See n. 9.
13 See n. 9.
14 A.I.R. 1986 S C. 137.
15 A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 667.
16 A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 146.
17 A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2488.
18 A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 232.

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BOOK REVIEWS

NEHRU'S REFLECTIONS AND WARNINGS

A Review Article

THE Second Volume of Jawaharlal Nehru's *Letters to Chief Ministers —1947-64** affords insights into the mind of India's first Prime Minister on a wide range of issues. This volume holds seventy eight letters and covers the period from January 1950—May 1952. These epistles written on a fortnightly basis to the Chief Ministers unfold before us a panoramic view of events in India then and indeed the world at large. The book runs across a whole gamut of issues, with practically nothing being left uncovered, be it communalism, planning, Korea, Kashmir or for that matter the unwelcome presence of astrologers in India. We have a finely interwoven collection of Nehru's reflections and warnings on various themes.

This was a period of India's history when the country was confronted with critical problems on various fronts, and politics was "in a peculiarly fluid state." (p. 531) The communal canker was eating into the vitals of the nation and Nehru had his hands full dousing the flames. Communal incidents were regular occurrences on both sides of the border, and Nehru was cautioning the people not to fall a prey to this evil. He decried the attempts of the Hindu Mahasabha and other communal elements for stirring up passions and inciting the people, and warned that "so long as I am Prime Minister, I shall not allow communalism to shape our policy, nor am I prepared to tolerate barbarous and uncivilized behaviour." (p. 61) He was vehemently critical of political parties both of the left and the right taking advantage of caste groupings to fight eleetions and bemoaned the ascendance of the communal element in Indian society. The belief that, "If India is to progress, we must absorb and make our own the various minorities in India, and notably the Muslims," (p. 40) was ingrained in him. He repeatedly pleaded that the communal path should be eschewed and warned that any infractions in this regard would be strictly dealt with. It distressed him that the lessons taught by Gandhiji had been forgotten so soon and

*G. Parthasarathi: *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-64. Volume II 1950-52*. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1986, 661 pp., Rs. 150.

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he advocated the "Gandhian approach to the communal problem." (p. 59)

The Kashmir issue was also to occupy Nehru during this trying period of India's history. In fact the seriousness of this issue is evident from the fact that it figures repeatedly in his letters. This was also to be one of the most vexatious and volatile issues that Nehru had to face in his years at the helm of affairs. He castigated the Pakistani leaders for creating a war psychosis and thereby vitiating the atmosphere in the two countries. He deplored the fact that this continuous war-like propaganda in Pakistan heightened tensions in Indo-Pakistan relations. The need to avoid war with Pakistan was constantly stressed, and he was insistent on all issues being settled through negotiations. He was scathing in his criticism of the "jingos" in both nations and made the offer of a no-war pact to Pakistan, wanting all disputes to be settled by peaceful means. Predictably enough, his overtures did not meet with the desired response from Pakistan which strangely enough found the terms "vague." (p. 7) He ruled the fact that the Kashmir problem was not considered by Pakistan as an economic or political problem but was viewed from a communal angle. A noteworthy event of this period to which Nehru attached great importance was the Pact he signed with Liaquat Ali Khan on 8 April 1950 to settle the problem of the minorities in both the states. He implored upon the governments to do their "utmost to implement this agreement in every way." (p. 65) Though he repeatedly stressed the need to avoid war, he nevertheless warned Pakistan that any attack on Kashmir would be viewed as an attack on India and that they would not find India unprepared. In fact Nehru was not averse to even holding a plebiscite to decide the future of Kashmir provided that certain conditions were met. He berated the United States and United Kingdom for their support to Pakistan which led it to assume more strident postures towards India. Notwithstanding the signing of Nehru—Liaquat Ali Khan Treaty and the mediation efforts of Frank Graham of the United Nations, Indo-Pak relations remained very strained during this period.

Foreign affairs was Nehru's forte and in fact one could even call it the 'exclusive preserve' of Nehru. Even in the pre-independence days, Nehru had been in charge of drafting the foreign policy resolutions of the Indian National Congress. It was to be so till he remained on the scene. Pakistan was, as we have noted, the dominant theme on his 'external' plate. The bone of contention with Pakistan was of course Kashmir though other nettlesome issues cropped up from time to time. Pakistan's minatory postures towards India irked Nehru. But this "obsession with Pakistan" did not preclude his involvement with various other dominating issues on the international horizon. Nehru turns our

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attention to the need for better relations with our neighbours, China, the Korean imbroglio, Anglo-Iran dispute, Japan, Tunis and more. The emergence of China was to Nehru "an event of the highest importance in the present and the future." (p. 109) He attached the greatest importance to maintaining friendly relations with China. "It has to be remembered that history and geography have brought India and China near to each other. However much we may agree or differ with each other in regard to our policies, the relationship of India and China is of paramount importance to both our countries and the world." (p. 589) He was particularly critical of the Big Power policy of excluding China from the United Nations and ceaselessly campaigned in favour of its admission. In his eyes this "was the first major step in lessening the universality of the United Nations." (p. 603) The Korean situation also troubled Nehru a great deal. He was anxious that the Korean conflagration should not blow up into a world war. Korea, to him, was "in a kind of death agony" (p. 183) and he was anxious that the conflict be resolved soon. In fact, he was even prepared to mediate if called upon, to serve the cause of 'peace' in the Far East. The uneasy situation in Nepal also troubled him a lot and he called upon the Rana regime to make concessions to the demands of popular movements. He expressed an ardent desire that "Nepal should get out of its old rut and feudal regime." (p. 255) Though his sympathies were with the progressive movements there, it did not influence his attitude of neutrality towards the power struggle prevailing in that country. With regard to the American and British policies, he aptly remarked—"Undoubtedly Communist expansion must be met. But it cannot be met adequately with the support of reactionary and feudal regimes. It is here that European and American policies have failed." (p. 459-460) Recent events in the Philippines, Chile, South Korea and other third world countries have only seemed to confirm this incisive analysis. The Anglo-Iran dispute over the oil fields, situation in Egypt and Tunisia, he attributed to an inadequate appreciation of the nationalist sentiments in these countries. He was also deeply concerned about the plight of the South African Indians, and to him the racial issue remained "one of the basic issues of our time." (p. 356) He was apprehensive that delay in finding a solution to this issue would lead to a "racial explosion...on a big scale in Africa." (p. 542) While enunciating India's policy of "neutrality" he made it clear that "our country and our policy stand for world peace." (p. 361) Neutrality to him consisted in India, not giving up "the right to decide for ourselves as to what we should do and what we should not do in any particular set of circumstances." (p. 139) To Nehru, a sacrifice of these rights amounted to an abject surrender of our independence.

On the domestic front Nehru had his hands full coping with an

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assortment of problems. The food situation continued to be grave throughout this period and there were near-starvation conditions in different parts of India. The situation was particularly serious in Madras and Bihar. His comments on various occasions—"Food is still problem No. 1 for us," (p. 305) "Food continues to be our primary occupation at the present moment," (p. 383) reveal the gravity of the situation. Rains had failed and the nation faced the gloomy prospect of a famine. But Nehru did not allow himself to be swept away by the onslaught of problems and frequently exhorted his Chief Ministers to procure more, grow more and to clamp down on hoarders and blackmarketeers. He also arranged for massive imports of food grain from the United States and China to tide over the situation. He berated his Chief Ministers for treating 'food' as "a secondary portfolio," (p. 399) and advised them to give it their utmost attention. Timely rehabilitation work on a massive scale was also undertaken in various parts of the country. "Food" Nehru said, "now and always, is the primary problem. Nothing else can be given higher priority and it is primarily by the way we deal with the food problem that we will be judged." (p. 423)

On the economic front, it was during this period that the Planning Commission was set up (on 28 February 1950) to catalyse India's development activity. "I am quite convinced," he said, "that without a planned approach we are doomed to failure." p. 205) He was acutely distressed at the low purchasing capacity of the masses and advised employment generation schemes to alleviate their sufferings. He attached the greatest importance to the establishment of "major schemes and productive enterprises", (p. 345) and to him, they represented "the promise of the future." (p. 346) His plaintive cry that "all our development schemes and social reform schemes are suffering terribly because of lack of money," (p. 307) serves only to highlight the difficult position that Nehru was caught in. On the one hand, he was eager to lay the foundations of a modern India through major schemes—which would serve as a vehicle for ameliorating the lot of the poor—and on the other, his vision of a new India was hamstrung by an acute scarcity of resources.

In the agricultural sector, Nehru argued that agrarian reform was "by and large the most vital and urgent of our problems." (p. 387) Zamindari was abolished, and in fact the Constitution was amended so as to enable implementation of the Zamindari legislation. But at the same time he was mindful of the fact that "in any scheme of land reform, we have to aim at something more than mere abolition of big zamindars." (p. 408)

The prevalence of corruption distressed Nehru a lot. To him corruption and blackmarketing were the invisible but real evils in the country and he advocated stringent measures to tackle these evils. He was also

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insistent that in any purchase of machinery from abroad or in the matter of giving contracts, "no opportunity be given for individuals to make private profit out of these big transactions." (p. 211) He was also critical of political attempts to shield prominent personalities; as he put it, "few things discredit government more than a belief in the public that prominent offenders are shielded." (p. 214) What times, what mores!

He was also critical of the lack of discipline in the Congress Party and bewailed the growth of "parlour politics" (p. 394)—decisions not being taken in the AICC but in small groups outside. Selection of candidates on the eve of elections, he felt was bad and pleaded for an early selection of Congress candidates. Political expediency of any kind was loathsome to him. As he put it, "whether we win or loose, we have to carry on, in our different capacities, the nation's work." (p. 539)

But Nehru was not infallible and no one was more aware of it than Nehru himself—"I realize all too well my own failings and imperfections. I know that the great work and service that India demands cannot be fulfilled by a few individuals." (p. 289) "No doubt", Nehru said, "we committed mistakes, but I think that it can be said with truth that we worked to the utmost of our capacity and ability and with the desire to serve India during this very difficult period of our history." (p. 90-1) These letters are, not a mere chronology of events, but the sensitive reflections of a colossus who strode our nation for more than four decades. The volume under review, is as other volumes are, a compulsory reading for the 'second generation' politicians who have stifled and almost destroyed the legitimacy of the institutions which Nehru endeavoured to build up for both effective state formation and nation-building.

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FOREIGN POLICY

KARUNAKAR GUPTA: Sino-Indian Relations 1948-52—Role of K.M. Panikkar. Minerva Associates Pvt. Ltd., Calcutta, 1987, 143 p., Rs. 100.

THE book under review is an addition to the Research Monograph Series published by the Netaji Institute for Asian Studies, Calcutta. Dr. Gupta, the author, qualifies for this study because he was constantly in touch with Sino-Indian developments and had written on the subject quite regularly. The 1948-52 period was a formative period of relationship between India and China. To understand the role of historian diplomat, Sardar Panikkar, in shaping the relationship would thus be quite useful.

As long as hegemony in Sino-Indian relationship prevailed, culminating into the "Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai" syndrome, not an iota of criticism came to the fore. But soon after the Chinese skirmishes in Tibet (1959-60) and then in NEFA (1962) a witch-hunt to assign responsibility for the wrong advice to Nehru on China began.

To satisfy public sentiments and relentless pressure from all sides, even from a section of the Congress Party, Nehru removed Krishna Menon from the key portfolio of Defense. It was alleged at that time that Krishna Menon assured Nehru "that the Chinese would never attack India."

Dr. Gupta through this monograph, has made a systematic approach by not only putting the various criticisms at one place but also analyzing them critically.

Charges against Panikkar, as mentioned by Gupta in Chapter I, were broadly as follows:

1 He managed to stay improperly as Ambssador of the Peoples Republic of China even after having been accredited to the Kuomintang regime. He was "an opportunist" according to a critic.

2 He failed to realise the true nature of Communism in China and the real character of a totalitarian regime. Quite wrongly Panikkar considered it "as the culminating event of Asian resurgence."

3 Panikkar believed that whatever the Chinese said about their friendship to India and Tibet was proved wrong.

4 A strong note to China was sent against armed action. The second note was sent on Panikkar's persuasion recognising

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China's sovereignty over Tibet. Some critics go to the extent to say that the word "suzerainty" in the *aide memoire* was changed to "sovereignty" by Panikkar.

Critics also say that it was Panikkar who advised Nehru not to raise the border issue and demand acceptance by China of the McMahon Line as a pre-condition for recognising the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.

In this monograph the validity of the charges are examined by Gupta with the support of available documents, discussions with eminent persons and through some writings in books and journals. He has reached a singular conclusion that all charges against Panikkar were baseless. Dr. Gupta's views seem to be somewhat partial because of his overall devotion to Sardar Panikkar. Later events ultimately leading to Chinese aggression in 1962 confirm in unequivocal terms that whosoever advised Nehru on relations with China did not give the proper advice at the appropriate time. Morever, Gupta's exhaustive reading of Western authors has also influenced his mind to exonerate Panikkar totally.

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RAVI INDER MALHOTRA: Afghan Search for Identity: Frontier Settlements 1872-1893. GDK Publications, New Delhi, 1982, xii, 202 p., Rs. 60.

AFGHANISTAN could acquire "political statehood" by a coordination of its own "search for identity" and British India's search for security; the frontier settlements in the last three decades of the last century embodying this process of coordination. Afghanistan's "yearning for national identity" fitted into the British need for a scientific frontier for their Indian Empire, and thus came about the treaties and engagements demarcating Afghanistan's frontier with Persia, Russia and British India. Malhotra has analysed an important issue: the factors motivating the British involvement in Afghan frontier settlements. The British policy was largely a reaction to what Persia and Russia *actually did* in promoting and preserving their interests in Afghanistan and also to what the two powers *seemed to do*. In consequence, Britain's Afghan policy in the nineteenth century reflected both its correct understanding of the situation in the country and its total misunderstanding of it too. The process through which Afghanistan settled its frontier problems and

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the way the British were involved in the problems would establish this fact.

Afghanistan was an independent, but an "influenced" state, a political buffer for British India's security. The ambitions of Persia and Russia was for Afghanistan both a temptation and a risk, the one if the two powers could be played off against one another, and other if they united to pressurise Kabul. Rather than allowing Afghanistan to play a balancing game, the British would themselves assume an extended responsibility to give Kabul the protection and patronage it needed and yet feared. And so the keen interest of the British in all the settlements of Afghanistan with its powerful neighbours.

Persian expansion kept the Afghan rulers wakeful; the hold over Seistan being the most important cause of quarrel between the two powers. The British were eager to mediate in the Perse-Afghan dispute over Seistan and the friendly Afghan Amir as eager to turn the mediation to his advantage. Malhotra has avoided tracing the tortuous course of diplomacy in which the three powers, Persia, Afghanistan and Britain were involved; he has only succinctly narrated the results of the British diplomacy. The Seistan Award sought to meet the conflicting claims of Teheran and Kabul; the British arbitrator, Colonel John Goldsmid, being keen on balancing the two powers to avert renewed conflicts between them which Russia could exploit. Thus came into being "the frontier of compatibility between Persia and Afghanistan" (p. 40)— a triumph of British diplomacy and an evidence of the Afghan Amir's level headedness.

The settlement of the Russo-Afghan frontier at the Oxus River was a step to ensure both the Afghan and British Indian security, the two powers' interests being similar in the context of their fear of Russia. The problems associated with the Oxus boundary have been very clearly identified by the author, and their solutions as clearly narrated. (pp. 41-70) The point that emerges from the author's narration is that in respect of the Seistan frontier, the British had acted as impartial arbitrators, but in regard to the Oxus frontier settlement, they were holding Afghanistan's brief without its knowledge. (p. 50) the Granville-Gortchakev Agreement, 1872-73 gave the Afghan Amir no real relief from anxiety, for it was closely followed by the Russian occupation of Khiva, viewed by the Amir as a buffer between his kingdom and that of the Czar.

The eighties were packed with events and issues on the north-western frontier of India; the Panjdeh Crisis, in particular, accentuating the Anglo-Russian rivalry for, exclusive spheres of influence in and around Afghanistan. The need for a definitive agreement between Britain and

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Russia for demarcating the disputed sectors of the Russo-Afghan boundary was acutely felt. Malhotra has not provided anything but a very bald outline of the work of the Afghan Boundary Commission and how the British Commissioners, particularly, Sir West Ridgway executed his difficult job. By this settlement Russian advance towards Herat, holding the very key to India, was stopped. In the words of Sir Alfred Lyall, the boundary pillars set up by the British and Russian officers on the Hindu Kush and by the Oxus "record the first deliberate and practical attempts made by the two European Powers to stave off the contact of their incessantly expanding Asiatic empires." Malhotra's observation that the Oxus-boundary settlement made by the British and the Russians was accepted by the Amir, for he "had hardly any choice" in the matter needs some elaboration. (p. 70)

If the Afghan Amir had "frontiers of fear" with Russia in the north, British India had a frontier of uncertainty with Afghanistan. The settlement of the Indo-Afghan frontier, therefore, engaged the attention of the British Government. The "tribal problem" of the Indo-Afghan frontier, the problem of crime and lawlessness and how the problems were viewed by successive Governors General are too well known; so the author's narration of these "problems and policies" are mercifully short. (pp. 71-86) The Durand Agreement settled the Indo-Afghan frontier, although it did not quite succeed in putting the Amir's suspicions of the British intention at rest. In the context of the forward policy of the British Indian Government, the suspicion was well grounded, and Amir Abdur Rahman made no secret of his opposition to the projected British mission to Kabul headed by Lord Roberts, a strong supporter of the "forward policy."

That Amir Abdur Rahman refused to be "a puppet to be made to dance" by the British Viceroys (p. 92) is made clear by the author's analysis of his reaction to the British proposal to send a mission to Kabul and his attitude to the mission when it went to Kabul. Lansdowne found Abdur Rahman both tough and wily; the Amir's appeal to the British Government in London over the head of the Viceroy was particularly annoying. Ultimately, however, a crisis was averted thanks mainly to the backstage diplomacy of Salter Pyne, the English Chief Engineer in Kabul, who enjoyed the trust and confidence of the Amir. (pp. 96-98)

Malhotra has analysed the instructions to Durand while avoiding a good discussion of the problems faced by Durand and how he solved them. In fact, not much can be had in the author's treatment of how the Durand Agreement came about; the keenness to avoid details has resulted in the narration being too short. One would indeed doubt if the

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Amir's reaction to the Agreement was one of "genuine satisfaction." (p. 113) He has summed up the results of the Durand Mission by saying:

> Sir Mortimer Durand's Mission reconciled matters by giving me some sort of compensation, and I am quite contented and satisfied that I have gained more than I have lost by British friendship. I merely mention these facts to show...that though England does not want any piece of Afghanistan, still she never loses a chance of getting one—and this friend has taken more than Russia has.

So much has been written on Afghanistan and from so many viewpoints that it is difficult to find anything new in a book that has grown out of a Ph.D. thesis. The main merit of this work is the lucidity with which the author has told a story which is already known but which one likes to be retold.

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K. MOJUMDAR

HARI RAM GUPTA: Panjab, Central Asia and the First Afghan War. Publication Bureau Panjab University, Chandigarh, 1987, xv, 381pp., Rs. 120.

THE book under review was first published from Lahore in 1943 under the title *Life and Work of Mohan Lal Kashmiri 1812-1877*; the same now reappears with a new title as its second edition. To justify this change, the original biographical work is said to have been "thoroughly revised and to some extent recast." Even in its new incarnation, the book however essentially remains a narrative of Mohan Lal's travels and adventures, his observations on the countries he passed through and the exciting role he plyayed in the First Afghan War (1838-42) as an agent of the invading British forces.

Born in a Kashmiri Pandit family of Delhi, Mohan Lal was first taught Urdu and Persian at home and later, was given instruction in the English language at the Delhi College for some three years. However, before he had completed his studies there, he was persuaded to accept service in 1831 at the age of 19, as a Persian interpreter under Alexander Burnes, who had been appointed to undertake a secret intelligence mission beyond the Khyber Pass. This first itinerary of Mohan Lal,

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from December 1831 to January 1834, took him through Maharaja Ranjit Singh's territories to Afghanistan, Bokhara, Balkh and Herat. after this first round of foreign tour in various disguises, Mohan Lal was back home to Delhi and from there by July 1834 was sent to the Hindu College of Calcutta for eighteen months' training in practical surveying.

In 1835-36, he was employed for collecting information for the British about trade and commerce of Ranjit Singh's south-west Panjab. But thereafter he was once again sent to Afghanistan on a diplomatic mission under Alexander Burnes. Among his colleagues attached to the Mission was also Nourozee Fardunji of Bombay. The mission failed and the disastrous Afghan War followed in which Mohan Lal played a very important role both as an informer and as a diplomat. On one occasion, he successfully negotiated the release of British prisioners. In several chapters, the author has depicted in great details the thrilling episodes of Mohan Lal's life, in hiding and captivity and his secret reports from Afghanistan. Despite his admirable services to the British, Mohan Lal was pensioned off when he was only 32 years old. But before his retirement he sailed to England in 1844 on his own and, after a visit also to Germany, he returned in 1846. While abroad, he was cordially received by important state dignitaries and was even presented to Queen Victoria. He settled in Delhi on his return but his later years were pathetic and depressing. Having been refused acceptance in the Hindu society for his unorthodox ways of life, he died unsung and was buried as a Muslim in 1877 at the age of 65.

On his return from Central Asia in 1834, Mohan Lal published his *Journal of a Tour Through the Punjab, Afghanistan, Turkistan, etc.* (Calcutta, 1834/London, 1835). This work was again printed in London in 1846, with an additional account of his journey across Sind and Afghanistan and his visit to Europe. His third publication was *Life of Dost Mohammed*, Vols I-II (London, 1841). It is these publications and other works of Mohan Lal's contemporaries as well as archival materials that constitute the major sources for Hari Ram Gupta's work. Gupta also traces a grandson of Mohan Lal, Agha Hyder Hasan of Hyderabad, and seems to have left no stone unturned to gather additional information, wherever available, about his hero's chequered personal career. We learn that Mohan Lal kept a regular diary from 1831 till his death, but it is now irretrievably lost.

The author's efforts have been rewarding, in so far as he has been able to throw light on certain hitherto unknown or distorted facts about Mohan Lal's private life which still remains largely shrouded in darkness. "This book enables us to know something about a fascinating person. It gives us". writes Jawaharlal Nehru in his Foreword to its first

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edition (reproduced also in the second),

> ...intimate and revealing glimpses of the early days of British rule in North India, of the Punjab under Maharaja Ranjit Singh, of the British campaigns through Sind and in Afghanistan, of the disasters in Kabul and of the prevailing conditions in Central Asia in the thirties of the Nineteenth Century. These glimpses are not flattering to the British.

It was accidentally that young Jawaharlal came across Mohan Lal's published *memoirs* and journals and thus became inquisitive about "this unusual and attractive and much married man," who had dined with princes and potentates in his best days. In the course of his Foreword Nehru says:

> Here was a person full of the spirit of adventure, to whom adventure came in full measure before he was out of his boyhood...The British power profited by Mohan Lal's ability fully. Often, as Mohan Lal admits sorrowfully, he gave definite pledges on behalf of the British authority, which were not subsequently kept.

Nehru's tribute to such a man, despite the latter's consistently loyal service as an intelligence man and diplomat to British imperialism is understandable. For Nehru was of the opinion that in a free India a man like Mohan Lal would have risen to the topmost rungs of the political ladder; but under British rule he could not rise higher than the position of a Mir Munshi because his superior British officers were "jealous of his ability and of his contacts with sovereigns and others who were beyond their reach."

The Foreword written by Jawaharlal Nehru and the reproduction of a portrait of Mohan Lal have made the book under review all the more valuable.

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AMALENDU GUHA

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R.C. MAJUMDAR: India and South East Asia. *Edited*: K.S. Ramchandran and S.P. Gupta. B.R. Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1979, xv, 218 p.

IN the Preface to the first edition of his monumental work—*A History of Southeast Asia*, Prof. D.G.E. Hall wrote, "A completely objective history has never been produced nor is one man's knowledge and judgement adequate for a fully satisfactory treatment of so vast a subject as the present one..." Research work on Southeast Asia no doubt owes a great deal to the zeal and sincere hard work of European scholars, a process which may go on for many more years to come in view of the innumerable original manuscripts and inscriptions available on the subject which are yet to be properly studied and interpreted. In other words, it may be said that what one studies or writes today may well be challenged and even demolished in not so distant a future.

However, all original researches have their own merit since they have made pioneering contributions to the subject. Among Indian historians of Southest Asia, there are two such pioneers whose names immediately come to one's mind; they are Nilkanth Sashtri and R.C. Majumdar. Their contribution to the subject lies not only in the fact that they carried out original research on the subject at a time when precious little had been done by Indians on this most fascinating period of ancient history of Southeast Asia, but also in that they rediscovered the rich cultural heritage of India which lay buried deep in the lushgreen rice cultivations of Java and Indo China. Dr. Majumdar has often been labelled as a "chauvinistic", "partisan" historian who was out only to glorify the ancient Indian Hindus and attributed all socio-cultural-economic developments of this region to the genius of the Hindus. However, before passing a judgement one must remember the times when this great historian did the bulk of his work. A cultural regeneration was sweeping India as a part of the Freedom Movement which necessarily led even the most eminent leaders of the period to harp on the achievements of their ancestors in order to infuse a sense of pride and confidence among the people who had been enslaved for centuries by their colonial rulers and were told that whatever civilizing influence they had obtained was brought to them by the Europeans. Subhash Bose took serious objections to Prof. Oten's remarks to this effect. Obviously in an atmosphere surcharged with cultural resurgence, Mazumdar could hardly have been expected to remain uninfluenced. Apart from this, it may also be said that he was perhaps as "Indo-centric" in his views as Europeans were "Euro-centric" in theirs; a fact which Prof. Hall himself admits, though his book bears only a single reference to this prolific writer whose voluminous work, spanning nearly half a century, has hardly left untouched any aspect of ancient Indian history.

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The present compilation of nineteen of Mazumdar's articles on India and Southeast Asia, written between the years 1934 and 1961 and published in various journals is therefore a useful compendium since these articles are not readily available anymore. The articles cover a wide range of topics starting from Indian "colonization" of Southeast Asia to the political and cultural history of various well known ancient kingdoms of Southeast Asia, trade relations between India and Southeast Asia to the influence of Sanskrit and the great epics of India on the people of the region.

Since nearly three decades have passed from the time that the last of these articles was written and lot of research has been done on these subjects, it would perhaps be more appropriate to highlight certain special features which mark the writings of Dr. Majumdar. In the article on "Greater India", he explains what he actually means by this much misunderstood term. Indian cultural influence, according to him, had permeated the soul of the diverse races of Asia. India played to a large extent that role in Asia which the Greeks had played in Europe, he contends. He also refutes the theory that India was a country which did not trouble itself with the domain of the others.

The ancient Indians were a sea-faring trading community who travelled to areas far beyond their frontiers. In the chapter on Ancient Indian Colonization of the Far East, Majumdar says that the point to be noted in this context is that unlike the colonial empires of the later periods, the Hindus did not regard their colonies as outlets for their excessive people and an exclusive market for their growing trade. These "cultural missions", as he calls them, left their indelible impact on the religion, art, language, literature and architecture of the people of this region, and of special importance is the influence of Sanskrit, the great epics-*Ramayana* and *Mahabharata*, and the classical art of the Gupta period.

In the subsequent articles, he talks about specific empires in the region which flourished till the Eleventh Century. More interesting however are the chapters on art, where he talks about the influence of the Pala art of Bengal on the Sailendra Empire and that of the Gupta period on the Sri Vijaya art.

In the chapters dealing with the impact of Hindu law on areas like Java and Bali, he says that though Indian law books like the *Manu Samhita* were known, local traditions and customs heavily influenced these, as in the case of criminal law. Even in civil law, many regulations dealing with women, particularly regarding marriage and divorce have pronounced local influence and at times have no parallels in Indian law books. Greater similarities are to be found in the cases of rules of property, inheritence, etc.

The rest of the articles mainly deal with the cultural and religious

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impact of the Hindus on the various kingdoms, like the Hindu kingdom of Srishetri in Burma and Sukhodaya in Thailand. The book is rounded off with two chapters, one on Buddhism and the other on the influence of Sanskrit in Southeast Asia.

The compilation can serve as a handy reference book for those who are deeply interested in the subject. The use of original sources and the tallying of dates and events with the Chinese sources constitute a very important contribution to the subject. The one thing about Dr. Majumdar's work which probably will always inspire successive generations is his profound scholarship and study of original source material. To the students of ancient Indian History, he will remain a constant source of inspiration.

New Delhi, DILIP CHANDRA

BALADAS GHOSHAL: Indonesion Politics 1955-59: The Emergence of Guided Democray. K.P. Bagchi & Co.; Calcutta, 1982, viii, 314 pp., Rs. 75.

THE book under review is the Ph.D. dissertation of the author written during the late sixties, with important additions and revisions. It is a scholarly and incisive analysis of the political processes that led to the birth of Soekarno's "Guided Democracy." At the same time, the reader is able to draw from this work important insights relevant for many other parts of Asia and the Third World.

The main events taken up by the author centre around the period when the 1955 elections revealed the fragile nature of the Indonesian parliamentary system when Soekarno formulated his famous "*Konsepsi*", the unrestful period of 1957 and 1958, and the emergence of "Guided Democracy" in 1959. An interesting chapter has been added on at the end about the regime of Suharto "in order to highlight the...major continuities in the political system in Indonesia."

What is the content of "Guided Democracy"? It is essentially an art of manouevering the four major political parties in the policy to create political stability. The failure of parliamentary democracy by 1955 threw up the challenge: How was Soekarno to please the diverse charismatic leaders around whom were organised various political parties, without offending the Army and without loosing his own control over the country? The answer was found in the revival of the hitherto abandoned 1945 Constitution to replace the then prevailing 1950 Constitution: "Whereas under the 1950 Provisional Constitution the Parliament was

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the supreme legislative body, under the 1945 Constitution the powers of Parliament to legislate were severely restricted by Article 21 which gave the President an unconditional veto. Secondly, under the 1945 Constitution it was not the Parliament but the Supreme Consultative Congress (MPR) which was the highest legislative institution. There was also another important difference between the 1945 and 1950 Constitutions. Whereas under the former, Parliament could not overthrow the government since it was of Presidential character and responsible to the President alone, under the latter, the government could be overthrown by the Parliament' (p. 261).

Thus, "With the revival of the 1945 Constitution, Soekarno laid the foundations of Guided Democracy and prepared the institutional framework for it. Soekarno's own position was strengthened with the assumption of dual functions of the Head of State and the Prime Minister and with his right to appoint the members of Parliament, the People's Consultative Assembly, the Cabinet, and the Supreme Advisory Council." (p. 262) Soon the "functional groups" virtually replaced political parties, the powers of the Army found a legitimate avenue of growth through the "functional groups" and the National Front, and finally the elected Parliament itself was dissolved. "Democracy" in this system lay in the possibility for expression of popular will and opinion through the channels that were instituted for this purpose. The "Guide" (in 1959 Soekarno and 1969 Suharto) designed these institutional channels. Thus the Indonesian concept provided both options to the "Guide": he could keep the cake of power and also eat it (i.e. legitimise it at will through controlled elections).

Rather than view this in a limited framework of political rhetoric, Ghoshal asks the question as to how this came about? His answer is clear. The constraints which Soekarno, the leader of the masses during the liberation struggle, found himself with were as follows. Political parties, barring the Communist Party (PKI), took positions and stands which were essentially opportunistic in nature; the Army was getting increasingly disgruntled; and the economy was stagnating. The format through which these issues were articulated in popular rhetoric were "*Pantjasila* vs Islamic State," "Java vs Sumatra,"*Santris* vs *Abangans*," "Communism vs anti-Communism," etc. The 1958 revolts in the outer regions, gave the opportunity to Soekarno and he took it. He created "Guided Democracy."

Further, what is also noteworthy is Ghoshal's attempt to trace the roots of the concept of "Guided Democracy" to the socio-cultural ideology of the Indonesian tradition embodied in principles such as *gotong rojong* (mutual assistance), *musjowarah* (deliberations) and *mufakat* (consensus). Soekarno symbolising such a tradition had thus

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found an answer. In fact, Ghoshal traces Soekarno's proclivity for "Guided Democracy" to as far back as the pre-independent revolutionary struggle. (p. 81).

There are some general issues that are thrown up by Ghoshal's work. For example, What was the reason for the rise of opportunism in political parties? Further what role was played by the peculiar demographic and geographical features of Indonesia?

Of the political parties, the PNI, the NU, PKI and the Masjumi stood out distinctively. On their performance at the 1955 Elections, Ghoshal's analysis appears somewhat incomplete and perplexing. For example, after stating that, "Ideology had always played a very significant role in Indonesian politics", (p. 45) Ghoshal continues that "the Masjumi set the ball ralling by vociferously campaiging for an Islamic state...It is possible that the Masjumi intensified its campaign for an Islamic state, because it was afraid of the growing strength of the PNI and the PKI especially." (p. 45) It is evident that, atleast for the Masjumi in 1955, ideology was a proxy in its struggle for political supremacy. If this were so how could ideology have been important on its own?

The political economy of Indonesia was heavily dependent on and subject to the vicissitudes of the world market for extractive and agro-based products during the 1950's. The importance of this factor in the politics between Java and the "outer regions" also appears to have been understressed and overlooked. The author does bring out the importance of the political economy of Suharto's regime with its dependence on private foreign capital and US assistance. However, the existence of sub-political economic pressures during the 1950s, is not noted by the author.

The class and the ethnic character of the Indonesian society and its evolution during 1920-1950, would have thrown up important clues to the understanding of the evolution of Indonesian politics during and after the liberation struggle. As a result, the reader is left uninformed (except perfunctorily) about the socio-economic basis of the events of 1955-59. Notwithstanding the acute sense of detail in the narrative, it remains confined to persons and factions and party dynamics.

These drawbacks do not detract the reader from the fact that it is an important work which provides valuable insights into the political and other sociological factors at work in the emergence of "Guided Democracy" in Indonesia.

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B.D. ARORA: Indian-Indonesian Relations 1961-80. Asian Education Service, New Delhi, 1981, vx, 371 pp., Rs. 95.

THE study is a revised version of a doctoral thesis presented to the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

In surveying Indian-Indonesian relations between 1961 and 1980, the author has applied a historical-analytical approach. The sources used are published documents of the Governments of India and Indonesia, as well as newspapers pertaining to the period. A number of policy makers, Indian and Indonesian have also been interviewed.

The first chapter, "The Background," describes the significant geographical location of Indonesia which formed an important link in the overseas trade of the Indian coastal towns. The centuries-old contact with India left its impress on the art, culture and civilization of the Indonesian islands, particularly Java. The colonial rule of the British in India and the Dutch in Indonesia brought an end to the close contacts between the two countries. National movements forged contacts again, and the Asian Relations Conference (New Delhi, 23 March-2 April 1947) was an important landmark, with Indonesian delegates participating. Post-independence cultural relations and cooperation between the armed forces developed. However, the author notes the evident strains in the relationship because of the feeling that India was adopting a 'Big Brother' attitude.

Major landmarks in the relations between the two countries were the Bandung Conference of April 1955 and the Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade in September 1961. Differences of opinion started to emerge with India giving priority to the issues of war and peace, while Indonesia emphasized the need to condemn Western Colonialism. Indonesian leaders were also disappointed at not getting direct support for the West-Irian issue. The author feels that one of the major consequences of the divergent views expressed at Belgrade was the "cooling off of relations at a personal level. Nehru's opposition to Sukarno's views on various issues was interpreted in Indonesia as personal insult to the latter. This tended to bring personal *rapport* between the two leaders under strain." (p. 89)

Against this backdrop, the author has, in subsequent chapters analysed bilateral relations focusing on issues like the West-Irian question, the Malaysia problem and the role played by certain countries primarily Pakistan and China. On the West Irian issue, India gave moral and diplomatic support to Indonesia, but the author points to the dichotomy in India's espousal of a peaceful solution for Indonesia when India had itself used military force in Goa. Incidents such as the so-called "Sondhi incident" created tensions. G.D. Sondhi, Senior Vice-President of the

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Asian Games Federation suggested to the Executive Committee of the Fourth Asian Games (being held in Djakarta) that the Asian Games be stripped of its official name because of the non-participation in the Games by the athletes from Israel and Taiwan. It sparked off virulent anti-Indian demonstrations in Indonesia with the press and Government adopting an anti-Indian stance.

When China attacked India (October 1962), Indonesia chose to remain neutral concentrating on efforts to restore peaceful relations between China and India.

The proposal for the formation of the Federation of Malaysia invoked an increasingly hostile response. Its apprehensions centered around continued British military presence in the area and the British-Malayan Defence Agreement of 1963, whereby Britain was entitled to maintain bases in the area. The unstated fear perhaps also was, that of the concentration of large numbers of Chinese in one area. India took the stand that it did not wish to get entangled, but welcomed the inauguration of Malaysia in September 1963. In Indonesia there was violent reaction which also spilled over against India. Differences also surfaced with respect to the Second Afro-Asian Conference and India's stand that Malaysia and the Soviet Union should be invited to the Conference. Trade and cultural relations between the two countries suffered.

The author devotes considerable attention to discussing the role of China and Pakistan in influencing the relations between India and Indonesia. The signing of the Sino-Indonesian Friendship Treaty in 1961 witnessed a new phase in the relations between China and Indonesia. According to the author, "A near identity registered in the two countries' approach to the continued existence of the British and American economic, political and military influence in the region, thus demonstrating the high degree of success China had achieved in its policies towards Indonesia." (p. 217) China supported Indonesia's policy of confrontation with Malaysia and also supported Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations. Chou-En-lai, along with a large Chinese delegation, attended the Tenth Anniversary Celebrations of the First Asian-African Conference held in Djakarta in April 1965.

During the same period relations between Pakistan and Indonesia were growing, particularly with Indonesia's support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. For Indonesia it seemed to be a *quid pro quo* since Pakistan had supported the Indonesian stand on the West Irian.

The 1965 *coup* in Indonesia, with the coming to power of Suharto, brought many changes in Indonesian policy, internal as well as external. The new leadership accused China of interference in Indonesia's affairs. The Chinese were unhappy at Indonesia's actions against the PKI and the overseas Chinese community. Relations between

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the two countries were suspended in October 1967. With respect to India a new wave was in the air, with the new Indonesian leadership eager to improve relations. Indonesia adopted a new stance on the Kashmir issue and the two countries issued a Joint-Communique on 19, January 1967.

The major thrust of the work is a survey of Indian-Indonesian relations upto 1967. The style used is descriptive, recounting events and incidents. However, within this framework the author has tried to delineate two distinct phases—pre-1965 *coup* and post-1965 *coup*, with the change in the Indonesian leadership bringing about significant changes in external policy and relations.

The post-1967 period has been added as a postscript, and encapsulated in one chapter. In July 1969 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi paid an official visit to Indonesia, being the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister since 1955. In the 70's however, divergent approaches to the problems with regard to Cambodia and the Indo-Soviet Treaty were emerging. Despite lip service, trade between the two countries has remained very low, though it showed an improvement towards the end of the decade. In the early eighties, joint industrial ventures with Indonesia were started but several problems have belied the early expectations.

A brief concluding chapter presents a summary, reiterating facts and views presented earlier. A work of this nature, painstaking though it may be, suffers from some endemic flaws. It remains limited in scope and analysis, dependent as it is on conventional source material. The evidence that it offers is limited in nature because it has to draw perforce, on documentary evidence and newspaper reports in English. A survey of the local language press would benefit an analysis of policy initiatives and ehanges. The limitations in the study are not so much that of the author as of the nature of the study itself. In the survey of Indian Indonesian relations, what also emerges is the limited nature of the contact since 1961. This is but a reflection of the political power game and the part played in it by the big powers and the small powers.

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KIRAN DATAR

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TEJPAL SINGH, The Soviet Federal State: Theory, Formation and Development. Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1982, vii, 104 pp. Rs. 40.

THE book under review, as the Foreword by Devendra Kaushik states, is "expected to fill the gap which exists in our study of the subject;" very few competent works by Indian scholars exist on such an important subject as the basic Principles, evolution and functioning of the Soviet Federal System. "The present work based on mainly Soviet sources consists of two parts: theoretical and historical. Chapter I covers the place of federalism in Marxist-Leninist theory and traces the emergence of this concept in the pre and post-October Revolution eras. Chapter II deals with the principles of autonomy which are considered to be the offshoot of the rights of self-determination by the nations. Chapter III is devoted to the analysis of the concept of democratic centralism—as an important principle of Soviet Federalism. The principle is as the author puts it, "a combination of uniform centralised and planned management of the economy and soeial and cultural development with local initiative ensuring diversity of ways and means of advancing towards the common goal of socialist construction." Chapters IV, V and VI discuss the origins and development of the Soviet Federal state, how it emerged during the formation of the RSFSR and on what basis the USSR was established.

The author's basic premise is that the Soviet concept of federal state, which is totally different from the Western concept is, "basically related to the nationality question and its solution! It is from here that concepts like Soviet citizen and Kazakh nationality have emerged." The author maintains that the federal state structure is in the Soviet view a transitory phase leading to ultimate fusion of all nationalities and therefore, like western federations it is not rigid and "static". While dealing with the theoretical position of Marx, Engles and Lenin, Singh analyses Lenin's works—*On the Manifesto of Armeaian Social Democrats* (1903); *Critical Remarks on the National Question*; and *The National Question in our Programme* (1903), in which he was slowly moving towards the view that the federal form of state construction in Socialist Russia was the most suitable form. It was in April 1917, on the basis of the experience of two Russian revolutions, Lenin formulated his thesis on federalism in his work *on The Republic of Soviets*. Again in his article "Finland and Russia" (May 1917), Lenin formulated the idea of a voluntary union of Russian proletarian and peasant republics and republics of all other nations. It is in his work, *State and Revolution* that Lenin concretely advances the idea of the necessity for a federal form of state construction of Socialist Russia. In his work, *Revision of the Party Programme* written in October 1917, Lenin observed that the Communists must

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"strive for a political system, which would best ensure economic progress and the rights of the people in general, and in particular, make the transition to Socialism as painless as possible." The author in this section brings out clearly that Lenin by 1917 had come to recognise the federation as a 'historically necessary form of state construction in the multinational Russia.' The author then gives Leoposhkin's arguments as to the factors which made the Communist Party change its stand on federation. These were according to him Lenin's perception that the Soviet Republic was different than the bourgeois state both in essence and form; relative strength of the national movement was more serious and the unity of nations more complicated; the desire towards a unitary state was particularly strong among the Muslim bourgeoisie particularly the Tatar trading bourgeoisie and nationalistically inclined intelligentsia; the demand of national territorial federation was the ideology of the young national industrial bourgeoisie which strove for freedom in forging economic links with other countries. Particularly strong federalist tendencies were present among the Azerbaijanian bourgeoisie which tried to lead the federal movement of the Muslims. In the Baltic region Bolsheviks were struggling for the creation of Soviets and their strengthening as organs of power of a single democratic Soviet state. The party saw federation as a desirable form of state construction because it did not appear contradictory to the task of forging economic cooperation of the toiling masses of the various nationalities; the federation also guaranteed the external security in the military sphere. It was in the Second Congress or the Comintern in August 1920 that the Communist Party confirmed federation as a "transitional form towards full unity of toilers of various nations."

During the last seventy years of its existence USSR has continued to be in this transitional form towards full unity of toilers of various nations, and until recently the world did not officially come to know of the stresses and strains Soviet Federalism had been experiencing. Western scholars had been propagating that Russian was being imposed on all the other nationalities and that their culture was not being preserved while the Soviet scholars like Filin, Yu, Desheriev and others have been maintaining that Russian has been accepted willingly by many nationalities who did not have a script of their own. Soviet sociologists and the 1979 Census of the USSR maintains that about 80 per cent of the Soviet population has declared Russian as their second mother tongue and international marriages are on the increase. (See *Dynamics of Bilingualism and Nationality Question: A Case Study of USSR and India*—Y.C. Bhatnagar, Delhi 1985). Soviet literature could claim of giving bilingual writers like Chingiz Aitmatov, who can create equally beautifully in Russian as well as in his mother tongue. In other words, Soviet litera-

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ture on the state clearly brought out that Soviet Federalism was working smoothly and the nationality question was settled amicably. The revised edition of CPSU also recognised that the nationality question is completely solved. The matured Socialist Soviet State was moving in the direction of mutual enrichment of national cultures. But suddenly with *glasnost* and *perestroika* the strains in Soviet Federalism have begun to appear; the Tashkent and the Armenian demonstrations and new demands for redrawing the territorial maps of the republics—particularly Azerbaijan and Armenia. These incidents have of course, attracted the attention of the CPSU and the party has taken some concrete steps, but can one call these incidents as 'strains' in the Soviet State—is a question which needs indepth study. The author of this book is the most suitable person to study these 'strains' which have emerged in the "transitional form of the State." The book on the whole is a good historical study and will be useful for scholars interested in Soviet affairs.

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Aurangabad. Y.C. BHATNAGAR

S.C. SAXENA: Political Conflicts and Power in Africa. UDH Publishers, Delhi, 1985, xii, 428 pp., Rs. 200./£ 15/$ 20.

THE book under review deals with some of the major conflicts that presently afflict the continent of Africa. Africa as a continent, Dr. Saxena notes, faces many problems, hence only five have been selected for the purpose of this study: Apartheid in South Africa, the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa, conflict in the Western Sahara, Civil war in Chad and Military Rule in Nigeria. Each of these, the author says, represents a different type of political conflict.

The author purports to have "made an in-depth analysis of these problems, examining at the same time, their various implications for the continent and for the whole world." But the book hardly lives up to its stated claims. The book is marred by casual statements, contradictory assertions and other such inconsistencies.

The Namibian problem, Saxena writes (in the Preface) is essentially a colonial problem where South Africa, the Mandatory Power is the colonial power and Namibia the colony. Similarly, he regards the *Polisario Front* led national liberation struggle of the Saharawis against Morocco, as a colonial issue. In 1976, the Western Sahara (formerly known as Spanish Sahara) was partitioned between Morocco and

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Mauritania by the withdrawing colonial power Spain. Both Morocco and Mauritania had been laying claims to the Sahara as its own territory since the 1960s. The Saharawis reacted to this event by demanding self-determination and an armed struggle ensued. In 1979, Mauritania abandoned its claims and withdrew from the territory in its possession. The Government of Morocco continued to maintain that the Sahara was an integral part of the state of Morocco.

Mainly on the basis of circumstantial evidence, Saxena asserts that Morocco is the only non-European colonial power and the only African nation which is a colonial power. Further he cites this as the only instance of a former colony, namely Morocco, colonising another people—the Saharawis. Obviously, Saxena is overlooking certain facts. He has already termed the Namibia Question as one of colonialism and South Africa, a colonial power. Does the existence of minority white regime negate South Africa's status as an African State? The *Polisario Front* at present controls the major part (90 per cent) of Western Sahara. The SADR Government is a member of the OAU and is recognised by more than 60 nations (including India). It is accepted that the struggle of the Saharawis is for self-determination, but, how does Morocco's illegal occupation of this territory fit into the paradigm of European colonialism? The issue is more of a territorial dispute than one of colonial subjugation. Such a tenuous definition of the problem as made by Saxena, reflects a flawed perspective on the issue, for clearly the objective conditions do not go along with the definition. (By this logic even Tibet will be deemed a colony and China a colonial power).

Chapter IV, titled "Chad: Victim of Intervention" (pp. 267-329), discusses the Chad Question. From the time of its independence in 1960, the former French colony, has experienced communal tensions. There was no appreciable change in the situation even after the Minority Christian led Government was replaced by a Government of the Muslim majority. How deceptive was the monolithic character of the Muslim community was seen after tribal and ethnic divisions emerged within it. The lust for political power, Saxena writes, drove the various factions to seek material assistance from external powers, all of whom, be it France, Egypt, Sudan, the US or Zaire, had their own interests in granting such support; and it is unlikely, says the author, that external intervention would be discontinued in the near future.

Nevertheless, the author calls for a halt to external assistance without which no agreement would be possible. He argues that once external military aid to the various factions is stopped they would be forced to come to some settlement and since "by and large there is not much difference to their policies (sic) therefore, an agreement between them would not be difficult."

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Saxena's optimism about a possible reconciliation amongst the Chadian group, once external support is withdrawn, appears to be somewhat misplaced. The root cause of the conflict is to be found in an amalgam of socio-economic, cultural, religious and political factors. The Chadian state lacks a well-structured and efficient administrative system. Chadian society with its diverse population is yet to be welded into a homogenous and well integrated community. Interwoven into the problem are both internal communal and ethnic differences and external vested interests. Major powers and foreign governments are not the only condict for arms in the contemporary world. The world today also consists of the Adnan Khassogis, arms smugglers and mercenaries. Even after outside intervention is discontinued, the challenge to the creation of a modern and viable nation state will come from within. That is the real challenge. And it is one that stares in the face of not just the least underdeveloped states of Africa but also the better placed countries of Asia.

The last chapter (V) has been devoted to a discussion of the conflict within Nigeria. This African nation has experienced military *coups* and military rule for the better part of its existence as an independent state. Military rule, according to the author, was the fallout of the failure of civilian government in Nigeria. He attributes the failure to rampant corruption, bankrupt economic policies, nepotism, maladministration and electoral malpractices by the civilian ruling class to perpetuate its own rule. As a consequence an economic crisis of great magnitude has engulfed Nigeria causing irreparable damage to the Nigerian society and the state.

Considering the Nigerian predicament, Saxena holds forth that only military rule is the solution in the circumstances. He welcomes the military *coup* of 1983 and says the military must continue to rule "for many years to come so that they are able to undo the wrongs by the ousted civilian regime." An early return to civilian rule, according to him, is neither desirable nor feasible in the existing situation. But he accepts that military rule cannot be a permanent solution but only a short term measure to last till normalcy and sanity in public life is restored. He does not believe there is need to be pessimistic about the future of democracy in Nigeria, given that some democratic traditions and democratic institutions have existed amongst certain Nigerian tribes since early times.

Saxena's concern is for a stable political order, immediate rather than long-term. Therefore, the issue is not whether the stable political order can be ensured through the democratic process, i.e., the nurturing of viable democratic institutions and the spread of a democratic consciousness, or through a regimented discipline and the concentration of power

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in the hands of a group. Perhaps for this reason he does not care to address himself to some of the real problems such as the "failure of Nigerians to evolve into a nation with common symbols, common attachments and common loyalties," which he says, "is one of the important reasons for the demise of democracy in Nigeria." The question is: Was the foundation for democracy well laid?

The author's advocacy of military rule does not take into account its long-term implications and the disastrous consequences it could have for a future free, just and egalitarian Nigerian society. Saxena's belief that the military will be able to set the house in order is difficult to accept for, as Bayo Ninalowo points out, "With the ideological, socio-economic and political alignment of the military with dominant functionaries of the peripheral state, one should hardly expect a transcendence of the current socio-economic and political contradictions with a military administration." The thrust of the policies adopted by the Military Administration, Ninalowo further says, is such that "it reinforces prevailing socio-economic contradictions."

No less misplaced is Saxena's hope that the military will voluntarily hand over power to a civilian government. Here we may quote William Graf's pertinent observation about the Nigerian situation (though it has general applicability as well), "...departing military governors will seldom voluntarily transfer power to civilians whose outlooks, socio-economic antecedents and poltical *weltanschauung* are too dissimilar to their own, since they will be concerned about policy reversals, loss of prequisites of even possible trials, retributive acts, etc."

In the light of all this, Saxena's suggestion that to check corruption the military and the civilian could alternately form government, albeit the military mainly as a transitional government; and that incumbents of each set up could keep a match on the members of the other, is clearly based on untenable premises.

The book comes through disatisfactorily mainly because of the very approach it has adopted to the issues it deals with. What particularly strikes the reader at the very outset about the book is the absence of a general statement of the problem. Also missing is the presentation of a broad conceptual framework under which all the different types of conflicts can be subsumed. The questions that come to mind as one approaches the book are: What are the different types of conflicts? Can we have a typology of conflict situations? Is that essential for a study of this kind? What are the common undercurrents passing through all these conflicts which weaves them into the web of a strife-torn problem-ridden Africa? What, for example, is common between such apparently divergent conflicts as apartheid in South Africa and military *coups* in Nigeria?

A book titled, *Political Conflicts and Power in Africa* one would be led

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to believe, is an attempt at political analysis of conflict and power in Africa's context. It follows therefore that such key concepts as power be defined. Further, the implications that an all encompassing conflict arising out of the quest for power, has for the progress and development of any society (here African society) at one level and for peace and stability of the international system at the second level, needs to be first elaborated through a theoretical formulation.

An in-depth analysis impliesan enquiry into the source of the problem and its various dimensions. Here the expectation is that the study would go into the basic cause of the discords that beleaguer the African countries while simultaneously raising certain fundamental questions regarding these conflict situations. Instead we have a description of these conflicts. A book dealing with problems such as these, but which lacks a well argued theoretical framework can hardly lay claim to be a well researched study. The bibliography, almost entirely consisting of secondary sources, is also an indication of this fact. Apart from this lacuna, the author has also not assigned any specific reasons for considering these few conflicts; as a result the selection appears arbitrary.

Of interest to us in India is the fact that the subject has engaged the attention of an Indian academic. This raises (perhaps not fully justified) certain expectations. It is felt that the author might be able to provide an understanding and insight into the issues, missing in an Eurocentric point of view. Possibly he would be able to comprehand the problems that plague Africa in a different light from that of a Western scholar. Perhaps he would able to discern certain similarities and commonalities between some of these conflict situations and other discords afflicting other parts of the underdeveloped world. But in the end what is clearly felt throughout the book is the absence of a meaningful insight into the African imbroglio.

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ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

ROBERT O. KEOHANE: After Hegemony—Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984, ix, 291 p., $ 39.

THIS book has a vast theme and an ambitious aim: to show the possibilities of international cooperation based on common interests. To many, such a theme may appear laughable or as trite, as the oft-repeated outpourings of some career UN official. However, Keohane's argument is more sophisticated, being based on a largely "realist" analysis of the prevalence of discord between nation-states. He argues that international stability based on the hegemonic leadership of a particular nation-state is not the only alternative to chaos. Cooperation, defined not as the absence of conflict, but rather as a process that involves the use of discord to stimulate mutual adjustment, can also be a form of ensuring international stability.

Keohane uses the theory of international regimes to suggest that cooperative processes can be created and later sustained because it is easier to modify existing regimes than to seek radical alternatives. Regimes are described as consisting of "injunctions at various levels of generality, ranging from principles to norms to highly specific rules and decision-making procedures." Rational-egoist models do not necessarily predict that discord is the inevitable result of initially anarchic relations. Rather, factors such as whether anyone may be excluded from collectively provided benefits, or whether interactions between players can be expected to continue over time, may lead to the emergence of cooperation for mutual benefit and even to international regimes. Further, Keohane argues that the value of international regimes is likely to be higher for organisations with bounded rationality, leaders who wish to bind their successors, or governments that have empathy for one another.

Clearly these arguments are more relevant for interactions between the states of advanced capitalist economies. Keohane's empirical discussion traces the period of hegemonic cooperation (Bretton Woods) and its decline for the countries in this group. In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States was an economic and political hegemon which was not only able to dictate terms to the rest of the world, but also had various ways of providing incentives or pressures to induce others to conform to its preferences. The increasingly complex interdependence between nation states was backed by a number of international regimes, of which Bretton Woods is the most outstanding example. This pattern of hegemonic stability brought with it not only collective goods (such as

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an increased certainty about future patterns of behaviour) but also non-collective goods in the form of incentives (loans, oil supplies, other aid) that could be provided to particular countries.

The decline of hegemonic cooperation, both because of international economic discord and domestic political pressures, has not meant the disappearance of all forms of international cooperation. Rather, some institutions have persisted, since "international regimes perform functions demanded by states having shared interests; when the regimes already exist, they can be maintained even after the original conditions for their creation have disappeared." Nor is such cooperation always directed towards "liberal" purposes, as the prevalence of voluntary export restrictions and agreements like the MFA, indicate. Thus, hegemony and international regimes can both contribute to cooperation. Neither is necessary or sufficient, but in the absence of both, the prospects for cooperation are likely to be extremely bleak.

Keohane suggests that "the arguments of this book surely apply to some relationships between the advanced market economies and the developing countries. These states have interests in common, which can only be realized through cooperation." But in reality, if such an extension is to be made, then an important dimension of the interaction—that of relative bargaining strengths and the ability to coerce—must be incorporated. Relations between these two sets of countries are not relations between economic or political equals, and to the extent that one group is "forced" to adjust to conditions imposed by the other, cooperation may be a misnomer. Indeed the "optimistic" picture that Keohane presents can also be interpreted as one of cooperation between advanced capitalist countries who can together impose some form of hegemonic stability upon the rest of the world. The suppression of discord in such an arrangement may not always work to the best advantage of the developing countries.

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JAYATI GHOSH

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K. KRISHNAMURTHY and V. PANDIT: Macro Econometric Modelling of the Indian Economy—Studies on Inflation and Growth. Hindustan Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1985, xii, 159p., Rs. 50.

THIS carefully prepared work really belongs to the third generation models prepared recently, *e.g.*, those by Ghosh, Lahiri, Madhur and Roy, Bhattacharya, Sarkar and Rao. While policy-making is concerned with institutional and structural changes, which are very difficult to capture in econometric models, the concern for policy has been largely with "long-run" rather than with short-term problems. Still for several types of issues, these models can provide plausible answers.

For various reasons, the dominant issue has been the structure and sources of growth. While both the models here emphasize the critical role of the agricultural sector, Krishnamurthy explains productivity changes that are used to decide the output level. But Pandit directly explains variations in output levels in terms of factors like cultivated area, rainfall and irrigation. In both, focus is on deficit financing, public sector investment and budget constraints. Also price behaviour is analysed in considerable detail.

The Krishnamurthy study here looks at inflation-inducing forces, with several special features; role of public investment in infrastructure, identification of links between public and private investment, price determination for each of the sectors, incorporation supply, demand, cost and impact of import prices.

The Indian models do not rely exclusively on the Keynesian theory of aggregate output determination. Here, the Krishnamurthy model of 77 equations is estimated for the period 1962-80, by Ordinary Least Squares. Not all the equations in the model are behaviourial or technological. Really the model performs well in historical veracity. Imported inflation has been the main contributor in the post-1974 years. The restraint on monetary expansion has been an important factor in containing inflation. Given the limits to taxation and public sector pricing, the expanding claims for subsidies and bank credits at concessional rates for equity or production lead to various dilemmas. The message of the model is obvious, that increase in public sector investments is necessary for growth, without too much dependence on inflationary finance.

The Pandit model looks more closely at the role of the agricultural sector in determining the level of economic activity and price behaviour, along with study of saving-investment equilibrium. It also looks at the impact of changes in money supply on 'real' variables. Several adjustments observed in the economy over the last three decades are carefully analysed. Crucial in the study is the 'endogenity' of the money supply; linkage between this variable and prices runs in both the directions.

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Some important inferences follow here: 1) price increases may increase revenues less fast than expenditures, creating a gap. 2) If price rise is due to harvest failure, expenditure to be increased due to various relief measures.

Hence evidence of a structural break taking place in the economy during the mid-sixties is not clear. But various monetary effects are transmitted to real variables through variations in the rate of inflation, rate of interest, absolute price levels and relative prices. While the role of agriculture is overwhelming, the public sector also has an important place according to the manner in which public expenditure is financed and allocated.

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GEETA GOURI: Pricing for Welfare: Petroleum Products in India. Amerind Publishing Co. Ltd., New Delhi, 1988, xvi, 92p., Rs. 35.

GEETA Gouri's compact monograph is an extremely readable volume and yet terse enough to pack the basic principles and issues in public sector pricing in an effectively seventy page work. After an Introductory Chapter on public enterprise pricing, the book quickly moves on to the basic microtheoretic issues of public enterprise pricing. The basic thrust of the work is to suggest that petroleum pricing in India (or for that matter other public sector prices) have tried to combine a number of diverse considerations, without having an appropriate theoretical framework to do so. It is not even clear if some of the considerations are mutually contradictory and if a single instrument (pricing) is capable of achieving all of them. The author has used a model due to Baumol and Bradford to derive alternative pricing schemes. The underlying model ensures efficiency in resource allocation and is both simple and operationally manipulable. What it does not ensure is to deliver a pricing scheme corresponding to any arbitrarily given set of social considerations that the planners may have. The author suggests that since a price scheme corresponding to such distributional considerations would be distortionary to the efficient allocation of resources, and there is no way of *a priori* judging the extent of distortion for different distributive norms, it is best to relieve the price system of this additional task. Quantitative controls may be used to attain these distributive ends, and the prices fixed so as to ensure allocative efficiency.

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The book is organised into six chapters. The First Chapter introduces the general perspectives, while the second develops the microtheoretic tools. The Third Chapter presents the structure of demand for various petroleum products, together with some econometric analysis of the sectoral demands for petroleum products. Expectedly the price sensitivity of all sectors turns out to be low—partly because of the nature of the products, lack of available substitutes and rationing. But this also shows the difficulty of using price as a goal of redistribution of consumption of petroleum products, and strengthens the author's suggestion that this may better be left to quantitative controls. Chapter Four gives a glimpse of the evolution of pricing of petroleum products before and after nationalisation through the successive oil price committees, and looks critically at the currently prevailing pricing principles. Chapter Five contains the alternative pricing schemes that the author suggests, based on efficient resource allocation principle. The last chapter is a critical look at the megalomania of the Indian public sector pricing, which hopes to achieve all possible goals through pricing alone. It is here that the author puts forward her basic view that the distributional tasks be better left to non-market instruments, and the market prices be utilised for market-goals of ensuring allocational efficiency.

All in all, the monograph is stimulating, informative, and given the current political scene where the academia and the bureaucracy are both engaged in a debate as to the merit of the market versus that of quantitative controls, a book which suggests utilising both in their appropriate places is also topical.

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AMAL SANYAL

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GENERAL

MUSHIRUL HASAN: Mohamed Ali: Ideology and Politics. Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 1981, x, 177p., Rs. 85.

IN life, as in death, Mohamed Ali provoked no end of controversy. For exactly two decades—from the inception in January 1911 of his journalistic career with the appearance of the *Comrade*, an English language weekly from Calcutta, to his death in London (January 1931) during the Round Table Conference—the Maulana remained a stormy petrel of Indian politics in general and of Muslim politics in particular. He had started with a raging and tearing campaign to help and succour the much-hated, and by then decrepit, Ottoman Turkish Empire in the aftermath of the disastrous Balkan Wars (1912-13), Europe's prelude to its impending dance of death, which almost, though not quite, wiped out the *Sublime Porte*. Mohamed Ali's swan song in London twenty years later was a variant on the same theme, a vigorous plea for pan-Islamism! Characteristically insisting for a burial in the Holy Land of Jerusalem where the shadow of Judaism, in the shape of the birth of Isreal, was yet a far cry.

The Khilafat Movement, demanding the restoration of the Caliphate in the person of the Turkish Sultan—after his Empire, Germany's erst-while ally, had been badly beaten in World War I—however was not the only cause the Maulana embraced with characteristic enthusiasm. He was Gandhi's right hand man in the non-cooperation movement which had been launched in the early 1920s. And as an activist, Mohamed Ali had presided over some annual sessions of the Indian National Congress.

Presently however the Maulana changed his colours and hummed a different tune. He denounced the Mahatma and his handiwork in no uncertain terms. Mohamed Ali's role in the All Parties Conference (1928) which had been constituted to undo the mischief of the all-White Simon Commission was far from helpful to the nationalist cause he had earlier so openly supported. Later, he vehemently opposed the Nehru Report which had envisaged a united Indian polity with joint—*not* communal—electorates and inched closer to the politics of Mohammed Ali Jinnah and his Fourteen Points. At the Round Table Conference, the Maulana's appearance was brief but his contribution constructive.

Mushirul Hasan—who is well read in Mohamed Ali's life and thought—having edited his *Selected Writings* and written on such cognate themes as communal and pan-Islamic trends and Muslims and the Con-

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gress*—succintly sums up the Maulana's career in four brief chapters. "Ascent to Leadership" surveys the earlier *Comrade* and (the Urdu daily from Delhi) *Hamdard* phase, followed by the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation Movements which had got inextricably mixed up. Follows a brief interlude with Gandhi in "Mohamed Ali and the Congress: Devotion and Disillusionment." And the penultimate, "The Nehru Report: Debate and Crusade." There is also a 6-page Introductory Chapter, and, towards the end, a 12-page "Assessment." The appendices runing into 44 odd pages, provide useful documentary evidence but occupy a respectable niche in this slender volume little over one-third of the text.

Two significant facts about the Maulana need to be heavily underlined. One that his was a complicated mental and ideological make up. Thus as has been pointed out, Mohamed Ali was at once "the ideological storm trooper" of the pan-Islamic bogey and at the same time the chief architect of the short-lived Congress-Muslim League honeymoon, its "bhai bhai" phase. This meant, in the very least, fluctuating loyalties and, not unoften, glaring contradictions in the Maulana's politics. There was the additional fact that Mohamed Ali was a compulsive writer, his impressive (in size) journals and verse apart, he was an enthusiastic correspondent and wrote no end of letters—to all and sundry. Added to what the author aptly calls his "flair for the dramatic" and a "wry self-awareness", it was an explosive combination.

In the upshot, some of the causes the Maulana fostered led him, and not him alone, into trouble. Thus his brave effort to make a hero of the Turkish Sultan long after it was patent even to the purblind that he hardly enjoyed a vestige of support among his compatriots, not to speak of the Muslim world beyond Turkey's shores. Not that it made any difference. For Mohamed Ali's single-track mind continued to wage a dogged and unrelenting fight to recreate the Khilafat of the classical theorists! Even when Muslims in most countries were busy establishing national states, scrupulously avoidng any external ties, much less extra-territorial loyalties.

In sum, the Maulana's singular tragedy appeared to be that he set himself seemingly impossible, even unattainable, goals: Muslim unity and pan-Islamism. Without much fore-thought he invited the Amir of Afghanistan (2 April 1921) to liberate India from British imperialism! And lent countenance to the ill-fated, if disastrous, *hijrat* of his co-religionists to the land beyond the Khyber. Before long came Mohamed

*Mushirul Hasan, *Mohamed Ali in Indian Politics: Selected Writings*, Delhi, 1982; *Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India*, Delhi, 1981; *Muslims and the Congress: Select Correspondence of M.A. Ansari, 1912-1935*, Delhi, 1979.

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Ali's unabashed defence (1924-26) of Ibn Saud long after he had forfeited all claims to such a defence, which led him, into all kinds of embarrassments. Khaliquzzaman's assertion that the Maulana was "not a man to accept facts as facts" is putting it a little too mildly. For not unoften—as in the case of the Khilafat Committees in the late 1920s—Mohamed Ali appeared relentlessly, if with quixotic tenacity, charging at non-existent wind-mills.

A close scrutiny of the Maulana's life and thought bears out his detractors' oft-repeated charge that his [Maulana's] ideas were not only 'vague, immature (and) irrelevant' but also betrayed an lack of realistic understanding. His ideology, such as it was, may have been a 'extreme type of Mullaism' with all its inevitable concomitant of prejudice, superstition, orthodoxy, hatred and intolerance. And this largely because to the discussion of every problem the Maulana was wont to bring in God and his Prophet. Towards the end, his great zeal to remain in touch with the masses and guide them made him sink, critics aver, to the level of the cheapest, fanatical and most ill-informed of Muslim mullahs.'

And yet 'mullaism' was not Mohamed Ali's only bane. He lacked financial probity. Francis Robinson's sum up *in his separatism Among Indian Muslim (1974)* is characteristically British in its understatement: "The funds were legion, the accounts few and in financial matters the politicians, the Ali brothers in particular, came to be trusted by no one. They lived well. It is a fair presumption that they lived well on the proceeds of pan-Islamic politics."

The study under review offers a reasonally fair assessment and yet one comes away with a vague feeling that somehow the author refrains from stating the obvious. At places he is ambivalent, appears to skrit controversies while giving the Maulana the benefit of doubt even where the evidence is much too overpowering (*viz.* Mohamed Ali's role in the campaign against the Nehru Report). It is sobering to reflect that his much-flaunted nationalist zeal notwithstanding, Mohamed Ali has been lionised in Pakistan as second only in importance to the *Quaid-i-Azam* in promoting and fostering a separatist Muslim identity. The present work it would also appear was hurriedly composed: "The actual writing," Professor Hasan tells us, "has not occupied me for very long." Perhaps under some unstated compulsion! For with a few i's dotted and t's. crossed the work is essentially a rehash of the author's earlier and deservedly respected *Nationalism and Muslim Politics in India, 1916-1928* (1979). There are few fresh insights: fewer, if any, reappraisals.

Chandigarh. PARSHOTAM MEHRA

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IAN TALBOT: Punjab and the Raj 1849-1947. Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 1988, viii, 258 p., Rs. 190.

MARCUS FRANDA: Punjabis, War and Women—The Short Stories of Gulzar Singh Sandhu. Heritage Publishers, New Delhi, 1983, 271 p., Rs. 75.

IN many ways, Punjab was the sword arm of the British Indian Empire. The strategic location of Punjab led to its emergence as an area of military and economic significance to British colonial rule. Thus, if on the one hand the British developed Punjab into a major centre of recruitment for the Indian Military, on the other they constructed there the most elaborate canal irrigation system in the world. Needless to add, all these developments had a bearing on the political developments in Punjab.

In his book under review, Talbot deals with the evolution of the British rule in Punjab in the period between 1849-1947. It covers the development of Punjab's internal political process marked by closer relationship between the British Colonial Authority and the various "collaborating groups" operating there. Talbot submits that the defeat of the Unionist Party by the Muslim League in the 1946 Punjab Elections paved the way towards the cause of Pakistan as advocated by the Muslim League. This was an important development since Punjab was to constitute the heartland of the future Pakistan state, rightly contends the author.

How does the author treat this subject matter? The author's treatment has been perceptive and on the whole balanced in his analysis.

In handling this subject matter Talbot has organised his study into ten chapters. The First Chapter, for obvious reasons, starts with Punjab and its society and the entry of the British rule. Chapter Two highlights Punjab's emergence as the sword arm of British colonial rule. In Chapter Three the author describes the development of British allies' there. Chapter Four deals with the rise of communal politics and its bearing on British rule. Chapter Five explains why and how an informal relationship between the Unionist Party and British Colonial rule could operate so successully in the period between 1929-1937. In other words, why was the Unionist Party able to weld more political influence than any other political element. In Chapters Six and Seven, the author handles the rise and fall of the Unionist Party. From Chapter Eight onwards, Talbot considers the following: how the British deserted their

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allies; the victory of the League and the end of this system of collaboration that the British had set up.

In winding up his study, the author examines the significance of the breakdown of the British system of collaboration in Punjab and the particular timing of withdrawal from India that the British Government had chosen. All these provide the backdrop of the massive communal violence in the autumn of 1947.

While Talbot's treatment of the role that Britian played in Punjab is quite interesting, one fails to understand why he chose to ignore the impact of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre (1919) on Punjab politics in particular and that of India in general. This is an important watershed in Indian Politics. Any history of Punjab during the period 1849-1947 is incomplete without reference to the Jallianwala Bagh tragedy.

The second publication on Punjab is a collection of four essays about Gulzar Singh Sandhu, a leading Punjabi short story writer. It also contains some of his selected outstanding short stories. The book has been organised in five different sections. Section one contains a biographical sketch of Gulzar Singh Sandhu written by the editor. In the second section, Kulwant Singh Virk introduces Punjab and the Punjabis to the wider readership of Indian literature. The next essay is a survey of the evolution of Punjabi literature and Sandhu's place in it. This has been written by Sant Singh Sekhon. In the following section of the volume, Surjit Singh Dulari gives his assessment of Sandhu's literary output. The fifth or the final section offers a collection of Sandhu's short stories.

Short stories written by Sandhu have been very judiciously selected by the editor in consultation with the author himself. These stories have been variously translated by some of the leading figures in Punjabi literature, such as Khuswant Singh, Balwant Gargi, Prem Grewal and others. In presenting Sandhu's short stories, Franda has arranged them topically—Punjabis, War and Women. In some ways this volume, gives an overview of the cross currents of Punjabi society as reflected in the writings of Sandhu.

Marcus Franda has been a specialist on sub-continental radical politics, demography and economic development. After his initial specialisation in political and economic areas, Franda's area of interest seems to have been widening both vertically as well as horizontally in the sub-continental context. His treatment of radical politics in South Asia, electoral and federal processes in India with reference to West Bengal and development problems in Bangladesh, make him one of the leading South Asianist's in USA. The fact that earlier he was involved in the translation of a number of Bengali novels, plays and short stories, and

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then decided to bring out this edited volume on Punjabi short stories, only underline Franda's attempts to understand the sub-continental societies from a different vantage point. Even otherwise, the volume is helpful to non-Punjabi readers to understand the recent trends in Punjabi Literature.

New Delhi. SHIVAJI GANGULY

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Vallabhbhai Patel: Power and Organisation in Indian Politics

Rani Dhavan Sankardas

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